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This  study  analyses  the  impact  of  institutional  change  upon 
political  behaviour.  Beginning  in  1968  a  series  of  reforms  trans- 
formed  the  American  presidential  nominating  process,  amounting  to 
the  most  substantial  changes  since  the  inception  of  national  con- 
ventions.  This  study  seeks  to  comprehend  the  effects  of  this 
transformation  upon  the  strategies  employed  by  candidates  and  in 
so  doing  assessing  the  influence  upon  the  nominating  process  of 
various  actors  -  party  leaders,  voters,  interest  groups,  campaign 
organisations. 
The  comparative  method  is  adopted  to  elucidate  the  impact  of 
change.  The  content  and  execution  of  strategy  is  compared  across 
continuous  periods,  the  nominations  immediately  before  (1960  -  68) 
and  after  (1972  -  1980)  reform. 
A  party  function,  candidate  selection,  is  set  within  a  theoret- 
ical  discussion  of  party.  Familiar  models  of  party  are  examined  and 
criticised  for  their  inapplicability  to  the  American  case  for  their 
omission  of  an  intra-party  role  for  voters.  An  additional  ideal  type 
model  is  developed  of  a  party  dominated  by.  voters.  -;  the  application 
of  direct  democracy  to  intra-party  affairs.  This  additional  type  is 
integrated  into  the  schemes  analysed  earlier,  increasing  their  rele- 
vance  to  American  practice  and  providing  a  set  of  logical,  possibilities 
against  which  party  reform  can  be  measured. 
Previous  reforms  of  the  presidential  nominating  process  are 
described  and  recurrent  trends  identified.  The  background  to  the 
impetus  for  reform  originating  in  the  discontents  of  the  McCarthy 
campaign-to  mobilise  voters  into  the  party-dominated  selection  process is  described.  The  composition  and  functioning  of  the  Commission 
on  Party  Structure  and  Delegate  Selection  authorised  in  1968  to 
recommend  reform  proposals  is  discussed.  The  implementation  of 
reform,  its  unintended  consequences,  the  work  of  subsequent  reform 
commissions  in  the  Democratic  Party,  change  in  the  Republican  Party 
and  innovations  in  the  regulation  of  campaign  finance  are  detailed. 
The  combined  impact  of  these  reforms  transformed  the  context 
of  nominating  campaigns.  Primaries  became  the  dominant  delegate 
selection  mechanism.  The  non-primary  process  was  opened  to  exten- 
sive  voter  participation.  In  both  processes  the  linkage  between 
the  candidate  preferences  of  participating  voters  and  the  resulting 
delegates  tightened.  The  size  of  campaign  donations  was  limited, 
federal  funds  became  available,  and  ceilings  were  placed  on  total 
expenditures  for  recipients  of  federal  aid. 
Having  depicted  the  altered  context  of  the  nominating  contest 
the  study  analyses  the  content  and  execution  of  strategy  in  the  two 
periods.  The  basis  for  comparison  include  the  choices  of  strategies, 
the  form  of  campaign  organisation  and  their  relations  with  party 
organisations,  the  conditions  of  interest  group  influence,  the  role 
in  strategy  of  the  primary  and  non-primary  processes,  the  content 
of  candidates'  appeals  and  the  means  employed  to  communicate  the 
campaign. 
The  conclusion  re-states  the  principal  strategic  differences 
between  the  two  periods.  The  strategic  consequences  of  reform  are 
linked  to  the  effects  of  previous  reform  efforts,  and  the  model  of 
parties  developed  earlier. 
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CHAPTER  ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning  in  1968  the  structure  of  the  presidential  nominating 
process,  little  changed  since  the  inception  of  presidential  primaries 
early  in  the  twentieth  century,  was  transformed  by  changes  in  the 
mechanisms  of  delegate-selection  and  the  laws  of  campaign  financing. 
The  cumulative  impact  of  these  changes  -  some  of  them  unintended  - 
was  the  most  substantial  alteration  in  the  structure  of  the:  nominating 
process  since  national  conventions  were  introduced  in  the  1830's. 
Changes  in  structure  required  changes  in  strategy  (defined  as 
courses  of  action  adopted  to  maximise  advantage  pursued  to  achieve 
desired  goals).  For  structure  -  the  rules,  laws  and  procedures  which 
regulate  the  conduct  of  the  contest  -  must  condition  strategy  for  the 
latter  to  be  effective.  The  structure  defines  the  eligible  parti- 
cipants,  their  rights  and  available  resources,  identifies  the  elect- 
orate  and  the  mechanisms  utilised  to  decide  the  outcome. 
But  strategy  in  presidential  nominations  has  received  little 
systematic  study,  despite  the  frequency  of  references  to  it  in  dis- 
cussions  of  campaigns  by  candidates,  their  staffs  and  journalists. 
The  existing  literature  takes  three  forms  which  can  be-labelled 
respectively,  narrative  accounts,  strategic  types-and  theoretical 
applications. 
Narrative  accounts  derive  from.  journalists,  -.  candidates'and.  - 
campaign.  staffs.::  They  are:  foundýin:  either"specificcampaign  histories 
or  as  parts-of  larger  works  of"biography  and  autobiography.  Such 
works  provide,  considerable  detailed  -informationon  the  personnel,  -: 
planning  and  conduct,  of  campaigns.  ,:, 
Though  useful  sources  of  infor  4. 
oration,  the  scholarly,  value  :  of,  such  .  works  is  constrained,  by.  their  cý=-,  -  =. -2- 
descriptive  rather  than  analytical  style  and  their  focus  upon  a 
particular  candidate  or  election  year,  with  little  attempt  to  gener- 
alise  beyond  these  . confines. 
Strategic  types  are  generated  in  the  course  of  academic  works 
on  presidential  nominations?  The  breakdown  into  types  permits  some 
rule-of-thumb  means  for  distinguishing  between  candidates  in  their 
approach  to  the  nomination  and  establishing  links  across  different 
campaigns  and  election  years.  The  word  types  is  preferred  to 
typologies  because  a  deficiency  of  these  works  is  a  discussion  of 
strategy  which  fails  to  specify  the  variables  by  which  candidates 
are  differentiated.  Nor  are  the  types  exhaustive  in  their  coverage 
of  all  possible  strategies.  - 
For  example,  Polsby  and  Wildavsky  specified  only  three  types 
writing  in  the  early  1960ts  -  president,  front  runner,  dark  horse  - 
which  are  state  mints  more  of  competitive  standing  than  of  strategy3 
The  category  front  runner  is  characterised  by  aggressive  campaigning 
in  primaries  and  state  conventions.  But  such  a  depiction  conflates 
activities  that  could  be  pursued  independently  of  one  another.  The 
types  are  too  broad  which  necessitate  the  grouping  together  of  can- 
didates  who  in  many  respects  pursued  dissimilar  strategies,  (for 
example,  Roosevelt  in  1932  and  Kefauverýin  1952).  This  imprecision 
entails  categorising  candidates  according;  to  specifications  with 
which  their  campaigns  were  considerably  at  variance.  For  example,  in 
the-1952  Democratic,  contest.  major  contenders  Harriman,  Barkley  and 
Russell,  fall-easily  into  neither  of-.  the  two  possible  types  available 
when  . 
the.  president  is  not  a  contender. 
Gerald,  Pomper￿generates  four-types  -  dominant  leader,.  popular. 
hero,  favourite  son.  and.  organisation  man.  , 
This  analysis-does 
possess  an-ünstated  dimension-.  for,  -distinguishing  between-the  candidates -3- 
-  the  location  of  their  support  -  but  it  does  not  differentiate 
candidates  by  the  degree  of  their  campaign  activity.  In  consequence, 
campaigns  conducted  in  a  markedly  different  manner  are  merged  into 
a  single  type.  The  organisation  man  incorporates  all  candidates, 
except  favourite  sons,  whose  campaigns  were  concentrated  within  the 
party  organisations  irrespective  of  their  activity  level.  Thus  an 
active.  candidate  conducting  an  organisation-based  campaign  such  as 
Landon  in  1936  would  be  categorised  with  an  inactive,  apparent  non- 
candidate  such  as  Stevenson  in  1952. 
Both  these  efforts  at  strategic  typing  also  suffer  from  the 
employment  of  strategies  that  were  anachronisms  as  plausible  routes 
to  the  nomination  by  the  time  they  were  written.  Favourite  sons  and 
dark  horses  were  plausible  nominees  when  availability  was  the  para- 
mount  characteristic  sought  in  nominees.  They  could  be  selected  by 
autonomous  conventions  where  the  conditions  for  bargaining  were  present. 
The.  terms  dark  horse  and  favourite  son  appear  in  nineteenth  century 
descriptions  of  national  conventions  when  these  conditions.  were 
presents  But  by  the  1960's  public  prominence  was  displacing 
availability  as  the  essential  quality  for  nominees,  as  Pomper  argued6 
Where  prominence  was  required,  candidates  possessed  of  localised 
support  or  obscurity  were  implausible  as  nominees. 
James  Ceaser's  threefold  strategic  types  do  possess  a  clear 
dimension  for  differentiating  candidates.  The'inside,,  outside,  and 
mixed  strategieswere-distinguishable  by,  the  different  bases  of  - 
candidate  support.  -:  amongst  the  party,  the  voters  or  the  two  in  com- 
bination  .  :.  _ 
But  Ceaser's.  inside  type,  is,  subject  to,  the.  sameideficiencies,  as,.  ra, 
Pomper's  organisation  man.,,  It.  makes  no  discrimination  between  the 
1evels.  of  candidate  activity  thereby  leading.  to  the  equation-of,  ifor -4- 
example,  Humphrey  in  1968  with  Stevenson  in  1952. 
In  discussing  the  mixed  type  Ceaser  concedes  that  there  is  a 
distinction  within  it  based  upon  differentiated  levels  of  candidate 
activity:.  The  personally  inactive  Roosevelt  in  1932  and  Smith  in 
1928  are  thus  distinguished  from  Dewey  in  1940  and  Taft  in  1952.  But 
this  distinction  is  not  employed  to  generate  a  new  type,  nor  is  it 
used  to  make  a  differentiation  within  the  two  pure  types. 
Theoretical  applications  are  those  works  which  utilise  either 
formal  or  empirically-derived  theories  to  comprehend  strategy. 
Rational  choice,  game  and  coalition  theories  have  been  used  to  this 
end?  These  approaches  provide  a  systematisation  of  the  details  of 
nomination  campaigns  and  attempt  comprehensive  explanations  of  can- 
didate  strategy  and  behaviour. 
The  studies  employing  formal  theory  evidence  the  problems  common 
to  such  approaches.  Constructed  from  a  series  of  rational  standards, 
when  applied  to  explain  strategy  and  behaviour  in  the  'real  world' 
they  impart  a  degree  of  rationality  which  cannot  be  sustained  by  the 
empirical  evidence.  (These  works  do  use  the  theories  as  explanations 
of  'real  world'  conduct.  They  do  not  seek  to  test  such  conduct  against 
the  standards  of  formal  theory). 
'Real  world'  strategies  may  be  based  upon  misperceptions  - 
Johnson's  1960  campaign  assumed  that  members  of  Congress  were  powers  in 
their  state  parties;  McCarthy's  campaign  in  1968  concentrated  on  the 
primary  states  although  they  provided  only  a  minority  of  the  total 
delegates;  Muskie's  1972  candidacy  sought  support  amongst  party 
leaders  in  a  process  requiring  the  mobilisation  of  voters1.0  Secondly, 
rational  strategies  may  be  devised  but  prove  impracticable.  Constraints 
are  imposed  by  campaign  staffs,  loyal  supporters,  contributors  and 
sheer  accidents.  One  of  the  editors  of  the  first  Harvard  University -5- 
Institute  of  Politics  election  post-mortem  recognised  the  intrusion 
of  irrational  features  in  campaigns'  treatment  of  issues  - 
"positions  on  issues  may  reflect  neither  principle  nor 
calculation  but  (may)  be  products  instead  of  problems 
within  the  campaign  organisation  or  accidental  results 
of  the  way  the  organisation  works,  the  prearranged  schedule, 
or  sheer  coincidence.  A  speech  taking  a  particular  line 
on  a  particular  subject  may  seem  necessary  from  the 
manager's  standpoint  in  order  to  appease  some  factions 
in  headquarters  that  do  not  necessarily  have  any  large 
counterpart  in  the  electorate.  The  speech  may  have  a 
certain  character  because  some  ghostwriters  happen  to 
be  on  the  scene  when  others  are  not;  the  pressure  of 
time  permits  their  text  to  be  used  without  clearance 
ý 
at  headquarters;  and  the  candidate  becomes  committed 
to  a  posture  that  he  might  otherwise  not  have  adopted.  ' 
Internal  pressures,  organisational  deficiencies,  coincidences  and 
accidents  are  regular  hazards  of  campaigns.  Attempts  to  explain  them 
as  guided  by  rational  standards  are  inevitably  a  distortion. 
A  second  distortion  in  formal  theoretical  applications  derives 
from  their  employment  of  assumptions  and  propositions  which  are 
contradicted  by  the  available  evidence,  thereby  reducing  their  value 
as  explanations  of  actual  campaigns.  For  example,  John  Aldrich's 
treatment  of  issue  discussion  in  the  1976  Democratic  contest  contains 
the  assertions  that  the  vote-maximising  strategy  of  fdzziness  used 
by  Carter  did  not  prove  damaging  because  only  Republicans  charged 
him  with  ambiguity. 
12 
Yet  Witcover  reports  the  use  of  fuzziness 
against  Carter  by  his  Democratic  opponents  including  Udall's  incor- 
poration  of  the  charge  into  his  advertising  in  the  Michigan  primary 
campaign13  Aldrich  maintains  that  the  substantial  shifts  in 
candidates'  poll  standings  were  attributable  to  the  importance  of 
electability  in  winning  the  nomination  -  as  Carter  emerged  as  the 
most  electable  candidate  so  voters  shifted  towards  him  But  surveys 
of  those  voters  who  participated  in  primaries  indicated  that  electa- 
bility  had  low  priority  for  Democratic  voters  in  197615 -6- 
In  his  chapter-length  application  of  game  theory  to  the  nomin- 
ating  process  Steven  Brams  states  that:  no  candidate  defeated  in 
primaries  is  ever  likely  to  reach  the  national  convention;  issues 
take  precedence  over  alternative  voter  cues,  and  issues  are  of  more 
importance  in  primaries  than  in  general  elections16.  The  evidence 
contradicts  all  three  propositions.  It  is  untrue,  and,  for  a  book 
published  after  1976,  bizarre  to  argue  that  candidates  defeated  in 
primaries  fail  to  reach  the  convention  (no  special  definition  of 
defeat  is  offered).  In  1976  Ford  lost  ten  preference  primaries  and 
Carter  nine  yet  both  were  nominated.  Voting  studies  show  that 
candidate  factors  usually  outweigh  issues  in  deciding  candidate 
preference  in  the  primaries. 
17 
The  incidence  of  issue  voting  in  the 
1976  primaries  attained  the  general  election  level  only  on  the 
Republican  side,  and  this  was  a  year  in  which  issue  voting  fell  in 
the  presidential  election  from  that  obtaining  in  the  preceding 
elections. 
18 
Though  based  on  an  empirical  rather  than  formal  theory,  John 
Kessel's  coalitional  approach  betrays  deficiencies  co=onr.  to  the 
latter  type.  The  author's  discussion  of  Republican  strategies  in 
1964  defines  proto-coalitions  for  each  candidate  based  on  shared 
attitudes  -  of,  ideology,  regional  interest,  perception  of  a  likely 
winner19 
But  no  evidence  is  adduced  to  show  that:,  the  campaign  organisations 
perceived  their  potential  support 
this  approach  in,  other  sources  is 
author  thus  imposes  his,  own  modes 
organisations  in  what  is  intended 
strategies. 
in  these  terms  and  confirmation  of 
available  only  for  Goldwater.  The 
of  thinking  and  logic  on  candidate 
as  an  empirical  discussion  of  their 
Secondly,  though  Kessel  attempts  some  systematic  understanding -7- 
of  candidates'  potential  constituencies,  his  treatment  of  the  means 
to  mobilising  them  has  no  theoretical  basis;  Rather,  the  execution 
of  strategies  is  based  upon  familiar  assumptions  such  as  the  need  for 
primary  victories  for  Rockefeller  because  he  lacked  support  in  the 
party;  Nixon's  necessary  inactivity  and  withholding  from  criticism 
of  other  candidates  to  enable  him  to  capitalise  on  deadlock;  Gold- 
water's  reliance  on  his  conservativism  and  diligence  on  the  party's 
behalf  as  sources  of  support.  Kessel's  discussion  of  the  execution  of 
strategy  is  a  narrative  account. 
Common  to  all  three  categories  of  literature  is  the  discussion 
of  strategy  within  a  single  structural  context  (Ceaser  excepted). 
They  deal  either  with  a  single  election  year  or  a  longer  period  in 
which  the  structure  remained  stable. 
This  study  is  concerned  with  the  responses  in  candidate  strategy 
to  structural  change.  It  focuses  upon  the  nominations  on  either  side 
of  the  reforms  commenced  in  1968,  the  national  conventions  of  ' 
1960  -  1968,1972  -  1980.  Studying  contiguous  periods  facilitates 
an  assessment  of  the  impact  of  structural  change  whilst  as  far  as 
possible  holding  constant  all  other  sources  of  change  which  impinge 
upon  the  nominating  process. 
The  impact  of  structural  reform  is  assessed  in  relation  to  the 
types  of  strategy  adopted,  and'its  execution  is  then  related  to  the 
forms  of'campaign  organisation,  the  role  of  primary  and  non-primary 
delegate'selection"mechanisms,  the"content  of  candidates'  appeals, 
th'e'  role  of'  political!  actors  such`  as  party  leaders,  `  voters,  interest 
groups  and  the  mass  media  in  deciding  the  nomination. -8- 
Candidate  selection  is  one  of  the  principal  functions  of  poli- 
tical  parties.  Chapter  Two  thus  seeks  to  set  American  presidential 
nominations  within  a  general  understanding  of  parties.  Typologies 
of  party  are  examined  for  their  relevance  to  the  American  party. 
Deficiencies,  are  identified  and  a  typology  elaborated  better  equipped 
to  incorporate  the-American  case. 
The  literature  on  pre-reform  nominations,  termed  the  convention 
wisdom,  is  surveyed.  The  attributes  of  nominations  depicted  in  this 
literature  are  then  utilised  to  locate  national  convention  decision- 
making  within  the  typology  fashioned  earlier. 
The  explanatory  value  of  the  conventional  wisdom  for  understanding 
pre-reform  nominations  is  then  assessed.  Cases  which  deviate  from  its 
generalisations  are  identified,  and  reasons  for  these  deficiencies 
specified.  The  characteristics  of  nominating  politics  in  the  i  mediate 
pre-reform  period  are  described  and  the  argument  is  made  that  most 
cases  conform  to  the  propositions  of  the  conventional.  wisdom.  As 
generalisations,  the  conventional  wisdom  retained  its  validity  into 
the  1960's. 
Chapter  Three  covers  the  history  of  reform  of  the  presidential 
nominating  process.  The  major  shifts  in  the  development;  of  the 
nominating  process  from  the  introduction  of  national  conventions  to  1960 
äre,  described.  The  pressures  and  rationales  for-each  change.  are 
specified  and  trends  common  in  the  course  of  reform  are  defined.,  This 
is  followed'by.  ýan'extensive  discussion  of.  the.  post-1968  reforms. 
Explanations  for  the  nature  and-magnitude-of'the  reform  effort  are 
provided.  . 
'The,  principal-changes  insstructure  between  the  pre-  and 
post-reform  periods  are  summarised.  .: 
Chapter  Four  characterises  the  strategies  adopted.  by  candidates 
in  the  two  periods.  'A  systematic  and  exhaustive  typology:  of  strategy -9- 
is  developed  for  the  pre-reform  period.  Major  candidates  are 
categorised  by  strategic  type  and  the  execution  of  their  strategies 
described.  The  effects  of  structural  reform  upon  strategy  are 
demonstrated  by  using  the  pre-reform  classification  scheme  to  type 
post-reform  candidates'  strategies.  This  registers  the  shift  in 
choice  of  strategies,  and  modifications  in  the  way  they  were  executed 
after  reform  are  noted. 
Influential  actors  in  the  two  nominating  systems  are  identified. 
In  the  pre-reform  period  the  locus  of  power  was  the  party  leaders. 
In  the  voter-dominated  system  the  locus  shifted  to  high  turnout 
elements  amongst  the  electorate.  The  role  of  interest  groups  in  the 
nominating  process  is  described  and  the  conditions  for  group  influence 
under  each  system  defined.  The  effects  of  reform  upon  group  influence 
is  demonstrated  by  an  analysis  of  the-'role  of  two  groups  which 
possessed  veto  power  over  pre-reform  nominations,  a  position  which  has 
since  eroded.  Explanations  for  this  decline  are  offered. 
The  fifth  chapter  compares  campaign  organisations  in  the  two 
periods.  The  bases  for  comparison  are-campaign  personnel;  relations 
with  state  and  local  parties,  and  fund  raising  organisation. 
Chapters  Six  and  Seven  define  the  changed  roles  of  the  primary 
and  non-primary  processes  after  reform.  Primaries  evince  contrasts 
between  the  periods  in  the  range  of  candidates  employing  them,  the 
rationale  for  doing  so,  and  the  extent  of  their-use.  The  increased 
impact  of,  the  post-reform  primaries  is  elaborated  and  explanations 
provided  for  the  changes  in  emphasis  assigned  to  the  various  state 
contests  by  the  candidate  organisations. 
Chapter  Seven  registers  the  impact  in  the  shift  from  caucuses 
controlled  by  party  leaders  to  ones  dominated  by  voters.  The  candi- 
dates'  relationship  to  the  party  organisations  ceased  to  be  the  pivot -  10  - 
upon  which  success  in  non-primary  processes  hinged.  Open  caucuses 
facilitated  delegate  recruitment  in  non-primary  states  by  insurgent 
candidates  mobilising  voter  support  where  formerly  they  had'been 
excluded.  The  linkage  between  primary  and  non-primary  processes  in 
the  two  periods  is  defined. 
Campaign  content  in  the  two  periods  is  described  in  Chapter 
Eight.  The  dimensions  for  comparison  are  the  candidates'  presenta- 
tions  of  themselves  in  relation  to  their  parties,  issues  and  ideology, 
their  traits  and  characters.  Changes  in  emphasis  over  the  two 
periods  are  related  to  shifts  in  the  composition  of  the  nominating 
electorate  and  the  participant  bias. 
The  communication  of  the  campaign  is  analysed  in  Chapter  Nine. 
The  pre-  and  post-reform  periods  provide  contrasts  between  personalised 
and  mediated  campaigns.  Reform  inspired  shifts  in  influence  upon  the 
nomination  from  the  prestige  press  to  the  popular  media;  and  an 
increased  dependence  upon  news  reportage  when  spending  limitations 
curbed  the  use  of  media  advertising.  The  increased  dependence  upon 
reportage  encouraged  news-generating  strategies  and  a  responsiveness 
to  the  foci  of  media  attention  to  obtain  coverage. 
The  final  chapter  seeks  to  draw  the  preceding  bases  of  comparison 
together.  The  principal  differences  between  the  two  periods  are 
restated.  The  characteristics  of  reformed  structure  are  located 
within  the  party  models  discussed  earlier',  and  within  the  history  of 
nominating  process  reform. -  11  - 
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CHAPTER  TWO 
MODELS  OF  PARTIES  AND  NOMINATIONS 
This  chapter  seeks  to  provide  a  theoretical  framework  in  which 
to  comprehend  the  pre-reform  presidential  nominating  process.  The 
first  section  relates  familiar  typologies  of  party  to  the  American 
case.  Pre-reform  conventions  were  populated  by  party  organisations 
so  a  knowledge  of  the  structural  and  operational  variants  of  party 
contributes  to  an  understanding  of  the  process  and  outcomes  of  con- 
ventions. 
The  analysis  of  party  types  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  they  are 
,  of  limited  utility  for  comprehending  the  American  variant.  In  no 
typology  is  a  role  assigned  to  voters  in  intra-party  affairs  which  is 
a  distinctive  characteristic  of  American  parties.  A  revision  is 
offered  to  the  theories  of  party  elaborating  an  additional  type  which 
specifies  an  extensive  role  for  voters  in  party  affairs.  American 
parties  are  then  located  on  a  continuum  bounded  by  this  new  construct 
(the  Voter  Dominated  type)  and  the  Cadre/Rational  Efficient  models 
generated  by  Duverger  and  William  E.  Wright  respectively. 
This  modified  model  of  parties  is  utilised  in  the  second  section 
of  the  chapter  to  comprehend  descriptions  of  the  presidential  nomin- 
ating  process  to  1960.  These  descriptions  are  collectively  referred 
to  as  the  conventional  wisdom  or  the  traditional  model.  (The  latter 
term  is  used  loosely  for  the  original  authors  did  not  claim  theoret- 
ical  sophistication  for  their  work).  The  traditional  model  defined 
the  characteristics  of  national  conventions  and  sought  to  explain 
process  and  outcomes  in  relation  to  them.  However,  the  conventional 
wisdom  is  deficient  in  producing  explanations  of  some  convention 
processes  and  outcomes.  Most  nominations  are  comprehensible  within -  15  - 
its  propositions  but  there  are  inexplicable  exceptions.  Suggestions 
are  offered  for  modifications  of  the  conventional  wisdom  in  order 
to  accommodate  this  minority  of  cases. 
The  third  section  considers  the  applicability  of  the  conventional 
wisdom  to  the  nominations  of  the  1960's,  the  immediate  pre-reform 
period.  By  the  1960's  the  political,  international,  social  and 
technological  environment  of  presidential  nominations  had  altered 
so  rapidly  since  the  New  Deal  that  some  writers  argued  that  the 
context  of  nominating  politics  had  been  transformed  so  as  to 
render  the  conventional  wisdom  an  anachronism.  An  examination  of 
the  1960's  nominations,  however,  rejects  this  proposition.  The 
conventional  wisdom  retained  its  explanatory  power  for  most  cases. 
Exceptions  to  the  traditional  model  are  identified  but  they  betray 
characteristics  similar  to  earlier  conventions  that,  as  discussed  in 
the  preceding  section,  were  not  comprehensible  within  the  conventional 
wisdom.  If  the  suggested  modifications  to  the  model  are  incorporated 
the  validity  of  the  conventional  wisdom  persisted  for  all  cases  into 
the  1960's. 
Models  of  Party 
Two  theories  of  parties  are  particularly  pertinent  to  an  attempt 
to  comprehend  the  American  example,  and  in  particular  the  making  of 
nominations  by  such  parties.  Maurice  Duverger's  structural  differ- 
entiation  of  party  according  to  styles  of  membership  is  well-known, 
its  concepts  widely  used  and  an  explicit  attempt  is  made  to  subsume 
American  nominating  practices  within  the  typology1  William  E.  Wright's 
differentiation  of  parties  according  to  their  primary  goals  is  a 
synthesis  of  several  writers  (including  Duverger)  in  their  attempts  to 
define  types  of  party.  Wright  provides  a  detailed  exposition  of -  16  - 
variables,  and  delineates  internal  party  processes  including  the 
selection  of  candidates?  Furthermore,  several  of,  the  original 
authors  from  which  Wright's  typology  is  derived  are  specialists  in 
the  American  party  system3  They  are,  therefore,  familiar  with  its 
peculiarities  and  their  general  typologies  should  thus  be  sensitive 
to  the  American  case. 
For  Duverger,  Cadre  and  Mass  parties  are  distinguishable  by 
the  criterion  of  membership.  In  the  former  there  is  no  formal  member- 
ship.  The  party's  activities,  including  candidate  selection,  are 
controlled  by  a  small  number  of  notables.  Selection  criteria  are 
loose,  permitting  the  choice  of  independents  without  previous  attach- 
ment  to  the  party5  Mass  parties,  in  contrast,  provide  for  formal 
membership.  Candidate  selection  is  a  process  open  to  member  parti- 
cipation6  Selection  criteria  are  strict,  often  restricting  eligi- 
bility  to  party  members  with  a  specified  period  of  service? 
Wright's  distinction  of  alternative  ideal  type  parties  rests  on 
their  principal  objectives.  Parties  of  the  Rational  Efficient  type 
emphasise  electoral  victory.  Structurally  they  resemble  Duverger's 
Cadre  type  with  no  formal  membership  and  control  by  leaders8  The 
pattern  of  leadership  recruitment  is  pluralistic,  being  either  self- 
recruited  or  introduced  from  outside  the  party  organisation9  Little 
attention  is  devoted  to  policy  making  or  intra-party  democracy.  The 
latter  is  considered  dysfunctional  to  the  primary  objective  of  winning 
10 
elections.  The  incentives  to  involvement  in  the  party  are  material, 
and  the  prime  beneficiaries  of  party  activity  are  its  elected  officials1  .1 
The  Party  Democracy  model  emphasises  ideological  goals.  Elections 
are  won  to  implement  policies  rather  than  policies  being  devised  to 
maximise  votes.  Structurally  the  party  is  equivalent  to  Duverger's 
Mass  type 
12 
There  is  a  formal  membership  and  strong  grass-roots -  17  - 
organisation.  There  is  an  institutionalised  career  pattern  of  leaders 
recruited  from  within  the  party13  Great  attention  is  devoted  to 
policy  making  and  intra-party  democracy  is  encouraged 
14 
The  incen- 
tives  to  involvement  in  party  affairs  are  purposive,  and  the  party's 
members  are  the  prime  beneficiaries  of  its  activities15 
Both  Duverger  and  Wright's  formulations  can  be  faulted  for 
their  inapplicability  to  American  parties.  In  both  theories  the 
significant  political  actors  are  confined  to  party  leaders  and  members. 
Yet  a  distinctive  feature  of  American  parties  is  the  role  exercised- 
by  voters  in  party  affairs.  Voters  select  candidates  for  many  public 
offices,  and  local  party  officials  are  also  often  selected  in  primaries 
and  caucuses  open  to  voters  who  are  not  formally  party  members. 
Through  caucuses  and  primaries  voters  have  been  assigned  prominence 
in  American  intra-party  decision-making  which  is  without  parallel  in 
other  western  party  systems 
16 
Whilst  the  day-to-day  running  of  American  parties  may  be  conducted 
by  a  handful  of  leaders,  some  decisions  are  removed  from  their  control. 
Responsibility  is  thus  divided  between  notables  (the  locus  of  authority 
in  Cadre  and  Rational  Efficient  parties),  and  the  voters  who  are  not 
assigned  a  direct  role  in  any  of  the  four  party  types  generated  by 
Duverger  and  Wright.  In  American  parties,  if  no  others,  the  alter- 
native  source  of  authority  to  leaders  are  the  voters. 
Duverger  seeks  an  accommodation  of  some  American  parties  to  his 
typology  by  regarding  voters  in  'closed'  primary  states  as  equivalent 
to  party  members.  Registration  of  voters  by  party  identification  is 
equated  with  formal  membership.  The  resultant  parties  are  regarded 
as  variants  of  the  Mass  type,  awkwardly  labelled  "Semi-Mass" 
17 
This  adjustment  to  incorporate  American  parties  can  be  questioned 
on  three  counts.  First,  it  makes  no  reference  to  parties  in  states 18  - 
holding  'open'  primaries.  Though  Duverger  describes  the  open  primary 
method  he  is  silent  on  its  relationship  to  his  typology  of  parties. 
In  'open'  primary  states  there  is  no  party  registration  therefore 
there  is  no  approximation  to  party  membership.  Parties  in  these 
states  thus  cannot  be  of  the  Mass  or  Semi-Mass  type.  Yet  nor  do 
they  conform  to  the  Cadre  type  because  a  major  decision,  candidate 
selection,  is  outside  the  leadership's  control.  This  inconsistency 
between  the  Cadre  type  and  voter  participation  limits  the  applica- 
bility  of  the  Cadre  model  to  American  parties  to  which  many  subsequent 
writers  have  argued  that  they  conform 
18 
Secondly,  members  and  'closed'  primary  registrants  are  not  equal 
in  their  commitments  to  the  party.  Membership  entails  obligations. 
Members  may  be  required  to  commit  themselves  to  a  body  of  principles 
as  a  pre-condition  of  entry.  Membership  dues  have  to  be  paid.  Services 
such  as  canvassing,  selling  party  literature  etc.  may  be  expected  to 
be  performed.  In  contrast,  the  registrant  has  no  obligations.  In 
some  states  the  statement  of  a  party  preference  is  the  only  qualification 
necessary  for  party  registration.  Even  the  most  demanding  state  laws 
require  only  an  affirmation  of  past  support  for  the  party  or  contemp- 
orary  sympathy  with  its  candidates  and  principles  (of  which  there  is 
no  official  definition).  Distinctions  in  commitment  are  also  likely 
to  appear  in  differing  degrees  of  loyalty  to  the  party  in  elections 
19 
Thirdly,  Duverger's  equation  of  party  registrants  with  members  is 
defective  in  that  it  exaggerates  the  degree  to  which  'closed'  primaries 
restrict  participation  to  party  adherents.  As  already  noted,  the 
qualifications  for  registration  are  meagre.  The  laxity  of  eligibility 
for  registration  has  inspired  Austin  Ramey  to  question  the  distinction 
in  practice  between  the  'open'  and  'closed'  primary.  He  concludes 
that  "so-called  'closed'  primaries  are  just  a  hair  more  closed  than -  19  - 
so-called  'open'  primaries" 
?0 
Studies  of  primary  participants  show 
that  the  closed  primary  type  does  curb  voting  by  non-partisans  in 
comparison  with  the  open  primary  but  their  numbers  are  still  substan- 
tial  in  the  former? 
' 
Thus  in  all  American  states  the  electorate 
-  including  but  not  restricted  to  loyal  partisans  -  performs  a  role 
in  party  affairs  which  is  not  incorporated  within  Duverger's  typology. 
Neither  can  American  voters  be  equated  with  members  in  Wright's 
Party  Democracy  model  because  the  role  performed  by  the  former  is 
inconsistent  with  the  latter.  In  American  parties  voters  control 
the  selection  of  personnel.  Members  perform  this  function  in  the 
Party  Democracy  type  but  their  principal  task  is  policy  formulation. 
In  the  American  party  case  policy  has  not  achieved  major  importance, 
and  its  formulation  has  resided  with  a  few  notables.  Thus  this  major 
membership  role  in  the  Party  Democracy  type  finds  no  equivalent  voter 
responsibility  in  American  party  practice. 
The  equation  of  party  voters  with  party  members  introduces  a 
further  discrepancy  for  Wright's  formulation.  Wright  regards  American 
parties  as  tending  towards  the  Rational  Efficient  pole.  Yet  if  voters 
are  equated  with  members  American  parties  obtain  a  characteristic 
(membership)  which  is  contrary  to  the  Rational  Efficient  model  to 
which  Wright  assigns  them.  Either  American  parties  have  members  or, 
alternatively,  they  are  of  the  Rational  Efficient  type.  By  definition 
they  cannot  possess  the  former  characteristic  whilst  corresponding 
to  the  latter  type. 
The  principal  deficiency  in  both  Duverger  and  Wright's  formulations 
which  limits  their  relevance  to  the  American  party  system  is  in  a  too 
restrictive  conception  of  political  actors  and  party  goals.  A  theory 
of  parties  incorporating  the  American  case  must  distinguish  voters  as 
political  actors  in  intra-party  affairs.  It  must  also  accommodate 
voter-determined  objectives  as  the  party's  goals  distinguishable  from -  20  - 
the  ends  pursued  by  parties  controlled  by  election-conscious  notables 
and  policy-oriented  members  respectively. 
To  establish  a  theoretical  framework  which  comprehends  the 
American  case  a  third  ideal  type  of  party  is  proposed  for  incorporation 
into  the  scheme  provided  by  Wright  (the  more  detailed  of  the  two 
typologies  considered).  This  additional  construct,  the  Voter 
Dominated  model,  seeks  to  define  a  party  in  which  the  influence  of 
voters  is  at  a  maximum.  It  is  the  application  of  direct  democracy  to 
intra-party  affairs. 
In  the  Voter  Dominated  party  all  major  decisions  are  determined 
by  voters,  the  discretionary  authority  of  party  and  public  officials 
is  minimal.  Candidates  for  public  and  party  office  are  determined 
through  mechanisms  accessible  to  voters  such  as  primaries  or  open 
caucuses.  Public  officials  are  mandated  to  advance  the  party  programme 
and  subject  to  a  constant  stream  of  instructions  as  new  issues  arise. 
They  are  removable  from  office  by  party  recall  procedures.  Party 
officialdom  is  minimal.  They  too  are  subject  to  instructions  from 
voters  and  recallable.  The  party  programme  is  derived  from  the  voters 
through  initiatives  and  referenda.  The  primary  goal  of  the  party  is 
procedural  rather  than  substantive  -  the  preservation  of  the  mechanisms 
within  the  party  that  facilitate  voter  control.  The  incentives  to 
involvement  in  the  party's  affairs  are  provided  by  the  'ethic'  of 
participation.  The  voters  (precisely,  the  voters  who  participate) 
are  the  principal  beneficiaries  of  the  party's  activities. 21  - 
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The  utility  of  the  Voter  Dominated  model  derives  from  its 
contribution  to  a  tri-polar  scheme  (in  association  with  Wright's 
typology)  to  which  American  parties  can  be  related  with  greater 
precision  than  is  facilitated  by  Wright's  continuum.  The  Voter 
Dominated  pole  also  provides  a  standard  against  which  the  intentions 
and  effects  of  participatory  reform  can  be  measured.  And  participation 
by  voters  in  intra-party  affairs  is  a  recurring  theme  of  American  party 
reform  efforts.  The  most  successful  reform  efforts  facilitated  voter 
control  of  personnel.  The  adoption  of  conventions  in  the  Jacksonian 
era  permitted  indirect  voter  control  of  candidate  selection.  The 
succession  of  conventions  by  primaries  converted  indirect  to  direct 
voter  control.  In  many  states  direct  voter  control  was  also  achieved 
over  the  selection  of  the  lowest  tier  of  party  officials,  the  precinct 
committeemen. 
Attempts  to  provide  voters  with  leverage  over  programmes  have 
been  less  prominent  in  American  party  reform  history  than  those  devoted 
to  personnel.  Though  less  successful  than  personnel  control  there 
have  been  numerous  efforts,  particularly  in  the  Progressive  era,  to 
transplant  control  over  platforms  from  the  party  organisation  to  the 
voters.  Indirect  control  over  policy  may  flow  from  platforms  composed 
by  convention  delegates  or  nominees  whose  election  is  attributable 
to  their  policy  stances.  Particularly  in  the  Progressive  period  there 
were  efforts  to  make  the  voter-platform  link  a  direct  one.  Robert 
La  Follette,  Sr.,  called  for  platforms  formulated  by  committees 
elected  "by  and  for  the  voters  of  each  party"22  He  argued  that 
elected  representatives  possessed  no  right  of  independent  judgement 
on  those  matters  covered  by  the  party  platform  that  had  been  submitted 
to  the  electorate.  The  two  La  Follette  proposals  combined  would 
result  in  elected  representatives  mandated  to  policies  composed  by -  23  - 
elected  committees.  The  so-called  Richards  primary  law  in  South 
Dakota  required  each  grouping  proposing  candidates  from  the  pre- 
primary  convention  to  list  a  paramount  issue,  "a  well-defined  and 
definite  proposal  for  publicy  policy",  the  winning  candidate  and 
issue  being  placed  automatically  on  the  general  election  balloJ3 
The  Richards  law  also  permitted  a  party  recall  of  elected  office- 
holders  for,  inter  alia,  failure  to  adhere  to  party  principles 
(although  a  successful  recall  only  initiated  an  investigation  by  the 
party  organisation,  displacement  was  not  automatic).  A  bill  intro- 
duced  into  the  Texas  legislature  in  1919  forbade  parties  from 
including  in  their  state  election  platforms  demands  for  specific 
legislation  without  prior  ratification  of  a  majority  vote  in  a  primary. 
In  addition,  convention  delegates  could  be  mandated  on  issues 
?4 
This  brief  survey  reveals  the  variety  of  proposals  designed  to 
expand  voter  control  of  American  parties.  This  is  not  to  say  that 
reformers  operated  with  the  Voter  Dominated  model  as  a  guiding 
ideal  but  it  provides  a  codification  of  the  logical  possibilities 
for  reform  against  which  actual  proposals  can  be  measured  and  'real 
world'  parties  evaluated. 
American  parties  have  been  characterised  by  organisational  diver- 
sity  including  urban  machines,  amateur  clubs,  citizen  parties  and 
virtual  disorganisation  in  many  areas.  But  most  of  the  legal  party 
organisational  forms  (this  excludes  the  extra-legal  amateur  clubs) 
can  be  located  along  a  continuum  between  Rational  Efficient  and  Voter 
Dominated  types.  Precinct  committeemen  and  candidates  for  public 
office  are  now  usually  chosen  by  voters  whilst  other  activities  are 
conducted  by  the  party  cadre.  The  absence  of  formal  membership  and 
the  relative  inattention  to  policy  remove  the  Mass  Democracy  model 
from  relevance  to  American  parties. -  24  - 
Presidential  Nominations  and  Party  Models 
The  preceding  section  located  American  party  practice  along  a 
Rational  Efficient  -  Voter  Dominated  continuum.  In  this  section  an 
attempt  is  made  to  locate  a  single  component  of  that  practice,  the 
making  of  pre-reform  presidential  nominations,  within  that  framework. 
The  picture  of  pre-reform  nominations  derives  from  a  summary  of  the 
'conventional  wisdom'  drawn  from  standard  texts  on  parties  and  nomin- 
ations  published  by  196025. 
Difficulties  in  characterising  convention  behaviour  might  have 
been  encountered  in  their  constituent  nature:  they  consisted  of 
state  and  local  parties  diverse  in  goals,  structure  and  operating 
style.  However,  this  complexity  is  not  prominent  in  the  conventional 
wisdom.  For  the  limited  purpose  of  making  presidential  nominations, 
political  scientists  appear  to  have  ignored  the  diversity  of  American 
state  and  local  parties  or  considered  their  variety  irrelevant  in 
understanding  their  behaviour  in  national  conventions. 
Into  the  1960's  the  conventional  wisdom  on  presidential  nomin- 
ations,  like  that  on  American  parties  in  general,  was  consistent 
with  the  Rational  Efficient  party  model.  Decisions  were  controlled 
by  a  small  number  of  leaders,  the  primary  objective  of  the  convention 
was  to  secure  a  winning  ticket,  the  leaders'  incentives  were 
predominantly  material. 
However,  as  with  American  parties  in  general,  there  were  elements 
of  the  Voter  Dominated  model  in  the  presidential  nominating  process. 
The  convention-caucus  method  of  selecting  delegates  was  adopted  in 
many  states  from  the  inception  of  national  conventions  and  often  the 
first  tier  of  this  pyramidal  process  was  open  to  voters.  The  intro- 
duction  of  presidential  primaries  early  in  the  twentieth  century 
tightened  the  linkage  between  voters  and  national  convention  dele- -  25  - 
gates  in  some  states  by  removing  the  intermediary  tiers  of  the 
caucus  process  which  were  immune  from  voter  participation.  Thus  by 
the  early  twentieth  century  millions  of  voters  participated  in  the 
various  processes  of  selecting  national  convention  delegates. 
In  comparison  with  other  American  party  nominations  those  for 
the  presidency  created  only  a  muted  role  for  voters.  The  twentieth 
century  diffusion  of  the  primary  was  not  as  far-reaching  for  presi- 
dential  nominations  as  for  lower  level  offices.  Presidential  prim- 
aries  were  grafted  on  to  national  conventions,  they  did  not  replace 
them.  In  consequence,  presidential  primaries  are  not  direct  in  that 
unlike  state  and  local  primaries  they  do  not  formally  determine  the 
nominee.  Furthermore,  several  constraints  operated  to  restrict  the 
potential  of  these  'indirect'  primaries  to  influence  national  con- 
vention  decisions.  Many  states  did  not  adopt  presidential  primaries, 
not  all  of  those  that  were  statutorily  permissible  were  utilised  and 
their  number  diminished  after  the  waning  of  the  Progressive  surge. 
In  those  states  where  primaries  were  used  the  delegates  emanating  from 
them  often  retained  their  independence  on  the  nominating  decision. 
Either  explicit  mandates  from  voters  were  absent  or  advisory. 
Alternatively,  the  party  organisations  adapted  to  the  intrusion  of 
voters  by  adopting  holding  operations  such  as  favourite  son  candi- 
dacies  or  organisation  slates  which  deferred  decisions  on  the  major 
contenders  until  the  convention. 
The  non-primary  states  (the  majority)  were  even  more  unamenable 
to  direct  voter  influence  than  the  primaries.  The  vast  majority  of 
voters  never  utilised  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  caucuses. 
In  addition,  voter  participation  was  confined  to  the  lowest  tier  of 
the  selection  sequence.  There  was  no  provision  for  mandating  first- 
tier  delegates,  their  candidate  preferences  were  rarely  explicit  and -  26  - 
their  accountability  to  the  electorate  was  elusive. 
Surveying  the  presidential  nominating  process  in  the  1950's 
Ranney  and  Kendall  rightly  concluded  ; 
"Party  voters,  it  would  seem,  have  less  formal  direct 
influence  upon  the  choice  of  presidential  candidates  than 
that  of  candidates  for  most  other  offices  in  the  United 
states.  "  26 
This  distinctive  immunity  of  nominations  at  presidential  level  from 
direct  voter  influence  renders  them  more  than  any  other  American  party 
nomination  intelligible  within  the  Rational  Efficient  model.  The 
'fit'  is  an  imperfect  one  for  the  model  precludes  voters  from  any 
direct  influence  on  or  participation  in  party  affairs.  However, 
because  the  degree  and  effect  of  direct  voter  involvement  was  modest 
the  independence  of  the  cadre  was  largely  preserved,  a  condition  of 
Rational  Efficient  decision-making. 
The  principal  themes  of  the  conventional  wisdom  on  presidential 
nominations  were  leadership  control,  the  primary  goal  of  electoral 
victory  and  material  incentives.  Interwoven  with  these  features  were 
lesser  themes  of  pragmatic  decision-making  and  career  pluralism  in 
the  recruitment  of  candidates. 
Leadership  Control 
Though  national  conventions  consisted  of  large  numbers  of  dele- 
gates  the  distribution  of  power  between  them  was  unequal.  Control 
within  conventions  was  oligarchic.  Blocs  of  delegates  were  controlled 
by  leaders.  Writing  in  1960,  Nelson  Polsby  noted,  "A  relatively  few 
party  leaders  control  the  decisions  of  a  large  proportion  of  dele- 
gates  to  conventions.  '128  Edward  Flynn,  a  former  national  party 
chairman,  estimated  that  considerably  less  than  a  hundred  men  dic- 
tated  what  occurred  at  national  conventions28  Provided  leaders -  27  - 
and  bosses  controlled  votes  it  was  not  essential  that  they  even  be 
members  of  the  convention  to  exercise  a  decisive  influence  over  its 
deliberations.  If  they  controlled  votes,  they  possessed  power. 
Leadership  control  derived  from  the  nature  of  the  state  parties 
represented  in  the  convention.  In  most  states  the  party  organis- 
ations  controlled  the  delegate  selection  process.  Within  the 
organisations  power  was  distributed  hierarchically  ("centralization 
within  decentralization").  Public  office  holders,  particularly  chief 
executives,  and  organisation  leaders  formed  the  apex  of  the  party 
exercising  control  through  patronage,  favours  and  personal  popular- 
ity.  Party  organisation  control  of  delegate  selection  allied  with  a 
pyramidal  distribution  of  influence  within  the  parties  meant  that 
"such  hierarchical  controls  as  exist  on  the  state  and  local  levels 
...  assert  themselves  in  the  national  convention" 
29  (In  fact,  the 
hierarchical  controls  were  probably  exaggerated  in  conventions: 
factionalised  state  party  conflicts  could  result  in  one  group 
triumphing  in  delegate  selection,  and  also  the  incentives  to  bloc 
voting  encouraged  centralised  leadership). 
The  Primary  Goal  of  Electoral  Victory 
The  priority  of  general  election  victory  in  deciding  between 
rival  contenders  for  the  nomination  is  encapsulated  in  Bryce's  dictum 
that,  "What  the  party  wants  is  not  a  good  president  but  a  good 
candidate  "3°  Seventy  years  after  Bryce  wrote,  Polsby  identified 
the  same  goal  being  pursued  by  party  leaders,  "The  most  important 
consideration  for  a  politician  in  choosing  a  presidential  nominee 
is  the  expectation  that  he  will  win  election". 
31 
An  assumed  precondition 
of  electoral  victory  was  party  unity  secured  through  the  selection 
of  candidates  popular  with  or  at  least  acceptable  to  every  major 
faction. -  28  - 
In  the  absence  of  precise  measures  of  electability  potential 
candidates  were  assessed  in  terms  of  their  'availability'.  In  its 
idiomatic  use  the  word  bore  no  relation  to  the  candidates'  willing- 
ness  to  run  but  provided  a  codification  of"the  qualities  the  parties 
believe  makes  a  politically  appealing  and  acceptable  -  and  thus 
winning  -  candidate.  "32  The  criteria  of  availability  required  post- 
Civil  War  candidates  to  be  to  white,  male,  Anglo-Saxon,  non-southern 
Protestants.  Beyond  these  baseline  requirements  candidates  from 
electorally  pivotal  states  -  ones  both  marginal  and  with  a  large  bloc 
of  Electoral  College  votes  -  were  preferred.  A  candidate  who  could 
deliver  a  substantial  base  of  home  state  votes  had  a  high  potential 
for  winning  the  election.  Thus  populous  swing  states  such  as  New 
York  and  Ohio  were  persistent  suppliers  of  presidential  nominees. 
33 
The  priority  of  victory  resulted  in  an  absence  of  an  institution- 
alised  career  structure  because  none  could  guarantee  electoral  popu- 
larity.  In  order  to  win  elections  candidates  could  be  recruited 
from  outside  partisan  politics.  War  heroes,  administrators,  judges 
and  lawyers  were  recruited  to  enable  the  party  to  secure  its  objec- 
tive.  Lack  of  political  experience  was  not  a  disqualification 
provided  the  candidate  "had  developed  that  intangible  quality  known 
as  'availability'.  °34 
The  Material  Incentive 
Electoral  victory  was  a  means  to  an  end.  Only  a  winning  candidate 
could  satisfy  the  parties'  needs  for  access  to'federal  patronage  and 
favours,  and  local  election  successes  (providing  their  own  access  to 
rewards)  generated  by  presidential  candidates  with  vote-pulling  power, 
the  coat-tail  effect.  Patronage  provided  largesse  for  the  leaders 
themselves  and  distributable  rewards  for  the  party  faithful  vital  to -  29  - 
the  maintenance  of  the  organisation. 
Federal  patronage  acted  as  an  adhes, 
party  system.  Access  to  the  benefits  of 
victory  which  in  turn  was  dependent  upon 
patronage  stimulated  heterogeneous  state 
together. 
Though  party  leaders  co-operated  to 
ive  force  in  a  decentralised 
office  were  dependent  upon 
unity.  Thus  the  desire  for 
and  local  parties  to  stay 
produce  convention  majorities 
they  also  competed  to  establish  claims  on  the  nominee.  Through 
devices  such  as  providing  early  support,  making  nominating  speeches 
or  switching  support  at  a  crucial  juncture,  the  leaders  sought  to 
establish  credit  with  the  candidates.  If  elected,  an  appreciative  can- 
didate  could  be  expected  to  reciprocate  with  rewards  thereby  enhancing 
the  power  of  favoured  leaders  in  their  bailiwicks.  Leaders'  failures 
to  deliver  support  could  be  punished  by  exclusion  from  rewards,  thus 
explaining  the  leaders'  desire  to  join  a  developing  bandwagon. 
The  conventional  wisdom  summarised  above  was  designed  to  explain 
the  process  and  outcomes  of  national  conventions.  All  processes  and 
outcomes  should  be  comprehensible  within  the  propositions  presented. 
Either  all  activity  must  be  consistent  with  the  propositions  or 
exceptions  must  be  explicable  by  reference  to  the  operation  of 
specified-variables.  However,  the  conventional  wisdom  failed  to  meet 
these  tests.  In  general  conventions  were  characterised  by  leadership 
control,  the  primary  goal  of  electoral  victory  and  material  incentives, 
but  there  were  exceptions  in  which  these  attributes  were  either  absent 
or  constrained  in  their  impact.  The  conventional  wisdom  offered  no 
explanation  for  the  absence  of  these  attributes  or  the  configuration  of 
nominating  contests  where  they  were  lacking.  Either  they  were  over- 
looked  or  forced,  Procrustes-like,  into  conformity  with  the  conven- 
tional  propositions. -  30  - 
Several  characteristics  inconsistent  with  the  conventional  wisdom 
which  examplified  the  Rational  Efficient  mode  of  organisation  and 
decision-making  are  evident  in  some  nominations.  These  exceptional 
characteristics  can  be  summarised  as: 
1.  The  inability  of  leaders  to  control  a  nomination. 
2.  The  triumph  of  purism  over  pragmatism. 
3.  The  conflict  between  demands  for  organisational  maintenance  and 
for  electoral  victory. 
The  hierarchical  model  of  state  and  local  party  power  stressed 
the  downward  flow  of  authority  in  the  convention.  But  the  leaders 
were  too  deficient  in  sanctions  to  enforce  compliance  on  rebellious 
delegates.  Their  position  as  leaders  was  dependent  upon  support  from 
below.  In  the  absence  of  sanctions  this  support  was  sustained  by 
responsiveness  to  pressure.  Where  the  pressure  was  intense  the 
leaders  had  either  to  acquiesce  to  it  or  imperil  their  own  positions. 
In  these  circumstances  leadership  was  preserved  by  following. 
Writing  in  the  1920's,  Merriam  and  Gosnell  noted  the  reluctant 
acquiescence  of  leaders  in  several  conventions.  Nominees  such  as  Bryan 
and  Wilson  had  been  "opposed  by  powerful  forces,  usually  dominating 
and  actually  holding  the  necessary  votes  to  defeat  them  but  not 
daring  to  act  against  the  evident  demand'of  the  party.  . 
35 
This  indi- 
cates  that  voter  preferences  could  be  a  significant  impact  on  con- 
vention  decisions.  The  autonomy  of  the  party  leaders  was  a  regular 
but  not  invariable  feature  of  the  nominating  process.  On  occasions 
leaders  were  compelled  to  acquiesce  to  the  pressure  of  their  followers. 
Secondly,  the  conventional  wisdom  emphasised  the  rational  cal- 
culation  of  electoral  chances  as  the  yardstick  for  discriminating 
between  the  contending  candidates.  Intense  candidate  and  issue 
commitments  were  not  given  prominence  in  accounting  for  convention -  31  - 
decisions.  Polsby  and  Wildavsky  noted  in  the  early  1970's  the 
36 
purism  of  many  delegates  but  regarded  it  as  a  recent  development 
However,  purist  attributes  are  identifiable  amongst  the  supporters 
of  Bryan,  and  Theodore  Roosevelt  in  1912,  for  example 
37 
Bryan's 
nominations  betray  little  concern  for  electoral  calculation.  His 
1896  nomination  resulted  from  intense  pressure  from  below  upon  the 
leaders.  His  two  subsequent  nominations  occurred  despite  the 
decisive  defeat  of  1896  which  produced  a  realignment  ending  the 
post-Civil  War  generation  of  closely  contested  presidential  elections. 
Despite  his  evident  'unavailability'  Bryan  was  renominated  in  1900 
and  1908  with  little  opposition. 
Thirdly,  the  necessity  of  electoral  victory  flowed  from  the 
demand  for  access  to  patronage  and  favours.  In  the  traditional  formul- 
ations  these  demands  for  victory  and  maintenance  are  treated  as 
consistent  with  one  another.  However,  party  organisations  consist 
of  individuals  who  seek  to  preserve  their  own  positions  and  access 
to  benefits.  Yet  for  a  president  there  is  no  necessity  to  preserve 
the  existing  party  structure.  The  party  cadre  is  replaceable.  A 
president  might  distribute  rewards  outside  the  party  or  seek  to 
re-order  the  distribution  of  influence  within  it.  Where  such  a 
possibility  arises  for  the  existing  party  leadership  the  goals  of 
electoral  victory  and  preserving  the  party's  structure  of  influence 
are  antagonistic.  Victory  could  lead  to  the  displacement  of  existing 
leaders  or  a  diminution  of  their  influence.  A  defeat  could  preserve 
their  positions. 
James  Q.  Wilson  in  his  characterisation  of  the  professional 
(i.  e.  non-purist)  orientation  to  politics  identified  many  of  the 
characteristics  of  party  leaders  evident  in  traditional  descriptions 
of  presidential  nominations38  Wilson  too  placed  great  emphasis  on -  32  - 
the  pursuit  of  victory  and  patronage.  But  he  also  correctly  recog- 
nised  that  the  quest  for  these  objectives  was  conditional  : 
"The  professional,  for  whom  politics  primarily  has  extrin- 
sic  rewards,  is  preoccupied  with  maintaining  his  position 
in  party  and  elective  offices.  Winning  is  essential, 
although  sometimes  electoral  victory  must  be  subordinated 
to  maintaining  the  party  organisation"  39 
The  antagonism  between  victory  and  maintenance  is  evident  in 
several  nominating  contests,  egregiously  so  in  the  Republican  Party 
in  1912 
C 
President  Taft,  an  unpopular  incumbent,  was  challenged 
by  Theodore  Roosevelt,  the  most  popular  political  figure  of  his 
generation.  Taft  commanded  the  loyalty  of  the  party  organisations 
whilst  Roosevelt's  greater  popularity  amongst  the  electorate  was 
repeatedly  demonstrated  in  primaries.  The  nomination,  under  organis- 
ation  control,  was  won  by  Taft  to  the  exclusion  of  the  independent- 
minded  and  non-incumbent  Roosevelt. 
To  survive  in  confrontation  with  the  exceptional  cases  cited 
above,  the  conventional  wisdom  should  be  regarded  as  a  series  of 
generalisations.  Leaders  usually  controlled  conventions.  But  where 
they  were  subject  to  the  pressure  of  intense  opinion  from  below  they 
could  acquiesceto  it  or  risk  their  own  positions.  In  most  instances 
opinion  from  below  was  uncommitted,  divided  or  lacked  intensity  if 
it  was  united. 
The  pursuit  of  the  electoral  goal  was  conditional.  Intense 
issue  or  candidate  commitments  could  overwhelm  the  customary  rational 
search  for  a  vote-maximising  candidate.  Alternatively,  the  electoral 
goal  could  be  displaced  by  the  need  to  preserve  the  internal  distri- 
bution  of  influence  within  the  party.  Whilst  political  neophytes 
were  sometimes  essential  to  win  elections,  the  self-interest  of  the 
leaders  demanded  resistance  to  mavericks  threatening  a  restructuring 
of  the  party. -  33  - 
The  1960's:  The  Continuing  Relevance 
of  the  Conventional  Wisdom 
By  the  1960's  the  social,  technological,  international  and  poli- 
tical  environment  of  national  conventions  had  changed  markedly 
since  World  War  Two.  Improved  communications  facilitated  active 
nationwide  campaigns.  Opinion  polls  providing  objective  tests  of 
electability  proliferated  and  grew  in  sophistication.  The  spread  of 
television  ownership  increased  the  potential  for  generating  national 
recognition  and  popularity.  America's  assumption  of  a  world  role 
and  the  onset  of  the  Cold  War  heightened  the  importance  of  familiarity 
with  foreign  affairs  for  potential  presidents.  The  enhanced  import- 
ance  of  foreign  affairs  allied  with  the  growth  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment  following  from  the  New  Deal  and  a  managed  economy  increased  the 
centralisation  of  government.  Media  attention  followed  a  similar 
trend  focusing  increasingly  upon  Washington. 
Changes  affecting  the  party  organisations  were  also  in  train. 
Patronage  appointments  declined  in  number  and  in  value  amidst  post-war 
prosperity  and  the  extension  of  the  welfare  state.  Parties  attenuated 
as  organisations  when  patronage  diminished  as  an  incentive  to  involve- 
ment,  and  the  mass  media  became  an  alternative  means  of  mobilising 
voters. 
These  developments  were  impinging  on  the  presidential  nominating 
process  and  modifying  their  nature  and  outcomes.  The  nationalisation' 
of  American  society  through  improved  communications,  the  Washington 
focus  of  the  mass  media  and  an  enhanced  concern  with  national  and 
foreign  affairs  promoted  vice-presidents  and  U.  S.  senators  as  presi- 
dential  contenders.  Developments  in  transport  facilitated  active 
pre-convention  campaigns.  The  decline  of  localism  and  the  growth 
of  objective  tests  of  electability  diminished  the  importance  of -  34  - 
satisfying  the  traditional  standards  of  availability  as  a  pre- 
condition  for  receiving  the  nomination. 
Though  these  developments  affected  the  nominating  process  they 
did  not  erode  the  explanatory  value  of  the  conventional  wisdom  as  a 
series  of  generalisations.  The  process  continued,  in  general,  to 
be  characterised  by  leadership  control,  the  priority  of  electoral 
victory  and  material  incentives.  These  characteristics  followed 
from  continued  party  organisation  dominance  of  the  nominating  process. 
In  inter-party  competition  the  party  organisations  declined  as 
mobilisers  of  votes  and  objects  of  loyalty.  But  in  the  intra-party 
presidential  nominating  contests  the  organisations  remained  largely 
insulated  from  challenge.  No  major  structural  changes  to  the  nomin- 
ating  process  occurred  before  1968  to  diminish  organisation  control. 
The  caucus-convention  mode  of  delegate  selection  continued  to  predom- 
inate.  In  1968  as  few  states  possessed  presidential  primary  laws 
as  at  any  time  in  the  previous  sixty  yearsýl  Furthermore,  the  vast 
majority  of  primary  state  delegates  were  not  committed  to  major 
candidates  when  selected)i2 
The  insulation  of  the  nominating  process  from  extra-party  challenge 
facilitated  the  persistence  of  leadership  control,  the  priority  of 
electability  and  material  incentives.  Leadership  control  persisted, 
in  part,  because  patronage  continued  to  be  available  particularly  at 
state  and  local  level.  Whilst  the  diminution  of  patronage  may  have 
reduced  the  number  of  party  workers  it  could  still  sustain  the  recep- 
tivity  to  leadership  of  those  who  remained.  Within  national  conventions 
patronage  continued  as  an  important  instrument  of  control  because  its 
survival  on  a  substantial  scale  was  concentrated  in  large  state  dele- 
gations  such  as  Pennsylvania  and  Illinois  which  could  play  a  pivotal 
role  in  deciding  nominations13 -  35  - 
Leadership  control  also  persisted  because  it  was  always  based 
on  more  than  patronage  alone.  First,  the  personal  popularity  of 
leaders  was  a  source  of  deference.  Whilst  no  claim  can  be  made  for 
the  enhanced  popularity  of  leaders  in  the  1960's  the  calibre  of 
state  governors,  it  has  been  argued,  improved  in  this  period 
ý4 
If, 
this  is  the  case  then  governors  might  have  been  recipients  of 
enhanced  respect  within  their  parties  particularly  amongst  the  non- 
patronage  seekers.  Secondly,  unity  around  the  leadership  was  a  means 
to  maximising  a  state's  influence  over  the  nomination.  Cohesion 
around  a  leader  to  decide  the  nominee  could  stimulate  state  pride 
in  addition  to  enhancing  access  to  thankful  presidents. 
The  decline  of  federal  job  patronage  diminished  only  one  form 
of  material  incentive  to  party  leaders.  Others  persisted  or  increased. 
As  the  financial  role  of  the  federal  government  expanded  in  inter- 
governmental  relations  under  the  New  Frontier  and  Great  Society  so 
the  potential  benefits  of  access  to  federal  grants  grew.  Between  the 
1950's  and  1960's  federal  grants  increased  from  one-fifth  to  one-third 
of  general  state  revenues  as  state  services  expanded  without  a 
corresponding  growth  in  fiscal  capacity45  By  the  1960's  state  depen- 
dence  on  federal  funding  was  at  an  unprecedentedly  high  level.  As 
dependence  grew  so  access  to  influence  in  Washington  increased  as  a 
factor  conditioning  the  quality  and  costs  to  local  taxpayers  of  state 
services.  Concomitantly,  access  in  Washington  expanded  as  a  factor 
in  the  electoral  fortunes  of  state  office  holders. 
The  continuing  belief  in  presidential  coat-tails  acted  as  a 
further  incentive  to  party  leaders  to  involve  themselves  in  deciding 
nominations.  Though  increased  split-ticket  voting  was  emblematic  of 
the  declining  party  loyalty  of  the  electorate  in  the  1960's  the 
straight  ticket  continued  to  be  the  normt6  Some  shift  in  state -  36  - 
election  dates  disaggregated  gubernatorial  from  presidential  elections 
but  as  late  as  1968  half  of  all  the  former  coincided  with  the  latter!? 
The  decline  of  the  Democratic  Solid  South  stimulated  a  concern 
with  coat-tail  effects  in  a  formerly  one-party  region.  Republican 
inroads  in  presidential  elections  in  the  South  created  the  potential 
for  further  incursions  at  sub-presidential  level.  In  consequence, 
for  both  parties  in  the  South  by  the  1960's  the  coat-tail  effect  became 
a  potentially  decisive  factor  in  state  elections  for  the  first  time 
in  the  twentieth  century. 
The  persistence  of  patronage  at  state  and  local  level  (as  already 
noted)  continued  to  provide  incentives  for  party  leaders  to  seek  to 
influence  presidential  nominations  in  the  quest  for  a  coat-tail  effect. 
Federal  patronage  appointments  dwindled  in  number  but  this  did  not 
preclude  them  from  continuing  to  act  as  an  incentive  to  involvement  in 
party  affairs.  As  a  representative  of  the  New  Jersey  Republican 
state  committee  observed  following  Nixon's  1968  victory:  "We  are  most 
pleased  when  we  receive  federal  appointments  which  in  many  instances 
help  build  the  morale  of  the  organisation  and  give  the  workers  a  goal 
upon  which  they  may  set  their  sights  " 
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Continued  party  organisation  control  of  the  nomination  (and  the 
persistence  of  incentives  to  exert  that  control)  preserved  the  char- 
acteristic  features  of  the  nominating  process  as  portrayed  in  the 
conventional  wisdom.  Both  popular  and  academic  discussions  of  the 
process,  in  addition  to  the  behaviour  of  participants,  subscribed  to 
the  continuation  of  leadership  control,  the  primary  goal  of  electoral 
victory  and  the  dominance  of  material  incentives. 
The  persistence  of  leadership  control  was  described  by  V.  0.  Key 
in  the  last  edition  of  his  standard  work  on  American  parties.  Con- 
vention  pageants  and  demonstrations  provided  an  outlet  for  delegates, -  37  - 
Key  wrote,  "while  their  leaders  are  negotiating  behind  the  scenes.  " 
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In  1968  political  scientist  and  New  York  reform  Democrat  Edward 
Costikyan  observed  that  leaders  rather  the  delegates  control  each 
state's  bloc  of  convention  votes: 
"The  first  thing  presidential  candidates  should  realise 
is  that  delegates  are  not  free  agents  subject  to  persuasion. 
A  delegate  is  the  property  of  his  leader.  "50 
In  the  same  year  Time  magazine's  preview  of  the  conventions  recognised 
that  delegate  status  was  conferred  rather  than  won.  It  was  bestowed 
by  leaders  as  a  reward  for  loyal  party  service  which  included  the 
susceptibility  to  leadership  direction: 
"Whatever  the  mechanics  (of  selection),  unless  the  delegate 
is  an  insurgent,  it  is  highly  likely  that  he  goes  to  the 
convention  as  a  payoff  for  his  loyal  activism  -  and  that 
hardly  presages  independence.  "51 
Theodore  White  compared  a  governor  endorsing  John  Kennedy  who  expressed 
the  belief  that  he  spoke  for  a  majority  of  his  delegation  to  "Mr. 
Kruschev's  belief  that  he  speaks  for  a  majority  of  the  Supreme  Soviet"52 
The  persistence  of  the  party  leaders'  electoral  orientation  was 
also  recognised  by  Key.  The  platform  and  the  nomination,  he  argued, 
"represent  an  attempt  to  unite  the  party  and  present  to  the  country 
a  ticket  that  will  win  the  election.  "53  Surveying  the  last  pre-reform 
presidential  nominations  Scammon  and  Wattenberg  concluded  that 
national  conventions  had  psephological  characteristics  -  they  made 
election-oriented  decisions5 
Candidates'  strategies  recognised  the  leaders'  primary  objective 
of  electoral  victory.  Kennedy  in  1960,  according  to  Sorensen,  "had  to 
prove  to  them  (the  leaders)  that  he  could  win.  . 
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Even  so  unconven- 
tional  a  presidential  aspirant  as  Eugene  McCarthy  perceived  that  his 
prospects  of  the  winning  the  nomination  were  premised  on  his  electoral 
potential.  He  would  be  nominated,  he  averred,  when  the  delegates 
decided  "that  they  have  to  have  me  to  win.  "56 -  38  - 
Electoral  victory  provided  the  leaders  with  access  to  material 
benefits  to  sustain  the  party  organisation.  Into  the  1960's  leaders 
continued  to  seek  preferential  treatment  and  candidates  continued  to 
promise  it.  In  Kennedy's  1960  campaign,  for  example,  "Few  promises 
of  future  patronage  were  asked  and  none  were  given,  although  it  was 
made  clear  that,  if  Kennedy  were  elected,  he  would  be  looking  for 
talented  people  whom  he  knew,  trusted  and  could  work  with., 
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Following 
Nixon's  election  to  the  presidency  twenty-two  appointmentz  were  made 
from  amongst  friends  and  associates  of  Senator  Strom  Thurmond  of 
South  Carolina,  the  pivot  of  Nixon's  support  amongst  southern  Repub- 
lican  delegations58  In  contrast,  in  retaliation  for  the  failure  of 
Ohio's  governor  to  deliver  his  delegation  to  Nixon  the  state  was 
overlooked  in  the  appointment  of  major  administration  officials 
!q 
Leadership  control,  the  primary  goal  of  electoral  victory  and 
the  incentive  of  material  benefits  therefore  retained  their  utility 
in  explaining  the  presidential  nominating  process  in  the  1960's. 
However,  as  in  earlier  years  there  were  exceptions  for  which  these 
generalisations  were  inapplicable. 
The  nominations  of  John  Kennedy,  Johnson,  and  Nixon  (in  both 
1960  and  1968)  correspond  closely  to  the  traditional  model.  In  each 
case  the  eventual  nominee  appeared  to  be  the  most  electable  of  their 
parties'  major  candidates  on  the  evidence  of  primaries,  and  polls  of 
party  identifiers  and  the  electorate  in  general.  Most  or  all  of  the 
major  party  leaders  supported  the  nominees  or  found  them  acceptable. 
Where  there  were  contests,  as  in  the  Democratic  Party  in  1960  and 
the  Republicans  in  1968,  access  to  material  benefits  was  employed  by 
candidates  as  an  inducement  and  leaders  sought  it  to  sustain  their 
parties.  The  absence  of  contests  in  the  Republican  Party  in  1960  and 
the  Democratic  Party  in  1964  derives,  in  part,  from  the  debts  incurred -  39  - 
in  the  past  amongst  party  leaders  by,  respectively,  the  Vice  President 
and  the  President. 
However,  the  1964  Republican  and  1968  Democratic  contests  exhibit 
discrepancies  with  the  traditional  model.  The  former  contest  evi- 
dences  a  disruption  of  leadership  control,  and  the  displacement  of 
the  priority  of  victory  and  material  incentives  by  purism.  In  1968 
the  electoral  goal  was  displaced  by  the  leaders'  priority  of  preserving 
the  existing  distribution  of  power  in  the  party  against  insurgents. 
The  deficiencies  of  the  traditional  model  in  comprehending 
several  nominations  before  1960  were  again  evident  on  these  two 
subsequent  occasions.  In  1964,  as  in  1896,  the  convention  was  extri- 
cated  from  leadership  control.  In  part,  this  resulted  from  the 
contraction  of  the  party's  leadership  group  owing  to  the  paucity  of 
state  governorships  under  party  control  that  year6o  More  importantly, 
the  Draft  Goldwater  campaign  from  1961  onwards  had  inserted  committe.  d 
conservatives  into  determinative  positions  in  the  delegate  selection 
process.  Committeed  conservatives  either  moved  into  the  vacuum 
resulting  from  the  absence  of  leaders  or  were  unamenable  to  leader- 
ship  direction  where  it  was  asserted.  The  hierarchical  convention 
model  was  inapplicable  in  1964.  Republican  leaders  were  overwhelm- 
ingly  opposed  to  Goldwater's  nomination  but  were  powerless  to  resist  it. 
Two  further  attributes  of  the  traditional  model  were  lacking  in 
1964:  conventions  possessed  of  decision-making  autonomy,  and  thus  the 
convention  as  the  determinative  stage  in  the  nominating  process.  As 
noted  above,  the  1964  nomination  was  bounded  by  the  activities  of  the 
Draft  Goldwater  movement  prior  to  the  election  year.  Restructuring 
the  influence  within  the  delegate  selection  process  in  the  preceding 
three  years  guaranteed  its  outcome  in  1964  -  large  numbers  of  committed 
Goldwater  delegates.  The  convention  registered  these  commitments -4o- 
rather  than  exercising  discretion  over  alternatives. 
For  many  1964  Republican  delegates,  commitments  to  Goldwater  was 
not  conditional  upon  his  potential  to  win  the  election.  He  was  valued 
for  his  personal  rather  than  instrumental  qualities.  Thus  evidence  of 
his  unelectability  in  primaries  and  polls  could  not  deflect  the  dele- 
gates  from  their  allegiance  to  him. 
The  1968  Democratic  nomination  was  comparable  to  the  1912  Repub- 
lican  contest  in  that  on  both  normally  mutually  consistent  occasions 
the  objectives  of  the  leaders  -  electoral  victory  and  party  maintenance 
-  were  in  conflict.  The  1968  contest  was  distinguished  by  attempts  to 
inject  large  numbers  of  voters  into  the  delegate  selection  process, 
both  primary  and  caucus.  The  consequence  was  both  a  division  over 
candidates  (Humphrey  and  McCarthy)  and  an  additional  antagonism  between 
the  party's  regular  activists,  and  the  insurgents. 
The  evidence  of  electability  was  ambiguous.  Humphrey  entered  no 
primaries.  McCarthy  won  several  but  was  also  defeated  in  others  by 
Robert  Kennedy.  Humphrey  was  the  preferred  candidate  in  polls  of 
Democratic  identifiers;  McCarthy  was  the  stronger  amongst  Republicans 
and  independents.  Trial  heat  polls  of  strength  against  prospective 
Republican  opponents  produced  oscillating  results  through  the  year. 
But  by  the  time  of  the  Democratic  convention  both  candidates  trailed 
Nixon,  McCarthy's  deficit  was  only  5  per  cent  to  Humphrey's  sixteen. 
Humphrey's  nomination  is  explicable  not  by  the  electability 
criterion  but  by  his  location  on  the  side  of  the  regulars  in  their 
conflict  against  the  insurgents.  (Scammon  and  Wattenberg  preserve 
their  argument  for  psephological  conventions  by  the  disingenuous  device 
of  employing  the  evidence  of  polls  at  the  time  of  the  Republican 
convention  to  distinguish  the  strongest  Democratic  contender.  By  the 
time  of  the  Democratic  nomination  -  the  point  nearer  to  the -ßt1  - 
election  and  to  the  time  when  the  candidate  was  selected  -  McCarthy 
was  the  stronger  contender  by  eleven  percentage  points.  Moreover, 
this  is  above  the  authors'  10  per  cent  'Line  of  Clear  Blue  Water' 
threshold  required  for  poll  evidence  to  be  regarded  as  uncontradict- 
able  and  a  basis  for  action, 
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The  insurgents  threatened  the  regulars' 
control  of  the  party  organisations.  To  the  extent  that  McCarthy 
supporters  and  insurgents  coincided,  a  victory  for  the  former  would 
promote  the  status  of  the  latter  within  the  party.  A  McCarthy 
electoral  victory  threatened  a  restructuring  of  the  party.  Such  a 
transformation  would  be  to  the  detriment  of  the  incumbents.  Elec- 
toral  victory  for  the  party  potentially  could  result  in  an  intra-party 
defeat  for  the  regulars.  Winning  confronted  preserving  influence 
within  the  party  as  mutually  exclusive  alternatives  in  1968: 
"McCarthy's  ascendancy  in  the  polls  did  not,  however,  impair 
the  resolve  of  most  delegates  to  reject  him.  In  a  curious 
way  it  may  have  increased  their  determination.  For  they 
were  operating  under  a  compunction  as  powerful  as  the  instinct 
for  a  winner:  the  instinct  for  their  own  survival.  In  this 
instance,  it  might  be  better  served  by  going  with  a  loser. 
Thus  the  real  explanation  of  Chicago  is  psychological  rather 
than  political.  " 
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In  1968,  as  in  1964,  the  priority  of  winning  was  displaced.  Unlike 
1964,  its  displacement  followed  not  from  purism  but  from  profession- 
alism  -  preservation  of  the  party  and  position  within  it. 
On  two  occasions  in  the  1960's,  as  in  the  past,  the  explanatory 
power  of  the  conventional  wisdom  was  deficient  because  its  central 
features  were  not  constants.  But  in  four  of  the  six  conventions  of 
the  1960's  the  usual  major  forces  operated  powerfully  to  render  them 
explicable  by  the  conventional  wisdom. 
However,  during  the  1960's  some  authors  challenged  the  validity 
of  the  traditional  models,  arguing  that  they  were  anachronistic. 
William  Carleton  maintained  that  convention  autonomy  was  at  an  end6. -  42  - 
Nominations  were  plebiscitary  in  character  as  conventions  ratified 
the  results  of  polls  and  primaries  in  choosing  the  voters'  national 
favourites.  James  Davis  advanced  similar  arguments  in  his  thesis 
that,  for  the  out-party,  presidential  primaries  were  the  pivotal 
stage  in  the  nominating  process65 
Such  arguments  exaggerated  the  impact  of  changed  circumstances 
on  the  nominating  process.  Election-oriented  party  leaders'  attention 
to  the  public  popularity  of  the  various  candidates  was  not  a  new 
development.  From  the  1930's  onwards  most  nominees  were  also  the 
preferred  candidates  of  their  party's  rank-and-file  voters  as 
measured  in  Gallup  polls66  But  the  process  was  still  not  plebis- 
citary  because  the  evidence  of  polls  and  primaries  could  be  disregarded 
in  determining  nominations.  In  1952  Kefauver's  strength  in  primaries 
and  polls  was  insufficient  to  prevent  the  nomination  of  the  nationally 
unknown  Adlai  Stevenson.  In  1964  Goldwater's  performance  in  primaries, 
and  polls  (of  Republican  voters  and  the  electorate  in  general)  indicated 
that  of  the  major  Republican  contenders  his  electoral  prospects  were 
amongst  the  weakest.  His  performance  in  primaries  was  so  meagre  that 
far  from  guaranteeing  his  nomination  they  instead  demonstrated  his 
implausibility  as  a  vote-getting  candidate  for  the  election.  As' 
Converse  and  his  associates  commented, 
"...  there  is  room  to  wonder  whether  any  presidential  aspirant 
has  ever  contested  so  many  primaries  with  as  disastrous  a 
showing,  and  still  captured  the  nomination  of  his  party's 
convention.  " 
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The  autonomy  of  the  1964  Republican  convention  was  circumscribed  by 
the  activities  of  the  Draft  Goldwater  movement  in  the  preceding  three 
years,  not  by  the  weight  of  public  opinion. 
The  1968  Democratic  contest  also  evidenced  the  survival  of 
autonomous  conventions.  Several  objective  indicators  suggested  that -u3- 
McCarthy  would  be  the  stronger  candidate.  Yet  the  party's  leaders 
were  able  to  exercise  their  discretion  in  deciding  the  nomination 
to  select  Humphrey  indicating  their  freedom  from  plebiscitary  con- 
straints. 
By  the  1960's  candidates  were  devoting  unprecedented  amounts  of 
time  and  money  to  demonstrate  their  public  appeal  but  determinative 
influence  over  the  nomination  remained  within  the  party.  In  deter- 
mining  nominations  public  appeal  was  an  influence  on  party  leaders' 
decisions  but  not  the  only  or  necessarily  the  paramount  influence. 
In  the  last  pre-reform  Democratic  contest  Humphrey's  nomination  was 
attributable  to  what  Theodore  White  described  as  "the  old  structured 
vote"  -  delegates  delivered  by  governors,  mayors  and  organised 
labour68  Humphreys  victory,  according  to  Richard  Rubin,  marked 
"both  the  high  point  and  the  end  of  clear  labor/organisation  dominance 
within  the  Democratic 
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party.  "  On  the  Republican  side  that  year 
Nixon's  strength  White  located  in  "a  solid  buttress  of  committed 
votes  in  primaries  and  ...  months  of  painstaking  work  on  state  party 
leaders  around  the  country.  " 
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As  late  as  1968  therefore,  the  conventional  wisdom  (with  modi- 
fications  that  were  necessary  before  the  1960's)  continued  to  compre- 
hend  the  presidential  nominating  process.  The  death-knell  of  its 
validity  was  not  the  transformation  of  the  environment  in  which  the 
process  took  place  in  the  post-war  period.  Rather,  the  conventional 
wisdom  lost  its  utility  only  after  1968  when  reform  transformed  the 
process  itself.  It  is  to  the  circumstances  and  effects  of  reform 
that  the  analysis  now  turns. -  44  - 
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CHAPTER  THREE 
THE  COURSE  OF  REFORM 
The  years  after  1968  saw  a  transformation  in  the  means  by  which 
the  parties  nominated  their  presidential  candidates.  The  change  was 
propelled  initially  from  within'the  parties,  particularly  the  Demo- 
crats,  but  acquired  impetus  subsequently  from  state  legislatures, 
Congress  and  the  courts.  The  consequence  of  this  transformation  was 
that  the  conventional  wisdom  defined  in  the  previous  chapter  lost 
its  explanatory  value  in  accounting  for  the  behaviour  of  actors  in 
the  nominating  process  and  the  power  relations  between  them.  The 
effects  (not  always  intended)  were  to  alter  the  rules  under  which  the 
process  was  conducted{ 
'the 
structure  and  locus  of  power  within  it. 
As  the  structure  of  the  nomination  altered  so  candidates  developed 
new  strategic  and  tactical  responses  to  it. 
This  chapter  seeks  to  describe  and  account  for  the  restructuring 
of  the  nominating  process  after  1968.  These  changes  in  the  institut- 
ional  context  in  which  nominating  campaigns  took  place  must  be  appre- 
ciated  to  comprehend  the  rationale  for  different  strategies.  before 
and  after  reform  presented  in  subsequent  chapters.  The  changes  are 
of  interest  for  additional  reasons.  Change  of  this  magnitude  is 
unusual.  Change  effected  largely  through  party  commissions  and 
committees  is  even  more  uncommon.  Furthermore,  the  changes  wrought 
by  the  parties  exemplifies  a  degree  of  independence  for  self-definition 
often  overlooked  in  depictions  of  parties  as  products  of  particular 
social,  economic,  constitutional  and  geographic  circumstances. 
The  early  sections  of  the  chapter  seek  to  locate  the  post-1968 
reforms  within  a  historical  context.  First,  previous  reforms  of  the 
presidential  nominating  process  are  described.  In  so  doing  the  con- -  51  - 
cerns  and  objectives  of  earlier  party  reformers  whose  interests 
included  the  presidential  nominating  process  are  identified.  This 
survey  establishes  two  trends  recurrent  in  the  course  of  nominating 
process  reform  -  towards  participation  and  nationalisation  -  evident 
again  after  1968.  Secondly,  the  events  of  1968  which  propelled 
reform  of  the  nominating  process  onto  the  Democratic  Party's  agenda 
are  detailed.  The  influences  that  conditioned  the  work  of  the  sub- 
sequent  reform  commission  (the  Commission  on  Party  Structure  and 
Delegate  Selection,  more  commonly  known  after  its  successive  chair- 
men  as  McGovern-Fraser)  are  identified.  The  proposals  for  reform 
are  then  analysed  and  related  to  previous  reform  exercises. 
Later  sections  of  the  chapter  deal  with  the  subsequent  develop- 
ment  of  reform  beginning  with  the  implementation  of  McGovern-Fraser 
and  its  effects  (both  intended  and  unintended).  The  work  of  the 
successors  to  McGovern-Fraser  within  the  Democratic  Party  and  the 
process  of  implementation  are  described.  Democratic  reform  activity 
is  then  contrasted  with  the  more  cautious  approach  of  the  Republican 
Party.  The  content  of  Republican  reform  is  analysed  and  reasons 
advanced  for  the  party's  restraint  relative  to  the  Democrats.  Reforms 
in  campaign  finance  regulations  are  then  detailed.  By  altering  the 
rules  relating  to  the  raising  and  spending  of  the  strategic  resource 
of  money,  campaign  finance  reforms  added  to  the  structural  changes 
originating  from  within  the  parties  to  transform  the  structural  frame- 
work  in  which  nominating  politics  was  conducted. 
Trends  in  Reform  of  the  Nominating  Process 
Two  goals  recur  in  the  successive  drives  to  reform  the  presidential 
nominating  process.  The  participatory  goal  is  the  oldest  and  the -  52  - 
most  persistent.  Existing  practices  have  been  criticised  for  being 
exclusionary,  dominated  by  unrepresentative  and  even  corrupt  minorities.., 
The  second  goal,  of  more  recent  origin,  is  the  demand  for  nationalis- 
ation.  This  entails  criticism  of  diversity,  irregularity,  unethical 
or  detrimental  (to  the  party's  unity  or  electoral  strength)  practices 
or  the  tolerance  of  regional  veto  groups.  The  recommended  cure  is 
a  set  of  regulations  to  which  all  state  parties  must  conform  and 
the  removal  of  regional  vetoes. 
Participatory  criticisms  were  applied  to  the  congressional  caucus, 
the  principal  nominating  device  of  the  early  party  system,  from  its 
inception.  The  caucus  was  regarded  as  a  denial  of  popular  sovereignty 
enfranchising  only  members  of  Congress  to  the  exclusion  of  the  mass 
electorate  and  on  occasions  over-riding  the  apparent  popular  choice. 
An  image  of  secrecy  and  dealing  also  contributed  to  the  anti-democratic 
image  of  the  caucus.  According  to  Richard  McCormick,  before  its  demise 
the  caucus  "had  long  been  an  object  of  popular  suspicion  in  many 
states,  and  the  operations  of  the  Republican  congressional  caucus  in 
1816  [which  overlooked  Crawford]  as  well  as  in  1824  [when  Jackson  was 
overlooked]  had  further  weakened  respect  for  the  device.  ". 
I 
Conventions,  in  contrast  to  the  congressional  caucus,  carried  the 
legitimacy  of  popular  sovereignty.  Delegates  to  them  would  be  selected 
by  mass  participation,  they  would  be  conducted  in  the  open  and  respons- 
ive'to  public  sentiment.  As  democratisation  proceeded  through  the 
adoption  of  direct  election  of  governors,  other  state  officials  and 
presidential  electors  so  the  pressure  for  a  method  of  similar  legitimacy 
extended  to  presidential  selection?  Contemplating  an  appropriate 
nominating  device  for  1828,  the  great  architect  of  early  party  organ- 
isation,  Martin  Van  Buren,  observed  that  a  convention  would  be  "more 
in  unison  with  the  spirit  of  the  times., 
3 -  53  - 
f 
Whilst  the  inceptions  of  major  party  national  conventions  in  1831' 
was  associated  with  the  strategic  advantages  sought  by  groups  competing 
for  the  nomination,  its  long-term  legitimacy  derived  from  its  amena- 
bility  to  popular  control.  It  thereby  satisfied  the  "great  political 
touchstone  of  Jacksonian  democracy  -  popular  sovereignty.  "4 
The  second  phase  of  participatory  reform  of  the  presidential 
nominating  process  occurred  during  the  Progressive  era  early  in  the 
twentieth  century.  For  progressives,  presidential  primaries  were  the 
means  to  circumscribe  the  influence  of  party  organisations  and  business 
interests  (the  latter  often  working  through  the  former)  over  the 
nomination.  For  progressives  such  as  La  Follette  the  process  of  dele- 
gate  selection  through  caucuses  and  nominations  by  delegate  conventions 
operated  to  frustrate  the  popular  will.  Their  abolition  and  the 
substitution  of  primaries  were  designed  to  restore  democratic  control. 
The  caucus  and  the  convention,  La  Follette  wrote,  were  "prostituted 
to  the  service  of  corrupt  organisation.  They  answer  no  further  pur- 
pose  than  to  give  respectable  form  to  political  robbery.  Abolish  the 
caucus  and  the  convention.  Go  back  to  the  first  principles  of  demo- 
cracy,  go  back  to  the  people.  "5 
At  the  state  level  the  progressive  reform  drive  entailed  the 
adoption  of  presidential  primaries  facilitating  expressions  of  prefer- 
ence  between  contending  candidates  or  the  election  of  delegates  to 
the  national  convention,  or  both.  At  national  level  progressives 
sought  to  substitute  a  national  primary  for  the  convention,  a  measure 
embraced  by  the  Progressive  Party  platform  in  1912  and  by  President 
Wilson  in  his  first  message  to  Congress. 
The  short-term  stimulus  to  the  adoption  of  presidential  primaries 
was  the  Taft-Roosevelt  contest  of  1912.  For  Roosevelt  to  defeat  the 
incumbent  president,  Taft's  support  amongst  the  party  organisations -  54  - 
had  to  be  circumvented  and  Roosevelt's  public  appeal  exploited.  Thus 
Roosevelt's  supporters  worked  through  state  legislatures  to  enact 
presidential  primary  laws.  Roosevelt's  eventual  defeat  amidst 
charges  of  a  stealhperpetrated  by  the  Old  Guard  of  the  party  gave  t 
added  impetus  to/drive  for  presidential  primaries  after  1912.  By 
1916  they  were  required  or  permitted  in  twenty-six  states? 
The  third  phase  of  participatory  reform  is  represented  by  the 
anti-racial  discrimination  provisions  written  by  the  Democratic  Party 
in  the  1960's.  By  seeking  the  removal  of  barriers  to  participation 
by  the  application  of  national  party  rules  the  anti-discrimination 
provisions  combine  both  participatory  and  nationalisation  themes. 
The  issue  of  racial  discrimination  emerged  at  the  1964  national 
convention  where  the  regular  Mississippi  party,  using  procedures  in 
conformity  with  party  rules  and  state  law,  had  selected  an  all-white 
delegation.  The  credentials  of  the  regular  party  delegation  were 
challenged  by  the  racially  integrated  Mississippi  Freedom  Democratic 
Party.  The  regular  party  claimed  the  legitimacy  of  law,  the  challen- 
gers  of  morality8  For  1964  a  compromise  solution  confirmed  the  regulars 
as  the  Mississippi  delegation  but  for  the  future  incorporated  the 
moral  stance  of  the  challengers  into  party  rules.  In  resolving  the 
Mississippi  dispute  the  convention's  Credentials  Committee  instructed 
the  national  committee  to  include  in  the  call  to  the  1968  convention 
a  specification  that: 
"a  State  Democratic  Party  in  selecting  and  certifying  dele- 
gates  to  the  Democratic  National  Convention  thereby  under- 
takes  to  assure  that  voters  in  the  State,  regardless  of 
race,  color,  creed  or  national  origin,  will  have  the  oppor- 
tunity  to  participate  fully  in  party  affairs  ... 
to 
9 
The  implication  of  this  instruction,  similar  to  that  of  the  Fifteenth 
Amendment,  is  that  anti-discrimination  guarantees  had  to  be  provided 
to  ensure  for  blacks  the  same  treatment  as  whites.  Such  thinking -  55  - 
entailed  the  assumption  that  for  whites  there  were  no  obstacles  to 
the  opportunity  to  participate  fully  in  party  affairs.  It  was  the 
undermining  of  this  assumption  in  1968  thatled  to  the  fourth  phase 
of  participatory  reform  thereafter. 
To  effect  the  Convention's  instruction  a  Special  Equal  Rights 
Committee  was  subsequently  established  to  aid  the  state  parties  in 
meeting  the  requirements  of  the  Call.  Chaired  successively  by  Gover- 
nors  David  Lawrence  and  Richard  Hughes,  the  Committee  held  public 
hearings  and  consulted  with  the  U.  S.  Commission  on  Civil  Rights.  In 
1966  the  Committee  propounded  six  anti-discrimination  standards,  the 
so-called  six  basic  elements.  These  standards  were  adopted  by  the 
national  committee  and  written  into  the  Call  to  the  1968  convention. 
They  aimed  to  bar  racial  discrimination  in  the  party's  affairs  and 
encourage  participation  in  them  by  blacks.  The  national  committee 
also  adopted  the  recommendation  that  a  commission  on  Party  Structure 
be  established  to  study  the  relationship  between  the  national  and  state 
parties  in  order  that  full  participation  regardless  of  race,  colour, 
creed  or  national  origin  should  be  facilitated  by  "uniform  standards 
for  structure  and  operation.  °10 
Nationalisation  is  a  twentieth  century  trend  in  reform  of  the 
nominating  process.  It  is  also  one  which  faces  greater  principled 
opposition  than  the  participatory  goal  for  it  conflicts  with  American 
traditions  of  federalism,  states'rights  and  party  decentralisation. 
Hostility  towards  centralisation  was  one  source  of  antagonism  towards 
the  congressional  caucus  for  it  located  control  over  presidential 
selection  in  national  party  leaders.  As  Schattschneider  noted,  the 
demise  of  the  congressional  caucus  marked  the  collapse  of  the  authority 
of  this  central  party  group., 
An  attempt  to  nationalise  the  party  is  evident  in  the  overthrow -  56  - 
of  the  two-thirds  rule  in  Democratic  conventions.  The  rule  enabled 
a  substantial  minority  to  resist  simple  majority  preferences.  In 
practice  this  facilitated  a  southern  veto  over  the  party's  nominees. 
The  overthrow  of  the  rule  in  1936  removed  this  regional  obstacle  to 
nominations  supported  by  a  national  delegate  majority. 
In  the  post-war  period  nationalisation  entailed  the  application 
of  universal  rules  for  delegate  selection  with  which  all  constituent 
state  parties  had  to  comply.  The  first  application  of  such  standards 
emerged  in  the  loyalty  controversy  in  the  Democratic  Party.  The  issue 
originated  from  the  1948  election  when  several  southern  parties 
adopted  the  Dixiecrat  candidates  as  the  nominees  of  the  Democratic  Party. 
Thenceforward  northern  liberals  sought  to  ensure  that  delegates  to 
Democratic  conventions  should  work  to  provide  their  electorates  with 
the  opportunity  to  vote  for  the  party's  officially-designated  nominees. 
At  the  1952  convention  an  attempt  was  made  to  require  of  dele- 
gates  a  commitment  to  work  for  this  objective  as  a  condition  of  their 
being  seated.  Senator  Moody  of  Michigan  proposed  that 
"No  delegate  shall  be  seated  unless  he  give  an  assurance 
to  the  Credentials  Committee  that  he  will  exert  every 
honorable  means  available  to  him  in  any  capacity  he  may 
have,  to  provide  that  the  nominees  of  this  convention 
for  President  and  Vice  President,  through  their  names  or 
those  of  electors  pledged  to  them,  appear  on  the  election 
ballot  under  the  heading,  name  or  designation  of  the 
Democratic  Party.  "12 
On  the  recommendation  of  the  Credentials  Committee  the  impact  of  this 
resolution  was  modified,  seeking  rather  to  avoid  commitments  "in 
contravention  of  the  existing  law  of  the  State,  or  of  the  previous 
instructions  of  State  Democratic  governing  bodies.  "13 
Attempts  to  define  a  position  on  loyalty  acceptable  to  all  elements 
within  the  party  continued  after  1952.  In  1954  the  national  party 
chairman  appointed  a  Special  Advisory  Committee  on  Rules  and  Procedure. -  57  - 
The  Committee  was  enjoined  to  study,  review  and  make  appropriate 
recommendations  on  all  rules  "specifically,  but  not  exclusively,  the 
subject  of  the  so-called  or  miscalled  Loyalty  Pledge  Resolution 
adopted  at  the  1952  convention  ...  "14  The  Committee's  deliberations 
evinced  an  attempt  to  secure  loyalty  whilst  eschewing  the  contro- 
versies  aroused  by  compulsory  pledges.  The  Committee  stated  the 
"understanding"  that  state  parties  in  selecting  national  convention 
delegates  undertake  to  ensure  that  voters  have  the  opportunity  to 
vote  for  the  nominees  of  that  convention.  It  was  "understood"  that 
delegates  certified  by  state  parties  have  the  "interests,  welfare  and 
success  of  the  Democratic  party  at  heart,  and  will  participate  in 
the  convention  in  good  faith  and  therefore  no  additional  assurances 
shall  be  required.  . 
15 
It  was  made  incumbent  upon  national  committee 
members  (convention  delegates  ex  officio)  to  declare  affirmatively  for 
the  party's  nominees,  failure  to  do  so  resulting  in  removal.  The 
Committee's  understandings  and  recommendations  were  incorporated  into 
the  Call  to  the  1956  convention. 
The  resolution  of  the  loyalty  controversy  marks  a  significant 
shift  in  the  balance  of  power  between  national  and  state  parties.  It 
also  constituted  an  innovation  in  the  responsibilities  assumed  by  the 
former.  As  Austin  Ranney  has  observed: 
"It  established  the  centralising  principle  that  henceforth 
the  national  party  agencies  will  not  only  decide  how  many 
votes  each  state  delegation  gets  at  the  national  convention 
but  will  also  impose  national  rules  on  what  kinds  of  persons 
can  be  selected.  "16 
Post-war  nationalisation  in  the  Republican  Party  originated  from 
the  controversies  arising  from  the  Eisenhower-Taft  contest  in  1952. 
In  that  year  disputes  arose  over  the  conduct  of  some  delegate  selection 
meetings  and  the  rules  of  eligibility  to  participate.  Though  the 
party  had  established  the  precedent  for  a  convention  to  enact  rules -  58  - 
binding  on  its  successor  this  right  had  not  been  exercised  for  the 
subjects  under  dispute.  Regulation  derived  from  the  laws  or  party 
rules  of  each  state  which  allowed  diversity  of  practice  and  the 
absence  of  appropriate  guidelines  where  the  states  or  parties  failed 
to  provide  them.  The  solution  to  this  problem  adopted  at  the  1956 
convention  was  the  prescription  of  national  delegate  selection  rules 
applicable  for  the  next  convention.  These  rules  specified  acceptable 
selection  devices  for  state  convention  delegates  -  primary,  caucus, 
convention  or  mass  meeting.  They  opened  participation  to  loyal  and 
qualified  voters.  Selection  devices  for  national  convention  dele- 
gates  were  specified  as  primaries,  state  or  district  conventions  or 
state  committees1Y  State  parties  were  allowed  to  provide  further 
rules  within  these  parameters. 
Nationalisation  in  the  early  1960's  was  pursued  in  the  Democratic 
Party's  anti-discrimination  standards  discussed  above.  These  standards 
built  on  the  precedents  established  in  the  loyalty  controversy  for 
circumscribing  states'  rights  in  delegate  selection.  The  loyalty 
provisions  restricted  states'  rights  by  defining  who  could  be  selected 
as  delegates;  the  anti-discrimination  standards  provided  further 
restrictions  by  specifying  conditions  as  to  how  they  would  be  selected. 
The  instances  of  nominating  process  reform  share  several  common 
features.  Those  within  the  participatory  trend  are  characterised  by 
attempts  to  widen  public  involvement  in  the  nominating  process  and 
control  over  it  whilst  diluting  the  influence  of  the  party  organis- 
ation  and  its  leaders.  These  reforms  are  thus  consistent  with  the 
movement  towards  a  Voter  Dominated  party  as  elaborated  in  the  preced- 
ing  chapter. 
The  reforms  are  also  illustrative  of  the  permeation  of  broader 
political  changes  contributing  to  redefinitions  of  desirable  means  of -  59  - 
making  presidential  nominations.  Heightened  participation  resulting 
from  the  establishment  of  national  conventions  and  presidential 
primaries  were  consistent  with  the  democratising  drive  of  the 
Jacksonian  and  Progressive  periods.  Party  nationalisation  accompanied 
governmental  centralisation.  Demands  for  black  voting  rights  in  the 
1960's  occurred  within  both  the  party  and  governmental  systems. 
The  timing  of  the  adoption  of  reforms  can  be  attributed  to 
short-term  pragmatic  responses  to  egregious  problems.  This  is  not  to 
discount  the  role  of  ideas,  for  the  reform  drives  were  greatly 
strengthened  by  the  conformity  of  proposals  for  change  with  emerging 
new  standards  of  political  legitimacy,  but  it  is  to  locate  the  trigger 
for  the  adoption  of  reform  in  short-term  political  considerations. 
For  President  Jackson,  a  national  convention  depriving  congressional 
leaders  of  influence  facilitated  the  displacement  of  their  favourite 
Calhoun  as  Vice  President.  For  the  opposition  National  Republicans 
a  convention  was  a  means  for  uniting  the  disparate  opponents  of 
Jackson  behind  a  single  candidate.  Presidential  primaries  were  a 
device  for  Roosevelt's  supporters  to  circumvent  Taft's  control  of  the 
party  organisations  in  1912.  Loyalty  oaths  were  sought  by  liberal 
Democrats  in  1952  in  the  wake  of  the  nomination  of  Eisenhower  who 
threatened  to  be  an  untypically  appealing  Republican  in  the  South.  The 
Mississippi  compromise  in  1964  attempted  to  hold  a  segregationist 
delegation  within  the  party  whilst  undertaking  reforms  for  the  future 
appealing  to  blacks. 
The  reform  impetus  tends  to  be  concentrated  in  the  majority  party. 
The  size,  heterogeneity,  and  stakes  of  victory  (i.  e.  the  likelihood 
that  the  party  will  win  office)  are  greater  in  the  majority  party 
making  it  the  natural  territory  for  conflict.  For  groups  in  the 
electorate  seeking  change  through  the  parties  the  majority  is  the  most -  60  - 
direct  route  to  success.  The  history  of  nominating  process  reform 
substantiates  Lubell's  contention  that  the  political  conflicts  of 
each  era  take  place  within  the  majority  party18 
Background  to  Post-1968  Democratic  Party  Reform 
The  Democrats'  post-1968  reforms  combined  the  two  goals  recurrent 
in  the  history  of  reform  of  the  nominating  process.  The  revelation  of 
obstacles  to  participation,  the  absence  or  manipulability  of  proced- 
ural  rules  were  countered  by  reforms  which  used  national  guidelines 
to  guarantee  voters  the  right  of  access  to  the  delegate  selection 
process. 
Discontent  with  existing  procedures  was  triggered  by  the  unprec- 
edentedly  widespread  attempts  to  mobilise  opponents  of  the  administration's 
Vietnam  war  policy  within  the  Democratic  Party's  presidential  nomin- 
ating  process  in  1968.  Anti-war  activists  sought  to  use  the  nominating 
process  to  demonstrate  the  breadth  of  opposition  to  the  war,  encourag- 
ing  a  change  of  policy  or,  more  ambitiously,  the  withdrawal  of 
President  Johnson.  The  opposition  to  Johnson  was  personalised  in  the 
candidacy  of  Senator  Eugene  McCarthy  of  Minnesota. 
McCarthy's  unexpectedly  substantial  vote  (42  per  cent)  in  the 
first  primary  in  New  Hampshire  was  followed  by  the  entry  of  Senator 
Robert  Kennedy  as  a  candidate  and  then  Johnson's  withdrawal.  Vice 
President  Hubert  Humphrey  subsequently  declared  his  candidacy  retaining 
a  supporter  of  administration  policy  in  the  contest  for  the  nomination. 
McCarthy's  candidacy  continued  with  the  new  objective  of  winning  the 
nomination.  This  transition  in  objectives  necessitated  an  organisation 
designed  to  elicit  a  majority  of  national  convention  delegates  in 
contrast  to  demonstrating  popular  opposition  to  the  war.  In  particular, -  61  - 
the  McCarthy  campaign  was  compelled  to  focus  on  the  non-primary  states 
which  provided  a  majority  of  the  delegates. 
Previous  insurgent  campaigns  for  the  nomination  sought  to  use 
the  candidate's  public  popularity  to  persuade  delegates  already 
selected  rather  than  mobilising  support  to  participate  in  their 
selection.  (Eisenhower's  supporters  did  pursue  this  latter  strategy 
in  some  states  in  1952  but  it  was  not  applied  universally).  In  con- 
trast,  the  McCarthy  insurgency  attempted  to  insert  its  supporters  into 
the  party  organisation  -  controlled  processes  of  non-primary  delegate 
selection.  It  was  the  impediments  encountered  in  translating  McCarthy's 
public  support  into  delegates  which  evoked  discontent  and  provided 
the  future  agenda  of  reform. 
McCarthy's  supporters  were  largely  mobilised  from  outside  the 
party  organisations,  they  were  mobilised  in  the  election  year,  comm- 
itted  to  a  candidate  and  an  issue  and  numerically  a  minority  in  most 
areas.  They  encountered  processes  characterised  by  informality, 
dominated  by  party  officials,  commencing  before  the  election  year, 
largely  abstracted  from  candidate  and  issue  concerns  and  often  oper- 
ating  on  winner-take-all  principles.  Rules  relating  to  the  holding  and 
conduct  of  caucuses  in  twenty  states  were  absent,  insubstantial  or 
unobtainable,  enabling  party  officials  to  schedule  and  manage  them  at 
their  discretion  to  the  exclusion  or  disadvantage  of  insurgents. 
Approximately  a  quarter  of  all  delegates  were  chosen  by  processes 
originating  before  1968  which  precluded  supporters  of  McCarthy  (whose 
candidacy  was  announced  November  30,1967)  from  participating  in  their 
selection.  The  criteria  for  selection  as  a  delegate  were  often  pre- 
mised  on  party  service,  precluding  insurgents  and  candidate  supporters. 
Where  candidate  preferences  were  recognised  they  were  not  necessarily 
translated  into  delegates  proportionately.  In  fifteen  states  the -  62  - 
operation  of  the  unit  rule  at  various  stages  of  selection  phased  out 
minority  representation. 
The  impediments  to  representation  encountered  by  McCarthy  suppor- 
ters  produced  two  responses  from  within  the  campaign  which  contributed 
to  the  drive  for  reform  at  the  1968  convention.  First,  a  commission 
was  established  to  investigate  the  mechanisms  used  to  select  dele- 
gates.  Secondly,  the  perceived  injustices  and  irregularities  encoun- 
tered  by  its  supporters  were  utilised  by  the  McCarthy  campaign  as  a 
basis  for  complaint  in  disputing  the  credentials  of  several  state 
delegations  with  a  view  to  denying  them  seating  at  the  convention. 
The  Ad  Hoc  commission  originated  from  the  discontents  of  the 
McCarthy  organisation  in  Connecticut  which  had  experienced  the  unit 
rule  and  numerical  under-representation.  A  plan  to  document  the  problems 
encountered  in  Connecticut  expanded  to  become  a  national  review  of 
the  convention,  and  of  delegate  selection  procedures.  Called  into 
existence  by  sympathisers  on  the  convention's  Rules  and  Credentials 
Committees  respectively,  the  Commission  was  designed  to  be  impartial 
between  the  various  candidates.  Impartiality  contributed  to  the 
Commission's  legitimacy  as  did  the  prestige  of  its  six  members  who 
included  Governor  Harold  Hughes  of  Iowa  as  chairman,  Representative 
Donald  Fraser  of  Minnesota  and  Professor  Alexander  Bickel  of  Yale  Law 
School.  The  Commission's  sponsorship  by  members  of  convention  comm- 
ittees  allowed  Hughes  to  claim  official  sanction  for  its  work19  Assisted 
by  researchers,  the  commission  provided  an  extensive  review  of  the 
American  party  system  including  the  first  documentation  by  a  party  of 
its  own  selection  procedures. 
The  significance  of  the  Commission  in  the  development  of  reform 
resides  in  the  substantiation  by  an  independent,  semi-official  body  of 
complaints  emerging  from  the  McCarthy  campaign,  in  identifying  where -  63  - 
change  was  needed  and  in  proposing  possible  corrections.  The  Commis- 
sion  report  was  utilised  by  the  convention  and  its  committees  to 
justify  reform,  define  objectives  to  be  attained  in  the  future  and 
indicate  subjects  requiring  further  study. 
Reviewing  delegate  selection  in  1968  and  national  convention 
procedures  the  Commission  concluded  that  they  "display  considerably 
less  fidelity  to  basic  democratic  principles  than  a  nation  which 
claims  to  govern  itself  can  safely  tolerate.  " 
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This  assessment 
derived  from  a  cumulation  of  deficiencies  which  exhibited  at  least 
one  of  four  properties: 
1.  Lack  of  public  participation:  some  delegates  were  appointed  by 
party  officials.  The  Commission  recommended  the  abolition  of 
appointed  delegates,  and  the  provision  of  meaningful  popular 
participation  in  the  selection  process. 
2.  Lack  of  timeliness:  some  delegates  were  selected  by  processes 
initiated  two  or  more  years  before  the  election  year.  The 
commission  proposed  that  all  delegates  be  selected  by  a  process 
beginning  not  more  than  six  months  before  the  convention,  and 
that  for  1968  the  incoming  rather  than  outgoing  members  of  the 
national  committee  would  be  ex-officio  delegates. 
3.  Lack  of  minority  representation:  employment  of  the  unit  rule 
penalised  minorities.  The  Commission  recommended  abolition  of 
the  unit  rule  for  convention  delegations  in  1968  and  its  elimin- 
ation  throughout  the  selection  sequence  in  subsequent  years. 
4.  Malapportionment:  the  principle  of  one-man  one-vote  was  contra- 
dieted  both  within  and  between  the  states.  The,  Commls.  8jon  proposed 
adoption  of  fair  apportionment  within  states,  the  abolition  of 
bonus  votes  in  allocating  convention  delegates  (i.  e.  a  reward 
to  states  which  supported  the  party  ticket  in  previous  elections) -  64  - 
and,  in  1972,  the  elimination  of  the  uniform  number  of  national 
committee  delegates  for  every  state. 
Disputing  the  credentials  of  the  opposition  delegates  is  a  stan- 
dard  tactic  adopted  by  candidates  trailing  in  support.  In  this 
respect  the  McCarthy  campaign  was  unexceptional  but  it  provided  dis- 
putes  unprecedented  in  their  number  and  diversity  of  grounds  for 
complaint.  In  earlier  Democratic  conventions  the  principal  basis  for 
dispute  had  been  the  suspect  loyalty  of  some  southern  delegations. 
Loyalty  did  generate  some  challenges  in  1968,  as  did  the  new  anti- 
discrimination  standards,  but  some  disputes  were  based  upon  the  informal 
obstacles  encountered  by  the  McCarthy  campaign,  such  as  the  impropriety 
and  irregularity  of  procedures  and  under-representation.  Such  novel 
bases  for  dispute  were  not  founded  on  law  or  party  rules  but  from 
standards  of  fairness,  openness,  and  proportionality  derived  from  the 
American  democratic  creed  or  Supreme  Court  definitions  of  democratic 
standards. 
Specific  complaints  related  to  the  permissibility  of  ex-officio 
delegates,  intra-state  malapportionment,  the  justifiability  of  the 
unit  rule,  under-representation  of  racial  minorities  and  candidate 
supporters.  Fifteen  state  delegations  were  disputed  in  whole  or  in 
part  before  the  Credentials  Committee.  Unusually  they  included 
northern  delegations  such  as  New  York,  Michigan  and  Minnesota  in 
addition  to  the  perennial  southern  disputants. 
In  resolving  the  disputes  the  Credentials  Committee,  dominated 
by  Humphrey  supporters,  was  forced  to  confront  a  conflict  between 
often  undemocratic  procedures  and  laws,  and  party  rules  which  did  not 
preclude  them.  The  Committee's  decisions  were  generally  consistent 
with  precedent  in  validating  legally-permissible  procedures.  In  all 
but  two  instances  the  selected  delegates  were  sustained  in  their 
positions. -  65  - 
However,  the  two  exceptions  evidenced  a  new  assertiveness  by 
the  national  party  in  prescribing  the  standards  to  which  state  parties 
should  conform  in  selecting  delegates.  Though  meagre  measured  against 
the  challengers'  demands  the  two  cases  represented  an  erosion  of 
states'  rights  in  delegate  selection.  In  the  Mississippi  case  the 
Committee  utilised  the  anti-discrimination  provisions  of  the  1968 
Call  to  unseat  a  lilywhite  delegation.  For  the  first  time  a  national 
party  agency  enforced  restrictions  on  how  parties  were  to  choose 
delegates. 
The  Georgia  challenge  was  resolved  by  an  even  greater  incursion 
into  states'  rights.  The  Committee  unseated  delegates  because  of  the 
way  they  had  been  selected  although  the  device  used  was  in  conformity 
with  state  party  rules  and  not  proscribed  by  national  party  regulat- 
ions.  Delegates  in  Georgia  were  selected  in  accordance  with  state 
party  Rule  55  which  located  selection  in  the  governor  in  consultation 
with  the  state  party  chairman,  a  gubernatorial  appointee.  Both  took 
office  two  years  prior  to  the  national  convention.  Challenges  to  the 
delegation  were  mounted  on  its  racial  imbalance,  loyalty  and  prefer- 
ential  unrepresentativeness.  Rival  delegates  presented  themselves 
selected  through  a  state  convention,  racially  integrated  and  committed 
to  national  party  nominees. 
The  Committee  resolved  the  dispute  through  the  compromise  of 
seating  half  of  each  of  the  two  rival  delegations.  Though  a  compromise 
the  Committee's  rationale  for  unseating  half  the  regular  delegation 
does  reflect  an  emerging  concern  that  selection  procedures  should  be 
open  to  public  participation.  The  regular  delegates  were  not  unseated 
on  grounds  of  racial  discrimination  as  some  authorities  have  claimed 
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Had  discrimination  been  proven  it  was  open  to  the  Committee  to  proceed 
as  it  had  in  the  Mississippi  case  by  displacing  the  entire  delegation. -  66  - 
Rather,  the  Committee's  objection  to  the  delegation  was  that  it  was 
selected  by  a  process  which  discriminated  against  all  citizens 
subsequent  to  the  Democratic  gubernatorial  primary  in  1966.  The 
explanation  for  the  Committee's  action  was  provided  by  its  chairman 
Governor  Richard  Hughes  in  his  presentation  to  the  convention  where 
he  argued  that  the  Georgia  regular  delegation  was  "subject  to  some 
infirmity,  the  dictator-like  procedure  of  Rule  55"h122 
The  Committee's  concern  over  exclusionary  practices  stimulated 
advocacy  of  future  reform.  In  his  speech  to  the  convention  Richard 
Hughes  expressed  the  continuing  commitment  to  an  inclusive  party  which 
thus  required  "even  fuller  participation  by  the  people"  in  its  pro- 
cesses23  The  Committee's  deliberations  suggested  that  "we  can  and 
should  encourage  appropriate  revisions  in  the  delegate  selection  process 
to  assure  the  fullest  possible  participation  and  to  make  the  Demo- 
cratic  Party  completely  representative  of  grass  root  sentiment., 
24 
To 
achieve  this  objective  the  Committee  proposed  that  the  national  party 
chairman  establish  a  special  committee  to 
1.  Study  delegate  selection  procedures. 
2.  Recommend  to  the  national  committee  "such  improvement  as  can 
assure  even  broader  citizen  participation  in  the  delegate  selec- 
tion  "25  process. 
3.  Aid  state  parties  in  changing  laws  and  party  rules. 
Z.  Report  to  the  national  committee  and  make  available  to  the  1972 
convention  its  findings  and  recommendations. 
Subjects  specified  for  particular  attention  reiterated  some  of 
the  areas  targeted  by  the  earlier  Ad  Hoc  Commission:  the  timing  of 
delegate  selection,  the  opportunities  for  public  participation  and 
the  use  of  the  unit  rule. 
The  Committee  offered  its  own  prescriptions  on  timing  and  parti- -  67  - 
cipation  in  advocating  an  elaboration  of  national  party  guidelines 
on  delegate  selection.  Future  convention  Calls,  the  Committee  recom- 
mended,  should  include  the  injunction  that  in  state  party  delegate 
selection  "all  democrats  of  the  state  have  meaningful  and  timely 
opportunities  to  participate  fully  in  the  election  or  selection  of 
proposed  a  special  ...  delegates  and  alternates., 
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The  Committee 
committee  to  assist  the  state  parties  to  meet  this  requirement27 
The  phraseology  of  the  Committee's  recommendations  evinces  the  influence 
of  the  Ad  Hoc  Commission  which  hadadvanced  the  principles  of  "meaning- 
ful  access"  and  "timely  selection". 
A  further  stimulus  to  reform  emanated  from  the  convention  Rules 
Committee.  The  right  to  a  hearing  before  the  Committee  was  exercised 
by  McCarthy  supporters  and  other  reform  advocates  to  publicise  exist- 
ing  deficiencies  and  prppose  remedies.  Harold  Hughes  used  the  hearings 
to  present  the  findings  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Commission.  The  focus  of 
immediate  efforts  for  change  was  the  unit  rule  which,  if  permitted 
at  the  convention,  would  continue  to  filter  out  minority  representation 
as  had  occurred  at  earlier  stages  of  the  selection  sequence  providing 
a  major  source  of  discontent  amongst  McCarthy  supporters.  But  repeal 
of  the  unit  rule  had  support  beyond  the  McCarthyites.  Few  states 
still  used  the  rule  at  the  convention  and  those  that  did  were  predom- 
inantly  southern.  Before  the  Committee  Humphrey  declared  his  opposition 
to  the  rule  removing  the  issue  from  the  contest  between  the  candidates 
and  widening  the  coalition  in  favour  of  repeal.  The  Committee's 
deliberations  eventually  extended  beyond  the  unit  rule  to  incorporate 
all  winner-take-all  rules  including  binding  primaries  (of  which 
McCanthy  was  theprincipal  beneficiary). 
The  Committee  report  subsequently  proposed  that  the  convention 
would  not  enforce  on  any  delegate  on  any  issue  "any  duty  or  obligation -  68  - 
which  said  delegate  would  coincide  to  violate  his  individual  con- 
science.  " 
28 
Committee  chairman  Governor  Samuel  Shapiro  commended  the 
move  as  anotherstep  in  democratising  the  party29 
It  was  evident  that  the  Committee's  hearings  and  the  Ad  Hoc 
Commission  report  had  aroused  members'  concern  over  the  adequacy  of 
existing  convention  rules  in  the  recommendation  that  they  be  system- 
atically  reviewed.  The  objects  of  a  review  by  a  Rules  Commission 
were  defined  as  : 
1.  The  study,  evaluation  and  codification  of  the  rules  of  past  Demo- 
cratic  conventions. 
2.  Investigation  of  the  advisability  of  changes  in  the  rules. 
3.  Submission  of  findings  to  the  national  committee  for  transmission 
to  the  Rules  Committee  of  the  1972  convention  for  acceptance, 
rejection,  modification  or  amendment. 
u.  Establishment  of  permanent  rules  for  the  convention  and  its 
committees  and  other  matters  "that  may  be  appropriate.  "30 
Ardent  reformers  within  the  Rules  Committee  found  the  proposals 
for  a  commission  a  long-winded  and  uncertain  mechanism  for  producing 
change.  A  minority  advocated  that  the  convention  should  assume  the 
initiative  and  legislate  reforms.  To  this  end  a  minority  report  was 
submitted  to  the  convention  proposing  that  state  parties  ensure  that 
delegate  selection  take  place  through  a  process  "in  which  all  demo- 
cratic  voters  had  a  full  and  timely  opportunity  to  participate.  . 
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In  evaluating  compliance  with  his  objective  the  convention  should 
require  that: 
1.  The  unit  rule  shall  not  be  employed  at  any  stage  of  the  selection 
process. 
2.  "All  feasible  efforts  have  been  made  to  assure  that  delegates  are 
elected  through  party,  primary,  convention  or  committee  procedures, 
open  to  public  participation  within  the  calendar  year  of  the -  69  - 
National  Convention.  " 
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Both  the  foci  of  the  minority's  concerns,  and  the  wording  of  proposed 
correctives,  indicate  the  influence  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Commission. 
For  recommendations  of  committees  to  take  effect  they  must  be 
endorsed  by  the  full  convention.  Thus  the  impetus  for  reform  emerg- 
ing  in  the  Committees  had  to  be  sustained  on  the  convention  floor  to 
have  binding  effect.  The  convention  proceeded  to  endorse  the 
proposals  of  both  committees  for  study  commissions  to  prepare  reform 
proposals,  and  the  Rules  Committee's  recommendation  that  the  unit  rule 
be  abolished  for  the  1968  convention.  Support  for  the  commission  idea 
was  unsurprising.  In  neither  case  were  the  proposals  the  subject  of 
debate  or  recorded  votes.  The  proposals  were  propounded  by  committees 
dominated  by  Humphrey  supporters  (like  the  convention  as  a  whole), 
they  dealt  with  arcane  subjects  and  commissions  probably  appeared  as 
rather  abstract,  dilatory  and  uncontroversial  means  for  providing 
further  consideration  for  complex  subjects. 
The  "freedom  of  conscience"  provision  recommended  by  Rules  excited 
more  controversy  but  was  still  sustained  by  voice  vote.  The  conven- 
tion's  deference  here  is  explicable  on  similar  grounds  to  those  which 
stimulated  the  Committee  to  make  its  recommendation  initially.  Humphrey 
had  publicly  endorsed  repeal,  few  states  employed  the  devices  (unit 
rule,  binding  primaries)  and  the  principal  users  were  southern. 
The  convention's  adoption  of  the  Rules  Committee  minority  report 
was  unexpected.  It  provides  the  only  instance  of  a  rejection  of  a 
committee  majority  report  at  the  convention.  It  was  also  the  only 
vote  at  the  convention  in'which  McCarthy's  supporters  were  in  the 
majority. 
An  explanation  of  the  success  of  the  minority  report  is  heavily 
dependent  upon  the  circumstances  in  which  the  vote  took  place.  The -  70  - 
ballot  occurred  the  day  after  the  acceptance  of  the  Rules  Committee's 
"freedom  of  conscience"  proposal  for  the  1968  convention.  Though  the 
minority  report  had  two  components,  the  unit  rule  and  timeliness,  the 
former  appeared  first  on  the  agenda  and  was  more  easily  comprehended 
than  the  latter.  Within  the  convention  the  distinction  between  the 
two  components  appears  tohave  been  lost  so  that  the  vote  was  understood 
as  being  on  the  unit  rule33  This  was  also  the  second  vote  relevant 
to  the  unit  rule  at  the  convention  and  it  is  not  clear  that  the 
different  implications  of  the  two  votes  were  appreciated  by  many 
delegates.  For  those  who  did  recognise  the  distinction,  the  second 
vote  (rejecting  the  unit  rule  at  the  next  convention  and  at  earlier 
stages  of  the  selection  process)  could  be  seen  as  an  extension  of  the 
defence  of  minority  preference  and  freedom  of  conscience  entailed  by 
the  first  vote  which  abrogated  the  unit  rule  and  other  binding  commit- 
ments  at  the  1968  convention.  In  the  debate  on  the  minority  report 
the  unit  rule  was  defended  in  principle.  No  speaker  sought  to  con- 
struct  a  defence  for  its  use  at  a  future  convention  and  at  earlier 
stages  of  the  selection  process  whilst  conceding  its  rejection  at  the 
current  convention.  Thus  the  vote  on  the  minority  report  (understood 
as  a  vote  on  the  unit  rule)  was  preceded  by  a  debate  on  the  principle 
of  a  rule  which  had  been  repudiated  the  previous  day. 
The  vote  took  place  amidst  considerable  confusion.  . 
The  debate 
and  the  vote  were  interposed  by  a  debate  on  another  matter  and  there 
was  misunderstanding  as  to  which  issue  was  being  voted  upon.  Excerpts 
from  the  debate  illustrate  the  confusion: 
Indiana:  "Is  this  the  previous  motion  or  the  previous  motion?  " 
Convention  Secretary:  "This  is  on  the  previous  motion,  sir  .,, 
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Virginia:  "Virginia  is  ready  to  vote  on  the  addition  to  the 
National  Committee  of  Young  Democrats 
...  't -  71  - 
Convention  Secretary:  "No,  wS6are  still  waiting  for  the  finish 
of  the  unit  rule  vote.  " 
Even  so  astute  an  observer  as  Theodore  White,  writing  after  the  conven- 
tion,  misinterpreted  the  vote  as  the  abolition  of  the  unit  rule  "for 
ever"  when  its  effect  was  to  insert  a  preclusion  of  the  rule  into 
the  Call  for  the  1972  convention  only. 
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Support  for  the  minority  report  was  generated  by  the  similarity 
of  its  concerns  to  those  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Commission.  According  to  one 
set  of  writers  the  Commission's  report  had  influenced  many  delegates 
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The  minority  report  provided  the  opportunity  to  act  upon  the  egregious 
deficiencies  of  the  unit  rule  and  timeliness  identified  by  the  Ad 
Hoc  Commission  in  time  to  affect  the  next  nominating  process.  The 
majority  position,  in  contrast,  would  result  in  a  report  to  the  Rules 
Committee  of  the  1972  convention,  i.  e.  after  that  year's  delegate 
selection  process  had  been  completed. 
The  vote  on  the  minority  report  was  divorced  from  the  immediate 
interests  of  the  rival  candidates.  The  absence  of  candidate  interests 
were  particularly  pertinent  for  the  Humphrey  delegates  who  were  dis- 
united  about  the  merits  of  party  reform.  Whilst  McCarthy's  delegates 
were  predominantly  amateurs  (characterised  by  a  commitment  to  intra- 
party  democracy,  principles  and  policies  given  priority  over  compromise 
and  winning)  there  were  also  many  amateur  Humphrey  supporters,  in 
addition  to  his  many  professional  supporters 
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In  the  absence  of  a 
unifying  candidate  interest,  Humphrey  supporters  could  vote  according 
to  their  individual  styles  dividing  amateurs  from  professionals  align- 
ing  the  former  with  the  McCarthy  delegates  on  party  reform.  Humphrey 
supporters  could  also  derive  approval  for  the  minority  report  from 
their  candidate  who  had  publicly  supported  ending  the  unit  rule  at  the 
1968  convention  and  inserting  its  preclusion  into  the  1972  Call. 
40 -  72  - 
The  1968  convention  stumbled  into  the  initiatives  for  future 
reform.  The  proposals  for  the  establishment  of  commissions  were 
accepted  without  evidence  of  critical  appraisal.  The  debate  on  the 
minority  report  took  place  amidst  confusion.  The  debate  between  the 
minority  and  majority  reports  posed  immediate  specific  change  against 
a  longer  process  designed  to  produce  an  agenda  for  change  of  an 
unspecified  nature.  There  was  no  dispute  between  the  relative  merits 
of  stability  and  change. 
The  critique  of  existing  practices  proceeded  from  the  McCarthy 
campaign  to  the  Ad  Hoc  Commission  which  added  recommendations  for 
change.  The  critique  and  recommendations  were  embraced  by  members 
of  the  Credentials  and  Rules  Committees.  The  Committees  then  trans- 
mitted  the  impulse  for  reform  to  an  acquiescert  and  possibly  uncompre- 
hending  convention. 
Reform  Agencies  in  Action 
Several  events  between  the  convention's  imprimatur  for  reform 
and  the  creation  of  the  agencies  for  its  realisation  enhanced  the 
impetus  for  change.  The  convention  itself  was  characterised  by  dis- 
harmony,  oppressive  security  and  the  domineering  assertiveness  of 
the  pro-administration  leadership.  On  the  Chicago  streets  the  con- 
frontation  between  anti-war  protesters  and  the  police  disintegrated 
into  bloody  riot.  A  divided  party  entered  the  election  with  the 
McCarthy  supporters  unreconciled  and  the  right  of  its  traditional 
constituency  corroded  by  George  Wallace's  third  party  candidacy. 
Though  voters  rallied  to  Humphrey  in  the  campaign's  closing  stages  the 
election  was  lost  and  the  Democrats'  arch  foe  Richard  Nixon  installed 
as  president.  The  absence  of  a  Democratic  president  from  1969  thereby -7'3- 
removed  the  traditionally  dominant  influence  over  national  party 
activities  capable  of  obstructing  or  shaping  a  reform  effort. 
Two  reform  commissions  authorised  by  the  1968  convention  were 
established  in  January  1969  by  party  chairman  Senator  Fred  Harris 
with  prior  authorisation  by  the  party's  national  committee.  A  Rules 
Commission  chaired  by  Representative  James  O'Hara  was  entrusted  with 
the  responsibility  for  studying  national  convention  rules.  Study  of 
the  pre-convention  delegate  selection  process  was  located  in  the 
Commission  on  Delegate  Selection  and  Party  Structure  headed  by  Senator 
George  McGovern  of  South  Dakota.  The  composition  of  both  commissions, 
selected  by  Harris  after  consultations  with  party  leaders,  reflected 
a  desire  to  include  all  the  party's  disparate  elements  -  blacks, 
state  officials,  women,  congressmen,  Chicana,  s,  labour  officials, 
academics,  party  officials,  youth  and  southerners. 
Because  the  Delegate  Selection  Commission  (McGovern-Fraser)  sub- 
sequently  monopolised  the  early  effectuation  of  reform,  its  activities 
are  emphasised  in  this  study.  Though  broadly  representative  of  the 
party  in  a  demographic  sense,  Byron  Shafer  in  his  exhaustive  study  of 
the  Commission,  posits  that  its  members'  preferences  were  biased  towards 
reform 
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This  followed  from  a  deliberate  strategy  by  Harris,  seeking 
to  build  a  personal  constituency  within  the  party  through  an  associ- 
ation  with  the  cause  of  reform.  Thus  representatives  of  urban  parties, 
the  apogee  of  American  party  organisation,  were  lacking.  The  one 
Chicagoan,  Louis  Martin,  was  a  newspaper  publisher  not  a  member  of  the 
Daley  machine.  Organised  labour  had  two  representatives  on  the 
Commission  but  the  traditionalist  AFL-CIO  provided  only  one,  balanced 
by  a  Commissioner  from  the  reform-oriented  UAW. 
A  pressure  group  for  reform  was  incorporated  into  the  Commission 
through  the  inclusion  of  three  members  of  the  Ad  Hoe  Commission  - -  74  - 
Harold  Hughes,  Donald  "Fraser  and  Fred  Dutton,  a  former  aide  to  Robert 
Kennedy.  David  Mixner,  a  non-primary  state  organiser  for  McCarthy 
in  1968,  and  Aaron  Henry,  a  black  veteran  of  wars  amongst  Mississippi 
Democrats,  were  also  members. 
A  strong  predisposition  to  reform  was  identifiable  amongst  the 
Commission's  staff.  Chief  Counsel  Eli  Segal  had  been  a  McCarthy 
organiser  in  California.  -.  -Research  Director  Kenneth  Bode  had  supported 
McGovern's  belated  anti-war  candidacy.  A  Consultant  Committee  of 
three  included  Anne  Wexler,  the  Connecticut  originator  of  the  idea 
of  the  Ad  Hoc  Commission,  and  Professor  Alexander  Bickel  who  had 
served  upon  it.  The  inclusion  of  Bickel  integrated  a  fourth  member 
of  the  Ad  Hoc  Commission  into  McGovern-Fraser's  operations. 
The  Commissioners  defined  their  tasks  as  a  cumulation  of  four 
separate  assignments.  From  the  Credentials  Committee  the  Commission 
assumed  the  responsibility  assigned  to  "a  Special  Committee"  to  review 
the  delegate  selection  process,  make  recommendations  to  the  national 
committee  for  enhancing  participation  and  aid  the  state  parties  in 
effecting  changes  in  state  law  and  party  rules.  The  Credentials 
Committee  report  also  authorised  "a  Special  Committee",  apparently 
distinct  from  the  first,  to  aid  state  parties  in  complying  with  the 
provisions  of  the  Call  to  the  1972  Convention.  To  this  latter  responsi- 
bility  the  Commission  conjoined  the  authority  derived  from  the  minority 
Rules  Committee  report  recommendation  that  delegate  selection  for  1972 
be  confined  to  the  election  year  and  that  the  unit  rule  be  prohibited 
from  all  stages  of  selection.  From  the  Special  Equal  Rights  Committee 
recommendation  adopted  by  the  national  committee  in  1968,  the  Commission 
derived  responsibility  for  studying  the  party  structure  as  it  related 
to  guaranteeing  full  participation  in  party  affairs  regardless  of  race, 
colour,  creed  or  national  origin. -  75  - 
The  Commission  acquired  information  through  public  hearings, 
written  submissions  and  staff  research.  At  the  Commission's  inaugural 
meeting  McGovern  had  announced  that,  "The  convention  has  told  us 
something  is  fundamentally  wrong  with  our  party.  "42  Witnesses  to 
the  seventeen  regional  public  hearings  proceeded  to  substantiate 
McGovern's  assessment.  Obstructions  and  hindrances  to  participation 
were  described  frequently. 
The  criticisms  and  commitment  to  change  extended  into  the  party 
hierarchy,  thereby  enhancing  the  legitimacy  of  reform  and  the  pres- 
sure  upon  the  Commission  to  respond.  Describing  delegate  selection 
in  1968  Senator  Edward  Kennedy,  then  favourite  for  the  1972  nomin- 
ation,  observed  : 
"New  resources  and  energies  and  people  flowed  into  the 
party's  nominating  process.  They  came  with  a  drive  and 
dedication  and  a  will  to  use  the  existing  party  machinery. 
Yetwhat  they  encountered  was  a  system  which  seemed  to 
discourage  their  participation.  They  frequently  found 
their  efforts  rebuffed  or  diluted  or  ignored.  Encrusted 
practices,  inflexible  rules  and  obsolete  laws  sometimes 
rendered  their  work  entirely  extraneous.  " 
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Hilbert  Humphrey  espoused  criticisms  of  the  system  through  which 
he  had  been  nominated  in  1968.  He  perceived  a  gap  between  the  party 
organisation  and  the  people  : 
"I  come  here  with  a  very  simple  message.  There  are  two 
Democratic  parties  in  this  country.  One  is  the  Democratic 
Party  of  the  people:  the  people  who  work  and  vote  and 
sacrifice  for  it,  the  people  who  look  to  it  for  leader- 
ship  and  assistance,  the  people  who  decide  whether  it 
will  sit  in  the  seats  of  power.  The  other  Democratic 
Party  is  a  collection  of  offices  and  machinery,  with 
fancy  titles  ...  It  was,  in  1968,  completely  and  thoroughly 
separated  from  the  people  of  the  real  Democratic  Party.  It 
is  still  separate  today.  It  is  your  job  to  return  the 
machinery  to  the  control  of  those  who  are  its  rightful 
owners.  '44 
The  liberals'  bete-noire  of  1968,  Mayor  Daley,  proposed  that 
all  states  hold  binding  presidential  primaries.  Candidates  for  the 
nomination  would  be  required  to  enter  at  least  a  third  of  them. 
5 -  76  - 
Though  the  hearings  produced  few  specific  proposals  for  change 
they  provided  ammunition  to  the  reformers.  They  provided  factual 
documentation  substantiating  the  complaints  of  the  McCarthy  campaign 
and  the  limited  research  effort  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Commission.  They  also 
revealed  the  hostility  that  unjust  practices  evoked6  The  hearings 
added  to  the  momentum  for  reform  by  publicising  the  party's  proced- 
ural  deficiencies.  After  such  revelations  failure  to  respond  would 
have  been  disastrous  for  public  relations.  As  Crotty  has  noted, 
"If  there  ever  had  been  a  road  back  from  significant  change, 
the  regional  hearings  virtually  assured  that  the  party  could 
not  take  it.  "47 
The  information  acquired  by  the  Commission  enabled  existing  prac- 
tices  to  be  measured  against  the  objectives  set  by  the  1968  convention. 
From  the  minority  Rules  Committee  report  this  entailed  the  provision 
of  "full  and  timely  opportunity  to  participate";  and  assuring  "even 
broader  citizen  participation  in  the  delegate  selection  process" 
(derived  from  the  Credentials  Committee).  The  perceived  discrepancies 
between  these  objectives  and  practice  generated  topics  for  reform. 
The  Commission  report,  Mandate  for  Reform,  was  drafted  bythe 
staff.  It  summarised  the  procedures  employed  by  each  state  in  1968, 
cumulated  their  deficiencies  and  made  proposals  for  change.  Meetings 
of  the  full  Commission  or  the  smaller  executive  committee  provided 
little  discussion  and  few  amendments  to  the  staff's  work. 
Assessing  the  procedures  in  use  in  1968  the  Commission  concluded 
that, 
"meaningful  participation  of  Democratic  voters  in  the 
choice  of  their  presidential  nominee  was  often  difficult 
or  costly,  sometimes  completely  illusory,  and,  in  not  a 
few  instances,  impossible.  " 
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This  conclusion  was  founded  on  six  inter-related  deficiencies 
1.  Rules  were  absent  or  inadequate. 
2.  Selection  commenced  before  the  election  year. -  77  - 
3.  Unrestrained  majority  rule  denied  representation  to  minority 
preferences  and  required  delegates  to  vote  contrary  to  their 
own  preferences. 
4.  Procedural  irregularities  (secret  caucuses,  misuse  of  proxies, 
etc.  )  were  rife. 
5.  Participation  as  a  delegate  was  expensive. 
6.  Convention  delegates  were  demographically  unrepresentative  of 
49 
the  electorate. 
In  framing  recommendations  the  Commission  was  confined  by  few 
constraints.  The  1968  convention  supplied  broad  objectives  but  speci- 
fied  only  eradication  of  the  unit  rule  and  the  concentration  of  dele- 
gate  selection  within  the  convention  year  as  the  means  to  secure 
them.  In  the  absence  of  instructions  from  outside,  the  Commission's 
proposals  were  conditioned  by  standards  derived  from  the  American 
democratic  creed  -  equal  protection,  equality  of  opportunity  and  due 
process.  These  standards  were  applied  to  a  nominating  system  which 
preserved  the  national  convention  as  not  inherently  undemocratic. 
50 
The  standards  were  applied  to  a  system  in  which  diversity  of  state 
delegate  selection  mechanisms  persisted.  The  Commissioners  opposed 
a  national  presidential  primary  and  any  increase  in  the  state  primaries, 
believing  that  a  participatory  process  was  consistent  with  the  reten- 
tion  of  the  convention-caucus  mechanism  as  the  dominant  mode  of 
selection.  Participatory  caucuses  were  viewed  as  a  block  to  the 
demand  for  primaries  to  produce  a  democratised  nomination 
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The  Commission's  eighteen  guidelines  were  aimed  at  three  categories 
of  problems.  First,  there  were  rules  or  practices  inhibiting  parti- 
cipation  which  included  discrimination  by  race,  age  or  sex;  onerous 
voter  registration  requirements;  the  expense  of  participation;  and 
the  absence  or  inadequacy  of  rules.  Secondly,  there  were  rules  or -  78  - 
practices  which  diluted  participants'  influence  including  proxy 
voting;  inadequate  quorum  provisions  for  selection  by  committees;  the 
unit  rule  and  other  depressants  of  minority  preference;  malapportion- 
ment;  unorthodox  means  of  selecting  alternates  and  filling  vacancies; 
and  the  integration  of  delegate  selection  into  regular  party  business. 
The  third  category  consisted  of  rules  and  practices  combining  the 
attributes  of  the  two  previous  categories.  Rules  and  practices  thus 
defined  as  inhibiting  access  and  diluting  participant  influence 
included  inadequate  public  notice  of  selection  meetings;  ex  officio 
delegates;  obstacles  to  enrolment  as  a  . 
Democrat;  selection  before  the 
election  year;  selection  by  committee  or  inaccessible  slate-making 
meetings. 
Procedural  safeguards  to  assure  access  and  influence,  and  positive 
discrimination  to  guarantee  participation  by  specific  groups  were 
adopted  to  correct  the  deficiencies.  Inhibitions  on  access  were 
attacked  by  measures  designed  to  widen  eligibility  for  participation, 
increase  knowledge  of  procedures  and  discriminate  in  favour  of  certain 
groups.  Each  state  party  was  required  to  produce  written  rules  defin- 
ing  delegate  selection  procedures  including  the  provisions  of  dates, 
times  and  locations  of  meetings.  Costs  and  fees  for  delegates  were 
recommended  (i.  e.  not  required)  for  abolition,  and  where  retained  were 
required  to  be  below  $10.  Petition  requirements  to  qualify  for 
delegate  status  in  excess  of  1  per  cent  of  the  standard  used  to  measure 
Democratic  strength  were  mandated  for  removal.  Onerous  voter  regis- 
tration  requirements  were  recommended  for  appeal.  To  preclude  racial 
discrimination  the  six  basic  elements  operative  for  1968  were  reiter- 
ated.  In  addition,  discrimination  by  race,  as  well  as  age  and  sex, 
was  attacked  by  the  requirement  that  minorities,  women  and  young  people 
(aged  under  thirty)  be  represented  on  national  convention  delegations -  79  - 
"in  reasonable  relationship  to  their  presence  in  the  population  of 
the  State.  "52  This  recommendation  for  race  (and  by  extrapolation  for 
age-and  sex  also)  was  qualified  by  the  statement  that  it  was  the 
Commission's  understanding  "that  this  not  be  accomplished  by  the 
mandatory  imposition  of  quotas.  " 
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To  preclude  dilution  of  influence,  measures  effecting  the  'one 
man,  one  vote'  principle  in  the  presidential  nominating  process  were 
devised.  The  unit  rule  was  outlawed  at  all  stages  of  selection  whilst 
representation  of  minority  presidential  preferences  throughout  was 
recommended.  Proxy  voting  was  outlawed.  In  non-primary  states  a 
minimum  of-three-quarters  of  the  delegates  were  required  to  be  chosen 
in  geographical  units  comprised  of  congressional  districts  or  smaller. 
The  apportionment  formula  for  the  intra-state  allocation  of  delegates 
was  required  to  be  based  upon  population  and/or  some  measure  of  Demo- 
cratic  voting  strength.  Further  measures  under  this  category 
included  the  clear  designation  of  meetings  concerned  with  delegate 
section;  40  per  cent  quorums  for  selection  by  committees;  alternates 
selected  by  the  same  range  of  devices  acceptable  for  delegate  selec- 
tion  -  primary,  convention  or  committee;  delegate  vacancies  to  be 
filled  by  decision  of  a  committee,  the  original  selection  mechanism 
or  the  rest  of  the  delegation. 
Measures  deemed  to  alleviate  the  combination  of  obstacles  to  both 
access  and  influence  were  principally  devices  for  enhancing  partici- 
pation  in  delegate  selection.  Ex  officio  delegates 
.  were  outlawed, 
meetings  to  select  delegates  and  draw  up  slates  were  required  to  be 
publicised  in  advance.  Selection  by  committee  was  restricted  to  10 
per  cent  of  state  delegations.  Selection  was  required  to  commence 
in  the  calendar  year  of  the  convention.  Eligibility  to  participate 
in  Democratic  processes  was  designed  to  be  widened  by  the  recommenda- 
tion  facilitating  easy  and  frequent  opportunity  to  enroll  as  a -  80  - 
Democrat.  Enhanced  influence  was  promoted  by  the  requirement  that 
delegate  candidates  specify  either  a  presidential  preference  or 
uncommitted  status  on  ballot  papers,  increasing  the  information  avail- 
able  to  voters  necessary  to  use  their  votes  to  maximum  effect. 
Issued  in  autumn  1969,  Mandate  for  Reform  pursued  trends  recurrent 
in  reform  of  the  nominating  process.  In  this  instance  participation 
was  sought  through  nationalisation.  Widened  public  involvement  in 
delegate  selection  was  pursued  through  the  introduction  of  nationally- 
imposed  standards. 
The  recurrent  themes  were  enunciated  in  the  introductory  section 
of  the  report.  The  Commission  goal  in  providing  the  guidelines  was 
defined  as  "to  stimulate  the  participation  of  all  Democrats  in  the 
nominating  process  and  to  re-establish  public  confidence  in  the 
National  Convention.  " 
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Nationalisation  was  the  means  to  the  parti- 
cipatory  end,  "In  order  to  ensure  the  democratic  selection  of  delegates, 
the  Commission  has  adopted  18  Guidelines  binding  on  all  state  Parties.  "55 
The  Commissioners  drew  upon  the  traditions  of  party  reform  to 
legitimise  their  proposals.  They  noted  the  growing  democratisation 
of  the  presidential  nominating  process  from  the  inception  of  national 
conventions,  marking  the  1968  reform  commitment  as  an  acceleration  of 
the  trend  towards  popular  participation.  The  participatory  trend  was 
located  in  the  party's  tradition, 
"Since  its  inception,  our  Party  has  been  an  open  party  -  open 
to  new  ideas  and  new  people.  From  the  days  of  Jefferson 
and  Jackson,  the  new  Democratic  Party  has  been  committed 
to  broad  participation  of  rank-and-file  members  in  all  of 
its  major  decision-making. 
"In  the  American  two-party  system  no  decision  is  more 
important  to  the  rank-and-file  member  than  the  choice  of 
the  party's  presidential  nominee.  For  this  reason,  popular 
control  over  the  nominating  process  has  been  a  principle  of 
the  Democratic  Party  since  the  birth  of  the  National  Con- 
vention  140  years  ago.  " 
57 -  81  - 
The  1968  convention's  response  to  the  revelations  of  the  failings 
of  participation  was  also  located  in  the  reform  tradition  that  the 
ills  of  democracy  are  curable  by  more  democracy 
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Party  commissions  are  unlikely  sources  of  radical  change  so 
McGovern-Fraser's  adventurbusnes4n  pursuing  reform  requires  explan- 
ation.  Some  change  was  inevitable  given  the  consensus  within  the 
party  that  a  repeat  of  the  1968  abuses  must  be  avoided.  The  hearings 
advertised  these  abuses  enhancing  pressure  on  the  party  to  rectify 
its  deficiencies  to  restore  its  image. 
That  the  degree  of  change  was  so  extensive  is  attributable  to 
factors  internal  to  the  Commission  -  biases  in  its  composition,  part- 
icipation,  staffing  and  mode  of  operation.  As  already  suggested, 
the  membership  of  the  commission  was  biased  towards  reform  by  the 
selection  policy  of  chairman  Harris.  Spokesmen  for  a  professional 
style  of  party  -  represented  by  urban  parties  or  in  the  AFL-CIO 
unions  -  were  few.  The  biases  in  composition  were  reinforced  by  those 
in  participation.  Supporters  of  reform  tended  to  be  active  in  the 
Commission's  work  whilst  its  opponents  or  more  cautious  reformers  were 
under-represented.  For  example,  the  AFL-CIO  ignored  the  Commission's 
work  and  in  consequence  its  one  representative  opted  out  of  its 
proceedings.  The  Commission  staff  were  committed  reformers  who 
utilised  their  positions  to  secure  their  objectives.  Full-time 
employees,  they  were  able  to  devote  attention  to  the  Commission's 
activities  and  develop  expertise  in  its  subject-matter  that  the 
part-time  Commission  members  never  equalled.  The  staff  set  the  agenda 
for  meetings,  and  drafted  the  reform  guidelines.  They  liaised  with 
sympathetic  Commissioners  in  developing  proposals,  lobbied  their 
support  and  encouraged  them  to  participate.  The  staff  thus  provided 
an  organisational  locus  for  reform  which  its  opponents  never  developed. -  82  - 
Several  members  of  the  Commission  subsequently  admitted  that  its 
activities  had  been  a  "runaway  staff  operation.  "59 
The  Commission's  mode  of  operation  of  identifying  specific 
abuses  and  matching  remedies  contributed  to  an  adventurous  product. 
This  compartmentalised  approach  discouraged  an  appreciation  of  the 
cumulative  impact  of  the  reform  proposals.  Their  implications  as  a 
acp  kage  were  not  discussed  in  Commission  meetings  and  probably  not 
widely  recognised  (except  by  the  staff). 
Like  previous  reform  efforts,  the  outputs  of  the  McGovern-Fraser 
Commission  were  conditioned  by  the  political  pressures  and  values  of 
the  period  in  which  it  operated.  Demands  for  participation  were 
prolific  in  American  society  in  the  1960's.  It  was  exemplified  within 
the  governmental  system  in  the  civil  rights  campaign,  and  outside  it 
in  student  demands  for  democratisation  of  the  institutions  of  higher 
education.  The  legitimacy  of  participation  was  evinced  and  enhanced 
by  its  incorporation  into  government  programmes  such  as  community 
action  and  model  cities60 
The  reform  measures  sought  to  respond  to  the  emergence  of  newly 
active  and  assertive  groups  in  the  electorate  -  issue  activists, 
blacks,  women  and  the  young.  Issue  activists  were  viewed  as  the 
principal  victims  of  the  1968  process6l  Their  activism  and  their 
numbers  elevated  them  into  a  potent  political  force.  Granting  them 
access  to  the  party  would  contribute  to  its  internal  debates  and 
reach  out  for  their  electoral  allegiance.  Continued  exclusion  wasted 
potential  support  but  also  threatened  the  party's  survival.  Desig- 
nating  the  party  as  the  principal  vehicle  for  progressive  peaceful 
change  the  Commissioners  asserted  : 
"If  we  are  not  an  open  party;  if  we  do  not  represent  the 
demands  of  change,  then  the  danger  is  not  that  people 
will  go  to  the  Republican  Party;  it  is  that  there  will -  83  - 
no  longer  be  a  way  for  people  committed  to  orderly  change 
to  fulfill  their  needs  and  desires  within  our  traditional 
political  system.  It  is  that  they  will  turn  to  third  and 
fourth  party  politics  or  the  anti-politics  of  the  street.  " 
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The  Wallace  candidacy  and  the  disorder  in  Chicago  gave  plausibility 
to  both  threats. 
Blacks  had  previously  been  excluded  from  party  affairs  in  the 
South  but  no  evidence  of  discrimination  against  women  and  the  young 
was  produced.  Rather,  the  incentive  to  guaranteeing  representation 
to  these  probably  derived  from  the  evidence  of  their  increasing 
activism  and,  ostensibly,  of  cohesive  group  interests.  Following 
the  Civil  Rights  Acts  and  the  Twenty-Fourth  Amendment  blacks  were 
voting  in  increasing  numbers.  The  emergence  of  the  women's  movement 
mobilised  women  into  politics  with  specific  group  interests.  Vietnam 
and  other  issues  activated  the  young  whilst  the  projected  lowering 
of  the  voting  age  to  eighteen  heralded  enhanced  influence.  Each  of 
these  groups,  all  with  representatives  on  the  Commission,  were 
potentially  important  recruits  to  the  Democratic  coalition.  Incen- 
tives  were  needed  to  attract  their  support,  a  pressing  demand  for 
the  party  whose  traditional  constituents  had  deserted  in  large  numbers 
at  the  previous  election.  Commissioner  Dutton  provided  the  electoral 
rationalisation  for  guarantees  of  participation,  "we're  talking 
about  winning  elections,  we've  got  to  provide  the  symbols.  " 
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Positive  discrimination,  the  chosen  method  for  providing  symbols, 
was  consistent  with  the  evolution  of  liberal  ideas  in  the  1960's. 
Government  programmes  registered  a  shift  from  attempts  to  provide 
equality  of  opportunity  to  equality  of  result.  This  entailed  guar- 
antees  of  minority  representation  in  the  distribution  of  government 
contracts,  jobs  and  places  in  higher  education -  84  - 
The  Implementation  of  Reform 
The  Commission's  proposals  promised  the  most  extensive  changes 
to  the  presidential  nominating  process  since  the  inception  of  national 
conventions.  Unlike  previous  revisions  in  delegate  selection  proc- 
edures  the  Commission's  proposals  had  implications  universally  where 
earlier  reforms  were  pertinent  principally  to  the  South. 
There  were  two  possible  obstacles  to  the  implementation  of  reform. 
The  first  hinged  on  whether  the  Commission  possessed  the  authority 
to  require  conformity  with  its  measures.  The  1968  convention  mandate 
establishing  the  Commission  derived  from  the  Credentials  Committee 
requirement  that  a  Special  Committee  report  its  findings  to  the  national 
committee  and  make  them  available  to  the  1972  convention.  In  addition, 
the  mandate  authorised  apparently  a  second  Special  Committee  to  aid 
the  state  parties  in  meeting  the  requirements  of  the  1972  Call  and 
report  its  efforts  and  findings  to  the  convention  and  its  committees. 
This  wording  intimated  that  the  Commission  lacked  independent  authority. 
Rather  it  was  subordinate  to,  variously,  the  national  committee,  the 
1972  convention  and  its  committees.  Moreover,  the  wording  implied 
that  there  would  be  two  committees,  one  to  devise  proposals  and  a 
second  to  assist  the  state  parties  in  conforming  to  the  1972  Call. 
On  this  interpretation,  McGovern-Fraser  would  have  no  role  in  securing 
implementation. 
The  second  obstacle  to  implementation  was  the  weak  authority  of 
national  party  organs  in  a  federalised  party  system.  State  parties  are 
traditionally  depicted  as  autonomous  units,  free  from  nationally-imposed 
discipline.  If  the  party's  national  organs  propounded  reforms  could 
they  impose  it  on  state  parties  and  what  penalties  were  available  to 
punish  non-compliance? -  85  - 
The  Commissioners  sought  to  vault  these  obstacles  by  an  assertion 
of  authority.  They  claimed  independent  authority  to  devise  reform 
proposals,  monitor  their  implementation  and  place  the  Credentials 
Committee  of  the  1972  convention  under  obligation  to  penalise  default- 
ing  state  parties  by  refusing  to  seat  them.  In  Mandate  for  Reform 
the  argument  was  presented  that  the  Commission  was  a  creation  of  the 
1968  national  convdntion,  the  party's  governing  body.  The  Commission 
was  subordinate  to  nobody  but  the  national  convention.  As  the  1968 
convention  was  no  longer  in  existence  only  its  successor  was  competent 
to  review  the  Commission's  actions.  Unless  reviewed  by  the  1972 
convention  (i.  e.  after  the  completion  of  that  year's  delegate  selection), 
the  Commissioners  argued  that  their  guidelines  were  binding  on  the 
state  parties65  The  Commission  also  appropriated  to  itself  responsi- 
bility  for  supervising  implementation  arguing,  "Ourmandate  is  to  work 
with  state  parties  ...  "66  In  dealing  with  cases  of  default,  the 
Commissioners  argued  that  they  possessed  the  same  legal  status  and 
options  as  the  Special  Equal  Rights  Committee  which  had  devised  the 
anti-discrimination  rules  after  1964.  In  issuing  its  regulations 
that  committee  threatened  that  its  response  to  non-compliance  would 
be  a  recommendation  to  the  Credentials  Committee  that  defaulting 
delegations  be  denied  seating67 
The  Commissioners  advanced  bold,  probably  specious  claims  but 
they  gained  acceptance.  The  national  committee  acquiesced  in  the 
Commission's  assertion  of  independence,  and  the  state  parties  imple- 
mented  the  guidelines.  The  national  committee's  acquiescence  probably 
pivoted  on  an  interpretation  of  the  Commission's  authority  by  the 
party's  legal  counsel,  Joseph  Califano,  which  endorsed  its  claims  to 
independence68  National  party  chairman  Lawrence  O'Brien  appointed 
a  screening  committee  on  delegate  selection  but,  pressurised  by -  86  - 
McGovern,  defined  its  role  as  to  assist  in  implementing  the  guidelines 
not  to  evaluate  their  legality 
69 
In  February  1971  the  national 
committee  incorporated  the  guidelines  without  amendment  into  the 
preliminary  Call  to  the  1972  convention. 
When  the  Commission  first  issued  its  guidelines  no  state  party's 
existing  procedures  satisfied  all  requirements.  Several  states  were 
out  of  compliance  with  most  of  the  fifteen  compulsory  guidelines. 
Yet  by  the  time  the  1972  convention  assembled  most  states  were  in 
full  conformity,  a  minority  in  "substantial  conformity.  ,  70 
State  party  obedience  followed  in  part  from  the  Commission's 
assertiveness.  The  guidelines  were  claimed  to  be  party  law  revocable 
only  by  the  1972  convention.  They  were  communicated  to  each  state 
party  by  Commission  staff  and  the  areas  in  need  of  remedy  specified. 
The  staff  lobbied  state  party  leaders  for  change  and  offered  guidance 
on  which  procedures  remained  out  of  conformity  with  Commission  norms. 
The  pressure  to  reform  was  enhanced  by  the  Commission's  threat  that 
non-compliance  would  lead  to  exclusion  from  the  convention. 
National  party  leaders'  support  for  reform  added  weight  to  the 
pressure  upon  state  parties  to  conform.  Party  chairman  Lawrence 
O'Brien  embraced  the  reforms.  His  prestige  amongst  the  professionals 
gave  the  reforms  credibility  to  suspicious  state  party  leaders. 
Humphrey,  Edward  Kennedy,  Muskie  and  McCarthy  also  endorsed  reform. 
A  further  assist  to  the  implementation  effort  derived  from  the  desire 
of  some  state  leaders,  particularly  amongst  the  crop  of  governors 
elected  in  1970,  either  for  reform  or  the  consolidation  of  their  support 
amongst  reformers  in  their  parties 
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Acceptance  of  reform  was  also  eased  because  state  leaders  were 
not  necessarily  committed  to  the  old  procedures  although  they  utilised 
them.  Power,  rather  than  procedural  forms,  was  their  priority.  Prob- -  87  - 
ably  some  leaders  misperceived  the  extent  to  which  changes  in  the  latter 
could  reallocate  the  former.  Mark  Siegal's  research  uncovered  such 
an  example  in  Pennsylvania  where  a  party  leader  commented,  "We  let 
them  change  the  damned  rules  because  we're  going  to  work  it  our 
way  anyway... 
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The  widespread  expectation  that  Muskie  would  be  the 
next  nominee  eased  acceptance  of  reform.  Acceptable  to  the  profes- 
sionals,  Muskie  was  regarded  as  the  inevitable  nominee  irrespective 
of  the  rules73  For  party  leaders  who  recognised  the  impact  of  the 
reforms  their  acceptance  was  consistent  with  the  traditional  profess- 
ional  strategy  of  inclusion.  Elements  had  been  excluded  in  1968  to 
the  party's  detriment.  To  open  the  party  in  the  future  would  stren- 
gthen  it  in  manpower  and  electoral  support. 
An  unintended  accompaniment  to  the  implementation  of  reform  was 
the  proliferation  of  presidential  primaries.  Resisting  the  demand  for 
more  primaries  had  been  a  goal  of  the  Commissioners  yet  between  1968 
and  1972  a  further  six  states  adopted  them.  In  1972  primaries  were 
used  in  twenty-three  states  and  two-thirds  of  all  national  convention 
delegates  were  selected  in  or  bound  by  primaries,  an  18  per  cent 
increase  on  1968. 
Reform  was  a  substantial  contributor  to  the  increase  in  primaries, 
though  not  its  single  cause.  Reform  repudiated  some  selection  mechan- 
isms  that  had  been  employed  in  1968,  compelling  state  parties  to  find 
alternatives.  Maryland  and  Rhode  Island  in  1968  selected  by  state 
committee,  a  mechanism  limited  to  a  maximum  of  10  per  cent  of  the 
delegation  for  1972.  Tennessee  and  Michigan  selected  all  or  most  of 
their  delegates  in  an  "untimely"  manner.  All  four  states  opted  for 
primaries  in  1972.  The  appeal  of  primaries  after  reform  was  to  offer 
a  selection  mechanism  consistent  with  the  Commission's  objectives  of 
timely  and  participatory  procedures  whilst  avoiding  the  complex  reform -  88  - 
rules  which  applied  principally  to  the  non-primary  process,  any 
contravention  of  which  risked  exclusion  from  the  national  convention. 
Factors  unrelated  to  reform  contributed  to  the  attractiveness 
of  primaries.  They  brought  media  attention  to  states  holding  them, 
as  exemplified  in  1968.  They  were  also  a  means  of  separating  state 
from  national  politics.  National  candidate  and  issue  preferences 
generated  intra-party  divisions  in  1968  to  the  Democrats'  detriment 
in  state  and  local  contests.  Presidential  primaries  offered  a  means 
of  removing  divisive  national  concerns  to  the  party's  electoral 
benefit. 
The  1972  Democratic  nominating  process  demonstrated  the  realis- 
ation  of  many  reformers'  goals.  Public  participation  in  all  delegate 
selection  more  than  doubled  over  1968  and  trebled  in  the  non-primary 
states  although  they  had  declined  in  numbers  from  four  years  earlier 
T4 
Amongst  national  convention  delegates  the  numbers  of  women  and  young 
people  were  close  to  their  proportions  in  the  population  whilst  blacks 
were  over-represented  by  this  standard.  For  all  three  groups  repre- 
sentation  increased  substantially  over  196875 
The  convention  continued  the  process  of  applying  the  reform  rules. 
Decisions  in  the  Credentials  Committee  and  on  the  convention  floor 
evidenced  a  willingness  of  the  party's  national  organs  to  demand 
adherence  to  the  reform  guidelines  from  its  constituent  state  parties. 
Given  thatthe  vast  majority  of  guidelines  had  been  adopted  by  the 
state  parties  the  Credentials  Committee's  role  in  disposing  of 
challenges  was  "not  so  much  in  enforcing  the  national  requirement  ... 
but  in  whether  a  state  abided  by  its  own  rules  in  its  selection  pro- 
cedures  . 
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In  the  two  most  controversial  challenges  which  reached  the  con- 
vention  floor  national  party  requirements  were  upheld,  in  one  instance -  89  - 
state  law  notwithstanding.  The  Credentials  Committee  unseated 
delegates  elected  in  primaries  in  Illinois  and  California  for  non- 
compliance  with  a  national  party  requirement  in  the  first  instance 
and  a  recommendation  in  the  second.  The  unseated  delegates  had  recourse 
to  the  courts,  eventually  reaching  the  Supreme  Court.  The  Court 
declined  to  rule  for  shortage  of  time  before  the  convention  assembled 
but  intimated  its  reluctance  to  insert  the  judiciary  into  the  politi- 
cal  process,  citing  the  national  convention  as  the  proper  forum  for 
deciding  such  intra-party  disputes77 
On  the  convention  floor  Illinois  delegates  slated  by  a  closed 
meeting  and  demographically  unrepresentative  were  unseated.  The 
Illinois  party  was  in  transgression  of  national  party  rules  but  not 
state  law.  In  the  California  case  delegates  selected  in  a  winner-take- 
all  primary  -  compulsory  under  state  law  but  recommended  (though  not 
required)  for  abolition  by  McGovern-Fraser  -  were  sustained  in  their 
seats. 
The  import  of  these  two  convention  decisions  was  to  institute 
priorities  between  various  types  of  rules  and  laws.  National  party 
rules  took  precedence  over  state  laws.  (A  ranking  subsequently 
endorsed  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  its  disposition  of  the  Illinois  case 
in  1975.78)  State  laws  took  priority  over  national  party  non-compulsory 
rules  where  state  party  rules  did  not  require  them. 
Though  the  convention  wastupportive  of  reform,  deficiencies  in 
the  new  system  were  recognised.  The  Rules  Committee  report  recommen- 
ded  three  specific  reforms  for  1976  and  a  general  review  of  procedures. 
The  three  problems  specified  for  reform  were  winner-take-all  primaries, 
participation  by  non-Democrats  and  delegates  disobeying  binding  primary 
mandates.  Delegates  were  to  be'-selected  in  a  manner  which  provided  a 
fair  reflection  of  the  division  of  preferences  of  those  participating 
in  the  selection  process.  This  ruled  out  winner-take-all  primaries -  90  - 
(as  in  California),  and  required  that  minorities  should  not  be  repre- 
sented  simply  in  principle  but  also  in  numbers  approximating  the 
proportions  of  participants  in  the  selection  process.  Primary  parti- 
cipation  was  to  be  confined  to  registered  Democrats  proscribing 
crossover  primaries  such  as  Wisconsin's  which  allowed  Republicans 
to  participate  in  Democratic  Party  processes  and  vice  versa.  Candi- 
dates  were  given  the  right  to  approve  delegates  running  on  their 
behalf  to  provide  a  check  on  their  loyalty. 
A  new  commission  was  proposed  charged  with  three  tasks: 
1.  To  review  the  1972  guidelines  "for  the  purpose  of  making  approp- 
riate  revisions  of  such  guidelines  after  due  consideration  of 
their  operation.  " 
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2.  Adopt  guidelines  necessary  to  implement  the  Call  to  the  1976 
convention  (i.  e.  including  the  three  reforms  specified  above). 
3.  Give  attention  through  monitoring  and  compliance  review  to  the 
requirement  that  the  state  and  national  parties  "take  affirmative 
action  to  achieve  full  participation  of  minorities,  youth,  and 
women  in  the  delegate  selection  process  and  all  party  affairs.  . 
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These  convention  decisions  failed  to  reflect  the  widespread  host- 
ility  within  the  party  engendered  by  the  reform  rules  in  operation. 
Traditional  power-wielders  in  Democratic  conventions  -  elected  Office- 
holders,  party  officials,  AFL-CIO  leaders  -  were  less  numerous  and 
less  influential  than  in  the  past.  Their  favoured  candidates  failed 
whilst  McGovern  triumphed  despite  their  hostility.  Though  their 
unenthusiasm  for  McGovern  could  not  prevent  his  nomination  it  proved 
a  major  obstacle  to  his  election.  The  unenthusiasm  of  the  party's 
leaders  was  replicated  by  many  of  its  voters.  The  consequence  was 
the  severest  defeat  suffered  by  a  Democratic  presidential  candidate. 
But  discontent  with  the  1972  process  and  its  outcome  did  not -  91  - 
develop  into  a  wholesale  reaction  against  reform  on  the  new  commission 
(the  Commission  on  Delegate  Selection  and  Party  Structure,  known  after 
its  chairwoman  Mikulski).  Particular  components  of  the  reformed 
process  were  targeted  for  revision  but  the  commitment  to  a  parti- 
cipatory  system  was  preserved. 
Three  reasons  can  be  adduced  for  the  continued  support  for  a 
participatory  process.  First,  the  principal  target  for  revision,  the 
(in  effect)  quotas  for  representation  of  women,  minorities  and  the 
young  acted  as  a  lightning  rod  for  discontent.  The  deficiencies  of 
1972  -  the  exclusion  of  party  leaders,  the  nomination  of  McGovern 
(who  had  appealed  to  the  quota  groups),  the  party's  radical  image  - 
were  attributed  to  the  quotas  rather  than  to  the  reforms  as  a  whole. 
Thus  the  quotas  were  sacrificed  whilst  most  of  the  reformed  system 
survived  unscathed.  Secondly,  there  had  been  a  consensus  within  the 
party  for  a  more  participatory  system  and  in  1972  this  objective  had 
been  secured.  Thirdly,  any  attempted  closing  of  the  process  would 
have  met  resistance.  Pro-reform  elements  were  a  force  within  the 
party  who  would  have  to  be  overcome  to  curb  participation.  Even  if 
their  opposition  was  surmountable  the  costs  for  party  unity  would 
have  been  substantial.  Cutting  back  would  also  have  been  a  thorny 
public  relations  problem.  The  party  would  be:  seen  to  be  revoking 
its  commitments  to  participation  which  had  emerged  as  responses  to  the 
deficiencies  of  1968  aired  in  public  hearings.  Even  for  those  opposed 
to  participation  there  were  pragmatic  rationales  for  its  retention. 
Published  in  1973,  the  Commission's  report  gave  prominence  to 
the  continued  commitment  to  participation.  The  preamble  to  the 
revised  rules  stated  that  their  objects  included  that  they  should  be 
"inclusive  of  all  elements  of  the  Democratic  constituency  and  fair 
to  all  those  who  seek  to  influence  the  Presidential  nominating  process.  "$1 -  92  - 
A  strong,  united  and  electorally  successful  party  was  sought  through 
"two  overriding  principles  ...  fairness  and  openness.  .. 
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Like  its 
predecessor,  the  Commission  located  the  commitment  to  participation 
in  the  Democratic  Party's  tradition, 
"As  long  as  the  Democratic  Party  has  been  in  existence,  it 
has  been  dedicated  to  easing  barriers  to  citizen  partici- 
pation  in  the  political  decision-making  process  and, 
especially  economic  and  other  unreasonable  barriers  to 
holding  elective  office.  "83 
Much  of  the  Commission's  report  was  a  reiteration  of  the 
McGovern-Fraser  rules.  The  principal  revisions  were  the  abolition  of 
quotas  and  an  increase  in  the  proportions  of  delegates  that  could  be 
selected  at-large  in  each  state.  Quotas  were  replaced  by  affirmative 
action  programmes  designed  to  encourage  participation  with  particular 
concern  for  minority  groups,  Native  Americans,  women  and  youth.  All 
state  programmes  were  to  be  vetted  by  a  specially  created  Compliance 
Review  Commission.  In  contrast  to  the  quota  provisions,  the  composi- 
tion  of  national  convention  delegation  was  not,  of  itself,  proof  of 
discrimination. 
Selection  by  state  committees  or  by  publicly  elected  delegates 
was  increased  to  facilitate  the  representation  of  public  officials, 
party  officials  and  members  of  traditional  under-represented  groups. 
Whilst  guaranteeing  larger  representation  of  the  officialdom  con- 
spicuously  absent  in  1972  they  were  denied  the  right  to  vote  their 
own  candidate  preferences.  Rather,  they  were  to  reflect  the  division 
of  preferences  of  the  publicly  elected  delegates.  The  Commissioners 
thus  sought  to  combine  leadership  inclusion  with  rank-and-file  deter-. 
mination  of  the  nomination. 
Other  Mikulski  reforms  pursued  the  McGovern-Fraser  goal  of  proh- 
ibiting  rules  or  practices  diluting  influence.  Fair  reflection  of 
participants'  presidential  preferences  in  delegates  was  advanced  by 
the  institution  of  proportional  representation.  At  all  levels  of -  93  - 
the  selection  process  delegates  were  to  be  distributed  in  proportion 
to  the  preferences  of  participants  although  a  threshold  of  10  per 
cent  of  the  total  vote  (later  revised  to  15  per  cent)  could  be  imposed. 
All  candidates  for  delegate  were  to  identify  their  presidential 
preference  or  declare  their  uncommitted  status.  To  ensure  that 
delegates  remained  faithful  to  their  pledges  they  were  subject  to 
approval  by  the  relevant  candidate.  Proxy  voting  was  reintroduced. 
Where  a  participant  had  to  leave  a  meeting  before  its  conclusion  he 
was  allowed  to  leave  his  vote  with  another  individual.  Participation 
was  restricted  to  Democratic  identifiers. 
The  Commission's  recommendations  were  approved  by  the  national 
committee  with  minor  modifications  (including  the  heightened  threshold 
for  representation).  It  thereupon  disbanded.  The  responsibility  for 
implementation  was  entrusted  to  a  specially  created  Compliance  Review 
Commission. 
Because  it  built  on  the  foundations  of  its  predecessor,  compliance 
with  the  Mikulski  guidelines  was  a  less  arduous  task  for  state  parties 
than  four  years  earlier.  Neither  the  scope  nor  number  of  changes  were 
as  great.  In  most  states  only  minor  changes  were  necessary.  The 
greatest  controversy  arose  over  the  Democrats-only  provision  which 
disbarred  crossover  primaries  from  a  role  in  delegate  selection.  In 
one  such  state,  Wisconsin,  attempts  to  institute  a  closed  primary  were 
defeated  in  the  state  legislature.  Wisconsin  had  proved  hospitable 
territory  to  liberals  in  the  past  and  for  1976  was  a  key  state  for 
Morris  Udall's  campaign.  Preserving  the  Wisconsin  primary  in  delegate 
selection  became  vital  to  Udall's  strategy.  His  supporters  lobbied 
the  Compliance  Review  Commission  for  its  retention  and  ultimately 
succeeded8 
The  survival  of  the  reformed  process  added  to  the  incentives  for -  94  - 
the  adoption  of  primaries.  By  1976  a  further  seven  states  had  added 
primaries  to  produce  a  total  of  thirty  generating  three-quarters  of 
the  delegate  total.  Primaries  offered  a  means  for  overcoming  the 
activist  minorities  who  dominated  some  caucuses  in  1972.  For  example, 
McGovern  showed  impressive  strength  in  southern  caucuses  despite  his 
meagre  support  amongst  the  electorate  there.  Primaries,  by  mobilising 
larger  numbers  into  delegate  selection,  enabled  the  influence  of 
activist  minorities  to  be  depressed.  Four  of  the  new  primary  states 
were  in  the  South.  McGovern's  success  in  theprimaries  in  1972  demon- 
strated  their  potential  for  transforming  a  little-known  candidate  into 
the  nominee.  Some  of  his  subsequent  imitators  sought  the  adoption 
of  primaries  in  favourable  territory,  seeking  to  maximise  the  impact 
of  localised  support.  The  passage  of  primary  law  in  Georgia,  designed 
to  aid  the  candidacy  of  Jimmy  Carter,  is  such  an  example. 
Forces  other  than  reform,  such  as  the  desire  to  attract  media 
attention  to  state's  delegate  selection,  continued  to  inspire  the 
adoption  of  primaries  but  they  gained  in  strength  in  the  context  of 
the  reformed  system.  Multiple  candidacies,  delegates  won  through 
public  mandates  and  proportional  representation  promising  a  return  in 
delegates  without  the  pre-condition  of  victory  all  worked  to  guarantee 
that  any  primaries  that  were  instituted  would  be  contested.  The 
influx  of  candidates  would  be  accompanied  by  money  and  publicity. 
Prior  to  reform,  primaries  frequently  failed  to  attract  candidates 
(and  thus  the  corollaries  of  their  entry)  diminishing  their  attract- 
iveness  as  selection  devices. 
Concern  over  the  growth  of  primaries  stimulated  the  party  chair- 
man  Robert  Strauss  in  1975  to  establish  a  commission  designed  to  find 
ways  to  curb  their  number  and  influence.  Chaired  by  Michigan  party 
chairman  Morley  Winograd,  the  group  was  designated  as  the  Commission 
on  the  Role  and  Future  of  Presidential  Primaries.  At  the  1976  convention -  95  - 
the  group's  remit  was  widened  to  incorporate  a  general  revision  of 
delegate  selection  rules  and  retitled  the  commission  on  Presidential 
Nomination  and  Party  Structure.  The  convention  voted  to  end  loophole 
primaries  (those  where  the  plurality  winner  in  each  district  won  all 
the  delegates  facilitating  a  winner-take-all  system  for  the  state 
as  a  whole).  Like  its  predecessors,  the  Commission  was  assigned  the 
responsibility  for  implementing  the  convention's  instruction. 
The  context  in  which  the  Winograd  Commission  worked  differed 
from  that  of  its  predecessors.  The  party  had  won  the  1976  presiden- 
tial  election.  Party  leaders  had  found  Carter  acceptable  if  not 
their  first  preference.  The  1976  nominating  contest  aroused  little 
controversy,  and  the  party  entered  the  election  united. 
Commission  activities  were  thus  conditioned  by  the  party's  control 
of  the  presidency,  usually  the  dominating  influence  in  national  party 
affairs.  Presidential  interests  were  built  into  the  Commission  after 
the  election,  with  the  addition  of  several  Carter  representatives, 
including  three  White  House  aides. 
The  intrusion  of  the  president's  interests  generated  controversies 
in  the  Commission's  work  extending  beyond  the  completion  of  its  report. 
In  consequence,  the  national  committee  was  required  to  exert  greater 
initiative  than  formerly  in  seeking  to  resolve  disputes  conclusively 
where  the  commission  failed.  Heightened  conflict  characterised  the 
Winograd  Commission  compared  with  its  predecessors  because  to  a 
greater  extent  than  formerly  party  factions  adopted  distinctive 
stances  on  procedure. 
The  commitment  to  participation  of  the  earlier  commissions  was 
preserved  as  reflected  in  the  title  of  its  report,  Openness,  Partici- 
pation  and  Party  Building  Reforms  for  a  Stronger  Democratic  Party85 
But  the  president's  interests  were  translated  into  constrictions  on 
candidate  entry  and  delegate  representation.  Critics  interpreted -  96  - 
these  changes  as  means  to  diluting  opposition  to  Carter's  re-nomination. 
Administration  spokesmen  justified  them  as  measures  promoting  con- 
sensus,  eliminating  marginal  candidates  and  assuring  a  nominee  with 
broad  support. 
Under  the  Winograd  guidelines  the  delegate  selection  process  was 
to  be  concentrated  within  a  three  month  period  (known  as  the  "window 
concept").  Filing  deadlines  for  entering  primaries  were  set  two  to 
three  months  prior  to  the  vote.  Proportional  representation  thresholds 
were  phased  according  to  when  selection  began  (the  "sliding  window"). 
In  the  first  month  the  threshold  was  set  at  15  per  cent  rising  to 
20  per  cent  in  the  second  and  25  per  cent  in  the  third.  Following  the 
convention's  mandate,  loophole  primaries  were  prohibited.  Each  state 
delegation  was  to  be  enlarged  by  10  per  cent,  the  supplement  to 
consist  of  party  leaders  and  elected  officials  mandated  to  vote  in 
the  same  proportions  as  the  elected  delegates.  Crossover  primaries 
were  outlawed  without  exception. 
Though  the  administration  forged  a  majority  on  the  Commission, 
the  defeated  minority  remained  unreconciled.  The  national  committee's 
review  o4he  Commission's  product  was  characterised  by  an  endeavour 
to  compromise  disagreements  and  heal  the  divisions  that  they  had  aroused. 
The  two  most  contentious  issues,  primary  filing  deadlines  and  propor- 
tional  representation  thresholds,  were  both  resolved  through  compromise 
solutions.  The  deadlines  guideline  aroused  opposition  from  the 
states  because  many  laws  required  amendment  to  enforce  it.  In  res- 
ponse  the  national  committee  widened  the  period  for  filing.  For 
delegate  allocation  the  "sliding  window"  was  scrapped.  For  the  final 
stage  of  the  caucus  process  and  the  selection  of  at-large  primary  dele- 
gates  the  threshold  for  representation  was  set  at  a  minimum  of  15  per 
cent  and  a  maximum  of  20  per  cent.  At  earlier  stages  of  caucus -"97 
selection  lower  thresholds  were  permissible.  For  primary  delegates 
elected  by  district  the  maximum  threshold  was  set  at  25  per  cent. 
On  the  less  contentious  issues  the  committee  ratified  the  commission 
proposals. 
Crossover  primaries  proved  the  principal  obstruction  to  the 
implementation  of  Winograd.  Most  states  holding  such  primaries  for 
delegate  selection  responded  to  the  Commission's  report  by  shifting 
to  a  caucus  process  although  some  retained  a  primary  for  the  expression 
of  presidential  preference  only  (i.  e.  a  "beauty  contest"  having  no 
bearing  on  the  selection  of  delegates).  In  Wisconsin,  however,  the 
state  party  insisted  upon  using  its  crossover  primary  for  delegate 
selection.  The  state  party  took  its  case  to  the  state  court  which 
ruled  in  favour  of  the  Wisconsin  party  and  ordered  the  national  party 
to  give  official  recognition  to  the  results  of  the  primary. 
86 
No 
appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  was  possible  before  the  convention,  so 
Wisconsin  preserved  its  primary  against  national  party  rules. 
Initially  established  to  check  the  growth  of  primaries,  the 
aftermath  of  the  Winograd  report  was  their  continuing  proliferation 
(see  Table  3.1).  The  Commission  had  taken  some  steps  to  discourage 
primaries  such  as  the  proscription  of  the  crossover  type,  and  the 
window  designed  to  cluster  selection  processes  thereby  reducing  the 
visibility  of  any  one  state.  But  the  Commissioners  declined  to 
assert  themselves  further.  Only  half  the  members  desired  a  greater 
preponderance  of  caucuses  and,  like  their  forerunners  on  McGovern- 
Fraser,  the  commissioners  opposed  a  national  party  rule  prescribing 
a  single  selection  mechanism. 
87 
The  proliferation  of  primaries  after  1976  was  a  response  to  the 
pressures  generated  by  the  reformed  process  in  general  rather  than 
to  the  Winograd  rules  specifically.  Primaries  continued  to  be  the -  98  - 
principal  recipients  of  candidate  and  media  attention,  particularly 
those  early  in  the  sequence.  Unsurprisingly,  most  of  the  new  primary 
states  scheduled  their  elections  early.  Primaries  were  also  estab- 
lished  to  suit  the  strategies  of  individual  candidates,  on  this 
occasion  in  the  multi-candidate  Republican  contest. 
Reform  in  the  Republican  Party 
Continuing  debate  in  the  Democratic  Party  over  reform  of  the 
nominating  process  after  1968  stands  beside  over  a  decade  of 
Republican  tranquility.  One  observer  of  the  Republicans  has  commented 
that,  "There  is  not,  in  fact,  a  whole  lot  to  say  with  respect  to 
substantive  party  change.  "88  But  tranquility  has  not  been  inactivity. 
Like  the  Democrats,  the  Republicans  from  1968  established  a  series 
of  bodies  to  propose  changes  in  party  practice  including  the  rules  of 
delegate  selection.  Some  of  the  resulting  proposals  paralleled  those 
in  the  Democratic  Party.  The  Republicans  too  sought  to  increase 
participation  and  achieve  greater  demographic  representativeness. 
Where  the  parties  diverged  was  over  the  magnitude  of  change  and 
nationalisation  as  the  means  to  attain  it. 
As  in  the  Democratic  Party,  reform  of  the  Republican  nominating 
process  in  the  1960's  initially  focused  upon  the  prohibition  of  racial 
discrimination  in  delegate  selection.  In  1968  the  party's  national 
convention  endorsed  the  report  of  its  Rules  Committee  prohibiting 
discrimination  in  party  affairs,  including  delegate  selection,  on 
grounds  of  race,  religion,  colour  or  national  origin  (the  same  four 
categories  defined  in  the  Democratic  Party's  anti-discrimination  rules 
adopted  four  years  earlier).  To  achieve  this  objective  state  committees 
were  required  to  take  "positive  action".  In  addition,  the  convention -  99  - 
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authorised  the  national  committee  to  establish  a  group  to  review  and 
study  a  range  of  subjects  including  convention  rules  and  the  implemen- 
tation  of  the  anti-discrimination  rule. 
The  focus  upon  racial  discrimination  proceeded  from  the  party's 
meagre  support  amongst  blacks  in  the  electorate.  Party  liberals  sought 
an  inclusive  strategy,  reacting  against  charges  that  the  party  had  become 
lilywhite89  Moreover  charges  of  racial  discrimination  in  delegate 
selection  had  been  levelled  at  various  southern  parties  dominated  by 
Goldwater  supporters  in  1964  which  broke  with  a  tradition  of  integrated 
delegations. 
The  body  authorised  by  the  convention,  the  Delegates  and  Organisation 
Committee  (commonly  abbreviated  to  DO),  was  appointed  by  the  party  chair- 
man  in  1969.  Its  membership  of  eighteen  consisted  of  national  committee 
members.  Evidence  was  obtained  through  a  questionnaire  sent  to  party 
officials,  written  and  verbal  submissions.  There  were  no  public 
hearings  and  submissions  were  overwhelmingly  provided  by  party  officials. 
Published  in  1971,  the  Committee's  report  pursued  a  participatory 
goal.  Its  foreword  expressed  the  Committee's  desire  "that  the  door  is 
open  in  every  state  for  those  who  wish  to  participate  in  the  procedures 
that  lead  to  the  selection  of  an  individual  for  President.  "90  The 
Committee's  proposals  were  designed,  inter  alia,  to  "encourage  greater 
involvement  in  the  Republican  Party  on  the  part  of  all  citizens,  regard- 
less  of  sex,  age,  race,  religion,  color  or  national  origin" 
91 
Several 
specific  DO  proposals  were  identical  to  the  McGovern-Fraser  report: 
the  demand  for  publicised,  open  caucuses;  and  prohibitions  on  fees, 
proxy  voting  and  ex  officio  delegates. 
To  implement  the  anti-discrimination  provision  the  Committee  advo- 
cated  that  each  state  designate  one  man,  one  woman,  one  person  aged  under -  101  - 
twenty-five  and  one  member  of  a  minority  ethnic  group  to  each  convention 
committee.  Each  state  was  urged  to  provide  delegations  evenly  balanced 
between  the  sexes.  Persons  aged  under  twenty-five  were  recommended  for 
inclusion  on  delegations  proportionate  to  their  numbers  in  each  state's 
electorate. 
Unlike  McGovern-Fraser,  the  DO  Committee  neither  possessed  nor 
claimed  independent  authority.  Its  recommendations  were  transmitted 
through  a  multi-tier  process  consisting  of  the  Rules  Committee  of  the 
national  committee,  the  full  national  committee,  the  Rules  Committee 
of  the  national  convention,  and  the  national  convention  proper  which 
retained  final  authority  to  decide  upon  rules  changes.  This  hierarchical 
structure  erected  several  potential  blocking  points  for  reform.  More- 
over,  the  location  of  final  authority  in  the  national  convention  intro- 
duced  a  time  lag  betwen  recommendation  and  implementation,  i.  e.  DO 
proposals  approved  by  the  1972  convention  were  first  effective  for  the 
1976  nomination. 
The  Committee's  participatory  proposals  proved  uncontroversial. 
They  were  consistent  with  the  participatory  ethos  of  the  period  but  they 
were  probably  less  contentious  in  the  Republican  Party  where  fewer  of 
the  proscribed  practices  had  been  shown  to  be  prevalent  in  the  party's 
nominating  process  than  on  the  Democratic  side. 
Moves  towards  demographic  representation  evoked  greater  hostility. 
Guaranteed  representation  for  some  groups  was  regarded  as  a  potential 
source  of  antagonism  amongst  those  not  so  recognised.  Critics  outside 
the  Committee  condemned  attempts  to  "McGovernise  the  Republican  Party.  "92 
The  convention  Rules  Committee  disapproved  required  representation  of 
the  young  on  delegations,  and  of  the  young  and  minorities  on  convention 
committees.  Both  revisions  were  endorsed  by  the  1972  convention. -102  - 
Though  avoiding  guarantees  of  representation  the  party  continued 
to  proclaim  its  commitment  to  inclusiveness.  The  convention  endorsed 
a  national  committee  commitment  to  extend  involvement  in  the  party  by 
"positive  action  to  achieve  the  broadest  possible  participation  by 
women,  young  people,  minority  and  heritage  groups  and  senior  citizens 
in  the  delegate  section  process.  "93  To  secure  this  mandate  a  new 
committee  was  authorised. 
Consisting  of  national  committee  members  and  other  party  officials 
the  resulting  Rule  29  Committee  (after  the  convention  rule  which  authorised 
it)  was  established  in  1973.  Responsibility  for  delegate  selection  was 
assigned  to  a  sub-committee  headed  by  former  national  party  chairman 
Ray  Bliss.  The  sub-committee  recommended  measures  for  adoption  by  state 
parties  to  generate  participation.  Times  and  places  of  caucuses  were  to 
be  publicised;  information  meetings  held  and  publications  produced  to 
increase  public  understanding  of  the  selection  process;  and  special 
emphasis  placed  on  the  recruitment  of  the  groups  targeted  by  the  1972 
convention. 
In  full  committee  the  wording  of  these  proposals  was  modified  to 
remove  the  implication  that  any  specific  activity  was  required  of  state 
parties.  Examples  of  state  party  positive  action  programmes  were  to 
be  submitted  to  the  national  committee  for  review  and  comment.  However, 
non-compliance  with  Rule  29  proposals  were  not  automatic  grounds  for  a 
credentials  challenge,  though  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  a 
positive  action  programme  was  taken  as  presumptive  evidence  of  a  good 
faith  attempt  to  comply  with  the  rules. 
Despite  the  full  Rule  29  Committee's  concessions  to  party  federalism, 
the  proposals  encountered  opposition  to  incipient  centralisation  amongst 
national  committee  members.  Conservative  critics  defended  state  party 
independence  against  the  national  controls  conveyed  in  the  proposed -103  - 
national  committee  right  of  review  of  state  positive  action  programmes. 
By  a  narrow  margin  the  national  committee  disapproved  the  right  of 
review.  It  was  replaced  by  a  more  permissive,  federal  orientation  by 
which  state  parties.  could  submit  their  positive  action  programmes  if 
they  chose,  and  could  invite  the  national  committee  to  review  and 
comment  upon  them.  Such  submissions  and  requests  were  to  be  voluntary, 
no  standards  to  which  programmes  should  conform  were  specified  and  no 
penalties  for  non-compliance  defined. 
the 
The  amended  version  of/Rule  29  recommendation  was  approved  by  the 
1976  convention.  The  convention  further  institutionalised  evaluation 
of  delegate  selection  procedures  by  the  authorisation  of  a  standing 
rules  review  committee  under  national  committee  aegis.  The  committee 
was  charged  to  "receive,  review  and  offer  recommendations  on  rules 
changes  made  to  the  committee".  The  location  of  rules  review  within  a 
unit  of  the  national  committee  was  regarded  as  a  victory  for  conservatives 
eager  to  restrain  the  intitative  of  reform-oriented  ad  hoc  groups95 
The  early  years  of  the  new  rules  review  committee  were  notably 
passive.  Its  chairman,  Penry  Hooper  of  Alabama  espoused  a  laissez  faire 
policy  towards  party  rules  observing,  "The  rules  say  we  are  to  receive. 
We  are  not  going  out  to  find.  "96  Its  major  recommendation  to  the  1980 
convention  waDthe  repeal  of  the  "justice  resolution"  enacted  at  the 
closely  contested  1976  convention  which  bound  primary  delegates  to 
particular  candidates  irrespective  of  their  own  preferences.  The 
convention  endorsed  the  proposal.  moving  the  party  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion  to  the  Democrats  in  dealing  with  the  problem  of  "unfaithful" 
delegates. 
The  modesty  of  the  Republican  reform  effort  is  attributable  to  the 
party's  electoral  success  at  presidential  level,  the  nature  of  Republican 
partisans  and  the  structure  of  the  party's  reform  process 
97  Unlike -  104  - 
the  Democrats,  the  Republicans  were  not  propelled  into  reform  by 
active  discontent  and  electoral  failure.  The  party's  minority  status 
amongst  the  electorate  proved  no  major  obstacle  to  the  winning  of 
presidential  elections,  suggesting  that  the  process  by  which  its  nominees 
were  selected  was  an  effective  one.  In  contrast,  continued  minority 
status  at  sub-presidential  level  promoted  a  more  vigorous  reform 
effort  devoted  to  strengthening  the  party  for  congressional,  state  and 
local  elections 
98 
As  the  in-party  at  presidential  level  between  1969  and  1977  the 
incentives  to  change  were  small.  Moreover,  the  potential  for  change 
was  depressed  by  the  party's  control  of  the  White  House  which  dominates 
the  parties'  national  affairs.  Neither  Nixon  nor  Ford  were  committed  to 
substantial  change  which  conditioned  the  work  of  the  national  party 
organs. 
The  legitimacy  of  the  existing  selection  mechanisms  derived  also 
from  the  absence  of  obvious  anti+democratic  features.  There  was  no 
modern  Republican  equivalent  to  the  McCarthy  campaign  to  generate  a 
critique  of  the  nominating  process.  Eisenhower  insurgents  had  proved 
able  to  exert  influence  in  caucus  states  in  1952.  In  1964  the  party's 
conservative  activist  wing  had  won  the  nomination  by  mobilising  early  and 
occupying  positions  of  influence  within  the  party. 
Republican  activists  are  supportive  of  states  rights  in  party 
affairs.  Those  reform  efforts  that  the  party  undertook  were  constrained 
by  the  support  for  a  decentralised  party  system  and  opposition  to 
nationalisation.  In  consequence,  the  definition  and  enforcement  of 
national  standards  were  either  absent  or  encountered  insurmountable 
opposition.  As  the  Republicans  have  become  the  party  of  governmental 
states  rights  so  they  have  become  the  more  committed  of  the  two  parties. 
to  federalism  in  intra-party  affairs.  Thus  Republicanrreform  statements -  105- 
defined  objectives  but  failed  to  provide  the  mechanisms  to  guarantee 
their  attainment  that  enforcement  by  national  party  organs  could  have 
provided. 
Republican  activists  are  less  committed  to  intra-party  democracy 
than  their  Democratic  counterparts.  The  evidence  on  this  subject  is 
fragmentary  but  consistent99  This  suggests  that  James  Q.  Wilson  was 
incorrect  to  equate  the  amateur  Democrat  with  the  Republican  equivalent 
!  00 
Both  are  committed  to  issue  espousal  but  faith  in  intra-party  democracy 
is  more  prominent  amongst  the  Democrats.  Whilst  there  may  be  parallels 
between  the  two  groups  about  the  desired  style  of  party  there  is 
divergence  over  the  desired  form  of  party  organisation. 
The  structure  of  the  Republican  reform  process  served  to  constrain 
the  magnitude  of  change.  Prior  restraints  on  the  reform  bodies'  assert- 
iveness  were  imposed  by  their  membership.  They  were  composed  exclusively 
or  largely  of  national  committee  members,  a  group  of  party  leaders 
unlikely  to  support  disruption  of  the  status  quo.  This  tendency  was 
strengthened  after  1976  when  rules  review  ceased  to  be  assigned  to  ad 
hoc  groups  and  instead  was  placed  permanently  in  a  unit  of  the  national 
committee.  Subsequent  restraints  followed  from  the  dependence  of  the 
reform  committees  upon  the  approval  of  four  other'bodies  to  take  effect. 
In  each,  groups  supportive  of  the  status  quo  were  entrenched.  The 
national  committee  provided  for  representation  of  the  state  parties, 
giving  supporters  of  a  decentralised  party  a  veto  over  reform.  Moreover, 
the  final  authority  over  rules  changes  rested  in  the  grouping  who  would 
be  most  affected  by  reform  -  and  therefore  likely  to  be  sceptical  of 
it  -  the  national  convention  delegates. 
Though  Republican  reform  accomplishments  were  dwarfed  by  those  on 
the  Democratic  side  the  trend  towards  participation  was  consistent  with 
the  reform  tradition.  The  second  reform  trend,  nationalisation,  was -  106  - 
resisted.  Its  absence  allied  with  that  of  any  alternative  enforcement 
mechanism  thus  muted  the  impact  of  the  commitment  to  participation. 
Despite  the  party's  own  caution,  the  Republican  nominating  process 
was  transformed  though,  to  a  greater  degree  than  on  the  Democratic  side, 
from  without.  The  proliferation  of  primaries,  prescribed  by  state 
laws,  applied  to  both  parties,  stimulating  participation  in  the  nomin- 
ating  processes  of  both.  The  reforms  of  campaign  finance  (described 
below)  also  applied  to  both  parties,  re-ordering  candidates'  money  raising 
and  spending  strategies.  The  effect  of  these  two  sets  of  changes  was 
to  retain  substantial  congruity  between  the  nominating  campaigns  of  the 
two  parties. 
Campaign  Finance  Reform 
Reform  of  campaign  finance  proceeded  from  a  recognition  by  poli- 
tical  leaders  of  public  dissatisfaction  with  the  effectiveness  of  exist- 
ing  controls.  In  the  early  1970's  the  principal  focus  of  reform  was  the 
rising  cost  of  campaigns,  particularly  growing  media  expenditures,  and 
campaign  donations  as  a  source  of  corruption  in  government.  Federal 
campaign  regulation  was  located  in  the  Federal  Corrupt  Practices  Act  of 
1925  which  was  widely  ignored  and  unenforced.  Proponents  of  reform  in 
principle  included  congressmen  of  both  parties,  the  Nixon  administration 
and  interest  groups  such  as  the  National  Committee  for  an  Effective 
Congress. 
The  resulting  reform  legislation,  the  Federal  Election  Campaign  Act 
of  1971,  sought  to  remove  the  principal  discontents.  Contributions  of 
over  $100  were  required  to  be  disclosed,  though  no  limits  on  donations 
were  applied.  Spending  on  media  advertising  was  confined  to  10  cents 
per  eligible  voter  or  $150,000,  whichever  sum  was  the  larger.  Supported -  107  - 
by  the  administration  and  large  majorities  of  Congress  the  law  came 
into  effect  in  April  1972  -  during  that  year's  presidential  primaries. 
(An  informal  agreement  amongst  the  Democratic  candidates  imposed  curbs 
on  media  spending  before  the  law  took  effect. 
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The  Watergate  revelations  generated  a  new  commitment  to  further 
regulation  of  campaign  finance  which  was  exploited  by  reformers  in 
Congress  and  groups  such  as  Common  Cause.  Watergate  exposed  the 
deficiencies  of  existing  controls  on  overall  spending,  the  misappropri- 
ation  of  funds  for  illegal  purposes  and  the  use  of  campaign  donations 
to  secure  political  influence. 
The  legislative  response  was  a  limitation  on  contributions  and 
overall  spending,  and  public  funding  of  presidential  elections  (wholly) 
and  nominations  (partially).  The  1974  Federal  Election  Campaign  Act 
applied  to  presidential  nominations  through  its  limitation  on  individual 
contributions  of  $1,000,  $5,000  for  groups  and  $50,000  for  candidates 
and  their  families;  limits  on  independent  (i.  e.  on  behalf  of  candidate 
but  not  controlled  by  his  campaign  organisation)  expenditure  of  $1,000 
per  candidate;  a  ceiling  of  $10  million  for  each  candidate's  primary 
campaign.  Half  of  this  expenditure  on  primaries  could  be  funded  by 
the  federal  government.  In  order  to  qualify  for  federal  funds  candidates 
had  first  to  raise  a  total  of  $100,000  sub-divided  into  $5,000  raised 
in  twenty  different  states  through  individual  contributions  of  $250 
or  less.  Only  contributions  of  $250  or  less  were  matched  from  federal 
funds.  The  law  was  to  be  administered  by  a  bipartisan  Federal  Election 
Commission  (FEC)  consisting  of  six  voting  members  (two  selected  by  the 
House  Speaker,  two  by  the  President  of  the  Senate  and  two  by  the  President). 
Watergate  notwithstanding,  the  law  evoked  considerable  opposition. 
Constitutionalists  charged  that  limitations  on  contributions  and  expen- 
ditures  were  invasions  of  the  First  Amendment  protection  of  freedom  of -  108  - 
expression.  Conservatives  criticised  public  financing  as  an  unwarranted 
federal  government  activity.  Opposition  continued  after  passage  of 
the  Act  in  a  court  challenge  filed  by  a  diverse  grouping  including  James 
Buckley,  Eugene  McCarthy  and  the  New  York  Civil  Liberties  Union. 
The  case  was  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  January  1976.  In  an 
unsigned  decision  the  court  found  restrictions  on  spending  by  candidates 
of  their  own  monies  and  by  groups  independent  of  candidates  to  be  breaches 
of  First  Amendment  rights, 
"A  restriction  on  the  amount  of  money  a  person  or  group  can 
spend  on  political  communication  during  a  campaign  neces- 
sarily  reduces  the  quantity  of  expression  by  restricting 
the  number  of  issues  discussed,  the  depth  of  their  explor- 
ation  and  the  size  of  the  audience  reached.  This  is  because 
virtually  every  means  of  communicating  ideas  in  today's 
society  requires  the  expenditure  of  money.  "102 
Public  financing  was  upheld  as  were  limits  on  contributions.  Limits  on 
expenditure  were  permissible  only  for  the  candidates  who  accepted  federal 
funding.  The  FEC,  a  body  with  executive  functions  in  part  chosen  by 
members  of  Congress,  was  held  to  contravene  the  separation  of  powers. 
Congress  enacted  amendments  to  the  Federal  Election  Campaign  Act, 
adjusting  the  law  to  come  into  conformity  with  the  Court's  rulings. 
Amendments  enacted  in  1976  facilitated  unlimited  expenditure  by  candi- 
dates  where  public  funds  were  not  obtained,  and  by  independent  groups 
and  individuals.  Candidates  obtaining  matching  funds  were  restricted 
to  spending  only  $50,000  of  their  own  or  their  family's  money.  The  FEC 
was  re-established,  selected  by  the  traditional  mechanism  of  presidential 
nomination  and  Senatorial  confirmation. 
A  further  amendment  to  the  Act  was  a  response  to  the  proliferation 
of  candidates  and  the  large-scale  drain  on  public  resources  that  their 
eligibility  for  matching  funds  threatened.  To  curb  such  outlays  the 
conditions  of  eligibility  were  tightened.  Candidates  obtaining  less 
than  10  per  cent  of  the  vote  in  two  consecutive  primaries  were  deprived, -  109- 
of  public  funding. 
The  disruption  resulting  from  the  Buckley  decision  combined  with 
Congress's  delay  in  passing  the  necessary  amendments  prevented  the 
FEC  from  authorising  matching  funds  in  early  1976  for  61  days.  During 
this  period  candidates  were  dependent  upon  private  contributions  and 
loans. 
Conclusion 
Reform  transformed  the  rules  by  which  presidential  nominations  were 
conducted.  Primaries  became  the  predominant  delegate  selection  device. 
Caucuses  were  opened  to  voter  participation.  The  selection  process 
was  confined  to  the  election  year.  Participation  by  specific  demographic 
groups  was  encouraged  by  positive  discrimination  (the  Democrats  in  1972) 
and  affirmative  action  programmes  thereafter.  Ex  officio  delegates  were 
outlawed.  On  the  Democratic  side  participants  were  able  to  register 
their  candidate  preferences  and  the  adoption  of  proportional  represen- 
tation  enabled  minorities  to  win  delegates.  For  the  Democrats,  the 
selection  process  came  to  be  regulated  by  published  rules.  Federal 
matching  funds  were  available  to  candidates.  The  size  of  donations  were 
limited.  Expenditure  limits  applied  to  candidates  accepting  matching 
funds.  (Table  3.2  provides  a  compilation  of  the  principal  differences 
in  rules  before  and  after  reform.  ) 
The  cumulative  impact  of  the  reforms  was  consistent  with  those  in 
the  Jacksonian  and  Progressive  eras  in  pushing  the  parties  towards  the 
Voter  Dominated  pole.  Voters'  participation  expanded  and  their  influence 
over  convention  nominating  decisions  tightened.  This  resulted  from  the 
increase  in  primaries,  the  opening  up  of  the  caucus  process,  increased 
opportunities  for  the  expression  of  candidate  preference  and,  particularly 
on  the  Democratic  side  where  it  was  mandatory,  proportional  representation -  110  - 
in  translating  voter  preferences  into  delegates.  Characteristics  of  a 
Rational  Efficient  party  were  attenuated.  Leadership  control  over 
nominations  eroded  as  curbs  were  placed  on  their  discretion  in  the 
conduct  of  the  selection  process,  the  increased  participation  by 
voters  and  the  linkage  between  voter  and  delegate  preferences  tightened. -  111  - 
TABLE  3.2 
MAJOR  CHANGES  IN  RULES  EFFECTED  BY  REFORM 
PRF.  _RFFfRM 
Majority  of  delegates  selected 
through  non-primary  process. 
POST-REFORM 
Majority  of  delegates  selected  in 
or  bound  by  primaries. 
In  some  states  non-primary  Non-primary  process  open  to  voters. 
process  confined  to  party  offi- 
ciäls. 
Delegate  selection  process  Delegate  selection  process  confined 
spread  over  several  years.  to  the  election  year.  1 
Racial  discrimination  in  Positive  discrimination/affirmation 
selection;  under-representation  action  programmes  to  increase  part- 
of  women  and  the  young.  icipation  of  racial  minorities,  women, 
the  young  etc. 
Ex  officio  delegates  permitted.  Ex  officio  delegates  prohibited. 
Participants  unable  to  express 
candidate  preferences  in  many 
states. 
Participants  able  to  express  can- 
didate  preferences. 
Winner-take-all  primaries;  unit 
rule  in  Democratic  Party. 
Rules  often  absent;  party 
officials  exercise  discretion. 
Campaigns  financed  from  private 
sources. 
Proportional  representation  in  distri- 
bution  of  delegates. 
2 
Rules  provided.  1 
Federal  matching  funds  available. 
No  limits  on  size  of  donations.  Limits  on  size  of  donations. 
No  federal  limits  on  expendi-  Federal  limits  on  expenditure  for 
tures.  candidates  accepting  matching  funds. 
1.  Not  required  by  Republican  Party  rules  but  generally  accurate  as  a 
description  of  its  selection  process  in  practice. 
2.  Not  required  by  Republican  Party  rules  and  not  observed  in  practice 
in  many  states. -  112  - 
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CHAPTER  FOUR 
CAMPAIGN  STRATEGY 
This  chapter  seeks  to  relate  the  strategies  pursued  by  candidates 
for  the  nomination  to  the  environment  in  which  the  contest  took  place. 
Change  in  the  structure  resulting  from  reform  produced  transformations 
in  strategy.  The  contrasts  between  the  two  periods  developed  in  this 
chapter  demonstrates  the  responsiveness  of  strategy  to  the  dominant 
actors  controlling  the  nomination,  their  selection  criteria  and  the 
preferences  of  interest  groups  which  were  entrenched  in  the  nominating 
process  or  could  be  mobilised  into  it. 
The  opening  section  provides  a  typology  of  campaign  strategies 
utilised  by  major  candidates  in  the  immediate  pre-reform  period.  Unlike 
the  discussion  of  strategies  provided  by  other  scholars  the  typology 
is  systematic,  exhaustive  in  its  coverage  of  all  candidates  and  pertin- 
ent  to  the  strategies  adopted  in  the  period.  The  rationales  for  each 
strategy  are  defined  and  their  application  described.  Strategies  for 
the  post-reform  period  are  then  analysed.  This  analysis  charts  the 
adaptations  in  strategy  stimulated  by  reform.  The  components  of  some 
strategies  were  adjusted  whilst  others  tended  towards  obsolescence. 
Post-reform  choice  of  strategy  showed  a  pronounced  trend  towards  a  single 
type  replacing  the  variety  of  the  earlier  period. 
In  the  second  section  strategy  is  related  to  the  participant  bias: 
the  distortions  injected  into  a  selection  system  by  uneven  distributions 
of  influence  or  rates  of  turnout  amongst  participants.  Before  reform 
the  bias  emanated  from  the  influence  over  the  nomination  exerted  by  party 
leaders.  Their  selection  criteria  reflected  the  demands  of  professional 
politicians  and  campaigns  were  keyed  to  their  concerns.  When  reform -  119  - 
established  a  participatory  system  the  bias  shifted  towards  the  parties' 
high  turnout  elements  in  which  one  ideological  wing  from  each  party  is 
disproportionately  represented.  This  bias  encouraged  candidates  to 
compete  who  appealed  to  the  activist  wings.  It  also  conditioned  the 
appeals  fashioned  by  all  candidates  inspiring  attempts  to  co-opt  or 
assuage  the  activists. 
In  the  third  section  campaign  strategy  is  related  to  the  particip- 
ation  of  interest  groups?  Before  reform  a  small  range  of  groups  entrenched 
in  the  party  organisations  exercised  veto  power  over  the  nomination.  To 
win  the  nomination  the  support  or  acquiescence  of  these  groups  had  to  be 
obtained.  Groups  lacking  anchorage  within  the  parties  generally  lacked 
leverage  within  the  nominating  process,  restricting  the  value  of  their 
support  as  a  strategic  resource.  By  ending  party  organisation  control 
of  the  nomination,  reform  divested  the  entrenched  groups  of  their  veto 
power.  A  participatory  system  became  accessible  to  groups  outside  the 
party  structures.  Candidates  mobilising  the  support  of  such  groups  gained 
the  strategic  resources  of  cohesive  voting  blocs,  organisation  and 
finance. 
A  Typology  of  Strategies 
The  most  salient  feature  of  the  pre-reform  environment  was  the 
control  exercised  over  the  nomination  by  party  leaders.  Their  prefer- 
ences  were  restricted  by  few  formal  curbs.  Reflecting  the  professional 
orientation,  their  decisions  were  conditioned  by  the  desire  to  win  the 
election,  maintain  the  party  organisations  and  their  own  places  of  power 
within  them.  In  consequence,  all  strategies  adjusted  to  this  environment 
seeking  to  fulfil  the  leaders'  demands  of  a  nominee. 
The  typology  of  strategies  provided  below  seeks  to  discriminate -  120  - 
different  emphases  in  campaigns.  It  does  not  claim  rigid  separations 
between  strategies  although  any  exercise  in  categorisation  tends  to 
suggest  this.  The  typology  is  designed  to  cover  the  immediate  pre- 
reform  period.  It  seeks  to  overcome  the  deficiencies  of  earlier  dis- 
cussions  of  the  subject  identified  in  Chapter  One.  Thus  it  seeks  to 
be  systematic,  exhaustive  and  relevant  to  the  particular  period.  It  is 
systematic  in  defining  the  variables  on  which  the  various  types  are 
constructed.  It  is  exhaustive  in  covering  every  major  candidate  of  the 
period.  It  is  historically  relevant  in  dispensing  with  strategies  that 
by  the  1960's  were  an  anachronism. 
An  analysis  of  strategies  employed  in  this  period  generates  two 
variables  for  distinguishing  the  candidates.  The  first  is  the  base 
of  support.  Candidates  sought  to  develop  support  either  within  the  party 
structure  or  amongst  voters.  Candidates  such  as  Symington  and  Johnson  in 
1960,  Humphrey  in  1968,  concentrated  on  the  former  making  little  effort 
to  prove  or  generate  support  amongst  voters.  John  and  Robert  Kennedy, 
Nixon  in  1968,  recognised  that  party  leaders  controlled  the  nomination  but 
sought  to  exert  pressure  upon  them  through  demonstrations  of  support 
amongst  voters  which  provided  the  focus  of  their  campaigns. 
Some  candidates  drew  widespread  support  from  both  bases.  Johnson 
in  1964  (the  incumbent  president)  and  Nixon  in  1960  (the  president's 
heir  apparent)  were  supported  both  within  the  party  and  by  the  voters. 
The  effect  of  predominance  in  both  spheres  was  to  preclude  a  challenge 
for  the  nomination. 
The  second  variable  is  the  degree  of  candidate  activity.  Some 
candidacies  were  publicly  avowed  early  in  the  election  year  and  denoted 
by  strenuous  campaigns  for  support  amongst  voters  or  party  leaders.  John 
Kennedy,  Goldwater  and  McCarthy  provide  examples  of  active  campaigns. 
Alternatively,  inactive  campaigns  consisted  of  a  delayed  admission  of -  121  - 
candidacy  where  one  was  made  at  all.  The  candidate  refrained  from  overt 
campaign  activity  though  efforts  could  be  mounted  on  his  behalf  by 
others.  The  principal  focus  of  activity  was  the  national  convention. 
Symington,  Nixon  in  1964  and  Reagan  in  1968  pursued  inactive  candidacies. 
The  dimensions  of  bases  of  support  and  activity  are  utilised  in 
Fig.  4.1  to  distinguish  the  range  of  campaign  strategies  used  in  the 
pre-reform  period.  The  five  types  consist  of  the  following  inter- 
relationship  of  variables: 
1.  VOTER  support,  ACTIVE  campaign  =  POPULAR  FAVOURITE. 
2.  VOTER  support,  INACTIVE  campaign  =  COMPROMISE  -  POPULAR. 
3.  PARTY  +  VOTER  support,  INACTIVE  campaign  =  DOMINANT  LEADER. 
4.  PARTY  support,  ACTIVE  campaign  =  ORGANISATION  FAVOURITE. 
5.  PARTY  support,  INACTIVE  campaign  =  COMPROMISE  -  UNITY. 
Table  4.1  uses  the  five  types  generated  above  to  distinguish  the 
strategies  employed  by  the  major  candidates  in  the  period  1960  -  68. 
FIGURE  4.1 
A  TYPOLOGY  OF  CANDIDATE  STRATEGY 
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Popular  favourites  based  their  claim  to  the  nomination  on  their 
proficiency  as  vote-getters.  They  appealed  to  the  party's  desire  for 
an  electable  candidate.  Active  campaigns  were  undertaken  using  instru- 
ments  of  mass  appeal  such  as  polls  and  primaries  to  demonstrate  support 
amongst  voters. 
In  a  party-dominated  process  the  attempt  to  pressurise  leaders  from 
below  was  undertaken'only  by  candidates  compelled  to  resort  to  the 
electorate  to  stake  a  claim  to  the  nomination.  Either  they  were  seeking 
to  overcome  a  candidate  with  greater  intra-party  support  (as  used  by 
Scranton  and  Robert  Kennedy)  or  they  possessed  some  form  of  political 
handicap  which  disqualified  them  as  nominees  unless  they  could  adduce 
contrary  evidence  in  their  favour.  They  lacked  national  prominence 
(Humphrey  in  1960),  they  were  'unavailable'  (John  Kennedy  a  Catholic, 
Nixon  a  loser)  or  they  were  mavericks  or  in  some  other  way  aroused  the 
leaders'  hostility  (Rockefeller,  McCarthy). 
John  Kennedy's  campaign  planning  for  1960  recognised  that  "he 
couldn't  negotiate  it 
_[the 
nomination].  If  the  Convention  ever  went 
into  the  back  rooms,  he'd  never  emerge  from  those  back  rooms.  "3  Simil- 
arly,  Nelson  Rockefeller  in  1964  realised  that  the  Republican  Party 
had  little  sympathy  with  his  independence  and  liberalism,  "since  it  was 
obvious  that  the  politicians  did  not  want  him,  he  must,  as  Kennedy  had 
done,  show  them  his  muscle  at  the  polls,  in  the  primaries..  "4  In  1968 
Richard  Nixon  was  acceptable  to  the  party  professionals  but  they  were 
sceptical  of  his  electability.  Proving  his  strength  amongst  voters 
would  provide  the  "leverage  to  pry  open  the  hidden  loyalties  that 
remained  his  among  the  major  delegate-brokers  of  the  Republican  Party"5 
Establishing  the  candidate's  credentials  as  a  vote-getter  of 
presidential  potential  preceded  the  election  year.  A  substantial  victory 
in  a  mid-term  senate  or  gubernatorial  election  of  a  large  state  promoted -  124  - 
the  candidate's  credibility  as  a  presidential  prospect  whose  intentions 
then  became  a  source  of  media  speculation. 
Seeking  re-election  to  the  Senate  in  1958,  John  Kennedy's  campaign 
aimed  "to  produce  a  massive  record-breaking  victory  that  would  gain 
national  attention  and  thus  help  move  him  towards  the  1960  presidential 
nomination.  "6  His  overwhelming  victory  -  accompanied  by  the  election 
of  the  first  Democratic  state  legislature  in  Massachusetts  history  - 
contributed  to  the  presidential  campaign's  objective  of  diminishing  his 
religion  and  his  youth  as  apparent  obstacles  to  his  election  as  president. 
Campaigning  on  behalf  of  other  candidates  for  office  facilitated 
political  contacts  and  obligations.  In  addition,  by  demonstrating  an 
ability  to  attract  votes  for  others  it  provided  presumptive  evidence 
of  a  pdrential  coat-tail  effect.  Like  Kennedy,  Nixon's  participation  in 
mid-term  elections  contributed  to  the  goal  of  overcoming  the  handicap 
perceived  as  precluding  his  nomination.  The  Republican  resurgence  of 
1966  assisted  by  Nixon's  campaigning  diminished  his  reputation  as  a  loser. 
According  to  his  1968  deputy  campaign  manager,  the  mid-term  elections 
marked  the  transformation  of  Nixon's  presidential  prospects  - 
"I  suppose  we  all  would  have  said  at  the  beginning  [before 
the  mid-term  elections],  it'd  be  nice  -  but  he  can't  be 
elected.  And  then  gradually  it  passed  over  into  something 
else  like  ...  maybe  he  can  be  elected.  And  then  the  night 
of  the  election  in  166,  with  those  telephone  calls  coming 
in  from  all  over  the  country  -  we  knew  we  were  in  business.  " 
Since  Theodore  Roosevelt  primaries  have  been  a  vehicle  for  candidates 
seeking  to  win  the  nomination  on  the  basis  of  their  popularity  with 
voters.  For  John  Kennedy  they  were  a  means  of  pressurising  "the  big- 
state  professionals  [who]  would  expose  themselves  to  the  charge  of  anti- 
Catholic  prejudice  (although  most  of  them  were  Catholic)  if  they  still 
turned  thumbs  down  on  his  nomination.  "8  Primary  victories  had  to  be 
obtained,  Robert  Kennedy  concluded,  "to  show  the  pols"  that  he  would  be 
a  stronger  candidate  than  Humphrey  for  the  Democrats  in  19689 -  125  - 
For  late-starting  candidates  opinion  polls  provided  a  post-primary 
measure  of  popular  appeal.  In  1968  Nelson  Rockefeller's  expensive  media 
campaign  was  followed  by  conducting  polls  to  demonstrate  his  electability 
and  the  likelihood  of  a  Nixon  defeat.  The  aim  of  what  one  writer  called 
the  search  for  "the  Holy  Grail  of  the  Nixon  can't-win  opinion  poll"  was 
to  show  the  professionals  that  their  preferences  for  both  Nixon  and 
electoral  victory  were  exclusive 
10 
The  belated  leader  of  the  Republican 
moderates  in  1964,  William  Scranton,  sought  to  expose  the  electoral 
disaster  latent  in  a  Goldwater  nomination.  Based  on  poll  findings, 
Scranton  argued  that  the  consequence  of  Goldwater's  candidacy  for  other 
Republicans  would  be  to  "doom  them  to  undeserved  defeat.  "11 
To  persuade  the  professionals  of  their  appeal  various  other  mechan- 
isms  were  employed  to  register  candidates'  breadth  of  support.  For  Robert 
Kennedy  the  intensity  of  the  reaction  he  generated  on  the  streets  was 
designed  to  demonstrate  demand  for  his  nomination  which  would  be 
irresistible  for  the  professionals.  "Our  strategy",  observed  a  Kennedy 
aide,  "is  to  change  the  rules  of  nominating  a  President.  We're  going 
to  do  it  in  a  new  way.  In  the  streets.  "17  The  1968  Rockefeller  campaign 
organised  the  People's  Postcard  Campaign  encouraging  written  statements 
13 
of  support  which  were  then  delivered  to  the  leaders  of  state  delegations. 
Kennedy  for  President  Clubs  were  established  in  1960  designed  to' 
convert  grass-roots  enthusiasm  for  his  candidacy  into  influence  upon 
delegates  not  subject  to  leadership  control. 
Compromise-Popular  strategies  were  dependent  for  success  upon  the 
failure  of  active  candidates  to  win  convention  majorities  and  unite  the 
party.  Compromise-Popular  strategies  offered  the  party  unity  around 
an  electable  candidate. 
Candidates  offering  a  compromise  between  rival  factions  are  recur- 
rent  in  the  history  of  national  conventions  but  this  study  posits  that -  126  - 
there  are  two  distinctive  types  of  compromise  candidates  in  this  period. 
They  are  distinguished  by  the  attributes  of  the  candidates  and  the 
focus  of  their  campaigns.  Compromise-Popular  candidates  enjoyed  public 
prominence  -  two  were  ex-nominees,  and  the  other  was  the  Governor  of 
California.  Prominence  was  part  of  their  appeal  in  contrast  to  the 
relative  obscurity  and  availability  of  the  Compromise-Unity  candidates 
who  resembled  the  "dark  horses"  of  the  past. 
The  salient  appeal  of  the  Compromise-Popular  candidate  was  vote- 
getting  ability  and  this  was  reflected  in  the  campaigns  conducted  on 
their  behalf.  In  1960  citizens  formed  Stevenson  for  President  clubs 
to  press  for  his  nomination,  telegrams  were  sent  to  delegates,  demon- 
strations  were  mounted  outside  the  convention  hall  and  the  galleries 
packed  with  his  vocal  supporters.  These  activities  were  directed  to 
establishing  a  public  demand  for  Stevenson's  nomination. 
For  Nixon  in  1964  and  Reagan  in  1968  evidence  of  electability  was 
sought  in  write-in  campaigns  in  primaries.  By  this  means  the  candidate's 
name  was  kept  in  contention  and  sizeable  vote  totals  employed  to  demon- 
strate  a  breadth  of  support  evoked  without  personal  campaigning.  Such 
results  insinuated  that  latent  support  existed  which  would  be  mani- 
fested  by  a  personal  campaign.  Favourable  comparisons  with  the  active 
contenders  were  also  facilitated  for  they  could  make  no  convincing  claim 
to  support  still  untapped. 
Like  the  other  compromise  type,  Compromise-Popular  candidates  were 
dependent  upon  deadlock  to  succeed.  Their  strategies  thus  entailed 
precluding  victory  by  other  candidates  without  overtly  challenging  them 
(for  they  hoped  to  inherit  their  support).  Invitations  to  other  candi- 
dates  to  compete  were  made  to  fragment  delegate  support  and  existing 
contenders  solicited  to  remain  active.  Thus,  after  Rockefeller's  defeat 
in  the  California  primary,  Nixon  urged  Romney  to  lead  the  moderate -  127  - 
opposition  to  Goldwater,  a  move  interpreted  as  aimed  at  producing 
deadlock  from  which  Nixon  would  benefit.  Stevenson  operatives  in 
1960  urged  uncommitted  leaders  and  favourite  sons  to  retain  their 
positions  to  insulate  their  delegations  from  incursions  by  the  front- 
runner  Kennedyý5 
Dominant  leader  strategies  were  available  only  to  those  in  estab- 
lished  positions  of  power  such  as  the  incumbent  president  or  his 
perceived  heir.  For  such  candidates  the  task,  according  to  Pomper, 
was  not  to  win  a  contest  for  the  nomination  but  to  prevent  a  contest 
from  developing16  Loyalty  within  the  party  organisation  and  a  popular 
appeal  outside  of  it  rendered  both  party  and  primary  processes  unprom- 
ising  ground  for  challengers.  Lack  of  financial  support  and  the  desire 
of  organisation  loyalists  for  a  united  party  to  contest  the  election 
provided  further  disincentives  to  potential  challengers. 
Successful  performance  in  office  was  the  incumbent  president's 
surest  means  to  the  nomination.  A  good  president  was  a  good  candidate. 
President  Johnson's  early  months  in  office  won  widespread  popular  approval. 
His  diligence  in  pursuit  of  civil  rights  legislation  conciliated  the 
liberal  wing  of  the  party  who  had  opposed  him  in  1960.  Supported 
both  within  and  without  the  party  organisation  there  was  no  challenge 
to  Johnson's  nomination  in  1964  beyond  the  efforts  of  George  Wallace 
to  demonstrate  the  magnitude  of  white  backlash  in  three  northern  prim- 
aries. 
In  1960  Vice-President  Nixon's  strength  within  the  Republican 
organisation  originated  from  his  diligence  for  the  party  whilst  President 
Eisenhower  remained  aloof  from  partisan  politics.  His  efforts  for  the 
party  during  the  eight  years  of  the  Eisenhower  presidency  earned 
Nixon  "enormous  equity  with  the  regulars.  "17  He  thus  attracted  the 
loyalty  of  the  party  professionals  normally  reserved  for  a  party-oriented -  128  - 
president.  His  visibility  in  national  and  international  affairs  such 
as  the  "Kitchen  debate"  and  his  role  in  the  steel  settlement  gener- 
ated  the  support  of  voters  providing  him  with  a  clear  majority  amongst 
Republican  identifiers. 
Exploring  the  potential  for  a  campaign  for  the  1960  nomination, 
Nelson  Rockefeller  found  the  party  leaders  and  Republican  financial 
powers  united  in  their  support  for  Nixon.  Declining  to  campaign,  Rocke- 
feller  stated  that  "the  great  majority  of  those  who  will  control  the 
Republican  convention  stand  opposed  to  any  contest  for  the  nomination. 
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(Originally  the  statement  had  cited  the  opposition  of  "the  men  who 
control  the  convention  and  the  financial  powers  behind  them  ...  1119) 
Contrary  to  Pomper,  the  Nixon  campaign  would  have  welcomed  a  contest 
for  the  nomination  to  prepare  their  election  organisation  and  to  deny 
the  Democrats  a  monopoly  of  pre-convention  publicity2.0  Nixon's  posi- 
tion,  however,  was  so  dominant  and  the  party  so  intent  on  preserving  its 
unity  that  the  resources  for  a  challenge  were  unavailable. 
In  1968  President  Johnson  was  unable  to  preclude  a  challenge  to 
his  nomination  as  discontent  over  the  conduct  of  the  Vietnam  war  increased. 
Unlike  1948,  the  dissidents  were  able  to  find  a  candidate  to  oppose  the 
President's  renomination.  Johnson  won  the  first  primary  in  New  Hamp- 
shire  but  the  narrowness  of  his  victory  exposed  his  electoral  vulner- 
ability.  Robert  Kennedy's  subsequent  entry  heralded  a  fierce  contest 
for  the  nomination  against  a  more  potent  primary  opponent  than  McCarthy. 
Despite  these  setbacks,  state  party  leaders  estimated  that  Johnson  could 
still  rely  on  winning  two-thirds  of  the  convention  delegates?  l 
However, 
he  had  failed  to  prevent  a  contest  from  developing  and  had  he  persisted 
with  his  candidacy  it  would  have  replicated  Taft  in  1912  as  an  incum- 
bent  president  forced  to  run  as  an  organisation  favourite. -  129  - 
The  organisation  favourite  concentrated  on  soliciting  support 
within  the  party  to  win  the  nomination.  Primaries  and  other  instruments 
of  mass  appeal  were  eschewed  or  of  secondary  importance  to  the  campaign's 
success. 
In  a  party-dominated  process  the  organisation  favourite  strategy 
was  the  directest  route  to  the  nomination  and  it  had  been  frequently 
utilised  in  earlier  conventions.  However,  by  the  1960's  when  some 
voter-orientation  was  a  feature  of  many  campaigns  there  were  additional 
rationales  for  organisation  favourite  strategies.  They  were  adopted  by 
candidates  for  whom  evidence  of  mass  appeal  was  unnecessary  but  also 
unfavourable  if  pursued.  Goldwater  (as  his  primary  performances  showed) 
had  greater  appeal  in  the  Republican  Party  than  outside  it.  Humphrey 
risked  unfavourable  comparison  with  Robert  Kennedy  in  any  attempt  to 
demonstrate  voter  support. 
The  organisation  favourite's  appeal  was  to  the  party's  demands  other 
than  electability.  They  were  committed  to  party  maintenance,  the  estab- 
lished  power  structure,  loyal  to  its  leaders,  consonant  with  its 
ideological  disposition. 
In  1968  Humphrey's  appeal  was  his  commitment  to  party  maintenance, 
the  existing  power  structure  in  state  and  local  parties  and  his  loyalty 
to  the  President.  As  Vice  President  he  had  assumed  many  of  the 
responsibilities  towards  the  Democratic  Party  organisations  that 
Johnson  neglected.  This  established  an  indebtedness'  for  his  services 
amongst  party  leaders  and  built  a  base  of  support  with  them  independent 
of  the  President.  Humphrey  was  also  a  loyal  supporter  of  the  President 
and  his  policies  whilst  McCarthy  and  Robert  Kennedy  had  deserted  him, 
widening  divisions  within  the  party.  Insurgents  threatening  the  local 
leadership's  power  position  also  tied  the  party  to  Humphrey.  McCarthy's 
nomination  threatened  the  established  leadership  whilst  Humphrey's -  130  - 
promised  to  preserve  it.  Supporting  Humphrey  was  the  leaders'  counter- 
insurgency  strategy. 
Ideological  affinity  provided  the  base  of  Goldwater's  appeal  to 
the  Republican  Party's  activists  who  were  demarcated  from  the  party's 
identifiers  in  the  electorate  by  their  conservatism22  For  a  committed 
conservative,  such  as  Goldwater,  there  was  potential  for  an  ideological 
appeal  within  the  party  which  could  not  be  replicated  amongst  its  voters. 
Goldwater's  support  was  concentrated  below  the  party's  top  leader- 
ship  positions  in  which  moderates  were  preponderant.  From  1961  onwards 
the  Draft  Goldwater  movement  insinuated  its  supporters  into  state  and 
local  parties  bolstering  their  receptivity  to  a  conservative  appeal. 
Particular  emphasis  was  placed  on  gaining  control  of  those  offices 
which  conferred  influence  in  the  delegate  selection  processý3  Build- 
ing  low-level  conservative  strength  increased  the  resistance  to 
assertions  of  influence  by  the  leadership  which  had  previously  ensured 
the  nomination  of  moderates.  This  task  was  facilitated  after  1962 
by  the  depletion  of  Republican-controlled  governorships.  When  Goldwater 
became  an  active  candidate  in  1964  he  confronted  a  Republican  Party 
disposed  towards  his  conservatism  to  an  unusual  degree. 
Compromise-Unity  candidates  sought  to  reconcile  a  divided  party 
around  a  candidate  acceptable  to  all  factions.  Compromise-Unity 
strategies  were  adopted  by  candidates  lacking  public  prominence  and 
first  ballot  strength  but  'available',  and  a  potential  second  choice 
of  many.  Their  campaigns  were  concentrated  within  the  party  eschewing 
attempts  to  generate  a  public  demand  for  their  candidacies. 
In  1960  Symington's  inclusive  appeal  was  counterposed  to  the 
exclusivity  of  that  of  his  rivals.  Their  exclusivity  was  their  handi- 
cap  on  which  Symington  could  capitalise.  According  to  the  campaign's 
executive  director, -  131  - 
"This  was  Clark  Clifford's  theme  song  in  planning  the  strategy 
that,  you  know,  all  the  other  candidates  couldn't  make  it 
for  reasons  A,  B,  C,  and  that  Symington  had  none  of  these 
problems  that  they  all  had.  Lyndon  Johnson,  too  far  south, 
Jack  Kennedy,  too  young  and  religion  of  course;  and  Hubert 
Humphrey,  too  liberal  and  so  forth.  " 
24 
Symington's  appeal  would  extend  to  the  supporters  of  the  leading  candi- 
dates  after  they  had  failed, 
"It  would  be  broken  up,  divided  and  ...  all  the  followers 
of  all  the  other  candidates  could  unite  on  Symington  where 
they  might  not  be  able  to  unite  on  any  other  candidate.  " 
25 
Johnson  sought  to  fulfil  the  criteria  of  availability  by  defining 
himself  as  a  western  rather  than  southern  candidate26-.  In  other 
respects  his  claims  to  unite  the  party  were  not  based  on  electoral 
considerations.  Rather,  they  were  premised  upon  his  control  of  the 
Senate  which  had  created  an  indebtedness  amongst  congressmen,  whom  the 
campaign  assumed  were  powers  in  their  state  and  local  parties.  The 
IOU's  accumulated  in  Congress  gave  Johnson's  campaign  national  potential 
enabling  it  to  extend  beyond  its  southern  bases  if  Kennedy  could  be 
blocked.  Then  the  party's  congressional  wing,  asserting  itself  through 
the  party  organisations,  would  unite  around  Johnson's  leadership. 
Dependent  upon  deadlock  for  success,  the  Compromise-Unity  candi- 
dates  sought  to  ensure  its  occurrence.  Thus  both  Johnson  and  Symington 
worked  to  block  Kennedy.  To  deny  Kennedy  a  victory  in  the  pivotal  West 
Virginia  primary  funds  were  channelled  from  both  candidates  to  Humphrey, 
Kennedy's  opponent  in  the  primary2.7  Robert  Byrd,  one  of  the  state's 
U.  S.  Senators  and  a  Johnson  sympathiser,  exhorted  supporters  of  all  the 
inactive  candidates  to  vote  for  Humphrey  as  a  means  of  promoting  their 
favourite's  prospects  for  the  nomination28  After  Kennedy's  victory 
attempts  to  halt  a  bandwagon  in  his  favour  included  an  endorsement  of 
Symington  by  Harry  Truman,  the  ex-president  held  in  esteem  by  party 
professionals.  In  a  televised  address  shortly  before  the  convention -  132  - 
Truman  spoke  approvingly  of  ten  Democrats,  omitting  Kennedy  from  the 
list29 
The  shift  in  influence  over  the  nomination  from  party  leaders  to 
voters  resulting  from  reform  produced  substantial  alterations  in  the 
plausibility  of  the  various  strategies  as  routes  to  the  nomination. 
A  participatory  process  with  results  firmly  linked  to  delegate  commit- 
ments  compelled  candidates  towards  voter-oriented  strategies.  Party 
leaders  were  so  reduced  in  influence  that  campaigns  could  feasibly 
focus  on  voters  exclusively. 
After  reform  the  popular  favourite  strategy  became  the  norm  (see 
Tables  4.2  and  4.3).  In  contrast  to  the  pre-reform  period,  the  popular 
favourite  strategy  could  deliver  delegates  directly  through  campaigns 
in  primaries  and  caucuses.  Formerly  mechanisms  of  popular  appeal 
(including  some  devices  outside  the  formal  nominating  process  such  as 
opinion  polls)  delivered  few  delegates  directly.  Rather,  they  were 
designed  to  persuade  the  party  leaders  who  controlled  delegates.  After 
reform  all  popular  favourite  strategies  were  concentrated  within  the 
formal  nominating  process  where  intensive  campaigns  were  mounted  to  win 
delegates  in  primaries  and  caucuses. 
Pre-reform  popular  favourite  strategies  were  the  preserve  of 
candidates  compelled  to  demonstrate  a  popular  appeal  to  become  serious 
contenders  for  the  nomination.  Either  they  were  trailing  a  party- 
supported  candidate  or  were  in  some  other  way  handicapped  which  precluded 
their  nominations  unless  effective  vote-getting  could  be  demonstrated. 
In  the  post-reform  environment,  thdre  is  little  plausible  alter- 
native  to  the  popular  favourite  strategy  even  for  candidates  supported 
by  party  leaders  and  without  electoral  handicaps.  Insurgency,  Pomper 
has  commented,  is  "no  longer  the  crusade  of  the  political  Don  Quixotes; 
it  is  the  path  to  the  political  kingdom.  "30 -  133  - 
The  possibilities  for  accumulating  delegate  majorities  in  the 
pre-convention  period  increased  substantially  diminishing  the  feasibility 
of  inactive  strategies  dependent  upon  divided  conventions.  Where 
active  candidates  competed  for  delegates  an  inactive  strategy  risked 
conceding  a  convention  majority  to  one  of  the  other  contenders.  In 
consequence,  compromise  strategies  of  both  types  declined. 
No  post-reform  candidate  adopted  a  Compromise-Popular  strategy  in 
the  form  that  it  assumed  earlier.  The  closest  approximation  was  Brown 
in  1976  which  was  a  late-starting  rather  than  inactive  campaign.  But 
the  premises  on  which  it  was  based  resembled  the  pre-reform  Compromise- 
Popular  type.  It  assumed  no  first  ballot  victory,  a  convention  divided 
between  the  active  candidates  reconciled  by  a  candidate  of  proven 
vote-getting  ability 
31 
Ford  was  the  potential  beneficiary  of  a  divided  party  in  1980. 
But  when  he  declined  to  become  an  active  candidate  to  block  the  front 
runner  Reagan  his  prospects  for  the  nomination  were  dismissed. 
Dominant  leader  strategies  diminished  when  the  shift  to  a  voter- 
dominated  process  increased  the  potential  for  mobilising  public  discon- 
tent  with  an  incumbent  president  into  the  delegate  selection  process  to 
deny  him  the  nomination.  Only  Nixon  of  the  three  post-reform  presidents 
enjoyed  sufficient  approval  amongst  his  party's  voters  to  deter  major 
challengers. 
Formerly  challenges  were  unlikely  because  the  party  leaders' 
fidelity  to  the  president  and  the  limited  opportunities  for  injecting 
voter  discontent  into  the  process  made  their  prospects  of  success 
meagre. 
After  reform  a  candidate  mobilising  opposition  to  the  president 
in  primaries  and  caucuses  stood  to  win  the  nomination.  To  resist  such 
challenges  presidents  were  propelled  into  active  candidacy,  dependent 
for  success  upon  mobilising  voter  support.  Two  of  the  three  post  reform -  134+  - 
presidents,  Ford  and  Carter,  were  thus  forced  into  popular  favourite 
strategies  having  failed  to  foreclose  opposition.  Ford  entered  twenty- 
seven  preference  primaries  and  Carter  thirty-four.  Their  nominations 
were  attributable  to  their  success  in  mobilising  voter  support  -  the 
only  two  instances  of  incumbent  presidents  needing  to  generate  such 
support  to  win  the  nomination. 
Organisation  favourite  strategies  were  the  definitive  casualties 
of  reform.  Party  leader  influence  over  the  nomination  was  so  attenuated 
that  exclusive  reliance  upon  their  support  ceased  to  be  a  feasible 
strategy  for  winning  the  nomination.  Candidates  supported  by  party 
leaders,  such  as  Muskie  in  1972,  were  required  to  adopt  popular  favourite 
strategies.  Where  previously  the  leaders'  endorsements  would  have 
delivered  blocs  of  delegates,  after  reform  they  provided  only  potential 
leverage  amongst  the  voters. 
Reform  not  only  forced  campaigns  outside  the  party  organisations, 
they  also  facilitated  strategies  which  broke  down  party  lines.  Textbooks 
distinguish  'open'  from  'closed'  primaries  but  studies  of  voting  in 
them  demonstrates  that  both  types  allow  substantial  participation  by 
independents  and  crossovers  from  the  other  party 
32 
Exponents  of 
popular  favourite  strategies  such  as  Wallace,  Reagan  and  Anderson  uti- 
lised  these  opportunities  in  attempting  to  construct  ideological  coalitions 
of  voters  across  party  lines.  These  candidates  sought  to  shift  the 
balance  of  preferences  in  the  nominating  process  in  their  favour  by 
enlarging  its  electorate. 
Compromise-Unity  strategies  confronted  the  contradiction  of  candi- 
dates  lacking  in  public  prominence  seeking  nomination  through  a  voter- 
dominated  process  and  conventions  of  candidate  supporters  lacking  the 
professionals'  concern  for  party  unity. 
In  that  he  was  inactive  and  projected  as  a  unifier,  Humphrey  in -  135  - 
1976  bore  some  resemblance  to  the  Compromise-Unity  type.  But  he  was 
dismissed  as  a  contender  for  the  nomination  when  he  declined  to  become 
an  active  candidate  (i.  e.  adhering  to  the  Compromise-Unity  strategy 
was  regarded  as  an  implausible  route  to  the  nomination). -  136  - 
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Strategy  and  the  Participant  Bias 
Pre-reform  strategies  were  conditioned  by  the  party  leaders'  domin- 
ance  of  the  nominating  process.  Their  selection  criteria  provided  the 
grounds  for  discriminating  between  the  contenders.  Reflecting  the 
professional  style,  their  objectives  in  selecting  a  candidate  were  the 
winning  of  the  election,  the  maintenance  of  the  party  organisations  and 
their  positions  within  them.  Candidates  fashioned  their  strategies  to 
demonstrate  their  ability  to  meet  the  leaders'  specifications  -  seeking, 
with  varying  emphases,  to  demonstrate  their  electability,  party  loyalty, 
deference  to  the  established  leadership  and  willingness  to  distribute 
patronage  to  strengthen  the  party  (see  Chapter  Eight). 
The  leaders'  criteria,  with  some  variations  in  the  priorities 
assigned  between  them,  were  persistent  influences  on  nominations. 
Nominees,  in  consequence,  conformed  to  a  type  reflecting  these  criteria. 
Democratic  nominees  were  party  regulars  designed  to  stand  for  and  appeal 
to  the  New  Deal  coalition.  Republican  nominees,  reflecting  the  party's 
minority  status,  were  less  persistently  party  regulars  but  also  included 
political  neophytes  (Willkie,  Eisenhower).  Nominees  were  chosen  to 
appeal  to  the  party's  more,  homogeneous  identifiers,  its  business  finan- 
ciers  and  also  the  independents  and  Democrats  necessary  to  win  elections. 
Thus  a  party  dominated  by  conservative  activists  selected  a  succession 
of  moderate,  "me-too"  Republicans  as  presidential  candidates  every 
election  year  from  1940  to  1968,  except  1964  when  leadership  control 
was  disrupted. 
Reform  shifted  the  participant  bias  away  from  party  leaders.  When 
a  participatory  system  was  established  the  customary  bias  was  established: 
advantaging  high  turnout  elements.  Intra-party  differentials  in  turnout 
are  relevant  to  nomination  outcomes  because  they  also  convey  an 
ideological  bias.  The  activists  in  both  parties  are  ideologically -  139  - 
unrepresentative  of  their  identifiers  in  general.  Democratic  activists 
are  preponderately  liberals.  Amongst  the  party's  voters  moderates  are 
the  dominant  bloc  and  conservatives  nearly  as  numerous  as  the  liberals. 
In  the  Republican  Party  the  voters'  bias  towards  the  conservative  pole 
is  exaggerated  amongst  the  activists  (see  Table  14.14). 
TABLE  4.4' 
LIBERALS  AND  CONSERVATIVES  AMONGST'PARTY  VOTERS  AND  ACTIVISTS,  1972 
Participant  Ideology 
Group  Conser- 
vatives  Liberals  Difference 
Democrats: 
Voters  17%  26%  9% 
Activists  13  43  30 
Republicans: 
Voters  23  11 
Activists  32  8 
Source:  Norman  H.  Nie,  Sidney  Verba  and  John 
Changing  American  Voter  (Cambridge, 
Harvard  University  Press,  1976),  pp. 
12 
24 
R.  Petrocik,  The 
Kass.: 
197,203. 
The  unrepresentativeness  of  the  activists  derives  from  two  rein- 
forcing  sources,  demography  and  issue  commitment.  Participation  in 
America,  as  elsewhere,  varies  by  socio-economic  gtatus33  High  status 
coincides  with  high  levels  of  participation.  As  both  American  parties 
are  demographically  heterogeneous  at  their  electoral  bases  socio-economic 
differences  in  turnout  are  evident  in  contests  within  them  as  well  as 
between  them. 
High  status  Democrats  are  disproportionately  liberals  representing 
what  Ladd  has  characterised  as  an  inversion  of  the  original  New  Deal 
Coalition  where  liberalism's  greatest  strength  in  the  party  was  concen- 
trated  at  the  bottom  of  the  socio-economic  scale 
35 
High  status  Demo- -  140  - 
crats  are  distinguishable  from  their  lower  status  Democrats  by  their 
liberalism  on  social  issues36  In  the  Republican  Party  high  status  is 
associated  with  attachment  to  conservative  principles37 
Some  issue  commitments  provide  a  stimulus  to  participation  indepen- 
dent  of  socio-economic  status.  Liberal  Democrats  and  conservative 
Republicans  of  all  status  levels  turn  out  at  higher  rates  than  voters 
from  the  parties'  other  ideological  sections  of  the  same  socio-economic 
rank38  The  corollary  of  ideological  incentives  to  participation  is 
that  even  a  demographically  representative  nominating  electorate  would 
be  biased  towards  the  parties'  activist  wings. 
The  impact  of  turnout  rates  is  exaggerated  by  the  variations  in 
voting  cues  employed  by  the  different  ideological  sections  within  the 
parties.  Liberal  Democrats  and  conservative  Republicans  tend  to  be 
more  disposeito  issue  voting  than  other  sections  of  the  parties'  elec- 
torates39.  This  tendency  enhances  the  potential  advantages  accruing 
to  candidates  appealing  to  the  parties'  activist  wings. 
McGovern's  campaign  planning  first  appreciated  the  resources  avail- 
able  to  candidates  able  to  co-opt  committed  support.  According  to 
campaign  manager  Hart: 
"The  nomination  in  an  open  process  will  go  to  those  who  work 
hardest  for  it,  and  people  are  not  motivated  to  work  who 
have  no  strong  convictions.  " 
40 
In  the  context  of  the  Democratic  Party  this  translated  into  an  attempt 
to  co-opt  the  left  because  "who-ever  becomes  the  leader  of  the  tradi- 
tional  liberal  wing  will  have  a  natural  advantage  because  it  is  a  broader, 
more  effective  base  than  its  conservative  counterpart.  " 
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Co-opting  the 
left  before  the  delegate  selection  process  commenced  was  designed  to 
pre-empt  the  entry  of  other  liberals.  Monopolising  liberal  support 
provided  the  money  and  manpower  to  create  an  effective  organisation.  o 
In  turn,  organisational  strength  produced  successes  in  the  early -  141  - 
caucuses  and  primaries  which,  as  the  campaign  planners  anticipated, 
expanded  McGovern's  appeal  beyond  the  liberal  wingý2 
McGovern's  success  in  converting  co-option  of  the  left  into  the 
nomination  stimulated  imitation  in  1976.  Amongst  conservative  Republi- 
cans  there  was  a  similar  contest  to  determine  activist  wing  leadership 
in  1980.  In  both  years  the  "invisible  primary"  witnessed  the  competi- 
tion  to  generate  organisation  strength  and  eliminate  opponents  before 
3 
the  selection  process  commenced 
Candidates  outside  the  activist  wings  are  compelled  to  develop 
strategies  adapting  to  the  participant  bias.  Activist  opposition  must 
be  neutralised  or  alternative  sources  of  support  generated.  To  mollify 
the  liberals  for  1976,  Jackson  spent  the  years  preceding  softening  his 
hawkish  image.  In  1974  he  campaigned  for  prominant  anti-war  Democrats, 
Allard  Lowenstein  and  Robert  Drinan,  and  in  San  Diego  campaigned  for 
the  same  candidate  as  Jane  Fondaý4  In  1975  he  reversed  his  long-term 
support  for  aid  to  the  South  Vietnamese  government  on  the  grounds  that 
the  Thieu  regime  was  repressive'  In  addition,  an  offer  of  the  vice, 
presidential  nomination  to  Muskie  at  the  start  of  the  campaign  was 
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designed  to  produce  a  balanced  ticket  to  run  in  the  primaries. 
Carter's  extensive  personal  campaigning  amongst  the  voters  of  the 
early  primary  and  caucus  states  established  a  band  of  dedicated  supporters 
committed  to  the  candidate,  not  to  the  issues  he  espoused.  For  the 
later  states  where  voters  had  not  been  cultivated  extensively  by  the 
candidate  greater  issue  definition  was  required.  Greater  substance  was 
designed  to  verify  Carter's  seriousness  as  a  candidate  to  the  press  and 
public  but  also,  according  to  the  campaign's  pollster  Caddell,  "to  send 
'signal'  to  interested  groups  and  particularly  to  the  suspicious  but 
￿48  open  liberals  ... 
Despite  the  altered  distribution  of  advantages  resulting  from -  142  - 
reform,  the  participant  bias  has  not  been  consistent  in  producing  acti- 
vist  wing  nominees.  Only  two  of  the  five  contested  nominations  have  been 
won  by  the  candidate  of  the  activist  wing  (McGovern,  and  Reagan  in  1980). 
In  the  immediate  pre-reform  period  only  1964  provides  an  exception  to 
the  dominance  of  the  participant  bias. 
Several  factors,  beyond  those  of  chance  and  error,  account  for  the 
reduced  potency  of  the  bias  in  determining  outcomes.  First,  in  a  voter- 
dominated  process  the  problems  of  securing  unity  around  a  single  candi- 
date  are  greater  than  previously.  Before  reform  the  concentration  of 
power  in  a  small  number  of  party  leaders  facilitated  co-ordination  and 
eased  the  establishment  of  consensus  about  a  candidate.  A  united  leader- 
ship  controlling  the  nomination  promoted  the  party  unity  regarded  as  a 
pre-condition  of  electoral  success.  For  the  professionals  incentives 
existed  to  co-ordination  and  control. 
When  reform  multiplied  the  number  of  actors  in  the  nominating  pro- 
cess  the  possibility  of  achieving  co-ordination  receded.  Concomitantly, 
the  connective  link  of  attachment  to  a  continuing  party  organisation 
weakened  thereby  diminishing  the  mutuality  of  interests.  The  influx 
of  political  amateurs  also  reduced  the  priority  of  electability  and  unity 
in  determining  the  nominee. 
The  proliferation  of  candidates  stimulated  by  reform  and  the  pro- 
vision  of  federal  matching  funds  hindered  the  emergence  of  a  single 
representative  of  the  activist  wing.  Where  no  leader  emerged  activist 
influence  was  dissipated  between  several  candidates  creating  opportunities 
for  the  parties'  other  factions  to  capitalise  on  the  divisions  to  win 
plurality  victories.  In  the  1976  Democratic  contest,  unlike  1972,  the 
winnowing  process  extended  into  the  early  caucuses  and  primaries 
splintering  the  liberal  vote  between  several  candidates  allowing  Carter 
to  record  victories  in  New  Hampshire  and  Wisconsin.  In  southern  primaries -  143  - 
liberal  abstinence  (unlike  McGovern's  participation  in  the  region's 
caucuses  in  1972)  enabled  Carter  to  capture  the  vote  of  the  Democratic 
left  against  Wallace.  Carter's  early  victories  projected  him  into  the 
leadership  for  the  nomination.  When  Udall  eventually  emerged  from  the 
liberal  elimination  contest  its  value  was  depreciated  by  the  series  of 
Carter-inflicted  defeats  incurred  in  the  process.  By  winning  primaries 
Carter  demonstrated  the  strength  to  generate  an  appeal  outside  his  natural 
base  of  support.  In  the  later  primaries,  Brown  and  Church,  untainted  by 
defeat  and  challenging  Carter  alternately,  consolidated  liberal  support 
to  inflict  seven  defeats  on  a  front  runner  who  possessed  an  ostensibly 
insurmountable  lead  in  delegates. 
Two  of  the  three  examples  of  successful  resistance  to  the  working 
of  the  participant  bias  involve  incumbent  presidents.  Compared  with 
the  pre-reform  era  incumbents  are  more  vulnerable  to  defeat  for  the 
nomination  in  the  post-reform  era.  In  consequence,  challenges  are  more 
likely.  Yet  presidents  still  retain  substantial  resources  despite  the 
erosion  of  influence  of  party  organisations  loyal  to  them. 
The  conduct  of  presidential  office  generates  publicity  and  voter 
recognition.  Timely  announcements  of  federal  projects  benefiting 
thousands  of  voters  are  a  persuasive  resource  in  particular  state  con- 
tests.  Crisis-laden  events  such  as  the  invasion  of  Afghanistan  and  the 
seizure  of  American  Embassy  personnel  in  Iran  stimulated  unity 
around  the  president  and  pressure  for  stability. 
The  incumbent's  resources  may  deflect  the  activists  from  their 
ideological  alignments  or  confine  them  to  minority  status  by  capturing 
the  support  of  less  committed  voters.  In  focused  contests  of  two  or 
three  candidates  majority  victories  are  likely.  The  activist.  wing 
(particularly  in  the  Democratic  Party)  is  too  narrow  to  win  unaided, 
and  the  president's  advantages  are  substantial  in  attempting  to  extend -  144  - 
beyond  his  natural  allies  to  produce  majorities. 
In  the  light  of  the  president's  campaign  resources,  the  challenges 
in  1976  and  1980  were  notable  for  their  magnitude.  The  convention 
votes  for  Reagan  and  Kennedy  were  the  largest  and  second  largest 
respectively  recorded  against  an  incumbent  since  Arthur  was  denied  re- 
nomination  in  1884. 
The  appreciation  of  the  working  of  the  post-reform  participant 
bias  is  reflected  in  the  changed  disposition  of  contenders  for  the 
nomination.  Post-reform  candidates  clustered  around  the  activist  poles. 
In  1976  Udall,  Brown,  Church,  Harris  and  Bayh  all  sought  the  support 
of  Democratic  social  issue  liberals  (the  New  Politics  elements). 
Attempted  mobilisers  of  the  New  Deal  coalition's  combination  of  economic 
liberals  and  social  conservatives  were  confined  to  Jackson  and  Shriver. 
(Presumably  an  active  Humphrey  campaign  would  also  have  focused  on 
these  groups.  ) 
Clustering  around  the  Democratic  activist  pole  occurred  despite 
first,  a  continued  faith  in  mobilising  the  New  Deal  coalition  as  the 
party's  most  viable  electoral  strategy.  Secondly,  it  was  not  deterred 
by  a  preponderance  of  moderates  amongst  the  party's  identifiers  (41  per 
cent  in  1976)  where  liberals  were  no  more  numerous  than  conservatives 
(29  per  cent  each) 
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Thirdly,  activist-oriented  strategies  persisted 
despite  McGovern's  disastrous  electoral  performance  four  years  earlier 
following  a  nomination  campaign  based  on  the  party's  New  Politics 
elements. 
In  1980  of  the  seven  major  candidates  for  the  Republican  nomin- 
ation  Reagan,  Connally,  Crane  and  Dole  appealed  to  its  conservative 
elements  espousing,  for  example,  supply  side  economic  programmes. 
Anderson,  Baker  and  Bush  sought  to  cultivate  the  party's  moderates. 
Yet  the  Republicans  remain  the  minority  party  in  an  electorate  in  which -  145  - 
Republican  conservatives  are  few.  Goldwater's  landslide  defeat  in 
1964  provided  pointers  to  the  election  chances  of  a  conservative 
Republican. 
Strategy  and  Interest  Group  Mobilisation 
Before  reform  interest  group  influence  in  the  nominating  process 
was  exerted  through  the  party  organisations.  Influence  derived  from 
four  sources  -  organisational  overlap,  personnel  overlap,  finance, 
electoral  strength. 
Organisational  overlap  occurred  where  an  interest  group  was  inte- 
grated  into  a  party  organisation.  Trade  unions  in  the  Democratic  Party 
exemplified  such  organisational  anchorage.  They  were  an  integral  part 
of  some  state  and  local  parties,  and  in  some  areas  a  substitute  for  it. 
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Organisational  anchorage  provided  groups  with  influence  in  the  party's 
internal  affairs.  Many  Democratic  national  convention  delegations 
included  labour  representatives  and  they  were  attuned  to  union  interests. 
Personnel  overlap  appeared  where  group  leaders  attained  positions 
of  prominence  (often  of  an  informal  nature)  in  the  national  party.  Where 
a  group  was  significant  in  party  affairs  its  leaders'  opinions  carried 
weight  in  its  decisions.  Thus  senior  figures  in  the  AFL-CIO  and  UAW 
such  as  Arthur  Goldberg  and  Walter  Reuther  were  influences  in  the 
Democratic  Party.  Franklin  Roosevelt's  injunction  to  "clear  it  with 
Sidney"  (over  the  1944  vice  presidential  nomination)  is  expressive  of  the 
degree  of  influence  exerted  by  group  leaders  in  the  party's  affairs 
despite  the  absence  of  formal  status  within  it. 
Financial  influence  derived  from  the  parties'  dependence  upon 
external  sources  for  funds.  As  the  party's  financiers,  the  stockholders 
and  executives  of  corporate  businesses  thus  gained  influence  in  Repub- -  146  - 
lican  Party  affairs.  According  to  Theodore  White,  describing  the 
infrastructure  of  the  party's  1960  nomination, 
"the  men  who  raise  the  money  for  the  Republican  Party  control 
it,  generally,  to  a  far  greater  degree  than  the  men  who 
raise  the  money  for  the  Democratic  Party.  In  almost  every 
state  with  a  major  Republican  Party,  except  New  York,  if 
one  knows  the  name  of  its  Finance  Chairman,  one  knows  where 
the  roots  of  power  twine.  " 
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Influence  through  electoral  strength  derived  from  the  indispens- 
ability  of  cohesive  voting  blocs  to  the  task  of  winning  elections.  The 
demographic  groups  that  provided  voting  blocs  exerted  influence  largely 
through  the  brokerage  role  of  party  leaders.  Their  concern  for  elec- 
toral  victory  necessitated  a  sensitivity  to  the  anticipated  reactions 
of  their  coalitional  blocs.  For  example,  within  the  Democratic  Party 
(the  more  obviously  coalitional  of  the  two)  the  interests  of  Catholics 
and  blacks  had  to  be  accommodated  through  nominations  and  platforms. 
Failures  of  accommodation  risked  alienating  the  groups'  electoral  support. 
In  a  system  dominated  by  two  inclusive  parties  groups  could  opt  for  exit 
as  a  feasible  alternative  to  loyalty  in  elections. 
To  win  the  nomination  candidates  were  compelled  either  to  co-opt 
or  pre-empt  the  interest  groups  exerting  influence  through  the  parties. 
Describing  the  1960  nominating  process,  Sorensen  observed  that  it  was, 
"dominated  and  influenced  by  all  the  groups  in  the  Democratic 
coalition  -  the  farmers,  labour,  the  South,  the  big  city 
people,  et  cetera.  These  groups  are  more  influential  in  a 
convention  than  they  are  in  the  country  as  a  whole.  There- 
fore  he  [Kennedy]  had  to  prove  to  them  that  he  could  win"  52 
Similarly,  Robert  Kennedy's  dependence  on  primaries  stemmed  from  his  lack 
of  support  amongst  the  party's  professionals  and  interests  groups, 
"Without  the  unions,  the  business  community,  the  regular  party 
leaders  or  the  South  he  had  to  show  the  delegates  that  he 
had  the  people.  "53 
A  candidate  capturing  the  support  of  his  party's  entrenched  interest 
groups  usually  possessed  the  resources  to  secure  the  nomination.  In -  147  - 
1960  Nixon's  dominance  of  the  business  interests  in  the  Republican 
Party  complemented  his  extensive  support  amongst  the  professionals 
dissipating  the  potential  for  a  Rockefeller  challenge.  Acknowledging 
the  dual  influences  in  Republican  politics  a  Rockefeller  aide  observed, 
"Richard  Nixon  is  a  shrewd  man;  he  spotted  where  control  of 
the  nomination  lay  seven  years  before.  When  he  was  travel- 
ing  he  wasn't  just  making  friends  with  State  Chairmen  and 
the  regulars;  he  was  dining  with  the  big  interests  at  the 
same  time.  " 
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The  entrenchment  of  interest  groups  in  the  party  organisations 
generally  elevated  them  into  insurmountable  barriers  to  candidates  who 
could  neither  co-opt  their  support  nor  secure  their  acgiiescence. 
However,  the  Goldwater  nomination  provides  a  deviant  case  denoting  the 
first  successful  resistance  to  the  opposition  of  the  moderate,  cor- 
porate  interests  in  the  party  since  the  New  Deal. 
Conservative  success  in  1964  followed  the  transformation  of  the 
Republican  Party  effected  by  the  Draft  Goldwater  Committee  in  the  pre- 
ceding  three  years.  Committed  Goldwater  supporters  captured  the  dele- 
gate  selection  apparatus  in  many  states  assuring  the  designation  of 
dedicated  conservatives  unamenable  to  the  demand  to  pick  an  electable 
moderate. 
The  campaign's  financial  base  was  supplied  from  outside  the  tradi- 
tional  moderate  eastern-midwestern  industrialist  and  publisher  blocs. 
Conservative  interests  in  Texas  and  California  allied  with  an  exceptional 
dependence  on  small  subscriptions  provided  alternative  sources  of 
funding 
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When  the  Republican  moderates  finally  united  to  repel  Goldwater, 
Dewey  and  his  "Eastern  Establishment"  associates  comprehended  the 
reconstruction  of  intra-party  power  achieved  by  the  draft  movement. 
A  participant  in  the  pro-Scranton  effort  quoted  by  Theodore  White 
observed  that,  "It  was  as  if  the  Goldwater  people  had  rewired  the  switch- 
board  of  the  party  and  the  numbers  we  had  were  all  dead.  "56 -  148  - 
Interest  group  influence  over  the  nomination  was  exerted  either 
by  group  or  party  leaders.  For  the  preferences  of  the  groups'  rank- 
and-file  to  attain  leverage  required  mediation  by  their  leaders.  Where 
leaders  proved  resistant,  influence  was  excluded.  Despite  attracting 
majorities  of  working  class  votes  in  primaries  Robert  Kennedy's  support 
amongst  the  labour  hierarchy,  and  thus  within  the  Democratic  parties, 
was  scarce 
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Having  entered  no  primaries,  Humphrey's  predominance 
amongst  labour  leaders  was  not  derived  from  evidence  of  blue  collar 
support.  Similarly,  Kennedy's  overwhelming  strength  amongst  blacks  was 
not  reflected  amongst  northern  party  leaders,  the  traditional  mediators 
of  black  interests58 
The  corollary  of  a  party-dominated  process  with  prominent  interest 
groups  entrenched  in  it  was  the  exclusion  from  influence  of  groups 
without  access  to  the  organisations.  Candidates  supported  by  extra- 
party  interests  were  unable  to  mobilise  their  mass  base  to  construct 
winning  coalitions.  For  these  candidates  the  primaries  were  the 
principal  arenas  in  which  interests  outside  the  parties  could  be  acti- 
vated  and  only  a  minority  of  delegates  could  be  won  by  this  means. 
Interests  outside  the  party  structures  were  dependent  upon  persuading 
the  professionals  to  advance  their  candidate's  cause.  Groups  such  as 
the  pro-McCarthy  anti-war  movement  in  1968  and  the  Stevenson  clubs  of 
1960  thus  depended  for  their  success  on  access  to  party  notables,  not 
on  their  voting  strength  in  the  nominating  process.  However,  owing  to 
the  confluence  of  nominating  politics  within  the  parties,  candidate 
preference  was  submerged  in  the  relations  between  groups  and  profession- 
als  by  generalised  conflict  between  regulars  and  insurgents  over  control 
of  the  party  organisation59  The  electoral  incentive  to  accommodate 
extra-party  interests  was  antithetical  to  the  professionals'  desire  to 
preserve  the  existing  power  structure  within  the  organisation. -  149  - 
Through  the  increased  permeability  of  the  reformed  process 
extra-party  interests  mobilised  behind  candidates  could  be  inserted 
directly  into  delegate  selection.  In  consequence,  the  range  of 
interests  whose  support  could  influence  the  nominating  decision 
greatly  expanded.  Interests  outside  the  party  structure  were  no 
longer  dependent  upon  the  intercession  of  professionals  within  the 
organisation  to  secure  influence.  Any  group,  irrespective  of  its 
previous  connection  with  the  party,  could  participate  in  the  nominating 
process  in  support  of  particular  candidates  and  issues. 
For  candidates  the  nominating  electorate  ceased  to  be  restricted 
to  a  small  range  of  interest  groups  whose  support  or  acquiescence  was 
a  pre-condition  of  winning  the  nomination.  Before  reform  the  entrenched 
interest  groups  could  usually  resist  candidates  against  whom  they  were 
united  in  opposition.  Thus  labour  leaders  and  northern  party  profession- 
als,  conscious  of  the  black  vote,  could  repel  the  southern  challenge  of 
Russell  and  Johnson.  Similarly  Republican  corporate  interests  could, 
1964  excepted,  ensure  the  nomination  of  their  preferred  candidate  - 
Willkie,  Dewey  and  Eisenhower  successively  over  Taft,  Nixon  over  Rocke- 
feller. 
When  reform  projected  the  nominating  decision  outside  the  party 
structures,  the  leverage  of  the  entrenched  interests-over  the  nomination 
diminished.  In  an  open  process  interest  group  support  outside  the 
parties  could  be  mobilised  to  provide  alternative  sources  of  influence 
to  those  entrenched  in  the  organisations.  In  the  voter-dominated  process 
the  size  of  the  group  and  the  distribution  of  candidate  preferences 
within  it  conditioned  its  value  to  candidates  rather  than  its  access 
to  the  party  organisations.  Thus  the  anti-war  movement  was  a  more 
potent  force  for  McGovern  under  reform  rules  in  1972  than  for  McCarthy 
under  party  organisation  control  in  1968.  Recruiting  mass-based  interests -  150  - 
also  simplified  the  task  of  constructing  candidate  organisations.  For 
example,  the  anti-war  movement  provided  McGovern  with  voting  support 
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but  also  campaign  manpower  in  every  state. 
Post-reform  campaigns  sought  to  build  majorities  from  voter 
constituencies  of  which  interest  groups  became  a  part.  In  consequence, 
campaigns  were  directed  towards  particular  groups.  For  example,  Jackson 
cultivated  the  Jewish  vote,  and  McGovern  targeted  the  "New  Politics" 
elements  -  youth,  blacks  and  other  minorities,  the  anti-war  movement. 
The  emphasis  on  interest  mobilisation  expanded  their  participation 
in  nominating  politics.  Groups  such  as  the  Moral  Majority,  anti- 
abortionists,  teachers'  unions,  the  National  Rifle  Association, 
feminists,  Chicanos  ,  the  American  Conservative  Union  gained  prominence 
in  particular  nominating  contests. 
Under  reform  rules  the  party-entrenched  interests  were  no  longer 
assured  of  their  former  pivotal  influence  in  the  nominating  process. 
In  the  post-reform  era  their  influence  became  dependent  upon  successfully 
mobilising  their  constituency  behind  a  candidate  in  state  contests. 
Compelled  to  compete  against  extra-party  interests  the  leverage  of  en- 
trenched  elements  was  uncertain.  In  1968  an  alliance  of  labour  and 
party  leaders  in  Pennsylvania  provided  Humphrey  with  three-quarters  of 
the  state's  delegates  despite  McCarthy  capturing  a  similar  proportion 
of  the  vote  in  the  non-binding  presidential  primary6.1  Four  years  later 
union  support  delivered  Humphrey  only  a  third  of  the  delegation  in  a 
multi-candidate  pledged-delegate  primary 
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Where  pre-reform  group  influence  flowed  through  leaders,  after  1968 
it  was  affected  directly  through  the  mass  'membership'.  The  consequent 
campaign  focus  on  members  was  necessitated  by  the  open  nominating  system 
but  also  enabled  unsympathetic  interest  leaders  to  be  circumvented  to 
win  the  support  of  their  constituents.  Formerly  leaders  could  deliver -  151  - 
delegates  through  their  relationship  with  the  party  leaders.  Subse- 
quently  interest  group  leaders'  command  of  their  members  loyalties  was 
often  insufficient  to  deliver  their  votes  in  primaries  and  caucuses. 
Wallace  and  Carter  appealed  'over  the  heads'  of  union  leaders  to 
win  primaries  against  candidates  supported  by  the  labour  leadership, 
Humphrey  and  Jackson.  Carter's  victory  in  the  pivotal  Pennsylvania 
primary  in  1976  examplifies  the  triumph  of  candidate  appeals  to  members 
over  responsiveness  to  interest  leaders.  Despite  the  commitment  of 
Pennsylvania  labour  leaders  to  Jackson  (in  the  absence  of  an  active 
Humphrey  candidacy),  Carter's  vote  in  the  primary  differed  by  one  per 
cent  between  union  and  non-union  households  whilst  Jackson's  support 
was  identical  between  the  two  groups. 
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Commenting  upon  his  success 
Carter  observed,  "I've  demonS  trated  that  I  don't  need  the  labour  bosses;  '64 
Carter's  support  amongst  black  voters  was  similarly  aimed  at 
pre-empting  the  neutrality  or  pre-Humphrey  commitments  of  black  leaders 
The  campaign's  deputy  director,  Benjamin  Brown,  emphasised  the  atten- 
tion  devoted  to  the  mass  base, 
"The  significant  difference  [about  the  Carter  campaign]  was 
that  there  was  involvement  coming  up  from  the  bottom  instead 
of  just  being  at  the  top.  Traditionally  there  have  been 
national  black  leaders  who  could  pretty  much  dictate  the 
direction  of  the  black  vote  in  any  given  community.  But 
this  time  around,  the  established  black  leadership  didn't 
know  what  struck  it.  " 
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After  reform  the  entrenched  interests  lost  their  rolle  as  veto  groups 
over  the  nomination.  Before  1972  nominees  were  likely  to  be  candidates 
preferred  by  or  at  least  acceptable  to  them67  Conversely,  candidates 
unacceptable  to  them  -  Johnson  in  1960,  Rockefeller,  McCarthy  -  could 
be  repelled.  Reform,  by  necessitating  extra-party  support,  created 
alternative  sources  of  influence  capable  of  overcoming  the  opposition 
of  the  entrenched  interests. 
Both  of  the  Democratic  Party's  first  two  post-reform  nominees -  152  - 
lacked  the  support  of  major  union  leaders,  particularly  those  within 
the  AFL-CIO.  In  fact,  labour  leaders  were  the  progenitors  of  the 
unsuccessful  stop-McGovern  movement  mounted  after  the  California 
primary. 
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In  1976,  though  less  hostile  to  Carter  than  to  McGovern, 
labour  leaders  favoured  Humphrey  or  Jackson.  Yet  they  lacked  the 
influence  to  assure  their  nominations. 
The  party  leaders,  the  traditional  mediators  of  the  interest 
groups  within  the  electoral  coalitions,  were  similarly  inconspicuous 
in  their  support  of  McGovern  and  Carter.  Only  three  Democratic  gover- 
nors  supported  McGovern  at  the  convention,  and  only  six  of  a  total  of 
thirty-seven  were  committed  to  Carter  before  the  conclusion  of  the 
primaries. 
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Leadership  opposition  to  McGovern  collapsed  with  the 
failure  of  the  California  credentials  challenge,  and  four  years  later 
party  and  labour  leaders  "spent  the  early  months  of  1976  watching  the 
Carter  bandwagon  roll  over  and  around  them'.  "  70 
In  1976',  as  in  1972, 
"whatever  there  was  that  called  itself  a  party  was  opposed  to  his 
nomination  but  was  powerless  before  his  assault  . 
1171 
In  the  Republican  party  corporate  influence  was  traditionally 
less  palpable  than  that  of  organised  labour  in  the  Democratic  politics 
so  the  impact  of  reform  is  more  difficult  to  gauge.  However,  it  is 
probable  that  their  former  influence  has  been  eroded  to  a  greater  extent 
than  that  of  labour.  Following  the  imposition  of  controls  on  campaign 
giving  the  influence  that  derived  from  business's  financial  resources 
diminished.  Furthermore,  the  major  corpprate  interests  were  never 
able  to  provide  strength  in  numbers,  a  major  resource  in  post-reform 
nominating  politics  and  one  which,  potentially,  remained  in  the  posses- 
sion  of  organised  labour  if  members  voted  cohesively. 
Fragmentary  evidence  suggests  that  in  both  the  1976  and  1980 
Republican  contests  the  party's  corporate  powers  supported  candidates -  153  - 
other  than  Reagan.  Yet  the  absence  of  such  support  did  not  prevent 
the  raising  of  funds  sufficient  to  mount  a  campaign  or  the  winning 
of  a  near-majority  of  delegates  in  1976  and  an  overwhelming  majority 
in  1980. 
In  1976  contributors  to  Ford  included  many  of  the  traditional 
Republican  financiers  such  as  Vincent  Astor,  Henry  Ford  II,  John  Paul 
Getty,  C.  V.  Whitney  and  five  members  of  the  Rockefeller  family. 
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Donations  from  business  and  professional  political  action  committees 
were  far  more  numerous  for  Ford  than  for  Reagan. 
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The  independence 
of  Reagan  from  traditional  Republican  financial  sources  is  reflected 
both  in  the  number  of  individual  contributors  to  his  campaign  (double 
that  for  Ford)  and  the  small  size  of  the  average  donation  -  lower  than 
that  for  many  Democratic  candidates. 
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Reagan's  independence  of  the  corporate  powers  persisted  in  1980. 
A  survey  of  corporation  presidents  conducted  by  Dun's  Review  found 
as  much  support  for  Bush  as  for  Anderson,  Connally  and  Reagan  combined. 
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Conclusion 
Candidate  strategies  in  the  pre-  and  post-reform  periods  reflected 
the  balance  of  power  over  the  nomination.  In  the  earlier  period 
strategies  emphasised  a  focus  on  party  leaders,  the  satisfaction  of 
their  selection  criteria  and  winning  the  support  of  groups  entrenched 
in  the  parties. 
The  reformed  voter-dominated  process  necessitated  voter-oriented 
strategies.  When  voters  controlled  the  nomination  the  popular  favourite 
strategy  became  the  norm  whilst  those  dependent  upon  party  leaders  and 
deadlock  became  anachronisms.  Centrifugal  drives  were  introduced  by 
the  post-reform  participant  bias  advantaging  the  activist  wings  where -  154+  - 
formerly  the  electoral  orientation  of  the  party  leaders  had  inserted 
a  centripetal  impetus. 
An  open  process  encouraged  the  mobilisation  of  groups  destroying 
the  oligopoly  that  characterised  group  involvement  before  reform. 
For  candidates,  the  groups  providing  strategic  resources  in  the  post- 
reform  period  were  those  with  cohesive  voting  blocs,  organisation  and 
finance  rather  than  party  anchorage. 
Openness  characterised  the  post-reform  process  in  contrast  to  the 
impermeability  of  its  predecessor.  In  a  closed  process  the  forces 
operating  on  the  nomination  were  relatively  stable.  This  produced 
consistency  of  outcomes  -  New  Deal  Democrats  and  "me-too"  Republicans. 
In  a  permeable  process  a  greater  range  of  forces  could  be  introduced 
to  influence  the  nomination  and  disrupt  the  participant  bias.  Incon- 
sistency  of  outcomes  resulted.  McGovern  and  Carter  were  not  only 
distinctive  from  the  New  Deal  Democrats  of  the  past,  they  were  also 
markedly  different  from  each  other.  Neither  Ford  nor  Reagan  fitted  the 
"me-too"  Republican  mould.  Though  both  were  conservatives  they  were 
differentiated  from  each  other  by  the  degree  of  their  conservatism  and 
their  consonance  with  the  concerns  of  the  New  Right. -  155  - 
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CHAPTER  FIVE 
CAMPAIGN  ORGANISATION 
Changes  in  the  targets  of  campaign  strategy  resulted  in  adap- 
tations  in  the  organisational  forms  through  which  they  were  effected. 
In  the  pre-reform  period  the  campaign  organisations  were  keyed  to  a 
party-dominated  delegate  selection  process  and  funding  provided 
by  large  subscriptions  from  a  wealthy  few.  Subsequently  the  mobili- 
sation  of  both  poltiical  and  financial  support  was  concentrated  upon 
the  mass  electorate. 
This  chapter  seeks  to  identify  the  principal  changes  in  the  form 
and  activity  of  campaign  organisations  in  the  two  periods.  The  first 
section  establishes  the  contrasts  in  the  composition  of  such  organis- 
ations  in  the  two  periods.  Pre-reform  organisations  included  party 
professionals  -  leaders  and  party  operatives.  They  exploited  their 
party  linkages  in  their  candidates'  interests.  They  comprehended 
campaign  protocol,  empathised  with  other  professionals  and  utilised 
established  relationships  with  them.  Post-reform  organisation  reflec- 
ted  the  change  to  candidate-centred,  largely  extra-party  nominations. 
The  campaign  hierarchy  consisted  of  the  candidate's  aides  lacking 
attachments  to  continuing  party  organisations,  professional  suppliers 
of  electioneering  services  working  under  contract  and  volunteers. 
The  second  section  charts  the  altered  relationships  between  the 
campaign  and  the  party  organisations.  In  the  earlier  period  campaigns 
adapted  to  the  various  state  and  local  parties'  power  configurations  and 
organisational  demands.  Alliances  were  sought  with  intra-party  factions 
and  holding  operations  such  as  the  favourite  son  device  deferred  to. 
Reform  greatly  reduced  the  incentives  for  adjusting  to  the  party's -  162  - 
power  structures  and  demands  as  they  lost  their  control  over  the  nomin- 
ation.  As  delegate  pledging  devices  multiplied  so  demands  for  delay 
were  opposed. 
The  third  section  delineates  changes  in  the  organisation  of  fund 
raising.  In  the  earlier  period  the  bulk  of  funds  derived  from  a  small 
number  of  substantial  donations.  Solicitation  was  informal  and  fin- 
ances  were  assured  sufficient  to  mount  a  campaign  through  the  conven- 
tion.  Reform  curbs  on  large  subscriptions  allied  with  the  attraction 
of  a  'doubling  up'  of  small  contributions  through  federal  funds 
encouraged  an  emphasis  on  modest-size  donations.  The  need  for  numerous 
small  subscriptions  resulted  in  the  use  of  formalised,  mass-oriented 
fund-raising  campaigns  directed  by  specialists.  Solicitation  was  keyed 
to  raising  sufficient  funds  to  produce  success  in  early  contests. 
Success  generated  voter  recognition  and  plausibility  as  a  nominee 
inspiring  further  donations  to  cover  the  remainder  of  the  campaign. 
Campaign  Personnel 
In  the  pre-reform  period  nomination  campaigns  were  largely  concen- 
trated  within  the  party  structure.  Campaigning  entailed  meeting, 
cultivating  and  co-opting  leaders  whose  influence  within  their  party 
organisations  was  then  exerted  over  the  selection  and  candidate  pref- 
erences  of  delegates.  Symington's  administrative  assistant,  Stanley 
Fike,  described  his  candidate's  objective  in  1960  as  "to  get  round, 
talk,  make  friends  further,  and  broaden  his  acquaintanceship  within  the 
party.  "1  Sorensen,  noting  the  anchorage  of  most  delegates  in  party 
organisations,  stressed  that  for  Kennedy's  1960  campaign,  "It  is 
important  that  contact  be  maintained  between  JFK  and  state  organis- 
ations.  "t  These  statements  evidence  the  significance  of  personal -  163  - 
campaigning  by  the  candidate.  The  task  of  the  campaign  organisation  was 
to  prepare  the  way  for  such  personal  meetings,  maintain  contact  with 
leaders  and  lobby  for  the  candidate  after  his  departure.  (An  elabor- 
ation  of  campaigning  amongst  party  organisations  is  provided  in 
Chapter  Seven.  ) 
From  the  dominance  of  party  organisations  in  the  nominating  pro- 
cess  followed  the  need  to  incorporate  party  professionals  into  campaign 
organisations.  Traditionally  campaign  organisations  had  been  founded 
on  the  candidate's  home  state  party  organisation.  In  1960  the  Humphrey, 
Johnson  and  Symington  campaigns  conformed  to  this  tradition. 
3 
It  was 
control  over  their  party  organsiations  that  contributed  to  the  plausi- 
bility  of  the  major  state  governors  as  presidential  nominees.  Into 
the  1960's  governors  continued  to  be  major  candidates  in  Republican 
nominations  (Rockefeller,  Scranton,  Reagan  and,  prior  to  1968,  Romney). 
Though  no  Democratic  governors  were  candidates  in  the  immediate  pre- 
reform  period  several  were  prominent  in  support  of  their  state's 
senators  for  whom  they  mobilised  the  state  parties. 
The  significance  attached  by  the  professionals  to  home  state  party 
backing  was  recognised  by  James  Rowe  in  devising  Humphrey's  1960 
strategy.  Having  cautioned  that,  "Protocol  demands  that  the  first  foot 
forward  in  a  quest  for  the  presidency  must  always  be  from  and  by  the 
candidate's  state",  he  recommended  that  this  condition  be  fulfilled  by 
Minnesota's  Governor  Freeman  urging  Humphrey  to  become  a  candidate. 
4 
Though  personal  campaign  organisations  were  evident  in  the  1960's 
their  personnel  usually  included  men  experienced  in  party  affairs.  John 
Kennedy's  campaign,  though  not  based  on  his  state  party,  did  include 
many  men  recruited  through  the  Massachusetts  Democratic  organisation. 
5 
The  campaign's  advisers  included  John  Bailey,  the  "boss"  of  Connecticut, 
and  the  candidate's  father,  Joseph  Kennedy  who  possesssed  a  network  of -  164  - 
contacts  into  the  party  established  from  his  own  involvement  in 
politics  under  Franklin  Roosevelt.  Rockefeller's  delegate-hunting 
operations  in  1968  were  led  by  Len  Hall,  a  former  national  party  chair- 
man.  Whilst  not  based  upon  their  respective  party  organisations  both 
Rockefeller  and  Robert  Kennedy's  campaigns  included  individuals  prominent 
in  the  New  York  state  parties.  For  example,  Kennedy's  advisers  included 
state  party  chairman  John  Burns  and  the  Nashua  county  chairman,  John 
English.  They  also  organised  his  campaign  in  the  state. 
6 
Voters'  control  of  the  reformed  nominating  process  encouraged 
the  construction  of  campaign  organisations  outside  the  party.  Campaigns 
came  to  be  staffed  by  professional  political  consultants,  the  candi- 
dates'  personal  aides  and  volunteers.  State  parties  ceased  to  provide 
the  candidates  with  organisations  and  experience  within  them  ceased  to 
be  a  characteristic  of  campaign  personnel. 
When  the  nominating  process  became  a  series  of  election-like  con- 
tests  political  consultants'  services  became  relevant  resources  for  the 
campaigns  to  acquire.  Pollsters,  media  consultants,  fund  raisers, 
campaign  managers  and  public  relations  men  -  the  personnel  of  American 
election  campaigns  -  were  recruited  into  the  candidate  organisations. 
They  were  distinguishable  from  pre-reform  campaign  personnel  by  the  sale 
of  their  services.  In  addition,  they  were  not  members  of  continuing 
party  organisations.  For  example,  President  Ford's  campaign  director 
in  1976  was  Stuart  Spencer,  a  professional  campaign  consultant  rather 
than  a  senior  figure  in  the  Republican  Party. 
Free  from  commitments  to  particular  state  parties  or  candidates, 
the  skills  of  the  campaign  specialists  were  recruited  anew  for  each 
nomination.  Direct  mail  fund  raiser  Morris  Dees  worked  for  McGovern 
in  1972,  Carter  in  1976  and  Edward  Kennedy  in  1980.  The  marketability 
of  campaign  skills  allowed  party  lines  to  be  traversed  (though  many -  165  - 
consultants  do  confine  their  work  to  one  party).  Direct  mail  specialist 
Richard  Vigurie  was  employed  by  the  Democrat  Wallace  in  1976,  by 
Republicans  Crane  and  Connally  for  the  1980  campaign. 
The  candidates'  personal  aides  were  experienced  in  their  service 
to  them,  not  to  political  parties.  For  example,  Carter  aides  Hamilton 
Jordan  and  Jody  Powell,  Reagan's  Edwin  Meese  and  Lyn  Nofziger,  had 
associations  with  their  state  parties  through  their  service  to  the  can- 
didates.  They  had  no  record  of  party  service  independent  of  their 
candidates.  Carter's  aides  in  1973  and  1974  served  at  the  Democratic 
National  Committee.  Whilst  their  formal  tasks  were  associated  with 
Carter's  chairmanship  of  the  congressional  campaign  committee,  they 
used  their  travels  around  the  country  to  develop  contacts  for  the 
candidate's  forthcoming  nomination  campaign. 
7 
Voter-oriented  campaigns  necessitated  extensive  campaign  organis- 
ations.  In  1980,  for  example,  Carter's  pre-convention  staff  numbered 
354  with  a  monthly  payroll  of  $400,000.8  Such  numbers  represent  the 
nucleus  of  a  larger  organisation  keyed  to  mobilising  voters  in  every 
state.  Limited  financial  resources  required  a  reliance  on  volunteers 
to  provide  the  manpower  of  campaigns. 
In  the  years  preceding  the  convention  candidates  travelled  the 
country  recruiting  the  volunteers  to  staff  their  campaigns.  A  nucleus 
of  supporters  was  established  in  each  state  who  then  widened  the 
organisation  using  contacts  provided  by  party  lists,  amateur  clubs, 
interest  groups,  college  campuses,  supporters  of  previous  campaigns  etc. 
Organising  efforts  were  stimulated  by  return  visits  by  the  candidate  and 
his  national  staff  to  attract  new  recruits  and  sustain  morale. 
The  need  to  recruit  an  organisation  (and  money  to  finance  it) 
allied  with  the  volume  of  tasks  to  be  performed  encouraged  early 
announcements  of  candidacy.  These  were  designed  to  co-opt  campaign -  166  - 
organisation  personnel  in  quantity  and  quality  to  advantage  the  candi- 
date's  competitive  position  and  discourage  potential  opponents.  The 
elimination  contests  amongst  liberal  Democrats  preceding  1972  and  1976, 
and  those  amongst  conservative  Republicans  before  1980,  were  attempts 
to  monopolise  support  in  the  party's  activist  wings  which  would  provide 
the  volunteer  manpower  with  which  to  mount  campaigns.  McGovern's 
early  co-option  of  the  liberals  prior  to  1972  deterred  potential 
competitors  Harris,  Hughes  and  Bayh  from  entering,  and  provided  insur- 
mountable  advantages  against  Lindsay,  his  challenger  for  liberal 
support  in  the  early  primaries  and  caucuses. 
Table  5.1  charts  the  trend  to  early  announcements  engendered  by 
reform.  In  the  pre-reform  period  candidates'  planning  usually  commenced 
after  the  preceding  mid-term  elections.  The  first  meeting  of  John 
Kennedy's  campaign  planners  took  place  in  April  1959,  for  example. 
9 
Announcements  of  candidacy  were  delayed  to  the  election  year,  until 
late  in  the  pre-convention  period  for  inactive  candidates. 
Post-reform  campaign  planning  began  shortly  after  the  preceding 
presidential  election.  In  fact,  Hamilton  Jordan  wrote  the  first  Carter 
strategy  document  three  days  prior  to  the  1972  election. 
10 
Some  'long 
shots'  such  as  Crane  and  Udall  were  announced  candidates  around  the 
time  of  the  mid-term  elections.  Many  other  candidates,  including  the 
incumbent  presidents  Ford  and  Carter,  announced  a  year  before  the 
election. 
Campaign  volunteers,  like  the  professional  consultants  and  candi- 
date  aides,  often  lacked  ties  to  the  party  organisations.  Hart  said 
of  the  McGovern  campaign, 
"bridges  were  being  built  to  the  regular  Democratic  Party 
organisation  at  all  levels.  But  to  the  degree  that  we  could 
not  obtain  regular  party  support,  we  were  developing  an 
insurgency  campaign  outside  the  regular  structure  to  capture 
the  nomination  with  this  separate  McGovern  organisation.  "11 -  167  - 
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Campaign  organisations  were  also  constructed  across  party  lines. 
The  recruitment  pool  for  McGovern's  organisation  included  lists  of 
subscribers  to  the  campaign  for  the  McGovern-Hatfield  amendment,  a 
bipartisan  effort  by  Senate  liberals  to  end  funding  of  the  Vietnam  war. 
In  his  organisation  recruitment  drives  Anderson  concentrated  upon 
students,  a  sector  of  the  electorate  denoted  by  widespread  partisan 
independence  and  a  smaller  proportion  of  Republican  identifiers  than 
in  the  electorate  in  general. 
12 
Campaigns  staffed  by  consultants,  candidate  aides  and  volunteers 
ceased  to  be  dependent  upon  the  backing  of  state  parties  to  supply  an 
organisation.  Though  governors  re-emerged  as  nominees  after  reform 
this  cannot  be  attributed  to  the  organisational  resources  provided  by 
their  state  parties.  Both  Reagan  and  Carter  were  former  governors, 
not  incumbents.  Their  state  parties  were  conspicuously  absent  from 
their  campaign  organisations.  No  major  state  party  figures  were  prominent 
in  either  campaign.  Carter's  candidacy  lacked  even  formal  support  from 
the  Georgia  party  hierarchy.  After  his  early  primary  victories  he 
still  lacked  the  endorsement  of  the  state's  governor,  two  senators,  nine 
out  of  ten  congressmen,  all  senior  party  officers  and  four  of  the  five 
former  governors  still  living  (excluding  Carter  and  the  senator  who  was 
a  former  governor). 
13 
Party-Campaign  Organisation  Relations 
To  advance  a  candidate's  interests  in  the  pre-reform  period 
campaigns  were  adapted  to  the  circumstances  of  each  state  party.  Relying 
on  supporters  within  the  parties  the  campaign  organisations  obtained 
information  on  the  distribution  of  candidate  preferences,  the  degree 
of  commitment  and  the  prospects  for  change  on  subsequent  ballots. 
14 -  169  - 
Decisions  on  whether  to  enter  a  primary  or  become  involved  in  delegate 
selection  were  mediated  through  professionals  in  the  states. 
15 
O'Brien's  Manual  for  the  1960  Kennedy  campaign  evinced  this  desire  to 
integrate  party  leaders  into  campaign  development, 
"Every  state,  district,  county  and  community  leader  is 
invited  to  personally  participate,  or  recommend  parti- 
cipants  and  be  advised  on  activity.  "16 
The  integration  between  party  and  campaign  organisations  extended 
into  the  primary  states.  Successful  adaptations  by  party  organisations 
preserved  influence  over  delegate  selection  despite  the  availability  of 
a  mechanism  facilitating  voter  participation.  In  consequence,  intra- 
party  politics  intruded  into  presidential  primary  campaigns.  For 
example,  in  West  Virginia  in  1960  the  Humphrey  and  Kennedy  campaigns 
sought  alliances  with  the  strongest  party  faction  in  each  area.  Recog- 
nising  the  dependence  of  the  Kennedy  campaign  upon  integrating  West  Virginia 
professionals  into  it,  O'Brien  noted,  "We  could  hold  our  receptions  and 
distribute  our  tabloids,  but  we  would  also  have  to  forge  personal 
alliances  with  dozens  of  local  politicians  to  influenced  thousands 
of  voters  . 
07 
The  involvement  of  local  leaders  in  campaigns  ensured  that  they 
were  responsive  to  parties'  organisational  demands.  To  avoid  antagon- 
ising  leaders  by  aggravating  factional  divisions,  candidates  usually 
delayed  the  quest  for  commitments.  Holding  operations  such  as  favourite 
son  candidacies  and  uncommitted  status,  delaying  the  entry  of  presid- 
ential  preferences  into  the  selection  process,  were  deferred  to  by  the 
candidates.  Negotiations  were  conducted  with  party  leaders  and 
delegates,  seeking  support  when  they  were  released  from  their  holding 
position. 
Challenges  to  favourite  sons  were  usually  reserved  for  states  where 
party  leaders  were  unfavourable  towards  the  candidate  and  opportunities -  170  - 
were  available  for  breaching  the  party  leaders'  control  over  the 
delegation.  John  Kennedy  opposed  favourite  sons  who  were  disposed 
towards  other  candidates  (Di  Salle  in  Ohio,  Tawes  in  Maryland,  Morse  in 
Oregon,  Hartke  in  Indiana,  Brown  in  California)  and  where  state  primary 
laws  permitted  pledged  delegates.  Defeating  favourite  sons  in 
primaries  in  these  states  would  ensure  their  delegations  for  Kennedy. 
Defeat  for  the  favourite  sons  risked  loss  of  both  local  prestige  and 
their  delegations.  This  threat  resulted  in  Tawes  and  Hartke  withholding 
from  the  primary  whilst  Di  Salle  and  Brown  committed  themelves  to 
Kennedy  on  the  condition  that  he  would  refrain  from  challenging  them 
in  the  primary. 
In  states  where  mechanisms  for  converting  popular  appeal  into 
delegate  mandates  were  unavailable,  challenges  to  favourite  sons  were 
normally  avoided.  Thus  in  1960  the  Kennedy  campaign  challenged  no 
favourite  sons  where  delegates  were  selected  through  the  non-primary 
process  or  New  Jersey  where  the  primary  was  not  binding.  The  Goldwater 
campaign  demonstrated  a  means  of  overcoming  favourite  son  opposition 
by  relying  on  its  committed  supporters  within  the  party  organisations 
to  exert  influence  over  delegate  selection.  This  resulted  in  a  Kansas 
delegation  unamenable  to  control  by  its  pro-Rockefeller  governor.  An 
alternative  device,  as  pursued  by  the  Nixon  campaign  in  1968  in  New 
Jersey,  was  to  attempt  to  breach  favourite  son  control  by  inducements 
to  receptive  delegates.  In  this  instance,  the  lure  of  kingmaker  status 
for  some  local  party  leaders  in  ensuring  Nixon's  nomination  operated 
to  loosen  control  over  part  of  the  delegation  from  its  pro-Rockefeller 
favourite  son. 
18 
The  corollary  of  the  integration  of  presidential  with  state  and 
local  party  politics  was  the  ascendancy  of  parochial  considerations  in 
determining  delegate  preferences.  Though  desiring  a  vote-getter -  171  - 
nationally  party  leaders  also  wanted  a  strong  candidate  at  the  top 
of  the  ticket  in  their  localities.  Different  candidates  met  this  latter 
specification  to  differing  degrees.  For  the  burgeoning  southern 
Republican  parties  of  the  early  1960's  a  Goldwater  candidacy  was  a  greater 
stimulus  to  continued  growth  than  the  moderate  alternatives.  To 
Illinois  Democrats  in  1960  Kennedy  at  the  top  of  the  ticket  was  a 
device  for  attracting  votes  away  from  the  popular  Catholic  Republican 
state's  attorney  who  had  proved  vigorous  in  pursuit  of  the  Chicago 
machine. 
19 
The  customary  convergence  of  candidate  and  party  interests  which 
characterised  the  conduct  of  campaigns  disintegrated  where  party  control 
was  challenged  by  insurgents.  Through  the  entrenchment  of  the  nomin- 
ating  process  in  the  party,  control  of  the  former  translated  into 
control  of  the  latter.  Insurgent  candidates  seeking  to  win  party- 
controlled  delegates  posed  a  threat  to  the  organisation's  internal 
power  structure.  For  the  professionals,  resisting  insurgent  candidates 
was  concomitant  with  preserving  the  existing  control  over  the  party. 
Repelling  McCarthy  in  1968  thus  became  the  means  to  self-preservation 
for  the  Democratic  professionals  exposing  the  incongruity,  in  this  case, 
between  winning  the  election  and  retaining  control  of  the  party. 
Pittsburgh  Mayor  James  Barr  examplified  the  intersection  of  interests 
in  Humphrey's  nomination  and  the  security  of  professional  control  in 
his  comment,  "I'd  rather  lose  with  my  guy  than  win  with  yours.  1120 
Campaigns  without  anchorage  in  the  party  organisations  were  further 
disadvantaged  by  the  absence  of  influential  supporters  to  promote  their 
cause  and  of  accurate  intelligence  with  which  to  inform  a  delegate- 
hunting  operation.  Thus  campaigns  based  on  volunteers  outside  the  party 
structure  such  as  the  McCarthy  and  Lodge  candidacies  lacked  bridgeheads 
into  the  state  and  local  organisations.  For  such  candidates  popular -  172  - 
support  could  be  mobilised  in  primaries  but  not  translated  into  dele- 
gates. 
In  the  post-reform  era  the  vastly  expanded  opportunities  for 
winning  committed  delegates  through  voter  mobilisation  diminished  the 
deference  shown  to  the  parties'  organisational  demands.  When  delegates 
could  be  won  by  by-passing  the  parties  the  need  to  compromise  the 
campaign's  conduct  with  the  demands  of  party  leaders  receded. 
Evidence  of  the  attenuation  of  party-imposed  constraints  on  the 
conduct  of  campaigns  was  evidenced  in  the  erosion  of  favourite  son 
strategies  after  reform.  By  the  1960's  favourite  sons  had  ceased  to 
be  serious  contenders  for  the  nomination. 
21 
However,  they  persisted 
as  vehicles  for  preserving  party  unity  by  precluding  the  involvement 
of  major  candidates  and  retaining  flexibility  for  bargaining  the  dele- 
gation's  support  at  an  opportune  moment. 
The  loosening  of  party  control  allied  with  the  expanded  provisions 
for  bound  delegates  reduced  the  protection  from  major  candidate  incur- 
sion  afforded  by  favourite  son  status.  Despite  opposition  from  within 
the  parties,  candidates  could  exploit  their  popular  support  to  win 
delegates.  Parties  could  be  challenged  with  the  diminished  risk  of 
foregoing  the  support  of  delegates  controlled  by  antagonised  leaders 
because  the  antagonised  leaders  no  longer  controlled  them. 
Recognising  the  altered  power  balance  within  the  nominating  process, 
few  party  notables  were  prepared  to  act  as  favourite  sons  after  reform. 
22 
Vulnerable  to  defeat  by  nationally-known  candidates,  most  party  leaders 
have  resorted  to  uncommitted  status  or  aligned  themselves  with  one  of  the 
major  contenders. 
In  a  voter-dominated  process  party  organisations  lack  the  resources 
to  repel  challenges  from  major  candidates.  The  candidates  possess 
national  recognition  and  popularity,  and  plausibility  as  nominees. 
Delayed  commitments  do  not  have  the  appeal  to  voters  that  they  did  for -  173  - 
party  professionals.  Moreover,  sophisticated  candidate  organisations 
mount  more  effective  campaigns  than  most  modern  state  parties.  For 
example,  in  1976  Senator  Lloyd  Bentsen,  backed  by  the  Texas  Democratic 
organisation,  sought  to  become  his  state's  favourite  son  by  running  in 
the  primary.  But  against  a  Carter  candidacy  capitalising  on  a  series  of 
primary  victories  which  promoted  him  into  front  runner  for  the  nomination 
Bentsen  could  carry  only  two  of  the  state's  thirty-one  senatorial 
districts. 
23 
The  two  states  evidencing  the  successful  exertion  of  favourite 
son  holding  operations  in  the  1976  Democratic  contest  (in  1980  there 
were  none  in  either  party)  provided  exceptional  strategic  environments 
for  delegate  selection.  In  the  Cook  County  sub-division  of  Illinois 
survived  one  of  the  last  party  organisations  capable  of  out-mobilising 
a  presidential  campaign.  In  consequence,  only  Wallace  of  the  major 
candidates  challenged  for  delegates  there.  West  Virginia  provided  the 
only  Democratic  primary  in  which  delegates  were  selected  without  the 
possibility  of  mandates.  Recognising  that  the  state's  delegates  would 
be  won  outside  the  primary  all  major  candidates  except  Wallace  refrained 
from  entering. 
The  attenuation  of  party  organisation  control  diminished  the  incen- 
tives  to  incorporate  local  leaders  into  campaigns,  and  pursue  intra-party 
alignments  with  leaders  and  factions.  Campaign  organisations  required 
information  about  the  states'  electorates  which  was  most  accurately 
measured  through  polling  conducted  by  specialists  attached  to  the 
national  campaign.  Advice  from  local  professionals  could  be  dispensed 
with  without  the  pre-reform  risk  of  being  locked  out  of  delegate  allo- 
cation.  Prior  to  1976,  for  example,  the  party  chairman  in  Iowa  advised 
the  Carter  campaign  that  the  state  was  inhospitable  territory  for  his 
candidacy. 
24 
But  within  the  campaign  the  belief  in  Carter's  potential -  174  - 
rapport  with  the  state's  voters  led  to  an  intensive  effort  being  mounted 
there. 
25 
Where  local  politics  intruded  into  post-reform  contests  it  was 
at  the  mass,  extra-party  level.  Thus  Wallace  would  exploit  his  oppo- 
sition  to  busing  amongst  Michigan  voters  in  1972  to  win  a  majority. 
Yet  his  stance  on  the  issue  was  unsupported  by  any  major  figure  in 
the  state  party. 
After  reform  the  absence  of  support  amongst  party  notables  ceased 
to  be  a  major  obstacle  to  winning  the  nomination.  Formerly  support 
within  the  party  organisations  had  been  essential  to  build  a  convention 
majority.  In  the  immediate  pre-reform  period  all  nominees  were  supported 
by  a  plurality,  at  least,  of  their  party's  county  chairmen  in  the  pre- 
convention  period. 
26 
In  1972,  in  contrast,  only  8  per  cent  of  Demo- 
cratic  chairmen  supported  McGovern  from  amongst  several  alternatives. 
27 
When  the  choice  was  narrowed  to  a  two-man  race,  the  chairmen  preferred 
Humphrey  by  a  greater  than  two-to-one  majority. 
28 
In  1976  Carter  repeated  McGovern's  extra-party  route  to  the  nomin- 
ation.  He  also  overturned  the  pre-reform  rule  that  a  candidate  unsupported 
within  the  party  organisations  could  not  win  the  nomination.  Elizabeth 
Drew  characterised  Carter's  relationship  to  the  party  as  follows  : 
"Whatever  there  was  that  called  itself  a  party  was  opposed 
to  his  nomination  but  was  powerless  before  his  assault. 
And  so  the  self-appointed  candidate  whom  no  important  members 
of  the  party  wanted  -  not  elected  officials,  not  Party 
officials,  none  of  the  old  Party  powers  -  captured  the  prize 
while  they  looked  on  helplessly.  "29 
Fund  Raising  Organisation 
Pre-reform  fund  raising  was  informal,  narrowly-based  and  usually 
completed  in  advance  of  the  campaign's  beginning.  Solicitation  was 
concentrated  upon  a  wealthy  few  and  the  success  of  such  efforts  was -  175  - 
largely  insulated  from  the  campaign's  record  in  recruiting  delegate 
support. 
Most  pre-reform  funds  were  derived  from  small  numbers  of  wealthy 
backers.  Candidates  relied  upon  themselves,  their  families  and/or 
a  few  outside  contributors.  For  wealthy  candidates  campaigns  were  self- 
financed.  Both  Rockefellers  1964  and  1968  campaigns  were  financed 
largely  by  the  candidate  and  his  family. 
30 
Over  a  fifth  of  the  total 
income  raised  by  John  Kennedy's  campaign  derived  from  Kennedy  and  his 
family. 
31 
Outside  financial  support  was  contributed  by  wealthy  individuals, 
usually  the  stockholders  or  executives  of  corporate  businesses,  contri- 
buting  substantial  sums.  For  1968,  Clement  Stone,  President  of  Combined 
American  Insurance,  was  reported  to  have  contributed  a  quarter  of  a 
million  dollars  to  Nixon's  campaign;  most  of  the  $1.5  millions  raised 
by  Rockefeller  outside  the  family  was  supplied  by  two  dozen  subscribers 
and  McCarthy  had  at  least  five  contributors  who  donated  over  a  hundred 
thousand  dollars  each  including  Stewart  Mott,  whose  family  control 
stock  in  General  Motors. 
32 
Outside  fund  raising  was  conducted  by  informal,  personal  solici- 
tation.  Fund  raising  organisation  was  headed  by  a  wealthy  supporter 
who  exploited  his  own  and  the  candidate's  network  of  contacts  to 
generate  the  contributions  to  fund  the  campaign.  For  example,  McCarthy's 
principal  fund-raiser  was  Howard  Stein,  president  of  the  Dreyfus  Fund 
and  investment  banker  Maurice  Stans  occupied  a  similar  role  for'Nixon 
'in  1968.  Backers  of  the  candidates'  previous  campaigns  were  relied 
upon  providing  a  local  financial  base  for  the  nomination  effort.  Over 
half  of  all  John  Kennedy's  outside  contributions  derived  from  Massa- 
33 
chusetts. 
Voter-oriented  fund  raising  efforts  were  the  exception.  Goldwater -  176  - 
and  McCarthy  provide  the  principal  immediate  pre-reform  instances,  both 
generating  over  a  quarter  of  a  million  individual  subscriptions. 
3' 
But  for  both  campaigns  voter-oriented  fund-raising  was  a  complement  to 
the  solicitation  of  wealthy  contributors,  not  an  alternative  to  it. 
Campaigns  funded  by  candidates  and  their  families  were  assured  of 
sufficient  funds  for  their  duration.  Thus  fund-raising  capability  was 
immune  from  the  progress  of  the  campaign's  delegate  mobilising  efforts. 
Rockefeller's  campaigns,  for  example,  were  lucratively  financed  without 
coming  within  reach  of  the  nomination. 
Candidacies  lacking  an  independent  financial  base  and  starting 
with  few  large  sponsors  were  more  dependent  upon  a  bandwagon  effect 
operating  amongst  likely  contributors  to  fund  their  campaigns.  For 
such  campaigns  fund-raising  activity  was  continuous  and  income  uneven 
in  supply.  The  McCarthy,  Lodge  and  1960  Humphrey  campaigns  were 
constantly  striving  to  generate  the  funds  necessary  to  remain  in  con- 
tention.  The  supply  of  funds  responded  to  surges  and  declines  in  the 
campaigns'  progress,  and  strategy  was  readjusted  to  available  resources. 
Reform  produced  a  democratisation,  nationalisation  and  formalisation 
of  fund  raising.  It  also  increased  the  responsiveness  of  fund-raising 
capability  to  the  campaigns'  political  progress.  Fund-raising  strategies 
became  voter-oriented,  geographically  diffused  and  commercially  con- 
ducted.  Campaigns  started  with  modest  financial  resources  seeking 
success  in  early  contests  to  generate  further  contributions. 
By  limiting  the  size  of  outside  and  family  contributions,  and 
offering  matching  funds  in  return  for  small  contributions  and  limitations 
on  self-financing  by  candidates,  campaign  finance  reforms  shifted  the 
focus  of  fund-raising  activities  from  an  elite  to  a  mass  base.  Nbunerous 
small  contributions  were  required  where  pre-reform  candidates  had  relied 
upon  large  sums  from  a  few  donors. -  177  - 
Solicitation  efforts  became  voter-oriented.  Professional  fund- 
raisers  such  as  direct  mail  specialists  were  recruited  by  campaigns  to 
generate  a  mass  base  of  financial  support.  Targeted  populations  of 
potential  subscribers  were  identified  by  interest  group  membership, 
magazine  readership  and  ideological  classifications  widening  the  sources 
of  campaign  funds  beyond  the  pre-reform  corporate  businessmen. 
McGovern's  targeted  groups  included  contributors  to  the  campaign  for 
the  McGovern-Hatfield  amendment,  members  of  SANE  and  readers  of  the 
New  Republic;  Bayh's  efforts  focused  on  feminists,  Brown's  on  members 
of  the  American  Federation  of  Teachers,  Jackson  rented  mailing  lists 
from  synagogues,  Udall  concentrated  on  environmentalists  and  Wallace 
upon  members  of  White  Citizen's  Councils. 
35 
Respondents  to  initial 
solicitation  efforts  formed  a  financial  base  tapped  regularly  as  the 
campaign  preoceeded.  For  example,  Wallace  relied  upon  a  mailing  list 
of  190,000  to  elicit  funds  before  the  delegate  selection  process  began 
in  1976. 
From  the  start  of  the  election  year  from  1976  matching  funds  became 
available  which  enabled  candidates  to  'double  up'  on  individual  contributions 
under  $250.  Thus  candidates  proficient  in  generating  a  mass  financial 
base  had  it  enlarged  by  matching  funds.  In  1976  federal  funding  contri- 
buted  $5  million  to  Reagan,  $4.7  million  to  Ford  and  over  three  million 
dollars  to  both  Carter  and  Wallace. 
Matching  funds  also  encouraged  a  nationalistion  of  fund-raising 
efforts.  To  qualify  for  matching  required  revenue  raised  in  twenty 
states  necessitating  the  construction  of  a  financial  constituency 
beyond  a  single  state  or  region. 
Formalisation  occurred  in  two  senses.  First,  it  followed  from 
the  decline  of  informal,  personal  solicitation  and  its  replacement  by 
formal  mechanisms  such  as  mass  mailings  and  media  advertising.  Formal- -  178  - 
isation  was  also  entailed  by  the  increased  regulation  of  campaign 
revenue  raising  and  expenditure.  All  donations  had  to  be  recorded  and 
disclosed,  matching  fund  applications  documented  and  expenditures 
reported. 
Formalisation  in  both  senses  entailed  professionalisatibn.  Voter- 
oriented  solicitation  needed  commercial  fund  raisers  and  increased 
regulation  required  specialist  administrators  skilled  in  techniques 
of  financial  control  and  familiar  with  the  relevant  legislation.  By 
1980  between  5  and  7  per  cent  of  pre-convention  budgets  were  expended 
on  professionals  of  the  latter  type. 
36 
Post-reform  fund  raising  campaigns  increased  in  responsiveness  to 
the  surges  and  declines  in  vote-winning  efforts.  No  candidate  entered 
the  selection  sequences  assured  of  funds  to  mount  an  entire  nomination 
campaign  and  available  resources  were  expended  disproportionately  in 
the  early  state  contests  (see  Chapters  Six  and  Seven).  All  campaigns 
were  premised  on  the  assumption  that  success  in  early  contests  would 
generate  sufficient  additional  income  to  finance  the  rest  of  the 
campaign. 
Contributions  flow  to  candidates  who  win  contests  and  gain  in 
plausibility  as  nominees.  Table  5.2  demonstrates  the  linkage  of  success 
in  delegate  selection  contests  to  success  in  the  campaigns'  fund-raising 
capabilities  using  the  example  of  Carter  and  his  competitors  in  1976. 
(The  nearest  competitor  is  defined  as  the  candidate  second  in  share  of 
delegates.  ) 
As  Carter  won  contests  and  acquired  the  delegates  which  moved  him 
towards  a  convention  majority,  he  was  the  beneficiary  of  an  upsurge  in 
contributions.  His  contributions  showed  a  lineal  increase  whilst  that 
of  his  opponents  underwent  lineal  decline,  remained  constant  and  low 
or  rose  after  early  success  and  declined  after  later  failure. 
37 -  179  - 
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Conclusion 
Campaign  organisations  registered  the  change  from  a  party-  to  a 
voter-dominated  nomination.  Pre-reform  organisations  included  experienced 
party  professionals  keyed  to  fostering  relations  with  their  counterparts 
in  the  states  from  which  candidates  sought  support.  Recognising  the 
lcs  of  power  within  the  nominating  process,  campaigns  were  deferen- 
tial  to  party  leaders  and  attuned  to  party  organisational  demands. 
For  many  pre-reform  campaigns  fund-raising  posed  but  slight  demands 
upon  the  organisation.  Candidates  or  their  families  funded  some  campaigns, 
a  few  wealthy  backers  accounted  for  most  others.  Reliable  sources  of 
funds  divorced  the  recruitment  of  political  support  from  its  financial 
counterpart. 
Post-1968  candidate  organisations  reflected  the  effects  of  reform 
in  propelling  both  control  over  the  nomination  and  sources  of  funds 
into  the  electorate.  Organisations  adapted  to  the  election-like  tasks 
involved  in  mobilising  voters.  Political  consultants  were  recruited  to 
provide  campaign  specialisms  and  volunteers  were  generated  to  provide 
organisational  manpower  necessary  for  voter-mobilisation  efforts.  As 
party  leaders  declined  in  influence  so  their  support  diminished  as  a 
resource  and  the  necessity  for  establishing  relations  with  them  declined. 
In  consequence,  party  professionals  diminished  in  numbers  amongst 
campaign  personnel  as  their  specialist  skills  became  redundant. 
Continuous  and  extensive  fund-raising  operations  to  supply  cam- 
paigns  dependent  upon  small  contributions  (and,  in  turn,  matching  funds), 
followed  reform.  Specialist  fund-raisers  were  recruited  who  solicited 
finance  from  national  voter  constituencies.  Beyond  this  base  candi- 
dates  were  dependent  upon  achieving  success  in  recruiting  political 
support  to  attract  the  finances  necessary  to  sustain  an  effective -  181  - 
campaign  through  the  convention.  Thus  the  linkage  between  political 
and  financial  mobilisation  tightened.  Campaigns  failing  politically 
struggled  to  find  the  funds  to  stage  a  recovery  whilst  those  enjoying 
political  success  obtained  increased  resources  enabling  them  to  maximise 
their  advantage. -  182  - 
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CHAPTER  SIX 
THE  ROLE  OF  PRESIDENTIAL  PRIMARIES 
Presidential  primaries  have  been  the  most  conspicuous  feature 
of  the  pre-convention  nominating  process  for  most  of  the  twentieth 
century.  Though  a  consistent  feature  of  the  modern  nominating  process 
the  functions  of  primaries  altered  after  reform.  This  followed,  first, 
from  an  unintended  consequence  of  reform  -  the  proliferation  of  prim- 
aries  so  that  they  became  the  predominant  selection  mechanism  and 
provided  a  substantial  majority  of  the  total  national  convention 
delegates.  Secondly,  as  reformers  intended,  the  linkage  between  the 
preferences  of  voters  participating  in  the  primaries  and  the  delegates 
derived  from  them  was  tightened.  This  combination  of  changes  created 
the  potential  -  which  candidates  proceeded  to  realise  -  for  the  pri- 
maries  to  determine  national  convention  decisions  where  formerly  they 
had  been  no  more  than  influences  on  those  decisions. 
In  this  chapter  the  argument  for  the  altered  role  of  presidential 
primaries  is  developed  by  examining  the  strategic  responses  adopted 
towards  them  by  candidate  organisations,  and  their  impact  upon  conven- 
tion  decisions.  A  comparison  of  the  pre-  and  post-reform  periods  is 
provided  contrasting  the  type  of  candidates  entering  the  primaries,  the 
role  of  primaries  in  campaign  strategy,  the  effects  of  defeat  and 
victory  in  them  upon  the  competitive  standing  of  the  contenders,  and 
the  distribution  of  influence  between  the  states  in  the  primary  system. 
Before  reform  primaries  were  employed  by  a  restricted  range  of 
candidates.  They  were  used  to  demonstrate  electability.  Primary 
defeats  were  usually  fatal  to  prospects  of  winning  the  nomination. 
Victories  in  them  rarely  altered  the  relative  standing  of  the  contenders. 
Potentially  the  most  influential  primaries  were  those  few  that  provided -  187  - 
contests  between  major  candidates. 
Since  reform  virtually  all  candidates  conduct  active  campaigns  and 
all  active  campaigners  enter  primaries.  They  are  used  to  win  large 
numbers  of  pledged  delegates.  Defeats  can  be  withstood  if  the  per- 
formance  exceeds  expectations  or  if  it  occurs  late  in  the  sequence 
when  delegates  have  been  accumulated  even  if  the  result  confounded 
expectations.  Primary  victories  have  produced  dramatic  improvements  in 
the  competitive  standing  of  winning  candidates.  Primaries  scheduled 
early  in  the  sequence  carry  the  greatest  impact  on  the  nominating 
contest.  In  consequence,  they  receive  disproportionately  large 
allocations  of  the  candidates'  resources  measured  against  the  number 
of  delegates  at  stake. 
Primaries  and  Candidate  Type 
When  primaries  supplied  only  a  minority  of  national  convention 
delegates  they  were  not  a  part  of  all  candidates'  strategies.  A  can- 
didate  "theoretically  at  least,  could  sweep  all  the  primaries  and  lose 
the  nomination". 
1 
Theodore  Roosevelt  (in  1912)  and  Kefauver  in  1952 
came  close  to  translating  this  theoretical  possibility  into  practice. 
Though  not  mathematically  necessary  for  a  convention  majority 
the  primaries  did  attract  some  entrants.  A  listing  of  those  who  con- 
centrated  their  campaigns  on  the  primaries  prior  to  1960  is  instructive 
as  an  indicator  of  a  type  of  candidate.  They  included  Robert  La 
Follette,  Theodore  Roosevelt,  Leonard  Wood,  Hiram  Johnson,  William 
Borah,  Harold  Stassen,  Estes  Kefauver  and  Dwight  Eisenhower. 
2 
The 
list  is  a  roll  call  of  insurgents.  Several  candidates  were  notable 
for  opposing  their  own  parties.  Roosevelt  challenged  the  incumbent 
president  of  his  own  party.  As  governor  of  California,  Johnson  created -  188  - 
lasting  impediments  to  effective  party  organisation.  In  1912  he  ran 
with  Roosevelt  on  the  third  party  Progressive  ticket  when  the  oppo- 
sition  to  President  Taft  extended  from  an  intra-party  challenge  into 
electoral  opposition.  Kefauver  rose  to  prominence  through  a  Senate 
committee  investigation  of  organised  crime  which  revealed  the  close 
links  of  some  local  party  figures  with  the  underworld.  Eisenhower, 
in  contrast,  was  a  political  neophyte  whose  partisan  allegiance  was 
unknown  until  the  start  of  the  election  year.  When  his  candidacy  was 
made  public  his  campaign  manager  had  to  announce  that,  "General 
Eisenhower  has  assured  me  that  he  is  a  Republican.  "3 
Apart  from  their  lack  of  entre  with  their  party  organisations, 
a  characteristic  shared  by  all  of  these  candidates,  except  Eisenhower, 
was  their  failure  to  obtain  the  nomination.  The  emphasis  upon  primaries 
was  necessitated  because  no  other  plausible  route  to  the  nomination 
existed.  Because  they  lacked  any  alternative,  the  primary  participant 
was  frequently  viewed  as  a  weak  candidate  - 
"primary  activity  is  often  (though  by  no  means  always)  a 
sign  that  a  candidate  has  great  obstacles  to  overcome  and 
must  win  many  primaries  in  order  to  be  considered  for  the 
nomination  at  all.  The  image  communicated  by  a  few  primary 
victories,  unless  they  are  overwhelming,  may  be  less  of  a 
conquering  hero  than  of  the  drowning  man  clutching  at  the 
last  straw.  " 
Several  of  the  candidates  who  emphasised  primaries  in  the  cam- 
paigns  between  1960  and  1968  were,  like  their  predecessors,  lacking 
support  within  the  party  organisations.  Humphrey  (in  1960)  was  con- 
sidered  too  liberal  to  be  electable.  Rockefeller's  liberalism  and 
independence  antagonised  Republicans  in  1964.  McCarthy  was  regarded 
as  a  rebel  for  challenging  Johnson's  renomination.  Similarly  Robert 
Kennedy  had  challenged  Johnson  and  then  Humphrey  behind  whom  the  party 
organisations  consolidated  after  the  President's  withdrawal. 
Though  the  primary  entrants  were  predominantly  insurgents,  they -  189  - 
were  not  exclusively  so.  Candidates  such  as  Robert  Taft,  Dewey  (in  1948) 
and  Stevenson  (in  1956)  entered  primaries  although  they  possessed  sub- 
stantial  support  within  the  party.  John  Kennedy  and  Nixon  (in  1968) 
were  both  the  favourites  in  the  polls  of  their  parties'  county  chair- 
men.  Nixon  had  been  the  party's  unopposed  nominee  in  1960.  Kennedy 
had  narrowly  missed  the  vice  presidential  nomination  in  1956  when  the 
decision  had  been  made  on  the  convention  floor.  Both,  however,  faced 
obstacles  precluding  their  support  in  the  parties  from  being  translated 
into  the  nomination  autonatically.  Nixon  had  been  defeated  in  his 
two  previous  elections  -  for  the  presidency  in  1960  and  for  governor 
of  California  two  years  later.  Kennedy's  religion  evoked  memories  of 
the  bigotry  and  the  sizeable  defeat  suffered  in  1928  by  Al  Smith,  the 
only  previous  Catholic  nominee. 
In  all  the  four  contested  nominations  between  1960  and  1968  at 
least  one  major  candidate  did  not  enter  the  primaries.  None  of  Kennedy's 
three  principal  opponents  -  Symington,  Johnson  and  Stevenson  -  cam- 
paigned  for  votes  in  primary  states.  In  1968  Humphrey  was  situated  in 
a  different  position  towards  the  party  organisation  to  what  he  had 
been  eight  years  earlier.  When  Johnson  withdrew,  Humphrey  inherited 
his  support  amongst  the  party  organisations  upon  whom  he  relied  for 
the  nomination  without  entering  primaries.  Though  seeking  strong 
showings  in  primaries,  Rockefeller  and  Reagan  in  1968,  like  Lodge  and 
Nixon  four  years  earlier,  did  not  campaign  in  person. 
Between  1960  and  1968  more  than  half  of  all  major  candidates  for 
the  nomination  were  not  active  in  primaries  (see  Table  4.1).  Five 
candidates  did  not  even  enter  their  names  on  primary  ballots.  Although 
one  of  the  five,  Scranton,  did  not  become  a  candidate  until  after  the 
primaries  were  completed  the  remaining  four  -  Johnson,  Symington, 
Stevenson  and  Humphrey  -  chose  to  rely  on  other  means  to  obtain  the 
nomination. -  190  - 
Before  reform  candidate  organisations  could  choose  whether  or  not 
to  contest  the  primaries.  The  scope  for  choice  depended  upon  the  can- 
didate's  relations  with  the  party  organisations  and  his  status  measured 
against  the  criteria  of  availability.  For  some  candidates  entering  or 
avoiding  the  primaries  were  genuine  alternatives.  For  example,  Gold- 
water's  support  amongst  Republican  cadres  was  sufficiently  widespread 
to  make  him  a  credible  contender  for  the  nomination  without  campaigning 
in  the  primaries  as  he  did. 
In  the  post-reform  period  the  range  of  choice  for  candidates  re- 
garding  the  primaries  disappeared:  to  win  the  nomination  they  had  to 
be  entered  in  substantial  numbers.  This  stricture  applies  to  all  can- 
didates  irrespective  of  their  relationship  to  the  party  organisations. 
President  Nixon  entered  seventeen  of  the  twenty-one  preference  primaries 
when  he  sought  renomination  in  1972.  Eight  years  earlier,  prior  to 
reform,  President  Johnson's  name  appeared  on  three  of  the  sixteen 
primary  ballots  it  was  possible  to  enter.  Whilst  the  insurgents  - 
Wallace,  Carter,  McGovern  -  continued  to  utilise  primaries,  candidates 
with  greater  equity  within  the  parties  also  conducted  extensive  primary 
campaigns.  Humphrey,  the  party  nominee  in  1968  without  entering  prim- 
aries,  recognised  four  years  later  that,  "Whoever  gets  the  nomination 
will  have  to  be  in  primaries  -a  representative  sampling  of  them.  "5 
Before  the  start  of  the  1972  primaries  Muskie  had  been  endorsed 
by  eight  governors  and  twelve  senators  which  formerly  would  have  guaran- 
teed  substantial  numbers  of  delegates  reducing  the  need  for  widespread 
primary  activity.  Yet  Muskie  committed  himself  to  running  in  every 
primary. 
The  concentration  of  the  candidates  in  the  primaries  shown  in  Table 
6.1  evidences  their  recognition  as  the  nucleus  of  the  nominating  process 
since  reform.  Of  all  the  major  candidates  since  1968  only  Humphrey -  191  - 
and  Ford  -  factors  in  most  speculation  about  the  1976  Democratic  and 
1980  Republican  nominations  respectively  but  never  announced  candidates 
-  refrained  from  entering  primaries. 
6 
The  Role  of  Primaries  in  Campaign  Strategy 
Prior  to  reform  the  significance  of  victories  in  primaries  did 
not  derive  from  the  delegates  that  they  conferred  but  as  a  means  of 
influencing  uncommitted  delegates  or  those  who  controlled  them.  The 
primaries  provided  a  source  of  evidence  for  those  deciding  the  nomin- 
ation  in  conformity  with  the  party's  imperative  of  electability. 
According  to  Polsby  and  Wildavsky,  primaries  were  important  "largely 
because  the  results  represent  an  ostensibly  objective  indication  of 
whether  a  candidate  can  win  the  election.  "7  In  conventions  dominated 
by  party  professionals  the  desire  to  win  the  election,  both  nationally 
and  locally,  was  usually  a  major  influence  in  deciding  the  nominee. 
Only  victory  could  enhance  the  professionals'  access  to  power.  In  the 
absence  of  primaries  the  professionals  either  employed  other  measures 
of  popularity  to  make  their  decision  or  relied  upon  intuition. 
The  primaries  provided  both  'hard'  evidence  and  pressure  from  voters 
circumscribing  the  professionals'  freedom  of  choice.  James  Rowe, 
Humphrey's  campaign  manager  in  1960,  delineated  the  dependent  status 
of  the  professional  and  the  pressure  that  could  be  exerted  upon  them 
by  primaries  - 
"These  men  [the  professionals]  do  not  operate  as  individuals. 
They  are  essentially  catalysts  -  catalysts  who  remain  in 
power  by  reflecting  accurately  the  moods  and  desires  of  their 
constituents.  Their  constituents  happen  to  be  minor  organis- 
ation  politicians  but  these  in  turn  reflect  accurately  the 
mood  of  the  voters.  These  moods  are,  in  turn,  affected  by 
the  actions  of  the  candidates.  So  the  'professionals'  -  like 
other  politicians  -  are  subject  to  political  pressures  from 
below  . 
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The  appeal  of  the  pre-reform  primaries  to  the  insurgents  or  candidates 
with  political  handicaps  was  that  they  provided  a  means  of  influencing 
the  professionals  who  would  otherwise  be  unwilling  to  nominate  them. 
Reflecting  after  his  nomination  appeared  assured,  John  Kennedy 
recognised  the  necessity  of  his  primary  victories  to  assuaging  doubts 
about  his  religion  as  a  barrier  to  electability, 
"Could  you  imagine  me,  having  entered  no  primaries,  trying 
to  tell  the  leaders  that  being  a  Catholic  was  no  handicap? 
In  the  same  way,  when  Lyndon  [Johnson]  said  he  could  win  in 
the  North,  but  could  offer  no  concrete  evidence,  his  claim 
couldn't  be  taken  seriously  ...  For  some  men  such  as  Lyndon 
and  myself  primaries  are  not  only  good,  they  are  absolutely 
vital.  "9 
Once  Kennedy  had  demonstrated  vote-getting  power  in  the  primaries  his 
religion  became  an  asset  in  pressurising  the  professionals  to  accept 
him.  In  a  party  dependent  for  its  electoral  successes  upon  substantial 
Catholic  support  "he  was  aware  that,  if  he  swept  the  primaries  and 
led  the  polls  and  had  most  of  the  delegates,  he  could  be  denied  the 
nomination  only  by  a  few  party  leaders  saying  'We  won't  take  him  because 
he's  a  Catholic'  -  and  this,  he  knew,  they  would  find  politically 
difficult  to  do.  "  10 
The  primaries  were  particularly  pertinent  to  the  professionals  in 
the  large  urban  states  whose  electoral  votes  were  frequently  crucial 
in  presidential  elections.  It  was  in  these  states  that  party  competi- 
tion  was  often  closest,  party  organisation  most  developed  and  patronage 
often  extensive.  In  such  states  the  need  for  an  effective  vote-getter 
at  the  top  of  the  ticket  was  particularly  intense  because  it  would 
benefit  the  party's  candidates  for  lower-level  offices  which  provided 
access  to  the  rewards  necessary  to  preserve  the  party  machine's  effective- 
ness. 
Theodore  White  noted  that  the  principal  observers  of  the  Kennedy- 
Humphrey  primary  contests  in  1960  were  - -  194  - 
"a  multiple  audience  -  first,  the  folksy  audience  of  the 
primary  state  to  be  won  directly,  along  with  the  local 
delegates  that  could  be  harvested  in  the  primary  victory 
(this,  of  course,  was  the  least  of  their  considerations); 
next  the  national  audience  and,  last,  there  were  the 
bosses  of  the  big  Eastern  states  and  smaller  organised 
states  who  would  watch  the  race  to  observe  the  performance 
of  political  horseflesh.  " 
11 
Although  the  key  primaries  in  1960  were  held  in  Wisconsin  and  West 
Virginia  both  candidates  recognised  that  the  prize  for  victory  would 
(or  could)  be  the  uncommitted  blocs  of  the  largest  delegations  seeking 
to  maximise  the  strength  of  the  party  ticket  in  November.  If  Kennedy 
could  win  the  primaries  "only  then  could  he  translate  his  voter 
strength  in  such  states  as  New  York,  Illinois  and  Pennsylvania  into 
solid  delegate  strength.  "12  Similarly  the  Humphrey  campaign  was 
designed  to  convince  "a  handful  of  professionals"  that  he  could  win 
the  election. 
13  A  win  in  Wisconsin,  survival  until  the  convention 
and  the  absence  of  a  clear  leader  might  allow  Humphrey  to  appeal  to  what 
he  called  "the  cold-eyed  boys  looking  for  someone  who  is  as  tough  and 
energetic  and  as  mean  -  if  need  be  -  as  Nixon.  "  14 
Eight  years  later  Nixon  set  himself  to  win  every  primary  he 
entered  perceiving  it  as  the  means  to  overcome  his  image  as  a  loser. 
If  he  proved  himself  the  most  effective  vote-getter  he  would  be  selected 
despite  his  previous  failures  - 
"I  [Nixon]  am  going  to  get  the  nomination  if  I  prove  I'm 
the  strongest  candidate.  If  I  can't  demonstrate  that, 
nothing  else  I  do  will  mean  anything.  "15 
His  campaign  was  particularly  directed  to  the  leaders  of  the  growing 
Republican  Party  in  the  South.  After  Goldwater's  landslide  defeat 
four  years  earlier  the  southern  leaders  were  prepared  to  support  a 
less  conservative  candidate  if  he  stood  to  be  elected.  Though  ideolo- 
gically  closer  to  Reagan,  they  had  "learned  a  lesson  of  political 
pragmatism.  If  they  thought  I  [Nixon]  was  the  man  who  could  win,  they -  195  - 
would  support  me  . 
06 
Elsewhere  the  reserve  of  loyalty  towards 
Nixon  within  the  Republican  Party  would  be  unlocked  by  primary  vic- 
tories.  17 
Robert  Kennedy,  like  his  brother  eight  years  earlier,  set  out  to 
win  the  primaries  "to  show  the  pole.  " 
1$ 
He  targeted  one  pol  in  par- 
titular.  "Daley",  said  Kennedy,  "means  the  ball  game.  "  19 
Entering 
after  several  primaries  had  passed,  Kennedy  sought  to  give  added 
emphasis  to  those  remaining  characterising  the  first  contestin  Indiana 
as  the  West  Virginia  of  1968.20 
Because  the  primaries  were  used  as  tests  of  electability  they  were 
selectively  employed  to  demonstrate  support  in  a  regionally  hetero- 
geneous  range  of  states.  James  Rowe's  advice  to  Humphrey  in  1960 
recommended  that  "it  can  and  should  be  presented  that  they  have  been 
selected  solely  on  the  basis  of  showing  to  the  country  that  Humphrey 
can  win  in  every  section:  ".  21 
Similarly  geography  was  a  factor  in  John 
Kennedy's  selection  of  primaries  for  "a  broad  enough  number  had  to  be 
chosen  to  give  a  national  cast  to  the  campaign.  "22 
Primaries  proved  to  be  decisive  for  John  Kennedy  and  Nixon  because 
the  party  leaders  were  not  hostile  to  their  candidacies  and  were  open 
to  persuasion  by  a  series  of  unequivocal  primary  victories.  After 
Kennedy's  victory  in  heavily  Protestant  West  Virginia  defused  the 
Catholic  issue,  "hesitant  leaders  became  convinced  that  Kennedy  was 
their  man.  "23  For  Pennsylvania's  Governor  David  Lawrence,  Kennedy's 
sweep  of  the  primaries  proved  irresistible.  He  committed  his  support 
to  Kennedy  because  he  had  "won  in  open  primaries  and  received  150,000 
votes  in  Pennsylvania's.  "24  Despite  his  own  enthusiasn  for  Stevenson, 
Lawrence  was  susceptible  to  pressure  from  below  conceding  that  "it 
would  be  running  against  public  sentiment  in  Pennsylvania  if  we  didn't 
'Z5  support  Kennedy.  The  surmounting  of  the  religious  barrier -  196c"- 
enabled  Governor  Williams  and  the  Michigan  party  leadership  to 
publicise  their  existing  preference, 
"we  had  more  or  less  in  our  own  minds  decided  in  favor  of 
Jack  [Kennedy]  before  Wisconsin,  but  we  weren't  in  a 
position  to  move  politically  until  about  West  Virginia.  "26 
In  Illinois  - 
"What  concerned  delegates  most  was  who  would  win  in  November, 
and  more  particularly,  who  would  most  help  the  state  and 
county  tickets  in  Illinois.  On  this  question  Senator 
Kennedy  clearly  had  the  advantage.  As  the  mayor  [Daley] 
emphasised,  the  Senator  had  won  seven  primaries  """"27 
Largely  on  the  basis  of  his  primary  performances  Kennedy  won  four-fifths 
of  the  delegates  from  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Illinois  and  Michigan 
providing  more  than  one-third  of  the  votes  necessary  to  nominate. 
Nixon's  primary  victories  were  the  means  to  activate  the  support 
latent  within  the  Republican  Party.  The  enthusiasm  for  him  had  been 
restrained  only  by  his  image  as  a  loser  but  after  his  record  vote  in 
New  Hampshire  "it  was  only  necessary  for  Nixon's  captains  to  shake  the 
trees  -  and  the  delegates  would  fall  into  their  baskets.  "28  The 
primaries  were  also  the  key  to  the  support  of  the  pragmatic  leaders  of 
the  South.  Following  his  fifth  successive  victory  in  Oregon,  Nixon 
planned  to  travel  to  Atlanta  to  "wrap  up  the  whole  campaign"  in  a 
meeting  with  southern  leaders. 
29 
When  his  southern  support  fissured 
at  the  convention  before  a  Reagan  surge,  Strom  Thurmond  rallied  his 
South  Carolina  delegation  to  support  a  candidate  who  could  be  elected, 
"We  have  no  choice,  if  we  want  to  win,  except  to  vote  for  Nixon  ... 
Believe  me,  I  love  Reagan,  but  Nixon's  the  one.  "30  (Theodore  White 
maintains  that  the  leaders  in  the  large  eastern  and  midwestern  states 
"waited  to  see  Nixon  run  in  the  primaries. 
01 
On  the  evidence  of 
their  behaviour  at  the  convention  this  seems  unlikely.  The  hierarchy 
in  these  states  either  supported  Rockefeller  or  deferred  first  ballot; 
commitments  to  major  candidates). -  197  - 
The  1960  Democratic  and  1968  Republican  nominations  represent 
two  examples  of  the  influence  of  primaries  upon  pre-reform  convention 
outcomes.  But  the  evidence  from  the  two  remaining  contested  nomin- 
ations  of  the  immediate  pre-reform  period  proves  that  primaries  were  not 
consistent  in  their  impact. 
Humphrey  was  nominated  in  1968  without  entering  primaries.  Robert 
Kennedy  had  won  six  primaries  when  he  died  but  he  remained  substantially 
behind  Humphrey  in  delegate  support.  Kennedy's  initial  objective  in 
entering  the  primaries  was  not  to  win  a  first  ballot  victory  but  to 
preclude  Humphrey  from  doing  so. 
32 
Such  a  plan  recognised  that 
Humphrey  would  have  considerable  first  ballot  support  irrespective  of 
Kennedy  wins  in  the  primaries.  Though  McCarthy  won  four  preference 
primaries  he  was  supported  by  fewer  than  a  quarter  of  the  delegates  on 
the  only  ballot. 
In  1964  there  was  a  different  winner  in  each  of  the  three  primaries 
contested  between  the  major  candidates  -  Lodge  in  New  Hampshire,  Rocke- 
feller  in  Oregon,  Goldwater  in  California.  Goldwater  was  active  in  more 
primaries  than  any  other  candidate  but  his  performances  were  notable 
for  their  failure  to  demonstrate  vote-getting  power.  In  Indiana  and 
Illinois  he  won  unimpressive  victories  against  minor  candidates.  In 
Illinois  over  200,000  voters  in  the  gubernatorial  primary  ignored  the 
presidential  preference  poll. 
33 
In  New  Hampshire  Goldwater  ran  second 
behind  write-in  votes  for  Lodge  and  he  suspended  his  campaign  in  Oregon 
when  his  prospects  for  victory  appeared  bleak.  Though  the  only  candidate 
on  the  Nebraska  ballot  he  received  only  a  plurality  of  the  votes  cast. 
His  only  victory  against  a  major  opponent  occurred  in  California  where 
he  beat  Rockefeller  securing  less  than  52  per  cent  of  the  vote. 
The  disparity  between  Goldwater's  primary  performances  and  his  first 
ballot  success  was  delineated  by  Converse  and  associates  - -  198  - 
"There  is  room  to  wonder  whether  any  presidential  aspirant 
has  ever  contested  so  many  primaries  with  as  disastrous 
a  showing  and  still  captured  the  nomination  of  his  party's 
convention  . 
'34 
Despite  the  overall  fragility  of  Goldwater's  showing  in  the  prim- 
aries  several  writers  have  asserted  that  his  one  victory  over  a  major 
opponent  was  decisive  to  his  nomination. 
35 
These  writers  argue  that 
the  California  victory  was  crucial  either  by  converting  uncommitted 
delegates  or  by  strengthening  the  Goldwater  forces  in  the  state  con- 
ventions  where  delegate  selection  was  still  to  be  completed.  But 
Goldwater's  support  within  the  party  was  so  widespread  that  it  must 
be  doubted  whether  California  provided  the  difference  between  a  con- 
vention  victory  and  defeat. 
Anticipating  the  possibility  that  California  might  "go  up  in  smoke" 
the  Goldwater  campaign  had  prepared  a  "fire  escape"  whereby  a  substantial 
number  of  delegates'  commitments  to  Goldwater  would  be  revealed 
immediately  after  the  primary  to  offset  the  adverse  publicity  of  a 
defeat. 
36 
The  campaign's  co-director  of  field  operations  estimated 
that  at  least  one  hundred  votes  would  have  been  gleaned  from  the 
post-California  conventions  irrespective  of  the  primary's  result. 
37 
Had  the  states  cited  by  Robert  Novak  as  ones  where  Goldwater's  support 
was  enhanced  by  California  provided  him  with  no  votes  at  all  (a  highly 
unlikely  possibility)  the  candidate  would  have  fallen  fourteen  votes 
short  of  a  first  ballot  majority. 
38 
As  the  second  largest  delegation, 
California  was  an  important  addition  to  Goldwater's  delegate  total. 
Whether  its  influence  upon  other  states  decided  the  nomination  is  doubt- 
ful  though  it  did  contribute  to  the  magnitude  of  the  victory. 
The  evidence  of  the  four  contested  nominations  preceding  reform 
suggests  that  primaries  varied  in  their  influence  upon  the  convention 
outcome.  For  John  Kennedy  and  Nixon  the  primaries  provided  leverage -  199  - 
over  large  numbers  of  delegates.  Humphrey  possessed  no  such  advantage  in 
1968  but  he  won  a  larger  proportion  of  the  delegate  total  than  either 
Kennedy  or  Nixon. 
39 
For  Goldwater,  the  primaries  indicated  vote-getting 
weakness  rather  than  strength.  Yet  Goldwater  won  the  largest  share  of 
the  vote  on  first  ballot  in  an  out-party  nomination  since  1944.40 
Prior  to  1972,  primaries  were  notable  more  for  the  information 
than  the  delegates  they  imparted.  They  provided  a  "demonstration  effect" 
indicating  electoral  potential. 
41 
But  several  conditions  controlled 
their  influence  on  the  nominating  outcome.  First,  at  least  one  candidate 
had  to  be  prepared  to  use  primaries  to  increase  the  information 
available  to  the  delegates.  Where  no  candidate  sought  to  alter  the 
existing  distribution  of  preferences  within  the  parties  -  as  happened 
in  the  in-party  nominations  of  1960  and  1964  -  the  primaries  were  of 
little  importance.  Secondly,  the  primaries  were  potentially  most  influ- 
ential  where  their  results  were  unequivocally  in  one  candidate's  favour. 
Nixon  and  John  Kennedy  won  all  the  primaries  they  entered  but  no  single 
candidate  emerged  as  dominant  in  the  other  two  contested  nominations. 
In  1964  each  of  the  major  primaries  was  won  by  a  different  candidate. 
In  1968  Robert  Kennedy  won  several  victories  over  McCarthy  but  also 
lost  to  him  in  Oregon.  After  Kennedy's  death  McCarthy  was  the  only 
candidate  in  contention  who  had  entered  the  primaries  but  he  had  lost 
more  than  he  had  won.  Thirdly,  the  party  leaders  had  to  be  receptive 
to  the  evidence  of  the  primaries  for  them  to  be  an  influence.  Both 
Kennedy  and  Nixon  were  favoured  within  the  party  organisations.  The 
primaries  demolished  the  uncertainty  over  their  electability  restrain- 
ing  leaders  from  supporting  them. 
The  susceptibility  to  primary  evidence  apparent  in  1960  and  1968 
was  not,  however,  a  constant  feature  of  presidential  nominating  politics. 
Whilst  no  one  effective  vote-getter  emerged  from  the  1964  Republican -  200  - 
primaries  they  did  provide  the  negative  lesson  that  Goldwater  had  only 
a  narrow  appeal  even  within  his  own  party. 
Goldwater's  nomination  was  attributable  to  the  effective  mobilis- 
ation  of  committed  supporters  in  the  convention  states.  The  Goldwater 
delegates  were  predominantly  political  purists  according  to  Wildavsky's 
research. 
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That  is,  "they  cared  more  about  maintaining  their  purity  - 
'I  would  rather  lose  and  be  right'  -  than  about  winning.  " 
43 
Their 
support  for  Goldwater  was  based  on  stylistic  rather  than  pragmatic 
grounds.  As  purists,  his  supporters  emphasised  internal  criteria  for 
decision,  what  they  believed  "deep  down  inside",  a  rejection  of 
compromise  and  a  lack  of  orientation  towards  winning. 
44 
The  delegates' 
enthusiasm  for  Goldwater  was  not  dependent  upon  his  electability  (al- 
though  they  passionately  hoped  that  he  would  win).  His  appeal  was  to 
the  politics  of  conscience  -  "In  Your  Heart  You  Know  He's  Right"  as 
the  campaign  slogan  ran.  Goldwater  did  not  base  his  appeal  on  his 
ability  to  win  the  election,  nor  did  the  delegates  support  him  on  those 
grounds.  They  were  thus  unconcerned  by  primaries  as  an  objective  indi- 
cation  of  election  potential.  As  purists,  the  Goldwater  delegates  were 
immune  to  the  pressure  to  select  a  winner. 
In  one  sense  the  1968  Democratic  convention  was  the  converse  of 
its  Republican  counterpart  four  years  earlier  because  the  purist 
orientation  was  largely  associated  with  the  minority,  the  McCarthy 
delegates. 
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Yet  the  professionals  rejected  McCarthy  though  he  had  won 
four  primaries  and  appeared  a  stronger  candidate  than  Humphrey  in 
trial-heat  polls  against  Nixon.  (Scammon  and  Wattenberg  preserve  their 
argument  for  "psephological"  conventions  by  the  sleight  of  hand  of 
avoiding  the  most  recent  poll  evidence  available  to  the  delegates. 
The  authors  argue  that  Humphrey  was  the  stronger  candidate  -  and  thereby 
justify  his  selection  -  by  employing  polls  taken  before  the  Republican -  201  - 
convention. 
46 
Between  the  two  conventions,  after  Nixon's  nomination, 
McCarthy  was  the  stronger  of  the  two  Democratic  alternatives  in  all 
polls  when  matched  against  Nixon. 
' 
)  But  McCarthy's  apparent  elec- 
toral  potential  did  not  persuade  the  delegates.  The  candidate  was 
perceived  as  a  party  divider,  his  supporters  as  insurgents  who  were 
a  threat  to  the  existing  leadership  of  the  local  parties.  For  the 
professionals  the  'costs'  of  supporting  McCarthy  were  prohibitive 
even  though  he  appeared  the  stronger  candidate. 
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In  the  early  1960's  Polsby  and  Wildavsky  asserted  that  "the 
great  search  at  the  convention  is  for  'The  Man  Who  Can  Win'  .. 
49 
But  the 
evidence  of  the  1960's  is  that  the  quest  for  a  winner  was  not  as  uncon- 
ditional  as  the  statement  suggests.  Because  electability  was  not  a 
consistent  criterion  of  selection,  the  influence  of  the  primaries,  even 
where  candidates  have  employed  them,  was  variable.  The  delegates  might 
be  persuaded  by  primary  results  -  as  in  1960  and  1968  -  but  in  both 
cases  there  was  a  reserve  of  support  for  both  candidates.  Though 
Kennedy  lacked  the  devotion  of  the  professionals  that  Nixon  enjoyed, 
his  campaign  to  demonstrate  the  electability  of  a  Catholic  was  directed 
at  leaders  several  of  whom  were  themselves  Catholics  -  Daley  of  Illinois, 
Lawrence  in  Pennsylvania,  Brown  in  California,  De  Sapio  in  New  York. 
But  the  leaders  were  not  consistently  responsive  to  the  primaries. 
Leadership  control  could  be  disrupted  and  the  nomination  controlled  by  pur- 
i5tbswho  preferred  to  be  right  and  lose  (as  in  1964)  or  the  leaders, 
displaying  the  professional  style,  preferred  to  preserve  their  own 
positions,  a  course  taken  by  the  Democrats  in  1968  and  1952  and  the 
Republicans  in  1912.  Because  the  influence  of  the  pre-reform  primaries 
was  qualified  by  the  receptivity  of  leaders  and  delegates  to  them,, 
victories  in  them  were  neither  a  necessary  nor  sufficient  pre-condition 
to  winning  the  nomination. -  202  - 
The  consequence  of  the  post-reform  extension  of  the  primary  system 
was  to  transform  campaign  strategy.  Primaries  became  a  necessary 
component  of  every  campaign.  Primaries  became  more  numerous  and  the 
linkage  between  their  results  and  the  preferences  of  the  delegates 
derived  from  them  tightened.  These  changes  enabled  the  primaries  to  be 
employed  to  garner  directly  large  numbers  of  delegates.  Prior  to 
reform  the  primaries  had  not  presented  such  a  possibility.  They  were 
few  in  number,  in  some  states  the  relevant  laws  precluded  pledged 
delegates  and  in  others  the  primaries  were  co-opted  by  favourite  sons 
and  party  organisation  deterring  involvement  by  major  candidates  (Table 
6.2  documents  the  contrast  in  pledging  provisions  in  primary  laws  in 
1960  and  1976.  In  the  latter  year  figures  for  both  parties  are 
presented  because  in  some  cases  binding  provisions  derive  from  party 
laws  which  creates  divergences  between  the  two). 
TABLE  6.2 
PLEDGING  PROVISIONS  IN  PRIMARY  LAWS  1960  AND  1976 
Status  of 
Delegates 
Bound  by 
preference  pol] 
Bound  by 
own  preference 
No  binding 
provision 
Total 
Party  and  Year 
Democrats  1960  Democrats  1976  Republicans  1976 
No.  of  %  No.  of  %  No.  of  % 
Primarie  Delegate  Primarie  Delegates  rimaries  elegatq 
7  31.4  19  57.5  18  54.1 
5  28.2  9  41.0  7  27.4 
6  40.4  1  1.5  3  18.5 
18  100  29*  100  28*  100 
:s 
*  Excludes  Vermont  and  Montana  (Republicans  only)  where  delegates  chosen 
in  caucuses  unrelated  to  the  results  of  the  presidential  preference 
poll. -  203  - 
Accompanying  the  increase  in  primaries  there  has  been  a  change  in 
the  function  they  perform.  Entering  primaries  is  the  principal  means 
of  acquiring  delegates  directly.  A  candidate  who  avoided  the  primaries 
would  surrender  access  to  a  large  majority  of  the  delegates  to  those 
candidates  who  participated  in  them. 
In  1972,  in  contrast  to  1968,  the  Humphrey  campaign  recognised 
that  primaries  were  unavoidable.  Furthermore,  employing  primaries  for 
a  demonstration  effect  was  no  longer  a  plausible  avenue  to  the  nomin- 
ation  as  the  campaign's  manager  appreciated  - 
"in  1972  more  delegates  than  ever  before  were  going  to  be 
selected  by  the  primary  process  ...  more  than  enough  to 
nominate.  The  name  of  this  whole  game  was  to  get  delegates 
to  get  nominated,  so  you  had  to  get  into  the  primary  pro- 
cess.  The  idea  that  you  could  sit  back  until  California 
and  all  of  a  sudden  make  a  big  show  was  absolutely  ridicu- 
lous.  You'd  flunk  third-grade  mathematics  if  you  took 
that  position.  "50 
Primaries  gained  in  significance  after  reform  because  they  became 
the  major  source  of  delegates.  The  rationale  for  entering  primaries 
after  1968  was  to  win  committed  delegates.  In  the  words  of  Jody  Powell 
speaking  on  behalf  of  the  1976  Carter  campaign,  "we  looked  at  this 
process  [the  primaries]  as  delegate  accumulation.  "51  Formerly  the 
possibility  of  winning  delegates  had  been  a  minor  consideration  in 
the  decision  to  enter  primaries.  Theodore  White,  in  his  appraisal  of 
the  1960  primaries,  described  the  delegates  selected  in  them  as  the 
least  of  the  candidates'  considerations. 
52 
Similarly  James  Rowe's 
counsel  to  Humphrey  for  that  year  observed  that  "while  helpful  in  a 
minor  sense,  the  number  of  delegates  to  be  gathered  in  such  primaries 
is  not  too  important  and  really  irrelevant  to  the  problem.  "53 
Once  primaries  became  a  means  of  accumulating  a  large  proportion 
of  a  convention  majority,  they  had  to  be  entered  in  large  numbers. 
Before  reform  a  handful  of  primaries  were  sufficient  to  the  task  of -  204  - 
demonstrating  electability. 
A  measure  of  the  increasing  use  of  primaries  is  provided  in  Table 
6.3  which  reveals  the  multiplication  in  the  number  of  contested  preference 
primaries  since  1968.  A  contested  primary  is  defined  as  one  in  which: 
1.  At  least  one  major  candidate  appeared  on  the  ballot. 
2.  At  least  two  major  candidates  received  over  10  per  cent  of 
the  vote. 
The  utility  of  this  definition  is  that  it  excludes  those  primaries 
where  no  candidates  chose  to  appear  on  the  ballot  but  miniscule  numbers 
of  write-in  votes  were  recorded.  Such  primaries  rarely  attracted 
attention  and  it  seems  a  distortion  to  regard  them  as  contested  simply 
because  some  votes  for  major  candidates  were  cast  although  one  study 
has  so  defined  them. 
54 
The  efficacy  of  the  above  definition  is  evidenced 
by  the  fact  that  it  produces  results  in  close  conformity  with  rule-of- 
thumb  evaluations  of  what  constituted  contested  primaries  at  the  time, 
e.  g.  West  Virginia  and  Wisconsin  in  1960.  The  10  per  cent  threshold 
is  usually  sufficiently  high  to  filter  out  unorganised  write-ins  (for 
the  objective  of  the  analysis  is  to  show  the  use  of  primaries  by  candi- 
dates);  and  sufficiently  low  to  embrace  at  least  the  top-two  candidates 
in  the  post-reform  primariie.  s  where  there  are  numerous  candidates  and 
low  pluralities. 
As  devices  registering  votes  for  presidential  candidates  the 
preference  polls  could  be  employed  to  produce  a  demonstration  effect. 
Whilst  the  successful  production  of  such  an  effect  was  not  necessarily 
dependent  upon  the  primary  being  contested  this  was  normally  the  case. 
There  are  examples  of  uncontested  primaries  (by  the  above  definition) 
proving  influential  -  Governor  Lawrence  referred  to  Kennedy's  showing 
in  the  entirely  write-in  Pennsylvania  poll  -  but  such  instances  were 
probably  few.  To  be  most  effective  the  primaries  had  to  be  contested 
and  prior  to  reform  such  primaries  were  a  minority. -  205  - 
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The  post-reform  section  of  Table  4.3  evidences  the  increasing 
use  of  primaries  but  not  their  changing  function.  Not  all  preference 
primaries  allow  the  election  of  delegates  pledged  to  candidates.  But 
after  reform  virtually  all  major  candidates  entered  a  large  proportion 
of  those  primaries  which  allowed  the  election  of  mandated  delegates 
in  contrast  to  their  modest  use  before  1968  (see  Table  6.4). 
Until  1972  the  value  of  primaries  to  candidates  resided  in  the 
information  they  supplied  to  party  leaders  rather  than  in  the  delegates 
derived  from  them.  In  consequence,  the  preference  polls  were  of  pre- 
ponderant  importance  for  it  was  that  component  of  the  primary  that 
evidenced  vote-getting  ability. 
Some  of  the  most  notable  pre-reform  primary  contests  took  place  in 
states  where  the  relevant  laws  prohibited  pledged  delegates.  In  West 
Virginia  in  1960  all  delegates  were  necessarily  elected  uncommitted. 
At  the  convention  the  delegates  divided  their  votes  between  several 
candidates  as  the  Kennedy  campaign  had  anticipated  when  they  first 
considered  entering  the  state. 
55 
West  Virginia  proved  to  be  the  deci- 
sive  primary  of  1960  because  it  influenced  leaders  in  other  states. 
Its  own  delegates  were  only  a  miniscule  contribution  to  Kennedy's 
convention  majority. 
Until  1968  Nebraska's  primary  law  was  similar  to  West  Virginia's 
in  proscribing  mandated  delegates  yet  several  candidates  found  it  an 
attractive  state  to  contest.  Both  Goldwater  and  Kennedy  campaigned 
there.  It  was  in  Nebraska  that  a  substantial  Nixon  write-in  effort 
was  mounted  in  1964  designed  to  remind  Republican  leaders  that  he 
retained  his  popularity  amongst  the  party's  voters  should  the  -convention 
produce  a  deadlock  between  the  active  contenders. 
56 
After  reform  winning  substantial  numbers  of  committed  delegates 
became  a  major  objective  of  primary  strategy.  This  required  devoting -  207  - 
attention  to  the  election  of  pledged  delegates  in  large  numbers  of 
primaries  (see  Table  6.5).  The  effect  of  this  change  was  to  guarantee 
the  importance  of  primaries  where  formerly  it  had  been  conditional 
upon  the  attitudes  of  the  leaders  to  them. 
Carter  was  credited  with  a  run-everywhere  strategy  in  1976  but  his 
campaign  was  not  markedly  different  from  that  of  other  candidates  in 
its  commitment  to  the  primaries.  Udall,  Jackson  and  Wallace  all  made 
substantial  efforts  for  delegates  and  their  names  appeared  on  more  than 
twenty  of  thirty  primary  ballots.  None  of  the  early  starting  campaigns 
appears  to  have  operated  on  the  assumption  that  there  would  be  a  dead- 
locked  convention  which  would  thereby  diminish  the  need  to  accumulate 
delegates  in  the  primaries  in  order  to  win  the  nomination. 
57 
Neither 
the  number  of  primaries  entered  nor  the  number  of  delegates  sought 
suggests  -  contrary  to  one  writer  -  that  all  Democratic  candidates 
except  Carter  and  Wallace  used  the  1976  primaries  to  produce  a  demon- 
stration  effect. 
58 
The  number  of  primaries  in  which  candidates  appear  is  inflated  by 
the  increased  use  of  Oregon-style  ballots  where  entry  is  compulsory  for 
those  recognised  as  aspirants  for  the  nomination. 
59 
However,  the 
spread  of  this  provision  does  not  in  itself  account  for  the  surge  in 
primary  entries  since  reform.  Primaries  in  which  entry  was  voluntary 
were  also  used  extensively.  Of  the  fifteen  such  primaries  in  1976, 
Carter  was  entered  in  fourteen,  Jackson  in  twelve,  Wallace  in  eleven 
and  Udall  in  ten.  Compared  with  the  modest  use  of  the  predominantly 
voluntary  pre-reform  primaries  these  figures  represent  a  substantial 
increase  in  primary  activity. 
When  the  winning  of  committed  convention  delegates  became  a  major 
objective  of  primary  participation  those  states  prohibiting  the  election 
of  mandated  delegates  were  relegated  to  an  inferior  status  in  the -  208  - 
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candidates'  priorities.  Where  a  primary  produced  only  uncommitted 
delegates  the  incentives  to  enter  it  diminished  after  reform.  West 
Virginia,  the  decisive  Democratic  primary  of  1960,  attracted  only 
Wallace  among  the  major  candidates  in  1976.  On  the  Republican  side 
Ford  never  entered  the  state  to  campaign  and  Reagan  appeared  there 
only  briefly. 
60 
Vermont,  which  held  a  preference  primary  but  selected 
delegates  in  caucuses  unrelated  to  it,  was  "largely  overlooked"  by 
Democratic  candidates  according  to  Witcover's  chronicle  of  the 
campaign. 
61 
For  the  Republicans,  only  Ford's  name  was  entered. 
Both  West  Virginia  and  Vermont  are  small  states  but  the  lack  of 
attention  paid  to  them  in  1976  is  not  explicable  by  their  size.  Under 
state  party  rules  both  New  York  and  Pennsylvania  Republicans  were 
elected  uncommitted.  The  Reagan  campaign  made  no  effort  in  either,  his 
campaign  manager  believing  that  delegates  could  be  won  by  negotiation 
after  their  election  - 
"It  was  our  feeling  that  if  we  handled  ourselves  adroitly, 
we'd  probably  come  out  with  as  many  delegates  just  by 
bargaining-°62 
As  the  delegates  were  elected  without  pledges  there  was  little  to  be 
gained  and  much  money  to  be  lost  by  campaigning  in  such  primaries. 
Referring  specifically  to  New  York,  the  campaign's  manager  observed 
that  - 
"As  long  as  nobody  was  committed  on  that  slate  and  we  could 
talk  to  local  leaders,  as  we  did  later  on,  we  did  not  feel 
that  our  chances  would  be  hurt  in  the  end.  "63 
Where  primaries  provided  for  both  preference  polls  and  delegate 
election  the  new  priority  of  delegate  accumulation  was  reflected  in  some 
candidates  ignoring  the  popularity  contest  entirely.  In  this  way  a 
candidate  could  enhance  his  delegate  total  without  subjecting  himself 
to  the  risks  of  an  embarrassing  showing  in  the  preference  poll  which, 
in  media  interpretations,  was  customarily  regarded  as  the  result. -  211  - 
The  adoption  of  delegate  election  by  districts  facilitated  local- 
ised  campaigns  within  states  to  win  delegates.  Such  efforts  were  of 
little  value  as  a  demonstration  effect  but  they  were  a  means  of 
acquiring  convention  votes  where  the  candidate  was  low  in  statewide 
popularity  or  his  finances  were  in  short  supply.  By  concentrating 
their  campaign  on  particular  districts  in  1972  the  McGovern  campaign 
emerged  with  delegate  support  from  Illinois  and  Pennsylvania,  two 
states  where  the  candidate  was  unlikely  to  win  a  popularity  contest 
(in  Pennsylvania,  where  the  preference  poll  was  entered,  McGovern  ran 
third  behind  Humphrey  and  Wallace). 
The  consequence  of  extensive  campaigns  to  win  delegates  in 
primaries  was  an  increase  in  pre-convention  commitments.  A  measure 
of  the  increased  use  of  primaries  to  produce  committed  delegates  is 
provided  in  Table  6.6.  Prior  to  reform,  primaries  which  permitted  but 
did  not  necessitate.  committed  delegates  were  frequently  won  by 
favourite  sons  or  uncommitted  slates.  After  reform  they  were  dominated 
by  major  candidates.  Such  primaries  became  too  valuable  to  candidates 
to  be  ignored  in  the  later  period. 
The  Logic  of  Primary  Inactivity 
Before  reform  primaries  were  only  influential  on  the  nominating 
outcome  under  particular  conditions.  Their  influence  was  dependent 
upon  them  being  used  by  a  major  candidate,  producing  unequivocal  results 
and  the  party  leaders  being  receptive  to  the  information  they  conveyed. 
Those  candidates  who  entered  the  primaries  gambled  that  the  second  and 
third  conditions  would  be  fulfilled.  Usually  they  entered  primaries 
out  of  necessity  either  because  they  lacked  support  within  the  party 
organisations  or  because  doubts  existed  as  to  their  vote-getting -  212  - 
ability.  For  candidates  more  favourably  placed  with  the  party  hier- 
archy  and  suffering  no  obvious  impediments  to  their  electability, 
primaries  were  inessential  and  avoidable. 
As  a  result  of  the  two  different  strategic  responses  to  primaries, 
their  legitimacy  and  utility  became  a  subject  of  campaign  debate  between 
the  candidates.  Those  candidates  active  in  primaries  engaged  in 
propaganda  exercises  to  promote  them  as  determinative  influences  on 
the  nominating  decision.  John  Kennedy  cited  history  in  support  of 
his  argument  that  primary  results  were  effective  tests  of  electability, 
noting  that  no  president  had  been  elected  in  fifty  years  without 
entering  and  winning  a  contested  primary. 
64 
The  active  candidates  stressed  the  integrity  of  primaries,  as 
instruments  of  open,  democratic  politics.  In  1968,  Nixon  declared 
that  he  was  testing  his  candidacy  "in  the  fire  of  the  primaries  and 
not  just  in  the  smoke-filled  rooms  of  Miami  Beach  [convention  site]. 
65 
Similarly  John  Kennedy  assailed  the  covert  scheming  of  his  opponents 
who  hoped  to  gain  the  nomination  "through  manipulation  of  the  conven- 
tion  . 
b6 
To  extend  the  influence  of  the  primaries,  the  candidates  active 
in  them  sought  to  interpret  the  results  so  as  to  constitute  a  rejection 
of  the  non-participants.  Thus  Robert  Kennedy  combined  his  own  primary 
votes  with  McCarthy's  arguing  that  they  amounted  to  a  repudiation  of 
the  administration's  Vietnam  policy  and  of  Humphrey,  one  of  its  prin- 
cipal  defenders. 
67 
The  candidates  who  eschewed  the  primaries  rationalised  their 
inactivity  either  in  terms  of  their  unavailability  to  participate  in 
them  or  the  defects  of  the  primary  system.  Symington,  frequently  the 
brunt  of  John  Kennedy's  goadings  to  enter  the  primaries,  declined  to 
do  so  arguing  that  they  were  held  in  only  a  few  states  and  that  only -  213  - 
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in  a  minority  were  delegates  bound  by  the  results. 
68 
He  also  asserted 
that  they  were  not  a  reflection  of  delegate  sentiment  (the  implication 
being  that  delegates,  not  voters,  decide  nominations).  Humphrey  employed 
a  similar  argument  eight  years  later  maintaining  that, 
"The  nomination  will  be  decided  by  convention  delegates, 
and  better  than  three  fourths  [sic]  of  these  delegates  are 
selected  in  non-primary  states.  " 
69 
The  alternative  to  decrying  the  value  of  primaries  was  to  plead 
other  commitments  precluding  involvement  in  them.  In  1960  Johnson 
stressed  that  his  responsibilities  as  Senate  Majority  Leader  precluded 
an  active  campaign  and  faulted  Kennedy's  frequent  absences  while  he 
had  to  "tend  the  store.  "  70 
Humphrey  contrived  to  argue  both  that 
primaries  had  little  influence  on  the  nominating  decision  and  that 
he  would  have  liked  to  have  participated  in  them  had  this  been  possible. 
He  claimed  that  President  Johnson's  withdrawal  came  too  late  to  allow 
him  to  file  in  the  primaries. 
71 
Had  Humphrey  declared  immediately 
after  Johnson's  announcement  he  could  have  filed  in  three  primaries. 
72 
By  delaying  his  declaration  of  candidacy  for  a  month  the  possibility 
of  entering  primaries  passed. 
The  feasibility  of  avoiding  the  primaries  derived  from  both  their 
number  and  their  utilisation  by  candidates  who  were  active  in  them. 
First,  only  a  minority  of-delegates  were  provided  by  primaries  allowing 
a  convention  majority  to  be  compiled  without  them.  Secondly,  because 
the  active  candidates  required  a  few  states  to  produce  a  demonstration 
effect  many  primaries  produced  delegates  who  were  either  uncommitted  or 
pledged  to  favourite  sons.  In  this  respect  many  primary  delegates  were 
comparable  to  those  from  the  convention  states:  contests  over  their 
selection  were  few  and  campaigns  to  win  their  support  were  conducted 
after  they  were  chosen. 
73 
As  a  consequence  of  the  underemployment  of 
primaries,  the  differences  in  campaigning  for  delegates  between  them  and -  215  - 
the  non-primary  states  were  diminished. 
Primary  delegations  elected  uncommitted  or  pledged  to  favourite 
sons  constituted  a  substantial  bloc  of  votes  because  they  usually 
included  some  of  the  largest  states.  Eight  of  the  ten  largest  states 
employed  primaries  to  form  at  least  part  of  their  delegations  but  it 
was  unusual  for  them  to  produce  delegates  pledged  to  major  candidates. 
New  York,  Pennsylvania  and  Illinois  delegates  were  necessarily  elected 
uncommitted;  Ohio,  New  Jersey,  Florida  and  California  delegates  were 
often  pledged  to  favourite  sons;  and,  in  Massachusetts,  until  a  change 
in  the  primary  law  effective  in  1968,  delegations  were  usually  chosen 
unpledged.  In  none  of  the  contested  nominations  between  1960  and  1968 
were  a  majority  of  more  than  two  of  these  eight  delegations  committed 
to  support  a  major  candidate. 
Excepting  California  and  Florida,  the  large  primary  delegations 
derived  from  states  with  a  history  of  strong  party  organisation.  This, 
in  turn,  normally  produced  hierarchically  controlled  delegations.  Thus 
a  mechanism  designed  to  promote  popular  participation  in  the  nominating 
process  remained,  through  legal  provision  and  the  strategic  choices  of 
candidates,  consistent  with  organisation  control. 
For  any  major  candidate  the  large  state  primary  delegations  were 
a  necessary  element  in  a  prospective  convention  majority.  Yet  the 
delegates  were  won  not  by  participating  in  their  primaries  but  by 
negotiation  after  their  election.  By  this  means  primary  delegates  could 
be  won  without  entering  primaries.  Either  party  leaders  were  cultivated 
or  individual  delegates  were  canvassed  where  leaders  were  absent  or  un- 
sympathetic. 
After  1972  primaries  became  central  to  every  candidate's  strategy 
for  the  nomination.  All  candidates  recognised  the  necessity  of  entering 
the  primaries  and  it  was  there  that  the  nomination  was  decided.  In  1972 -  216  - 
Gary  Hart,  McGovern's  campaign  manager,  perceived  that  - 
"The  battle  would  go  through  all  the  primaries,  and  two 
men  would  emerge;  and  there  would  be  a  battle,  not  only 
for  the  California  primary  and  not  only  for  the  nomination 
but  for  the  Democratic  Party.  " 
74 
Writing  in  1972  Hamilton  Jordan  made  an  equally  prophetic  forecast 
in  his  outline  of  a  Carter  strategy  for  the  1976  nomination  in  his 
assumption  that  it  was  probable  that  "once  again  the  Democratic  nominee 
would  be  selected  in  state  primaries  ...  1175 
The  problem  facing  candidates  entering  the  post-reform  primaries 
was  not  the  need  to  entice  others  into  contests  but  to  pre-empt  candi- 
dacies  before  the  primaries  began.  Prior  to  both  1972  and  1976  a  process 
of  "clearing  out  the  left"  occurred  amongst  the  Democratic  liberals 
as  candidates  sought  to  monopolise  the  votes  and  campaign  personnel 
of  the  party's  activist  wing  to  improve  their  vote-winning  capabilities. 
76 
The  increase  in  primary  delegates  and  the  strengthened  tie  between 
voter  and  delegate  preferences  stimulated  more  candidates  to  enter  more 
primaries.  These  changes  combined  to  diminish  the  proportion  of 
delegates  elected  either  uncommitted  or  pledged  to  favourite  sons. 
Hence  the  proportion  of  elected  delegates  accessible  to  a  candidate 
not  participating  in  the  primaries  dwindled  (see  Table  6.7).  After 
1968  the  non-primary  delegates  combined  with  those  primary  delegates 
not  committed  to  major  candidates  provided  insufficient  votes  for  a 
convention  majority. 
After  reform  it  ceased  to  be  possible  for  a  candidate  not  entering 
the  primaries  to  win  large  numbers  of  primary  state  delegates  by 
corralling  the  uncommitted  and  those  released  by  favourite  sons.  In 
1968  the  numbers  of  Democratic  primary  delegates  without  commitments 
at  the  convention  were  inflated  by  those  released  from  their  pledges  to 
Robert  Kennedy  upon  his  death.  In  consequence,  Humphrey,  without  enter- 
ing  primaries,  was  able  to  win  more  than  half  the  total  delegate  votes 
of  the  primary  states. 
77  Other  candidates  who  avoided  the  primaries -  217  - 
TABLE  6.7 
COMMITMENT  OF  DELEGATES  ELECTED  IN  PRIMARIES,  1960-1980 
Year  Commitment 
1.  2.  3.  4. 
Major  Minor  Uncommitted  Not  committed 
Candidate  Candidate  to  Major 
Candidate 
(cols  2&3) 
1960(D)  30.5%  16.7%  52.8%  69.5% 
1964(R)  36.6  14.8  48.6  63.4 
1968(D)  46.9  21.3  31.8  53.1 
1968(R)  43.2  17.6  39.2  56.8 
1960-68  40.3  18.2  41.5  59.7 
1972(D)  74.8  2.4  22.9  25.3 
1976(D)  81.3  5.6  13.1  18.7 
1976(R)  80.7  0  19.3  19.3 
1980(D)  99.5  0  0.5  0.5 
1980(R)  95.9  0  4.1  4.1 
1972-80  86.0  1.8  12.2  14.0 
such  as  Scranton  and  Rockefeller  (in  1968),  though  less  successful.  than 
Humphrey,  were  also  able  to  win  substantial  numbers  of  primary  delegates' 
votes  at  the  convention. 
After  reform  the  attractiveness  of  primaries  to  candidates  virtually 
eradicated  primary  states'  convention  votes  from  being  cast  for  non- 
participant  candidates.  Before  reform  over  forty  per  cent  of  all  votes 
from  primary  states  were  cast  for  candidates  not  entering  the  primaries. 
For  example,  as  indicated  earlier,  two-fifths  of  the  West  Virginia 
Democratic  delegation  in  1960  voted  for  Symington,  Johnson  or  Stevenson. 
In  the  four  contested  convention  nomination  ballots  since  reform  seven- -  218  - 
teen  votes  out  of  a  total  of  over  eight  thousand  from  primary  states 
were  recorded  for  candidates  who  did  not  enter  primaries. 
The  centrality  of  the  post-reform  primaries  to  nominating  outcomes 
is  reflected  by  the  participation  in  them  of  even  a  candidate  depen- 
dent  upon  a  convention  deadlock  for  success.  Traditionally  the  com- 
promise  choice  strategy  precluded  active  participation  in  primaries 
to  avoid  alienating  those  candidates  who  were  active.  By  this  means 
the  candidate  hoped  to  inherit  the  support  of  active  candidates  when 
their  attempts  at  the  nomination  failed.  The  compromise  choice  candi- 
dates  either  eschewed  primaries  or  relied  upon  write-in  campaigns 
ostensibly  conducted  without  their  authorisation. 
Since  reform  entering  primaries  has  been  indicative  of  a  candidate's 
availability  for  the  nomination.  Brown's  candidacy  in  1976  was  premised 
on  the  assumption  that  he  was  a  plausible  compromise  choice  because,  in 
the  words  of  his  campaign  manager,  "if  you're  there  and  you  have  a 
rising  popularity  and  you  have  done  well  in  some  primaries,  then  you 
are  as  likely  to  be  chosen  as  anybody  else.  "78  To  establish  himself 
as  a  credible  alternative  to  Carter,  Brown  had  to  defeat  him  in  some 
primaries.  If  he  succeeded  he  hoped  to  acquire  sufficient  delegates 
amongst  the  uncommitted  delegates  or  those  pledged  to  candidates  who 
had  subsequently  withdrawn  to  preclude  a  Carter  victory.  In  Maryland, 
Brown's  first  contest,  only  the  preference  poll  was  entered  indicating 
the  reliance  on  a  demonstration  effect  to  achieve  the  campaign's 
initial  objective  of  "changing  the  chemistry  of  the  race  . 
J9 
The  reasons  for  the  failure  of  Brown's  campaigns  provided  by  Jonathan 
Moore  are  instructive  evidence  of  the  limits  of  a  late-starting  demon- 
stration  effect  strategy  in  post-reform  primaries  - 
"Carter's  losses  in  the  late  primaries  were  too  little  and 
too  late  to  hurt  him,  given  his  strong  southern  support  and 
the  fact  that  even  where  he  lost  he  was  accumulating  more -  219  - 
delegates  due  to  proportional  representation.  In  addition, 
the  winners  in  this  phase,  Church  and  Brown,  had  started 
too  late  to  accumulate  real  delegate  strength  of  their 
own  and  couldn't  force  a  brokering  situation  via  delegates 
denied  Carter  -  sufficient  Jackson,  Udall,  Wallace  and 
Humphrey  support  had  not  materialised,  some  'favourite 
sons'  didn't  run,  and  not  enough  uncommitted  delegates  held 
firm  to  block  Carter.  "80 
Carter  possessed  a  solid  base  of  delegate  support  by  the  time  Brown  entered 
and  that  base  continued  to  grow  despite  defeats.  By  the  end  of  the 
primaries  Carter's  accumulation  of  delegates  compared  with  his  oppon- 
ents  made  him  a  plausible  first  ballot  nominee. 
The  most-discussed  compromise  choice  of  1976  was  Humphrey.  After 
Carter's  elimination  of  all  his  early  opponents  speculation  centred  on 
Humphrey's  intentions  regarding  a  challenge  to  Carter  in  the  New  Jersey 
primary. 
81 
When  Humphrey  clarified  his  position  he  did  not  state  that 
he  was  unavailable  for  the  nomination  but  specified  he  would  not  campaign 
or  enter  in  New  Jersey.  In  subsequent  interpretations  the  distinction 
between  eliminating  himself  from  consideration  and  not  running  in  New 
Jersey  was  lost  - 
"he  clearly  was  not  taking  himself  out  of  the  running  com- 
pletely,  simply  reiterating  he  would  not  campaign.  He 
remained  available  and  ready  if  asked.  Many  of  the  head- 
lines,  however,  said  Humphrey  was  out  ...  "82 
Amidst  a  system  dominated  by  primaries  declining  to  enter  them  was  to 
be  invalidated  as  a  candidate. 
The  Effect  of  Primary  Defeats 
Where  candidates  sought  a  demonstration  effect  from  primaries  it 
was  usually  regarded  as  essential  to  win  in  every  state  entered.  Though 
there  were  examples  of  an  impressive  second-place  showing  proving  bene- 
ficial  to  a  candidate  such  instances  were  rare. 
83 
Where  the  principal 
objective  in  entering  the  primaries  was  to  prove  potential  to  win  the -  220  - 
election,  the  effect  of  defeats  were  normally  adverse  if  not  disastrous 
to  a  candidate's  chances  of  the  nomination. 
Success  in  primaries  might  be  of  value  to  a  candidate  but  the 
consequences  of  defeat  were  more  consistently  damaging.  In  conse- 
quence,  primaries  gained  the  reputation  for  eliminating  rather  than 
assisting  candidates.  According  to  Adlai  Stevenson,  the  primaries 
provided  "a  very  questionable  method  of  selecting  Presidential  candidates 
and  actually  it  never  does.  All  it  does  is  destroy  some  candidates.  "  84 
For  most  of  the  candidates  employing  primaries  between  1960  and 
1968  their  self-defined  task  was  to  win  all  that  they  entered.  John 
Kennedy  believed  that  he  could  not  survive  a  defeat,  "It  has  to  come 
up  seven  every  time"  he  observed  on  the  night  of  the  Wisconsin  primary. 
85 
After  his  victory  in  the  state  proved  less  than  conclusive  he  re-emphasised 
that  every  subsequent  primary  had  to  be  won, 
"We  have  to  go  through  every  one  and  win  every  one  of  them  - 
West  Virginia  and  Maryland  and  Indiana  and  Oregon,  all  the 
way  to  the  Convention.  ", 
86 
Humphrey's  refusal  to  withdraw  despite  his  defeat  produced  a  furious 
reaction  in  the  Kennedy  campaign  where  he  was  viewed  as  a  spoiler  who 
refused  to  play  by  the  rules. 
87 
Nixon,  in  1968,  defined  his  loser  image  as  his  principal  barrier 
to  the  nomination.  His  emphasis  on  his  own  handicap  focused  attention 
on  the  primaries.,  "more  than  the  others,  I  have  to  win  every  primary", 
he  asserted. 
88 
After  his  opponents  had  failed  to  expose  his  weaknesses 
as  a  vote-getter  in  the  primaries  Nixon  felt  he  was  assured  of  the 
nomination  the  day  he  won  in  Oregon. 
89 
Robert  Kennedy's  late  entry  in  1968  precluded  his  participation  in 
the  early  primaries  compelling  him  to  accentuate  the  significance  of 
those  that  were  available  to  him,  "If  I  get  beaten  in  a  primary  I'm  not 
a  viable  candidate.  "90  After  his  defeat  in  Oregon-he  did  not  withdraw -  221  - 
but  admitted  that  "I'm  not  the  same  candidate  I  was  before  ...  and  I 
can't  claim  that  I  am.  "  91 
Though  other  candidates  were  less  explicit  about  the  necessity  of 
winning  every  primary  most  observers  interpreted  a  single  defeat  as 
fatally  damaging  to  their  prospects  of  the  nomination.  Humphrey's 
defeat  in  Wisconsin,  a  state  adjacent  to  his  own,  indicated  that  "he 
could  not  deliver  his  base;  therefore  he  had  been  eliminated,  .., 
92 
After  Lodge's  write-in  victory  in  New  Hampshire  in  1964,  James  Reston 
dismissed  both  of  the  defeated  candidates,  Goldwater  and  Rockefeller, 
as  prospects  for  the  nomination. 
93' 
Having  failed  to  detect  Goldwater's 
strength  in  the  convention  states,  one  of  the  persistent  themes  of 
journalists  in  1964  was  that  the  poor  showings  of  the  active  candidates 
in  primaries  enhanced  the  prospects  of  the  inactive  Scranton  and  Nixon. 
Goldwater  himself  initially  subscribed  to  the  view  that  a  defeat  was 
a  decisive  blow  and  considered  withdrawing  after  New  Hampshire  until 
assured  by  his  advisers  that  the  delegate-gathering  operation  in  non- 
primary  states  was  proceeding  effectively. 
94 
Apart  from  Goldwater, 
only  McCarthy  lost  two  primaries  and  refused  to  withdraw.  As  in  so 
many  matters  in  1968,  McCarthy  simply  refused  to  conform  to  the  rules 
of  the  conventional  wisdom.  As  Witcover  wrote  of  him,  "That  was  Gene 
McCarthy;  he  didn't  know  when  he  was  licked,  or  wouldn't  admit  it.,, 
95 
The  evidence  of  the  post-reform  nominations  is  that  defeats  are 
not  necessarily  the  decisive  setbacks  to  candidacies  that  they  once  were. 
Before  reform  Polsby  and  Wildavsky  maintained  that  "a  man  would  be  a 
fool  to  enter  a  primary  unless  the  information  at  his  disposal  led  him 
to  believe  that  he  was  reasonably  certain  to  win  . 
06 
In  contrast,  it 
is  evident  from  the  post-reform  nominations  that  candidates  entered 
primaries  that  they  were  unlikely  to  win  nor  was  winning  their  principal 
objective.  In  post-reform  primaries  less  than  victory  could  be  sufficient -  222  - 
for  two  purposes:  to  gain  recognition  from  the  media,  and  to  win 
delegates. 
The  early  multi-candidate  Democratic  primaries  of  1972  and  1976 
produced  no  single  winner  but  they  did  clarify  the  alternatives.  In 
these  early  events  media  observers  interpreted  the  fractionised  voting 
to  differentiate  serious  contenders  from  obvious  losers.  Where  there 
are  both  many  primaries  available  and  many  candidates  it  is  unlikely 
that  any  one  contender  will  win  every  primary  or  avoid  defeat.  It  is 
thus  likely  that  all  candidates  will  lose  primaries,  particularly  the 
lesser  known  candidates,  without  a  loss  necessarily  proving  decisive. 
Where  the  voting  is  fragmented  between  numerous  candidates  the  con- 
clusive  impact  of  the  early  primaries  is  less  whether  they  are  won  or 
lost  but  how  the  results  are  perceived. 
The  candidates'  objective  in  the  early  primaries  was  to  be  seen 
to  have  won  which  was  not  equivalent  to  winning  a  plurality.  To  be 
classed  as  a  winner  was  to  be  regarded  as  a  serious  contender  whilst 
losers  were  removed  from  consideration.  Candidates  were  measured  not 
by  'straight'  criteria  of  winning  or  losing  but  against  pre-primary 
expectations  of  their  strength  based  on  factors  such  as  poll  standings, 
a  candidate's  support  from  key  figures  or  groups,  the  state's  political 
complexion,  its  location  in  regard  to  the  home  states  of  the  candidates 
and  the  investment  of  resources  made  by  the  candidates  in  preparation  for 
the  primary. 
97 
For  the  candidates,  "winning"  was  to  exceed  expectations. 
McGovern  Is  purpose  in  running  in  New  Hampshire  in  1972  was  not  to 
win  the  primary  but  to  "wound"  Muskie  to  tarnish  his  image  of  invinci- 
bility. 
98 
Four  years  later  the  Carter  campaign  sought  a  "strong  sur- 
prise"  in  the  same  state,  defined  as  at  least  a  second  place  finish. 
99 
For  Harris  in  New  Hampshire  in  1976  the  objective  was  even  more  modest  - 
"The  candidate  does  not  have  to  run  No.  1  ...  because  the 
conventional  wisdom  of  the  national  press  and  political -  223  - 
officials  and  observers  will  be  that  he  will  not  make  a 
showing  there  ...  twenty-five  per  cent  in  New  Hampshire 
will  probably  be  enough  in  1976.  Running  in  the  top  three 
will  probably  do  it.  "100 
For  the  little  known  candidates  such  as  McGovern,  Carter  and  Harris 
expectations  were  low  and  success  entailed  exceeding  the  anticipated 
showing.  For  nationally  known  candidates  the  expectations  were  set 
higher.  Unlike  the  lesser  candidates  who  were  able  to  build  strength 
as  the  primaries  progressed,  the  established  figures  were  expected  to 
demonstrate  strength  from  the  outset.  "Strength"  might  be  proven  simply 
by  winning  or,  where  circumstances  were  thought  to  be  particularly 
favourable,  by  winning  decisively. 
In  1976  Jackson  did  not  enter  the  New  Hampshire  primary  as  a  way 
of  avoiding  losing  an  early  primary  that  would  have  been  fatal  to  his 
candidacy.  His  campaign  manager  reasoned  that  - 
"Henry  Jackson  was  not  a  new  quantity  in  American  politics 
and  he  had  a  very  strong  image  of  being  a  loser  -a  guy 
you  couldn't  take  seriously  ...  Probably  the  worst  thing 
Henry  Jackson  could  have  done  was  to  start  off  with  a  loss 
somewhere.  There  were  two  ways  not  to  lose  New  Hampshire: 
one  was  to  win  it  and  the  other  was  not  to  go  in.  The 
one  sure  way  was  not  to  go,  -so  we  didn't.  "101 
In  1972  Muskie's  performance  in  New  Hampshire  was  evaluated  against 
his  status  as  both  the  front-runner  for  the  nomination  and  the  senator 
from  the  neighbouring  state.  Amongst  reporters  a  consensus  formed 
that  Muskie  should  win  the  primary  with  a  majority  of  the  vote. 
102 
Whilst  Muskie  did  not  endorse  this  assessment  he  recognised  its  origin,, 
"New  Hampshire  is  important  to  me,  -in  part,  because  you 
gentlemen  of  the  press  have  undertaken  to  make  it  important  ... 
in  order  to  test  me.  " 
103 
When  Muskie  obtained  nine  per  cent  more  of  the  vote  than  the  second- 
placed  McGovern  but  less  than  a  majority  his  performance  was  interpreted 
as  a  setback  to  his  prospects.  Judged  as  the  front  runner  from  a  nearby 
state,  Muskie  "left  the  primary  suffering  the  ill-effects  of  what,  in  any 
other  context,  could  be  called  a  clear  victory.  "10  4 -  224  - 
In  1976  Reagan  sought  to  interpret  his  narrow  defeat  by  Ford  in 
New  Hampshire  as  a  victory  comparable  to  McGovern's  four  years 
earlier. 
105 
But  Reagan,  despite  Ford's  incumbency,  has  been  viewed 
as  the  favourite  to  win. 
106 
His  defeat  thus  contradicted  expectations 
to-Reagan's  detriment  for,  as  his  campaign  manager  recognised,  "The 
perception  was  that  we  were  going  to  win,  and  we  lost.  "  107 
The  surprise 
the  result  caused  reporters  was  captured  by  one  who  told  a  Reagan  aide, 
"You  have  just  committed  an  unpardonable  sin.  You  have  just  managed 
to  prove  us  all  wrong.  "108 
The  evaluation  of  candidates'  primary  performances  as  distinct 
from  a  "straight"  reading  of  the  results  was  probably  a  feature  of 
nominating  politics  since  the  inception  of  primaries.  But  the  sig- 
nificance  of  such  interpretations  grew  in  the  post-reform  period.  The 
multiplication  of  primaries  and  candidates  entering  them  increased 
the  number  of  performances  that  were  subject  to  evaluation.  As  the 
nominating  process  lengthened  and  primaries  proliferated,  events  were 
interpreted  in  terms  of  their  effect  upon  subsequent  events.  If  Muskie's 
victory  was  less  than  overwhelmingly  in  New  Hampshire  he  was  likely  to 
be  vulnerable  away  from  his  home  area.  If  McGovern  could  run  well  in 
Muskie  territory  his  prospects  elsewhere  were  probably  more  promising. 
If  Jackson  began  with  a  defeat  it  would  reinforce  his  image  as  a  loser. 
The  increase  in  the  number  of  primaries  reduced  the  periods  between  them. 
As  a  result  of  the  greater  clustering  of  the  post-reform  primaries  the 
potential  for  one  result  to  influence  another  was  enhanced.  This 
possibility  was  further  increased  by  the  constraints  on  the  candidates' 
time  (resulting  from  multiple  primaries)  and  money  (through  campaign 
finance  controls)  which  reduced  the  campaigning  possible  in  a  particular 
state.  In  consequence,  the  major  sources  of  information  available  to 
voters  derived  from  the  reporting  of  events  in  earlier  primaries  rather -  225  - 
than  the  candidate's  campaign  activities  in  their  own  state.  The 
influence  of  previous  events  not  only  conditioned  voting  intentions 
but  also  influenced  the  flow  of  resources  necessary  for  campaigns  to 
be  effective  -  publicity,  money  and  volunteers. 
The  post-reform  shift  in  the  functions  of  primaries  from  electoral 
trial  heats  to  major  supplier  of  delegates  increased  the  ability  of 
campaigns  to  withstand  the  effects  of  a  defeat  on  the  candidate's 
prospects  for  the  nomination.  Prior  to  reform,  one  test  of  a  candidate's 
popularity  was  whether  he  could  defeat  the  opposition  in  a  primary. 
Whilst  a  plurality  victory  was  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  persuad- 
ing  party  leaders  it  was  usually  a  necessary  one.  Thus  it  was  possible 
for  a  candidate  to  fail  to  benefit  from  a  primary  win  (as  for  John 
Kennedy  in  Wisconsin);  it  was  unusual  for  a  loser  to  be  cast  as  a  winner 
(as  Humphrey  mistakenly  thought  he  was).  Losing  a  primary  was  often 
evidence  of  a  candidate's  deficiencies  as  a  vote-getter. 
When  the  rationale  for  entering  primaries  became  to  acquire  dele- 
gates  a  defeat  was  not  necessarily  destructive  of  a  candidacy  (see 
Table  6.8).  This  was  particularly  the  case  in  the  second  phase  of 
primaries  after  the  early  results  eliminated  many  candidates.  In  the 
latter  primaries  the  task  was  to  win  a  large  bloc  of  delegates  to  build 
towards  the  total  required  for  a  convention  majority.  To  win  delegates 
in  large  numbers  required  entering  numerous  primaries  although  campaign 
finances  and  the  candidate's  time  were  too  limited  to  allow  an  extensive 
effort  aimed  at  winning  a  plurality.  However,  the  provisions  for 
proportional  representation  effective  in  many  states  enabled  delegates 
to  be  won  without  pluralities  in  preference  polls. 
Carter's  run-everywhere  strategy  in  1976  gained  him  pledged  dele- 
gates  in  every  primary  state  permitting  mandates.  Following  the  entry 
of  Church  and  Brown,  Carter  was  able  to  continue  winning  delegates -  226  - 
despite  suffering  several  defeats.  Of  the  final  fifteen  pledged 
delegate  primaries,  Carter  headed  the  preference  polls  in  only  six 
but  acquired  over  450  delegates,  near  to  one-third  of  the  total 
necessary  to  nominate.  As  Hamilton  Jordan  perceived,  the  continued 
accumulation  of  delegates  offset  the  risks  to  Carter's  nomination  posed 
by  a  series  of  defeats,  "It  worried  me  a  little  bit  and  scared  me  a 
little  bit,  but  when  you  go  back  to  the  numbers  it  was  there.  "109 
In  1972  six  of  McGovern's  nine  primary  wins  occurred  in  the  last 
six  contests.  In  the  preceding  fifteen  primaries  he  headed  the  pref- 
erence  polls  on  only  three  occasions.  His  victory  in  winner-take-all 
California  and  a  sweep  of  New  York  virtually  unopposed,  added  to  the 
delegates  won  in  other  states,  enabled  McGovern  to  emerge  from  the 
primaries  with  more  than  double  the  delegate  total  of  any  other  candi- 
date  and  as  the  clear  front  runner  for  the  nomination.  Yet  earlier 
in  the  primaries,  McGovern  ran  sixth  in  Florida,  second  in  Ohio  and 
New  Hampshire,  third  in  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  Such  results  exposed 
the  invalidity  of  Brams's  post-1976  observation  that  - 
"No  candidate  who  has  been  defeated  in  the  primaries, 
however,  has  gone  on  to  capture  his  party  nomination  in 
the  convention.  " 
110 
Goldwater's  nomination  in  1964  indicates  that  primary  defeats  were  not 
necessarily  eliminators  before  reform.  Since  reform  candidates  survived 
numerous  defeats  to  win  the  nomination.  Both  Carter  and  Ford  lost  more 
primaries  than  John  Kennedy  or  Nixon  engaged  in.  The  effects  of 
defeat  since  reform  have  been  conditioned  by  where  they  appear  in  the 
sequence  and  how  they  are  perceived.  An  early  defeat  interpreted 
as  such  may  be  a  decisive  setback.  Later  in  the  sequence  a  defeat 
has  to  be  evaluated  against  the  distribution  of  delegate  strength 
between  the  candidates.  A  candidate  like  Carter,  ahead  in  delegates 
'was  cushioned  against  the  impact  of  defeats  because  his  delegate  total -  227  - 
continued  to  grow  towards  a  convention  majority.  In  the  absence  of 
any  other  candidate  with  near  comparable  delegate  strength,  Carter 
was  the  only  one  capable  of  obtaining  a  first  ballot  majority. 
TABLE  6.8 
PERFORMANCE  OF  NOMINEES  IN  PRIMARIES  1960-1980 
Nominee  Preference  Primaries  Delegates 
No.  Entered  %  won  No.  won  %  convention 
majority 
Kennedy  7  100.0  181  23.8 
Goldwater  8  62.5  152  23.2 
Nixon  6  100.0  120  18.0 
1960  -  1968  21  85.7  453  21.7 
McGovern  15  60.0  1041.5  69.0 
Carter  '76  26  61.5  927  61.6 
Ford  27  63.0  606  53.6 
Carter  180  34  70.6  1375  82.5 
Reagan  32  87.5  1183  118.5 
1972  -  1980  135  69.6  5132.5  75.4 
Note:  Excludes  Humphrey  who  entered  no  primaries  in  1968. 
The  Contribution  of  Primary  Victories 
to  Improved  Competitive  Position 
The  introduction  of  presidential  primaries  increased  the  range  of 
possible  nominees  by  allowing  insurgents  or  formerly  little  known  can- 
didates  to  establish  their  claims  for  selection. 
ill 
Though  primaries -  228  - 
may  have  enhanced  the  chances  of  such  candidates,  in  no  clear  instance 
before  reform  did  they  enable  them  to  win  the  nomination.  The  possible 
exception  is  Eisenhower  in  1952.  However,  the  shift  in  delegates 
toward  him  continued  after  the  primaries  suggesting  that  additional 
influences  were  also  pertinent. 
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Furthermore,  Eisenhower  enjoyed 
substantial  support  from  leading  Republican  moderates  rendering  him  a 
less  than  pure  insurgent. 
Systematic  analyses  of  the  relation  between  primaries,  opinion 
polls  of  party  identifiers  and  presidential  nominations  show  scant 
influence  of  the  primaries  in  altering  the  competitive  standing  of 
candidates  prior  to  reform. 
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Leadership  of  the  final  pre-convention 
poll  is  highly  correlated  with  winning  the  nomination.  (These  studies 
imply  a  causal  link  between  poll  leadership  and  the  nomination  though 
no  evidence  is  adduced  to  substantiate  it.  ) 
Between  1936  and  1968  only  one  pre-convention  poll  leader  (Kefauver 
in  1952)  was  denied  the  nomination.  During  the  same  period  -  seventeen 
nominations  for  which  all  the  necessary  data  is  available  -  the  same 
candidate  who  led  the  last  poll  before  the  primaries,  retained  it 
throughout  the  sequence  and  into  the  final  pre-convention  poll  on 
eleven  occasions.  Thus  in  only  a  minority  of  cases  did  poll  leadership 
change  during  the  primary  period  -  containing  many  events  of  political 
import  besides  the  primaries  -  indicating  a  modest  impact  upon  the 
contest. 
Two  of  the  cases  in  which  poll  changes  occurred  took  place  in  the 
immediate  pre-reform  period  but  in  neither  did  primary  victories  assist 
in  establishing  poll  leadership  nor  in  identifying  the  nominee.  In 
the  1968  Democratic  contest  McCarthy's  strong  performance  in  New  Hamp- 
shire  and  the  anticipation  of  his  victory  in  Wisconsin  probably  encouraged 
Johnson  to  withdraw.  But  McCarthy  never  led  the  polls.  After  announc- -  229  - 
ing  his  candidacy  Humphrey  became  the  poll  leader,  a  position  he 
retained  without  participating  in  primaries.  In  1964,  as  already 
noted,  Goldwater's  primary  performances  were  notable  for  their 
evidence  of  weak  vote-getting  ability.  Though  his  support  increased 
after  his  California  victory  his  poll  standing  was  only  2  per  cent 
higher  before  the  convention  than  it  had  been  before  the  primaries. 
That  Goldwater  emerged  as  joint  poll  leader  (with  Nixon)  before  the 
convention  is  more  a  tribute  to  the  loyalty  of  his  support  which  showed 
less  fluctuation  than  that  of  other  candidates  during  a  year  in  which 
Republican  preferences  were  fragmented  at  the  outset  and  fissured 
further  as  the  year  proceeded. 
Where  primary  victories  influenced  the  polls  it  was  often  by 
reinforcing  the  position  of  the  poll  leader.  Both  John  Kennedy  and 
Nixon  increased  their  leads  in  the  polls  over  their  opponents  during 
the  primaries  of  1960  and  1968  respectively. 
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For  those  leaders 
sceptical  about  the  popularity  of  either  candidate,  polls  confirmed  the 
strength  demonstrated  by  the  primaries. 
Since  reform  the  primaries  have  had  a  more  substantial  impact  upon 
the  competitive  situation  within  the  parties.  In  the  Democratic  nomin- 
ations  of  1972  and  1976  primaries  both  eliminated  poll  leaders  and  were 
instrumental  in  bringing  the  nomination  to  candidates  who  were  otherwise 
unlikely  to  win. 
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Prior  to  1972  there  were  no  instances  of  primaries 
producing  either  of  these  effects. 
In  1972  the  leaders  of  the  pre-primary  polls  were  Muskie  and 
Humphrey.  The  early  primary  results  proved  so  adverse  to  Muskie  that 
he-ceased  campaigning  with  two-thirds  of  the  primaries  still  remaining. 
Humphrey  won  only  three  primaries  and  withdrew  at  the  convention  after 
the-failure  of  the  attempt  to  deprive  McGovern  of  part  of  the  California 
delegation.  Before  the  primaries  McGovern  ranked  fifth  in  the  polls -  230  - 
of  Democratic  voters  with  only  6  per  cent  of  the  total.  116 
Yet 
McGovern  won  nine  primaries,  only  one  less  than  the  total  won  by  all 
four  candidates  who  led  him  in  the  pre-primary  polls.  Of  these  four, 
Muskie,  Lindsay  and  Humphrey  were  precluded  from  the  nomination  by 
adverse  primary  results  and  only  Wallace's  name  was  placed  in  nomin- 
ation. 
In  1976  Carter  moved  from  4  to  53  per  cent  in  polls  of  Democrats 
between  January  and  the  convention  in  July.  Wallace,  the  poll  leader 
early  in  the  year,  was  eliminated  by  the  defeats  inflicted  by  Carter 
in  Florida  and  North  Carolina.  The  lead  Humphrey  established  in  the 
final  pre-primary  poll  survived  until  Carter  emerged  from  the  early 
primaries  as  the  front  runner.  Neither  Wallace  nor  Humphrey  were  placed 
in  nomination  at  the  convention. 
Where  the  contestwas  decided  in  the  primaries,  candidates  were 
compelled  to  enter  them  in  large  numbers  if  they  were  to  win  the  nomin- 
ation.  The  consequence  of  many  candidates  attracted  into  numerous  prim- 
aries  was  to  ensure  many  contests.  Where  many  of  the  primaries  were 
actively  contested  the  vulnerability  of  the  front  runner  was  enhanced. 
Formerly  the  primaries  rarely  provided  contests  between  the  leading 
contenders.  Risk-conscious  candidates  either  avoided  the  primaries 
entirely  or  eschewed  direct  confrontation  with  the  front-runner.  In 
1960,  for  example,  Kennedy's  opposition  in  the  primaries  came  from 
Humphrey,  the  weakest  of  the  five  major  candidates.  Symington,  Johnson 
and  Stevenson  declined  to  enter  the  primaries  enabling  them  to  avoid 
defeats  but  also  enhancing  the  opportunities  for  Kennedy  to  demonstrate 
his  effectiveness  as  a  vote-getter  unhindered.  By  refusing  to  oppose 
him  they  were  unable  to  answer  his  claims  to  be  the  party's  most  elect- 
able  candidate  (Kennedy  believed  that  Johnson  might  have  beaten  him 
in  the  West  Virginia  primary,  and  Symington  in  Nebraska  or  Indiana. 
117) -  231  - 
After  reform  the  necessity  of  primaries  to  nominating  strategy 
guaranteed  that  the  front  runner  would  be  opposed  by  serious  challen- 
gers.  As  both  the  primaries  and  the  challengers  increased,  the 
possibilities  for  upset  multiplied.  The  financial  advantages  usually 
enjoyed  by  front  runners  were  also  curtailed  in  1976  by  the  implemen- 
tation  of  limits  on  campaign  spending  and  the  provision  of  federal 
finances  to  assist  candidates  in  their  campaigns. 
In  addition  to  the  objective  dangers  to  front  runners  they  were 
vulnerable  to  the  interpretations  placed  on  their  performances.  As 
described  earlier,  the  nationally  known  candidates  faced  more  rigorous 
standards  than  those  applied  to  less  well-known  candidates.  Whilst 
this  may  have  always  been  so,  the  new  nominating  process  enhanced  the 
interpretive  assaults  that  the  front  runner  had  to  withstand.  First, 
the  increase  in  the  number  of  primaries  he  had  to  enter  multiplied  the 
performances  that  risked  unfavourable  evaluation.  Secondly,  the  rise 
in  the  number  of  candidates  provided  several  opponents  in  most  states. 
In  1972,  for  example,  Muskie  faced  opposition  from  three  or  more  major 
candidates  in  four  of  the  first  six  primaries.  In  contrast,  John 
Kennedy  and  Nixon  faced  opposition  from  a  major  candidate  in  two,  and 
three  primaries  respectively.  Thirdly,  the  multiplicity  of  candidates 
fractionised  the  vote  total  thereby  often  diminishing  the  proportion 
won  by  the  front  runner. 
For  the  candidates  with  little  initial  support  the  post-reform 
primaries  offered  enhanced  opportunities  to  become  serious  contenders 
for  the  nomination  -a  development  reflected  by  the  increase  in  candi- 
dates  active  in  the  primaries.  The  expectations  surrounding  their 
early  performances  were  low  allowing  modest  showings  to  be  interpreted 
as  successes.  Candidates  who  showed  unexpectedly  effective  vote-getting 
ability  (no  longer  equivalent  to  electability)  were  viewed  as  gathering 
strength.  McGovern  provided  an  example  of  this  phenomenon  in  1972  - -  232  - 
"Just  as  Muskie's  'decline'  was  measured  largely  against 
his  big  initial  lead,  so  was  McGovern's  upsurge  measured 
largely  against  his  lowly  position  in  the  early  polls.  "118 
Where  a  candidate  could  induce  the  perception  that  he  had  "momentum" 
which,  in  turn,  stimulated  media  coverage,  volunteer  and  financial 
support,  he  was  in  a  position  to  build  from  his  early  achievements 
into  front  running  status  in  the  later  primaries. 
After  early  successes  it  was  possible  for  a  candidate  to  rise  to 
being  the  leading  contender  for  the  nomination  during  the  primaries. 
Because  primaries  were  so  numerous  and  provided  the  preponderent  form 
of  delegate  selection  virtually  all  candidates  entered  them,  all  the 
candidates  were  subject  to  the  winnowing  effect  of  the  interpretations 
of  their  results.  Because  all  the  candidates  were  involved  in  the 
primaries  they  produced  the  front  runners.  Unlike  the  pre-reform 
primaries,  those  since  1968  "made"  as  well  as  destroyed  candidates. 
The  1976  Democratic  primaries  exemplify  how  quickly  early  suc- 
cesses  can  be  converted  into  the  front  running  position.  After 
several  early  wins  against  crowded  fields,  Carter  moved  on  to  beat 
Udall  in  Wisconsin  and  Jackson  in  Pennsylvania.  After  Pennsylvania 
all  of  Carter's  early  opponents  had  been  eliminated  from  contention 
and  only  he  was  in  a  position  to  win  the  nomination.  According  to 
Time  magazine,  "one  third  of  the  way  through  the  obstacle  course  the 
race  was  over-.  11119  From  that  point  Carter  became  vulnerable  to  the 
expectations  placed  on  leading  candidates.  His  defeat  by  an  eleven 
per  cent  margin  in  Maryland  against  Brown,  Witcover  described  as 
"devastating  "ot20  His  narrow  victory  the  same  day  over  the  many-times- 
defeated  Udall  the  same  author  described  as  "an  embarrassment  of 
nearly  equal  proportions,.  "121  One  writer  referred  to  the  result  as  a 
virtual  dead  heat  which  was  "even  more  telling  than  his  [Carter's] 
loss  to  Brown  in  Maryland.:  '  122 
After  his  defeat  against  Church  in -  233  - 
Oregon,  Carter  himself  described  the  loss  as  "a  psychological  setback 
in  momentum.  "123 
Carter's  survival  despite  these  setbacks  was  attributable  to 
the  fact  that  more  than  half  the  delegates  had  been  selected  depriving 
other  candidates  of  plausibility  as  first  ballot  nominees.  Moreover, 
Carter  was  sustained  by  his  continued  victories  in  some  primaries  and 
his  expanding  delegate  support.  The  momentum  derived  from  beating 
the  front  runner  was  also  dissipated  between  two  candidates,  Brown  and 
Church,  further  diminishing  the  prospects  of  either  as  a  likely  nominee. 
Although  the  in-party  post-reform  nominations  were  not  character- 
ised  by  multi-candidate  primaries  reform  did  enhance  the  vulnerability 
of  incumbent  presidents  in  addition  to  out-party  front  runners.  The 
openness  of  the  process  typified  by  the  primaries  stimulated  candidates 
to  challenge  for  the  nomination  thereby  increasing  the  likelihood  of 
opposition  to  the  incumbent.  Both  Ford  and  Carter  were  opposed  in 
the  post-reform  primaries  unlike  Johnson  (in  1964)  or  Nixon  as  the 
heir  apparent  in  1960.  Like  the  out-party  the  possibilities  for 
scoring  an  upset  increased.  Opposition  was  probable  and  there  were 
more  primaries  in  which  to  produce  a  setback  to  the  president. 
The  post-reform  primaries  possessed  the  potential  to  influence 
the  competitive  situation  in  the  in-party  beyond  delivering  psychological 
jolts  to  the  president.  Whilst  Johnson's  showing  in  New  Hampshire  in 
1968  was  interpreted  as  a  defeat,  it  posed  no  serious  threat  to  his 
renomination.  A  New  York  Times  survey  subsequent  to  the  primary 
estimated  that  Johnson  could  still  expect  to  obtain  more  than  65  per 
cent  of  the  first  ballot  votes  at  the  convention. 
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In  contrast,  in 
1976  both  the  Reagan  and  Ford  campaigns  believed  that  the  setback  to 
the  President  of  a  defeat  in  New  Hampshire  would  be  sufficient  to  deprive 
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him  of  the  nomination.  A  defeat  in  New  Hampshire,  the  President -  234  - 
believed,  would  be  a  "near-fatal  blow:  "  126 
Prior  to  his  withdrawal,  Johnson  declined  to  contest  any  primary 
other  than  those  where  entry  was  compulsory  (in  New  Hampshire  Johnson's 
name  was  not  on  the  ballot  but  a  write-in  campaign  was  organised  on 
his  behalf). 
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Though  a  refusal  to  enter  the  primaries  entailed  the 
loss  of  some  delegates  their  numbers  were  insufficiently  large  to 
preclude  a  convention  majority  -  as  Humphrey  subsequently  proved. 
Since  reform  it  ceased  to  be  possible  for  an  incumbent  president 
to  ignore  the  primaries  and  rely  on  the  loyalty  of  the  party  organis- 
ations  to  guarantee  a  convention  majority,  as  Johnson  had  intended. 
When  the  competition  for  the  nomination  was  decided  in  the  primaries 
a  candidate  who  coiid  defeat  the  President  in  them  stood  to  win  the 
nomination.  Though  McCarthy  in  1968  may  have  encouraged  the  President 
to  withdraw  after  his  showing  in  New  Hampshire  he,  like  Kefauver  in 
1952,  was  not  the  eventual  nominee. 
In  both  primary  and  non-primary  states  the  party  organisations 
were  largely  removed  from  control  over  delegate  selection  (especially 
on  the  Democratic  side)  preventing  them  from  acting  as  a  "safety 
net"  for  a  president  losing  primaries.  Furthermore,  the  non-primary 
states  provided  less  than  a  third  of  the  total  delegates  and  their 
accessibility  precluded  the  president  from  dominating  them.  In  1976 
Reagan  proved  the  stronger  candidate  in  the  caucus  states  winning  more 
delegates  there  than  Ford. 
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The  nomination  of  Ford  was  largely 
attributable  to  his  winning  more  of  the  primaries  and  more  of  the 
delegates  elected  in  them  than  Reagan. 
Although  Ford  led  both  the  pre-primary  and  pre-convention  polls  the 
primaries  did  have  a  substantial  impact  on  his  standing  compared  against 
Reagan.  His  victories  in  the  early  primaries  boosted  his  lead  to  26  per 
cent  in  early  May. 
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However,  after  Reagan's  subsequent  recovery  to -  235  - 
win  in  several  states  Ford's  lead  was  reduced  to  10  per  cent  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  primaries. 
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Whilst  Ford  retained  the  lead 
throughout,  its  size  was  susceptible  to  the  results  of  the  primaries. 
Had  Ford  not  won  more  primaries  than  Reagan  it  is  likely  that  his  lead 
would  have  disappeared  entirely  suggesting  that  the  primaries  can  alter 
the  competitive  situation  substantially  in  both  the  in-  and  out-parties. 
Formerly  the  impact  of  the  primaries  -  such  as  it  was  -  was  usually 
thought  to  be  restricted  to  the  out-party. 
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Davis,  in  his  study  of 
presidential  primaries,  exempted  the  in-party  from  their  influence 
noting  - 
"there  is  a  striking  difference  between  conditions  favoring 
nomination  in  the  in-party  and  the  out-party  Presidential 
primaries,  it  is  clear,  are  rarely  decisive  in  the  party 
controlling  the  White  House.  A  first-term  President  ... 
does  not  need  a  string  of  triumphs  in  the  primaries  to 
insure  his  renomination.  Nor  does  a  'crown  prince'  suc- 
cessor  ...  have  to  rely  heavily  on  the  primaries  when  the 
chief  executive  is  required  to  step  down.  "132 
Whilst  the  in-party  primaries  since  1968  have  yet  to  dislodge  an  incum- 
bent  and  provide  his  successor  the  experience  of  1976  suggests  they  have 
the  potential  to  do  so. 
In  his  assessment  of  the  determinative  influences  on  the  twenty 
nominations  from  1936  to  1972,  Beniger  concluded  that  'there  is  no 
greater  advantage  than  strength  in  the  early  polls.  "  133 
The  evidence 
of  the  post-reform  period  indicates  that,  for  the  out-party  at  least, 
poll  leadership  can  be  a  handicap.  In  both  1972  and  1976  the  early  leaders 
faded  quickly,  their  positions  eroded  by  primaries,  and  a  new  leader 
emerged  from  obscurity  assisted  by  the  primaries. 
Primary  Sequence  and  Strategy 
Prior  to  reform  primaries  were  used  by  some  candidates  to  promote 
themselves  for  the  nomination  but  the  primaries  had  little  impact  as 
i -  236  - 
a  sequence.  The  pre-reform  primaries  consisted  of  isolated  events 
which  might  influence  the  nomination.  After  reform  the  primaries 
assumed  importance  as  a  series  in  which  one  event  was  an  influence 
(though  not  a  determinative  one)  on  its  successors,  the  cumulative 
result  being  to  decide  the  nomination. 
Theodore  White  captured  the  changed  form  of  the  post-reform  primary 
process  - 
"In  1972,  however,  primaries  were  to  be  different  ... 
they  were  to  unroll  not  as  episodes,  but  as  a  continuum. 
Primaries  tell  a  story.  They  last  for  months,  spotted 
with  drama  and  clash,  and  as  they  move  across  the 
nation  and  the  front  pages,  the  story  teaches  the  nation 
about  the  candidates...  Thus  the  nature  of  the  Presi- 
dential  contest  slowly  defines  itself  ...  "134 
The  increased  importance  and  number  of  primaries  both  reduces  the 
amount  of  campaigning  possible  in  a  particular  state  and  increases  the 
temporal  proximity  of  primaries  to  each  other.  Thus  a  major  influence 
on  one  primary  are  the  results  and  interpretations  of  those  preceding 
it.  Formerly  the  few  primaries  that  were  contested  were  spread  over 
a  long  period  reducing  their  impact  on  each  other  and  allowing  sus- 
tained  campaigns  -  normally  unrestrained  by  legal  controls  on  spending  - 
by  the  candidate  organisations.  As  Table  6.9  shows,  the  intervals 
between  contested  primaries  halved  after  reform. 
The  proximity  of  the  primaries  increased  their  possible  influence 
upon  each  other  whilst  diminishing  the  opportuniteis  for  campaigns 
to  alter  the  perceptions  of  candidates  formed  by  voters  on  the  basis 
of  information  supplied  in  earlier  contests.  For  example,  prior  to  the 
1972  New  Hampshire  primary  a  Boston  Globe  poll  showed  Muskie  leading 
McGovern  in  Massachusetts  by  a  margin  of  33  per  cent.  A  similar  poll 
two  months  later  showed  Muskie  trailing  McGovern  by  eleven  per  cent. 
135 
Between  the  two  polls  Muskie  scored  an  undistinguished  victory  in  New 
Hampshire  and  ran  fourth  in  Florida  whilst  McGovern  won  in  Wisconsin 
in  addition  to  running  well  in  New  Hampshire. -  237  - 
TABLE  6.9 
INTERVALS  BETWEEN  CONTESTED  PRIMARIES,  1960-1980 
Year  No.  days  between 
first  and  last 
contested  primary 
1960(D)  33 
1964(R)  82 
1968(D)  82 
No.  days  primaries 
contested 
2 
4 
8 
Av.  interval 
between  contests 
(in  days) 
33.0 
27.3 
11.7 
1968(R)  54  4  18.0 
1960-1968  251  18  17.9 
1972  89  11  8.9 
1976(D)  104  13  8.7 
1976(R)  104  12  9.5 
1980(D)  69  14  5.3 
1980(R)  78  15  5.6 
1972-1980  444  65  7.4 
Reagan's  campaign  manager,  John  Sears,  described  a  similar 
experience  in  1976  - 
"The  week  before  the  New  Hampshire  primary,  our  polling  showed 
us  ahead  in  Florida,  then  on  the  Saturday  after  the  New 
Hampshire  primary,  the  poll  showed  us  eighteen  points  down, 
which  gives  you  some  idea  of  what  momentum  -  or  lack  of 
it  -  can  do.  "136 
As  Sears'  reference  to  momentum  indicates,  it  is  not  simply  that  a 
previous  result  is  reproduced  in  its  successor  but  that  results  influence 
voters  and  the  supply  of  resources  -  money,  media  attention  and 
volunteers  -  which  can  alter  or  reinforce  existing  perceptions  of  the 
candidates  amongst  voters. 
Given  the  potential  of  one  event  as  an  influence  on  its  successors 
there  was  a  great  incentive  for  candidates  to  contest  early  primaries 
to  gain  impetus  to  their  campaigns.  After  reform  the  primaries  were 
replaced  by  various  straw  polls  and  precinct  caucuses  as  the  earliest -  238  - 
campaign  events  but  New  Hampshire  and  other  early  primaries  continued 
to  attract  a  disproportionately  large  degree  of  media  attention  (see 
Chapter  Nine). 
As  Hamilton  Jordan's  planning  for  the  Carter  campaign  envisaged, 
"a  strong  surprise  in  New  Hampshire  should  be  our  goal,  which  would  have 
tremendous  impact  on  successive  primaries.  "  137 
Between  New  Hampshire 
and  the  eighth  primary  in  Pennsylvania  Carter  received  close  to  half 
of  the  coverage  on  television  network  news  compared  with  less  than 
one-fifth  for  Jackson,  the  next  most  publicised  candidate. 
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The  quest  for  impetus  from  early  contests  led  candidates  to 
devote  exaggerated:  amounts  of  attention  to  the  states  early  in  the 
sequence.  In  1972  McGovern  spent  more  than  three-quarters  of  the 
first  three  months  of  the  year  campaigning  in  New  Hampshire,  Florida, 
Illinois  and  Wisconsin  -  the  four  earliest  primaries. 
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In  both 
1972  and  1976  five  of  the  major  Democratic  candidates  expended  more 
money  per  voter  in  their  first  primary  state  than  in  any  other. 
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The  concentration  of  campaign  resources  in  the  early  states 
invested  them  with  overriding  influence  on  the  candidates'  long-term 
prospects.  The  absorption  of  large  quantities  of  time,  money  and 
effort  increased  the  urgency  of  obtaining  a  return  on  the  early  investments. 
As  Hart's  planning  for  the  McGovern  campaign  acknowledged,  "without 
respectable  showings  or  victories  in  early  primaries,  such  as  New 
Hampshire  and  Wisconsin,  there  could  be  no  campaigns  in  California 
and  New  York.  " 
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Under  the  spending  limitations  in  force  in  1976  the  dependence  on 
early  success  to  gain  impetus  was  probably  greater  than  four  years 
earlier  because  primaries  were  more  numerous  and  financial  resources 
to  develop  campaign  organisations  in  later  states  so  circumscribed. 
The  reliance  on  early  momentum  to  compensate  for  lack  of  organisation -  239  - 
subsequently  is  encapsulated  in  the  observation  of  Carter's  national 
finance  director  that  - 
"We  had  no  structure  after  Florida.  After  Florida  it  was 
all  NBC,  CBS,  and  the  New  York  Times.  " 
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The  importance  of  generating  momentum  gave  the  early  primaries 
a  pivotal  place  in  the  candidates'  overall  campaign  strategies. 
McGovemb  entry  in  New  Hampshire  derived  from  the  objective  of  co- 
opting  the  left.  By  performing  well  in  the  first  primary  against 
Muskie,  McGovern  hoped  to  monopolise  the  support  of  the  liberal-left 
of  the  Democratic  Party.  A  similar  contest  took  place  amongst  the 
Democratic  liberals  in  1976.  Bayh  sought  to  survive  until  New  York 
where  he  was  stronger  than  the  other  liberals. 
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Udall's  campaign, 
in  response,  was  aimed  at  eliminating  Bayh  from  contention  before 
then,  "Bayh  is  gambling  on  our  inability  to  capture  the  viable  left- 
center  position  in  the  race  before  New  York,  where  he  could  convinc- 
ingly  take  it  for  himself  ... 
[we  must]  prevent  Bayh  from  surviving 
until  New  York.  "  144 
Having  won  in  New  Hampshire,  the  Carter  campaign  sought  to  capit- 
alise  on  their  victory  by  intensifying  their  efforts  in  Massachusetts, 
the  next  primary,  believing  it  possible  to  eliminate  all  major  opposi- 
tion  in  the  first  two  primaries.  By  winning  in  Massachusetts  the  other 
candidates  would  be  deprived  of  early  momentum.  According  to  Patrick 
Caddell,  the  campaign's  pollster  - 
"The  fear  in  Massachusetts  was,  'Who  could  you  allow  to 
win  by  not  going  in  there?  '  ...  So  Massachusetts  became  by 
definition  whether  you  could  take  it  to  keep  anybody  else 
from  getting  it.  "145 
Owing  to  the  emphasis  placed  upon  gaining  early  momentum  those 
candidates  who  failed  to  generate  it  dropped  out  rapidly.  Though  the- 
number  of  candidates  in  primaries  increased  after  reform  few  survived 
the  entire  sequence.  In  1972  Muskie,  Lindsay  and  Jackson  had  either -2410- 
withdrawn  or  suspended  their  campaigns  after  the  first  six  primaries. 
Four  years  later  the  attrition  on  the  Democratic  side  was  even  greater. 
After  the  Pennsylvania  primary,  the  eighth  of  the  year,  only  Udall 
and  Carter  remained  active  candidates  from  amongst  seven  starters. 
Bayh,  Shriver  ,  Harris,  Jackson  and  Wallace  had  by  that  time  been 
eliminated  from  contention.  In  the  1980  Republican  contest,  the  winnowing 
effects  of  the  primaries  reduced  the  active  contenders  to  Reagan  alone. 
In  the  later  primary  states  he  faced  no  active  opposition. 
The  early,  -  primaries  did  not  necessarily  determine  who  the  nominee 
would  be  but  in  multi-candidate  out-party  contests  they  decided  who 
would  be  excluded  from  consideration.  In  consequence,  voters  in  the 
early  states  possessed  a  greater  range  of  alternatives  to  choose 
amongst  than  those  in  later  states.  In  Massachusetts  in  1976  there 
were  seven  active  Democratic  major  candidates.  In  none  of  the  post- 
Pennsylvania  primaries  were  there  more  than  three  candidates  campaign- 
ing  for  votes. 
Defeat  -  or  the  perception  of  defeat  -  was  not  necessarily  decisive 
in  a  later  primary  where  the  emphasis  was  upon  winning  delegates.  However, 
defeats  in  the  early  primaries  -  where  momentum  was  the  principal 
objective  -  were  likely  to  be  irrevocable. 
From  the  inception  of  presidential  primaries  those  held  earliest 
in  the  year,  in  general,  generated  the  most  interest. 
16 
Beniger's 
research  into  the  relationship  between  primaries  and  polls  found  that 
those  earliest  in  the  sequence  had  the  greatest  impact  on  the  candidates' 
standing  in  national  opinion  polls. 
147 
Though  it  occupied  a  first-in-the-nation  position  from  1920  it  was 
not  until  the  introduction  of  a  presidential  preference  poll,  effective 
for  1952,  that  New  Hampshire  stimulated  the  interest  of  presidential 
candidates.  Even  this  development  did  not  guarantee  a  contested  primary. -  241  - 
In  1960  there  was  no  opposition  from  major  candidates  to  either  Nixon 
or  John  Kennedy.  Theodore  White  noted  that  any  challenge  to  Kennedy 
in  New  England  would  have  been  "political  folly.  "  148 
A  defeat  would 
have  been  inevitable  and  damaging  to  a  candidate's  prospects  of  demon- 
strating  electability.  Twelve  years  later  the  McGovern  campaign 
entered  the  state  anticipating  defeat  against  another  front  running 
senator  from  a  neighbouring  New  England  state  but  believing  that  an 
advantage  could  be  derived  there.  In  fact,  in  the  attempts  to  promote 
a  modest  showing  by  McGovern  into  a  triumph  his  campaign  manager  sought 
to  persuade  journalists  that  Muskie  could  reasonably  be  expected  to 
obtain  65  per  cent  of  the  vote. 
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Though  the  press  consensus  set  a 
lower  target  McGovern  was  informed  by  his  campaign  manager  ten  days 
before  the  primary  that  he  was  "going  to  be  real  lucky  and  get  25  per 
cent  of  the  vote.  "150  Where  expectation  rather  than  electability  were 
the  standard  by  which  candidates  were  measured,  entering  a  state  where 
defeat  was  probable  was  not  necessarily  folly. 
After  the  Kefauver-Truman  and  Eisenhower-Taft  races  of  1952, 
1968  was  the  next  occasion  in  which  both  parties'  primaries  in  New 
Hampshire  were  contested.  Though  the  state  carries  the  reputation  of 
having  "unmade"  President  Johnson  its  significance  was  recognised  only 
belatedly.  Initially  the  media's  attention  focused  on  the  Republican 
contest  between  Romney,  the  former  front  runner  and  a  supposedly  new- 
model  Nixon. 
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When  announcing  his  candidacy  McCarthy's  opening 
statement  listed  the  primaries  he  had  definitely  decided  to  enter,  New 
Hampshire  was  not  one  of  the  four  states  mentioned,  McCarthy  believing 
that  Massachusetts  would  be  the  crucial  primary  in  the  Northeast  until 
persuaded  otherwise  by  local  supporters. 
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In  the  post-reform  period  New  Hampshire  was  a  particularly  inviting 
primary  for  candidates  to  enter.  As  a  small  state,  the  forty-second  in -  242  - 
population  size,  personal  campaigning  by  the  candidate  could  make 
his  presence  felt  to  an  unusually  high  proportion  of  the  electorate 
-  in  1976  around  400,000  registered  voters.  Although  the  candidates' 
expenditure  in  the  state  was  disproportionately  large  in  terms  of  the 
size  of  the  electorate  it  was  modest  when  compared  against  the  costs  of 
an  effective  campaign  in  the  largest  states.  Furthermore,  forward 
shifts  in  the  primary  dates  of  states  such  as  Florida,  Massachusetts 
and  Illinois  increased  the  costs  of  concentrating  on  an  early  altern- 
ative  to  New  Hampshire.  From  a  relatively  modest  outlay  -  around 
200,000  dollars  for  Carter  in  1976  -a  candidate  could  gain  the  momentum 
in  New  Hampshire  to  generate  the  resources  which  made  possible  campaigns 
in  the  larger  states  later  in  the  process. 
Conclusion 
Unlike  the  primaries  for  many  candidacies  those  at  presidential 
level  do  not  designate  the  nominee  formally.  But  the  contrasts  between 
the  pre-  and  post-reform  primaries  evidences  that  the  degree  of  indirect 
influence  they  exert  is  subject  to  change. 
Reform  intensified  the  prevailing  trend  enhancing  the  indirect 
influence  of  the  primaries.  The  convergence  of  active  candidates  in 
the  primaries  combined  with  the  effects  of  media  interpretations  to 
elevate  them  into  a  series  of  eliminators  reducing  the  range  of  plausible 
nominees.  This  winnowing  effect  reinforced  the  trend  toward  first  ballot 
conventions  and,  in  1980,  extending  it  to  uncontested  nominating 
ballots  for  only  Reagan  and  Carter  respectively  were  placed  in  nomin- 
ation  (though  many  of  Kennedy's  supporters  insisted  on  voting  for  him). 
On  the  Republican  side  the  elimination  contest  ended  during  the 
primaries  allowing  Reagan  to  monopolise  support  in  the  later  stages. -  243  - 
He  thus  became  the  first  nominee  to  accumulate  a  pre-convention  majority 
from  primary  state  pledged  delegates. 
In  effect,  the  post-1968  primaries  became  direct.  Although  they 
occurred  as  a  series  (unlike  their  counterparts  for  lower  offices) 
and  the  formality  of  convention  balloting  persisted,  the  primaries 
decided  the  nomination.  This  development  brought  the  presidential 
nomination  into  closer  conformity  with  practices  at  other  levels  of  the 
American  party  system.  By  further  extending  the  influence  of  voters  in 
intra-party  affairs  the  changes  in  the  primary  system  propelled  the 
American  parties  towards  the  Voter  Dominated  model  defined  in  Chapter 
Two. 
Polsby  and  Wildavsky  have  said  that  primaries  have  become  "almost 
but  not  quite  indispensable"  for  presidential  nominations. 
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Their 
qualification  is  unwarranted  by  the  evidence.  If  post-reform  primaries 
can  be  dispensed  with  no  candidate  has  effectively  demonstrated  how. 
The  experiences  of  Humphrey  in  1976  and  Ford  in  1980  indicate  that 
the  primaries  can  be  dispensed  with  only  at  the  cost  of  forgoing  the 
nomination. -  244  - 
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CHAPTER  SEVEN 
THE  ROLE  OF  THE  NON-PRIMARY  PROCESS 
The  altered  balance  in  the  numbers  of  primary  and  non-primary 
delegates  resulting  from  reform  required  a  shift  in  the  emphasis  of 
candidates'  campaigns  for  the  nomination.  Before  reform  the  prepond- 
erance  of  non-primary  delegates  made  them  the  focus  of  campaign 
strategies  either  directly,  through  negotiation  with  party  leaders, 
or  indirectly,  through  the  use  of  instruments  of  mass  appeal  such  as 
primaries  as  a  bargaining  device.  Since  reform  primaries  have  domin- 
ated  campaign  strategies  offering  a  direct  route  to  the  nomination. 
Where  pre-reform  candidates  concentrated  upon  winning  delegates 
selected  in  non-primary  processes,  many  of  their  successors,  including 
the  incumbent  president  in  1976,  devoted  little  attention  to  organ- 
ising  in  caucus  states  on  the  assumption  that  primaries  would  determine 
the  nominee. 
1 
Whilst  reform  displaced  the  non-primary  delegates  in  their  signi- 
ficance  to  candidates  it  also  transformed  the  process  by  which  they 
were  selected.  Party  organisations  lost  control  over  the  selection 
of  delegates  and  candidates  engaged  in  active  campaigns  amongst  voters 
to  dominate  caucuses.  Two  distinct  selection  procedures,  primary  and 
non-primary,  were  retained  but  the  post-reform  changes  in  both  tended 
in  a  single  direction:  towards  candidate-centred  delegate  selection 
and  processes  dominated  by  voters. 
In  this  chapter  the  altered  role  and  nature  of  the  non-primary 
process  is  delineated  by  an  analysis  of  the  strategic  responses  adopted 
by  the  candidates,  and  the  determinants  of  success.  The  first  section 
argues  that  before  reform  the  candidate's  relationship  to  the  party -  254  - 
structures  was  the  central  organising  principle  of  non-primary 
strategy.  Candidates  with  entree  to  the  party  leaders  concentrated 
upon  bargaining  with  them  for  support.  Only  candidates  without  direct 
access  to  the  leaders  sought  to  employ  support  amongst  voters  to 
influence  the  non-primary  process. 
After  reform  the  candidate's  relationship  to  the  party  organisations 
ceased  to  be  the  pivot  of  campaign  strategy.  To  win  delegates  all 
candidates  were  compelled  to  develop  voter-oriented  campaigns.  The 
increased  influence  of  voters  in  caucuses  also  strengthened  the  link- 
age  between  primary  and  non-primary  processes  of  selection.  As  argued 
in  the  second  section,  prior  to  reform  only  specific  types  of  candi- 
dates  -  party  outsiders  or  insiders  with  apparent  political  handicaps 
-  adopted  strategies  which  sought  to  link  the  two  processes.  For 
these  candidates,  primaries  were  a  means  to  gaining  otherwise  unobtain- 
able  influence  over  party  leaders.  After  reform  delegate  selection 
outcomes  resulted  from  an  interplay  of  the  two  processes.  Early  caucus 
successes  created  momentum  for  the  primaries  whose  results,  in  turn, 
subsequently  influenced  the  preferences  of  voters  in  the  non-primary 
states.  All  post-reform  candidates  competing  in  caucuses  sought  to 
link  their  campaigns  to  the  primaries. 
The  later  sections  of  the  chapter  assess  the  consequences  of  the 
changing  distribution  of  power  in  the  non-primary  process  for  the  nature 
of  the  campaigns  mounted  by  candidates.  Before  reform  candidates 
operated  in  an  environment  constrained  by  party  organisation  control. 
Delegate  selection  reflected  the  parties'  internal  power  relations, 
organisation  maintenance  needs  and  the  strategies  of  party  leaders 
seeking  future  influence.  After  reform  parties  were  displaced  from 
control  of  the  caucus  process.  Candidate  campaigning  was  conditioned 
by  the  formal  rules  of  the  caucuses  and  the  need  to  mobilise  supporters -  255  - 
in  the  electorate. 
Candidate  Strategy  in  the  Non-Primary  Process 
Prior  to  reform  non-primary  mechanisms  were  synonymous  with  party 
processes  of  delegate  selection.  Party  and  public  office-holders 
either  directly  appointed  the  national  convention  delegates  or  were 
a  major  influence  in  their  selection.  Because  the  organisations 
dominated  delegate  selection  the  determining  influence  upon  a  candi- 
date's  non-primary  strategy  was  his  relationship  to  the  party  structures. 
A  candidate  favoured  within  the  parties,  with  no  apparent  political 
handicaps,  sought  to  translate  the  existing  sentiment  into  delegate 
support.  Campaigns  were  unaggressive  and  concentrated  within  the 
organisations.  Prior  to  1960  such  expedients  were  followed  with  success 
by  all  twentieth  century  incumbents  seeking  another  term,  and  first- 
time  nominees  Landon  and  Dewey. 
2 
Candidates  without  substantial  approbation  within  the  organis- 
ations  sought  delegates'from  party  structures  by  influencing  them 
through  public  popularity  or  supplanting  their  control  of  the  selection 
process.  Campaigns  were  concentrated  outside  the  organisations  though 
directed  at  them.  Pre-1960  campaigns  of  this  type  were  undertaken 
successfully  by  Willkie  and  Eisenhower  (in  1952). 
3 
That  both  these 
successes  occurred  in  the  Republican  Party  is  indicative  of  the  influence 
of  an  extra-party  interest  -  corporate  business  -  over  the  nomination 
greater  than  any  Democratic  equivalent  (as  discussed  in  Chapter  Four). 
In  the  period  1960  to  1968  four  different  objectives  were  identi- 
fiable  in  the  strategies  adopted  by  candidates  towards  the  state  and 
local  parties  to  win  delegates:  cultivation,  reassurance,  inducement 
and  invasion.  The  first  three  sought  to  influence  the  existing -  256  - 
distribution  of  power  within  the  parties,  the  latter  to  reconstruct 
it.  Cultivation  was  practised  by  candidates  seeking  to  convert  their 
existing  popularity  in  the  party  into  delegate  support.  Candidates 
with  many  sympathisers  in  the  party  but  whose  enthusiasm  was  restrained 
by  apparent  political  handicaps  engaged  in  strategies  of  reassurance 
demonstrating  their  electability  to  assuage  the  doubts  of  their  latent 
supporters.  Candidates  lacking  support  within  the  party  relied  upon 
demonstrations  of  electability  proving  their  pre-eminence  as  vote- 
getters  to  induce  the  professionals  to  support  them.  Invasion  strat- 
egies  sought  to  overcome  unsympathetic  professionals  by  displacing  or 
diluting  their  influence  in  the  selection  of  delegates. 
Most  candidates  employed  a  mix  of  different  strategies  conditioned 
by  their  relationship  to  particular  state  and  local  parties,  and  the 
manner  in  which  delegates  were  selected.  Favourable  parties  could  be 
cultivated  or  reassured.  Those  parties  less  sympathetic  could  be 
subjected  to  inducement  or  invasion.  Where  the  distribution  of  influence 
over  delegate  selection  was  amenable  to  short-term  change  invasion 
strategies  could  be(ýemployed.  '.  Where  change  could..  not  ..  b.  e.  effected  strategies 
attuned  to  the  existing  structure  of  influence  were  necessary. 
Strategies  of  cultivation  were  available  to  those  candidates  who, 
through  their  offices,  their  politics  or  their  assiduity  in  the  party's 
cause  inspired  the  loyalty  of  the  professionals.  In  an  election  year 
their  objective  was  the  utilisation  of  credits  already  established 
to  produce  delegate  votes. 
President  Johnson  and  Vice  Presidents  Nixon  and  Humphrey  commanded 
the  support  of  the  organisations  through  their  positions  as  party 
leaders.  They  were  also  the  servants  of  the  party's  needs  -  dispensers 
of  patronage,  raisers  of  funds  and  campaigners  at  election  time.  Both 
Nixon  and  Humphrey  benefited  as  the  deputies  to  presidents  who  largely -  257  - 
neglected  party  affairs  permitting  them  to  earn  the  allegiance  of 
the  professionals  normally  reserved  for  the  president.  Of  Nixon, 
Theodore  White  wrote  - 
"For  seven  years,  dry  season  and  full  season,  the  Vice- 
President  had  crisscrossed  the  country,  delivering  himself 
to  regular  Party  organisations  ...  He  had  done  their 
chores  and  their  work  for  six  years  in  an  administration 
whose  president  was  -  as  they  put  the  phrase  delicately 
but  negatively  -  'not  politically  conditioned'.  "4 
The  loyalty  of  the  party  to  its  leaders  translated  into  substantial 
and  automatic  delegate  support.  Nixon  and  Johnson's  strength  was  so 
extensive  that  no  contest  for  their  party's  nomination  developed  in 
1960  and  1964  respectively.  In  1968  though  a  challenge  to  Johnson 
was  mounted  he  retained  the  loyal  support  of  many  party  organisations. 
Support  within  the  party  for  its  leaders  was  not  necessarily 
dependent  upon  their  public  popularity  or  the  issues  they  espoused. 
In  1960  Nixon  was  only  a  slightly  stronger  candidate  than  Rockefeller 
when  matched  against  Kennedy  in  trial  heat  polls. 
5 
In  1968  more  voters 
disapproved  than  approved  Johnson's  conduct  of  office  and  Robert 
Kennedy  appeared  in  the  polls  to  be  the  more  popular  D.  emocratic  candi- 
date. 
6 
Yet  even  after  the  New  Hampshire  primary  exposed  Johnson's 
unpopularity  amongst  voters  he  appeared  assured  of  a  convention 
majority. 
7 
Following  Johnson's  withdrawal  the  party's  loyalty  was 
transferred  to  Humphrey  despite  his  adherence  to  an  administration 
policy  on  Vietnam  which  many  within  the  party  questioned. 
8 
Goldwater,  Reagan  and  Johnson  (in  1960)  engaged  the  esteem  of 
particular  party  organisations  as  advocates  of  issue  positions  favoured 
within  them.  Both  Goldwater  and  Reagan  espoused  the  conservative 
principles  more  widely  subscribed  to  amongst  the  Republican  Party's 
professionals  than  its  voters.  Johnson,  as  a  southern  senator,  was 
the  most  cautious  of  the  major  candidates  on  civil  rights  in  1960. -  258  - 
In  the  South,  where  race  was  the  paramount  issue,  he  was  the  only 
candidate  who  had  an  acceptable  position  on  civil  rights  and  a  plau- 
sible  chance  of  winning  the  nomination.  Though  his  position  was 
imperfect,  Johnson  was  the  only  defence  against  the  integrationists. 
Candidates  whose  support  within  the  party  remained  latent  whilst 
doubts  existed  as  to  their  electability  engaged  in  strategies  of 
reassurance.  Both  John  Kennedy  and  Nixon,  in  1968,  employed  the 
primaries  to  overcome  the  scepticism  surrounding  their  ability  to  win 
the  election  (see  Chapter  Six).  By  winning  primaries  they  could 
exploit  the  existing  sympathy  within  the  party  to  produce  delegate 
support.  Kennedy  had  to  prove  that  a  Catholic  was  electable,  and 
Nixon  that  he  was  a  stronger  candidate  than  his  loser  image  suggested. 
Primary  victories  were  the  means  to  converting  latent  into  manifest 
support. 
Inducement  strategies  were  employed  by  candidates  lacking  organ- 
isation  support,  aimed  at  altering  the  balance  of  preferences  within 
the  parties  by  demonstrating  their  appeal  amongst  voters.  Their 
objective  was  to  overturn  the  existing  sentiment  rather  than  to  unlock 
it  (the  aim  of  reassurance  strategies). 
For  those  without  entree  to  the  party  organisations  demonstrating 
voter  appeal  was  the  only  available  means  of  winning  non-primary  votes: 
"There  was,  for  Rockefeller,  no  other  court  of  appeal 
but  the  people.  "9  (1961) 
"...  the  only  hope  of  Lodge  leaders  was  to  obtain  such 
compelling  evidence  of  public  support  that  the  politicos 
would  have  to  give  heed  to  it.  "10  (1964) 
"At  the  start  he  [Robert  Kennedy]  was  trying  to  blitz  the 
party  from  below,  from  outside  the  structure.  Without 
the  unions,  the  business  community,  the  regular  party 
leaders,  or  the  South,  he  had  to  show  the  delegates  he 
had  the  people.  11 
(1968) 
"Rockefeller,  like  McCarthy,  had  to  appeal  to  the  people 
over  the  heads  of  the  politicians*"  12  (1968) -  259  - 
Using  primaries,  polls  and  crowds  in  the  streets,  inducement  strategies 
sought  to  elevate  public  popularity  into  the  determinative  influence 
on  party  processes  of  delegate  selection.  In  consequence,  the  strategy 
proceeded  at  two  levels.  First,  campaigns  directed  at  the  voters. 
Secondly,  the  campaigns  directed  at  persuading  the  professionals 
capitalising  on  the  evidence  of  mass  appeal.  One  of  Robert  Kennedy's 
aides  expressed  the  duality  of  the  1968  campaign:  "We  were  playing 
mobs  by  day  and  trying  to  seduce  the  bosses  at  night.  "  13 
Because  inducement  strategies  aimed  at  converting  support  rather 
than  activating  it  they  contained  a  negative  component,  evincing  the 
weaknesses  of  opponents  closer  to  the  party  organisations.  Their  task 
was  to  convince  the  professionals  that  their  desire  for  both  a  party 
regular  and  electoral  victory  were  incompatible.  To  support  the 
party  insider  would  be  to  invite  defeat.  Thus  Rockefeller  sought 
to  influence  the  opinion  polls  seeking  to  prove  not  only  that  he  was 
more  popular  than  Nixon  but  that  he  could  win  whilst  Nixon  could  not. 
Employing  poll  evidence,  Scranton  argued  that  Goldwater's  nomination 
would  produce  massive  defections  of  Republican  voters  to  the  detriment 
of  the  party's  ticket  in  local  contests.  Robert  Kennedy  argued  that 
his  and  McCarthy's  showings  in  the  primaries  constituted  a  repudiation 
of  the  administration  of  which  Humphrey  was  a  part.  If  Humphrey  were 
the  nominee,  "the  Democratic  Party  would  be  making  a  very  bad  mistake 
to  ignore  the  wishes  of  the  people  ...  "14 
Invasion  strategies  were  aimed  at  winning  support  from  parties 
by  redistributing  the  influence  over  delegate  selection  within  them. 
This  objective  was  pursued  either  by  displacing  the  existing  influen- 
tials  or  diluting  their  control  of  the  selection  process. 
The  displacement  strategy,  requiring  several  years  to  effect,  was 
undertaken  by  the  Draft  Goldwater  Committee  which  reconstructed  state -  260  - 
and  local  Republican  parties  from  1961  onwards.  To  secure  the  parties 
for  the  conservative  cause  the  Goldwater  campaign  progressively 
moved  into  positions  of  influence  within  the  organisations  - 
"At  first  the  Goldwaterites  would  be  outsiders.  Later 
they  would  be  insiders.  In  the  end  they  would  be  dele- 
gates  to  the  National  Convention,.  " 
15 
By  controlling  the  offices  involved  in  the  selection  process  pro- 
Goldwater  delegates  would  be  guaranteed  - 
"Our  [the  Goldwater  campaign's]  job  would  be  to  assure 
the  selection  of  conservative  precinct  committeemen  and 
committeewomen  in  1962  and  1963  who  would  then  have  a 
major  voice  in  picking  delegates  dedicated  to  our  prin- 
ciples  in  196.  " 
16 
The  shorter-term  objective  of  mitigating  the  influence  of  party 
officials  was  adopted  for  the  McCarthy  candidacy,  a  campaign  virtually 
confined  to  the  election  year.  The  strategy  of  invasion  was  neces- 
sitated  by  the  solidity  of  support  within  the  party  for  Johnson  and 
Humphrey  but  facilitated  by  the  degree  of  popular  opposition  outside 
of  it  generated  by  issues  such  as  the  Vietnam  war.  By  increasing 
participation  in  those  states  holding  open  caucuses  the  influence  of 
unsympathetic  party  officials  in  normally  sparsely  attended  meetings 
could  be  overcome.  By  this  means  the  insurgents  could  win  delegates 
against  pro-administration  party  organisations,  as  the  Eisenhower 
forces  had  overcome  Taft-dominated  parties  in  the  South  in  1552.17 
Prior  to  reform  the  candidate's  relationship  to  the  party 
structures  was  the  decisive  influence  on  both  the  strategy  he  adopted 
and  the  likelihood  of  its  success.  Candidates  to  whom  the  professionals 
were  sympathetic  exploited  their  insider  positions  through  strategies 
of  cultivation  and  reassurance.  Those  candidates  without  reserves 
of  support  within  the  party  relied  upon  insurgent  strategies  of  induce- 
ment  and  invasion. 
i,  The  lack  of  entree  with  the  party  organisations  usually  proved  an -  261  - 
insurmountable  barrier  to  candidates  seeking  non-primary  support.  In 
the  immediate  pre-reform  period  it  was  the  insider  strategists  - 
Nixon,  Johnson,  John  Kennedy,  Goldwater,  Humphrey  -  who  dominated  in 
the  preferences  of  delegates  chosen  through  party  processes.  In  con- 
trast,  those  candidates  dependent  upon  outsider  strategies  won  meagre 
portions  of  delegates  which,  in  a  system  where  party  processes  were 
predominant,  precluded  their  nominations. 
Following  reform  the  non-primary  system  ceased  to  be  equivalent 
to  a  party  process  of  delegate  selection.  Voter  participation  was 
encouraged  and  formal  restrictions  placed  on  the  role  of  (Democratic) 
party  officials.  As  a  result  the  parties  were  removed  from  their 
former  controlling  influence.  A  candidate's  relationship  to  the  party 
structures  was  no  longer  the  pivot  of  non-primary  strategies  and 
outcomes. 
When  the  party  organisations  controlled  delegate  selection  their 
support  was  either  an  advantage  to  be  exploited  or,  for  insurgents,  an 
obstacle  to  be  circumvented.  After  reform  the  task  for  all  candidates 
became  to  mobilise  their  own  supporters  to  participate  in  a  process 
which  was  based  entirely  (for  the  Democrats)  or  largely  (for  the  Repub- 
licans)  upon  open  caucuses.  In  consequence,  the  number  of  a  candidate's 
active  supporters  rather  than  their  influence  within  the  party  organis- 
ation  became  the  decisive  campaign  resource. 
To  produce  the  superior  numbers  to  control  caucuses  post-reform  non- 
primary  campaigns  were  built  from  voters  rather  than  party  professionals. 
Recognising  the  necessity  of  constructing  a  campaign  organisation 
outside  of  the  power  structure  of  state  and  local  parties,  the  McGovern 
campaign  "relied  on  a  grassroots  campaign,  starting  from  the  ground 
up,  locating  workers  in  every  precinct  and  county,  the  leadership  coming 
from  citizens,  relatively  anonymous  and  unknown,  turning  out  thousands -  262  - 
of  people  on  caucus  day,  "18 
Whilst  the  McGovern  campaign's  objectives  resembled  the  pre-reform 
invasion  strategies,  the  context  in  which  it  was  executed  differed 
from  that  existing  prior  to  1972.  First,  by  requiring  open  caucuses 
reform  multiplied  the  milieus  in  which  invasion-style  strategies  could 
be  effective.  Formerly  many  delegates  had  been  selected  in  processes 
secured  from  election-year  invasions  of  voters.  Secondly,  the  restric- 
tions  placed  on  the  role  of  party  officials  in  delegate  selection 
enhanced  the  influence  that  could  be  exerted  by  the  'invaders'  in 
caucuses.  Thirdly,  when  superior  numbers  became  the  determinant  of 
success  in  the  non-primary  process  all  candidates  were  compelled  to 
adopt  invasion-style  strategies  irrespective  of  their  relationship 
to  the  party  organisations.  Finally,  the  reforms'  removal  of  organ- 
isation  control  reduced  the  parties'  defences  against  insurgency. 
Caucuses  became  space  to  be  occupied  rather  than  strongholds  to  be 
captured. 
Primaries  and  Caucuses:  The  Relationship 
Prior  to  reform  there  was  no  necessary  strategic  link  between 
the  primary  and  non-primary  processes.  The  preponderance  of  non- 
primary  delegates  enabled  candidates  to  focus  exclusively  on  party 
processes  to  construct  a  convention  majority.  In  the  immediate  pre- 
reform  period  the  majority  of  major  candidates  avoided  active  primary 
participation  (as  noted  in  the  previous  chapter).  Primaries  were 
considered  either  unnecessary  or  helpful  -  without  the  need  for  active 
involvement  -  in  eliminating  other  candidates. 
Only  a  minority  of  pre-reform  major  candidates  participated 
actively  in  primaries  seeking  to  use  their  results  to  persuade  the -  263  - 
leaders  to  award  them  delegates  in  party  processes.  But  for  the 
connection  between  the  two  processes  to  be  established  depended  upon 
the  receptivity  of  the  leaders  to  influence  by  the  primaries.  This, 
in  turn,  was  conditioned  by  the  clarity  of  the  primaries'  results, 
the  leaders'  attitudes  towards  the  contestants  and  the  degree  of 
sentiment  for  non-contestants.  Unless  the  leaders  were  disposed 
towards  a  clear  primary  winner,  combined  with  the  absence  of  a  consensus 
around  an  inactive,  candidate,  the  primaries  were  unlikely  to  be  a 
major  influence  on  party  processes  of  delegate  selection.  The  linkage 
was  potential  and  only  occasionally  actualised. 
Reform  removed  many  of  the  constraints  on  the  relationship 
between  primary  and  non-primary  processes.  When  both  processes  came 
to  be  dominated  by  voters  the  gatekeeper  role  of  party  leaders  in 
controlling  access  to  non-primary  delegates  (and  thereby  controlling 
the  influence  of  the  primaries  on  the  nomination)  was  largely  eliminated. 
For  one  process  to  influence  the  other  ceased  to  be  dependent  upon 
the  mediation  of  party  leaders. 
After  reform  most  candidates  sought  to  forge  the  link  between 
the  two  selection  processes.  Primaries  can,  mathematically,  provide 
a  convention  majority  but  they  influenced,  and  were  influenced  by, 
caucuses,  encouraging  candidates  to.  compete  in  both  systems. 
In  the  post-reform  nominating  process  success  was  cumulative. 
This  was  not  simply  the  operation  of  bandwagon  'psychology'  but  because 
success  was  productive  of  the  resources  -  publicity,  funds,  volunteers 
-  instrumental  in  mobilising  voters  to  produce  later  successes.  As 
the  first  contests  in  the  entire  nominating  process,  the  early  caucuses 
created  a  substantial  impact  on  the  opening  primaries  which  were 
decisive  in  narrowing  the  alternatives  available  later  in  the,  delegate 
selection  sequence. -  264  - 
The  quest  for  early  success  accounts  for  the  attention  devoted 
by  candidates  to  the  pre-primary  precinct  caucuses,  particularly 
those  in  Iowa  which  often  inaugurated  the  selection  process  each 
election  year.  Although  the  Iowa  precinct  caucuses  represented  only 
the  base  of  a  four-tier  process  culminating  in  the  selection  of  a 
small  fraction  of  the  total  delegates,  their  results  produced  an 
impetus  which  wastransmitted  into  the  early  primaries.  According 
to  Carter's  media  adviser  in  1976,  Gerald  Rafshoon,  "Knowing  the  domino 
effect  of  what  a  win  in  Iowa  would  do  to  our  chances  in  New  Hampshire 
and  then  Florida  ...  we  decided  we  had  to  win.  "19  Four  years  earlier 
McGovern's  campaign  manager  perceived  the  repercussions  of  a  clear 
Muskie  victory  in  Iowa  so  that  the  caucuses  "grew  in  significance 
with  the  increase  in  rumors  that  Muskie  intended  to  wrap  the  state 
up.  Such  reports  from  an  early  caucus  state  prior  to  the  first  primary 
would  seriously  damage  [McGovern  campaign]  morale  and  further  hinder 
latent  fund-raising  possibilities  "120 
Both  Udall  and  Bayh  entered  Iowa  in  1976  with  the  defensive 
purpose  of  denying  the  other  an  early  victory,  potentially  decisive 
in  the  contest  for  leadership  of  the  liberal  wing  of  the  Democratic 
Party.  The  Udall  campaign  concluded  that  an  indecisive  outcome  would 
enhance  the  significance  of  the  first  primary  where  their  prospects 
were  bright,  "We  must  ...  do  our  part  to  keep  Iowa  muddled  and  make 
New  Hampshire  all  the  more  critical  . 
'21  Recognising  Udall  strength 
in  New  Hampshire,  the  Bayh  campaign  sought  to  pre-empt  it  by  defeating 
him  in  an  earlier  contest. 
22 
The  priority  attached  to  the  pre-primary  caucuses  by  the  candi- 
dates  was  evidenced  by  the  number  of  visits  made  to  the  states  by 
candidates,  an  indicator  of  campaign  activity  (see  Table  7.1). 
Candidates  focused  attention  disproportionately  on  the  pre-primary -  265  - 
caucuses.  Thereafter  campaign  activity  switched  to  the  primaries 
with  a  corresponding  decline  in  efforts  in  non-primary  states. 
Amongst  the  Democratic  caucuses  in  1976  spending  by  candidates  was 
highest  in  Iowa,  the  earliest  caucus  state,  although  six  other  caucuses 
states  had  larger  electorates. 
23 
Of  the  seven  announced  major  candi- 
dates  at  the  beginning  of  the  year,  five  (Carter,  Udall,  Bayh,  Wallace 
and  Harris)  expended  a  larger  proportion  of  money  per  registered 
voter  in  a  pre-primary  caucus  although  most  of  the  large  blocs  of 
delegates  were  located  in  caucus  states  whose  selection  processes 
started  after  the  New  Hampshire  primary. 
24 
TABLE  7.1 
. DAYS  SPENT  IN  CAUCUS  STATES  BYYDEMOCRATIC  CANDIDATES,  1976 
Timing  of  First  No.  States  %  Total  Caucus  Total  Days  Visited 
Caucus  Delegates 
Pre-primary  5  28.1  26 
Post-primary  16  71.9  27 
Total  21*  100.0  53 
INA:  Alaska 
Based  on  data  for  the  Carter,  Jackson,  Udall  and  Wallace  candidacies, 
supplied  in  John  H.  Aldrich,  Before  the  Convention:  Strategies  and 
Choices  in  Presidential  Nomination  Campaigns  (Chicago:  University  of 
Chicago  Press,  1980),  p.  233. 
The  potential  perceived  by  candidates  for  caucuses  to  influence 
the  primaries  was  a  post-reform  development.  Previously  candidates 
either  recognised  no  relationship  between  the  two  processes  (those 
who  eschewed  the  primaries)  or  believed  that  influence  flowed  only 
from  the  primaries  to  the  election-oriented  leaders  in  party  processes 
(the  necessary  assumption  of  the  candidates  compelled  to  utilise -  266  - 
primaries).  Because  the  pre-reform  non-primary  process  was  not  viewed 
as  an  expression  of  voter  sentiment  it  was  not  regarded  as  either  an 
influence  on,  or  forerunner  of,  the  primaries.  In  1968  a  McCarthy 
invasion  of  the  pre-primary  caucuses  in  Minnesota  evidenced  substantial 
opposition  to  the  Johnson  administration.  But  the  results  gained 
little  of  the  national  attention  subsequently  devoted  to  McCarthy's 
showing  in  New  Hampshire.  As  one  Minnesota  observer  noted  - 
"The  spontaneous  outpouring  at  our  caucuses  had  been  too 
dramatic  to  deny.  Yet"  no  one  outside  our  borders  seemed 
to  see  it  as  a  harbinger.  "25 
After  reform  candidates  recognised  the  potential  repercussions  of  pre- 
primary  caucus  results  marked  either  by  strenuous  efforts  to  achieve 
success  or,  as  for  Jackson  in  1976,  evading  defeat  by  declining  to 
enter. 
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When  the  campaign  focus  switched  to  the  primaries  their  results 
became  a  major  influence  on  the  sequence  of  non-primary  delegate 
selection.  Success  in  primaries  enhanced  campaign  resources  and 
morale.  Media  attention  concentrated  on  the  successful  primary  candi- 
dates  converting  some  voters  to  their  side  and  stimulating  existing 
supporters  to  participate  as  their  preferred  choice  grew  in  plausi- 
bility  as  the  nominee.  In  contrast,  candidates  failing  in  the  primaries 
lacked  finances,  visibility  in  the  media  and  credibility  as  potential 
nominees.  Their  prospects  in  the  caucus  states  therefore  diminished. 
They  failed  to  win  new  converts,  existing  supporters  lost  the  incen- 
tive  to  participate,  the  campaign's  capacity  to  mobilise  voters  declined 
as  resources  and  morale  dissipated. 
In  the  post-reform  period  success  in  primaries  was  a  pre-condition 
of  success  in  non-primary  states  as  delegate  selection  proceeded.  In 
Iowa  in  1976,  where  selection  was  completed  during  Carter's  emergence 
as  the  front-runner  in  the  primaries,  state  organiser  Charles  Hammer -  267  - 
observed  that  "as  Carter  did  well,  our  Iowa  support  increased.  "27 
Similarly,  as  Udall  emerged  as  the  survivor  amongst  the  liberal  can- 
didates  his  strength  in  Iowa,  according  to  state  organiser  Norma 
Matthews,  "gained  ...  every  time  [he]  almost  won  a  primary.  "28 
In  contrast,  Carter's  later  setbacks  against  Brown  and  Church  slowed 
the  conversion  of  delegates  to  his  side.  A  supporter  in  Virginia 
noted  the  effects  of  Carter's  defeat  in  Maryland  and  unexpectedly 
narrow  victory  in  Michigan  in  his  state's  delegate  selection  process, 
"We  had  a  lot  of  people  between  third  base  and  home  ...  but  some  of 
them  scampered  back  to  third  when  they  saw  the  results  from  those 
states  on  television.  "29 
Prior  to  reform  the  primaries  produced  little  impact  during  the 
selection  of  delegates  in  non-primary  processes.  In  most  states  the 
selection  of  delegates  was  divorced  from  candidate  preferences  which 
were  thus  not  susceptible  to  a  surge  or  decline  generated  by  primary 
results.  Furthermore,  the  benefits  derived  from  success  in  primaries 
were  less  potent  when  transferred  to  pre-reform  party  processes  than 
they  were  in  post-1968  caucuses. 
The  resources  generated  by  primary  successes  were  more  effective 
assets  for  mobilising  voters  than  for  persuading  the  professionals. 
Thus  in  1968,  McCarthy's  early  primary  successes  produced  few  resources 
which  retained  their  value  when  translated  into  campaigns  in  non- 
primary  processes.  Moreover,  the  insulation  of  party  processes  from 
participation  by  voters  allowed  the  leaders  to  pursue  their  own 
candidate  preferences  largely  unchallenged  from  outside  (although  such 
a-course  risked  losing  the  election).  In  1964  active  campaigns  in 
non-primary  states  secured  the  selection  of  dedicated  Goldwater  supporters 
whilst  the  primaries  were  evidencing  the  candidate's  lack  of  appeal. 
to  Republican  voters. 
Traditionally,  the  conclusion  of  the  primaries  was  the  earliest -  268  - 
point  for  their  results  to  have  an  impact  upon  party  processes.  In 
part,  this  followed  from  the  chronology  of  delegate  selection.  Many 
state  processes  were  completed  after  the  primaries.  Only  at  the  time 
of  their  selection,  or  subsequent  to  it,  did  non-primary  national 
convention  delegates  register  their  candidate  preferences.  More 
significantly,  the  influence  of  the  primaries  was  normally  conditional 
on  their  providing  clear  evidence  of  electability  in  the  form  of  an 
uninterrupted  series  of  victories  by  one  candidate.  Their  potential 
for  influence  could  only  be  realised  when  the  series  was  completed. 
Thus  it  was  not  until  after  the  last  contested  primaries,  West  Virginia 
in  1960  and  Oregon  in  1968,  that  Kennedy  and  Nixon  respectively  could 
employ  their  results  to  prevail  upon  the  party  leaders  in  non-primary 
states. 
Before  reform  the  conclusion  of  the  primaries  was  only  potentially 
a  period  in  which  their  influence  could  be  registered  in  the  non- 
primary  process,  subsequently  their  impact  at  that  stage  was  actual. 
As  the  primaries  grew  as  a  source  of  delegates,  more  candidates  entered 
them  providing  them  with  a  decisive  role  in  winnowing  the  alternatives 
available  to  caucus  delegates.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  post-reform 
primaries  the  range  of  candidates  had  narrowed  substantially  since 
New  Hampshire.  In  the  pre-reform  period,  in  contrast,  the  primaries 
performed  a  smaller  role  in  clarifying  the  alternatives  because  many 
candidates  avoided  them  thereby  remaining  in  active  contention  for 
the  nomination.  In  1960,  for  example,  the  range  of  choice  amongst  major 
candidates  was  wider  for  the  delegates  to  the  Democratic  national 
convention  than  it  had  been  for  the  voters  in  the  party's  primaries. 
By  reducing  the  range  of  plausible  nominees  the  post-reform 
primaries  focused  the  preferences  of  non-primary  delegates.  Many 
candidacies  were  defunct  by  the  end  of  the  primaries,  not  all  of  the -  269  - 
survivors  had  a  realistic  prospect  of  the  nomination  and  some  candi- 
dates,  recognising  the  inevitable,  released  their  delegates.  (For 
example,  in  1976,  Harris  and  Shriver  withdrew  during  the  primaries. 
Udall  remained  a  candidate  in  the  convention  but  was  no  longer  a 
plausible  nominee.  Wallace,  Jackson  and  Church,  recognising  Carter's 
unsurmountable  lead  at  the  end  of  the  primaries,  released  their 
delegates.  )  Thus  for  the  uncommitted  delegates  or  the  supporters 
of  failed  candidates  the  choice  was  small  at  the  end  of  the  primaries. 
They  could  switch  either  to  the  'winner'  of  the  primaries  or  they 
could  vote  for  a  candidate  unlikely  to  win  the  nomination.  For  all 
but  the  most  cause-oriented  delegates  the  shift  was  likely  to  be 
towards  the  primary  winner.  Table  7.2  evidences  this  trend  working 
in  favour  of  Carter  and  Ford  in  1976.  This  trend  reached  its  con- 
clusion  in  the  1980  Republican  contest.  The  attrition  of  candidates 
produced  by  the  primaries  left  only  Reagan  in  contention,  effectively 
denying  a  choice  to  participants  in  the  later  stages  of  the  caucus 
processes. 
When  reform  made  voters  the  decisive  influence  in  both  primary  and 
non-primary  processes  the  responsiveness  of  the  two  systems  to  each 
other  increased.  Formerly  the  relationship  of  the  party  processes 
to  the  primaries  was  regulated  by  party  leaders'  definitions  of 
acceptability  which  (as  Theodore  Roosevelt,  Kefauver  and  McCarthy 
exemplified)  was  not  equivalent  to  a  test  of  electability.  Since 
reform  the  removal  of  the  leaders'  gatekeeper  role  ensured  that  the 
primaries  were  both  receptive  to  influence  by  and  an  influence  upon 
the  preferences  of  caucus  participants. 
Following  reform  the  non-primary  process  ceased  to  be  the  citadel 
of  party  insiders  immune  -  if  the  leaders  chose  -  to  the  popular 
pressure  of  the  primaries.  Success  in  the  latter  process  was  no -  270  - 
TABLE  7.2 
SHIFT  IN  PREFERENCES  OF  NON-PRIMARY  STATE' 
DELEGATES  FOLLOWING  PRIMARIES,  1976 
Candidate  Delegate  Preference  by  Stage  of  Nominating  Process 
Completion  of  Delegate  National  Convention  Vote 
Selection 
Carter*  34.1%  71.0% 
Udall  12.6  14.5 
Brown  1.3  6.8 
Others  19.3  7.6 
Uncommitted  32.7  0.1  (NV) 
Total  100.0  100.0 
Ford*  33.1  43.6 
Reagan  50.8  56.4 
Uncommitted  16.1  0 
Total  100.0  100.0 
*Candidate  winning  most  primary  delegates. 
NV  =  not  voting. 
longer  dependent  upon  party  leaders  for  translation  into  success  in 
the  former.  In  consequence,  the  pre-reform  cleavage  in  candidates' 
delegate  strength  in  the  two  processes  narrowed  and  nominees  tended 
to  be  favoured  more  by  primary  than  non-primary  delegates  reversing 
the  pre-reform  pattern.  (See  Table  7.3.  )  In  the  post-reform  period 
most  candidates  produced  an  integrated  strategy  for  primary  and  non- 
primary  processes. -  271  - 
TABLE  7.3 
NATIONAL  CONVENTION  VOTES  FOR  CANDIDATES 
BY  METHOD  OF  DELEGATE  SELECTION,  1960-1980 
Year  Candidate  Delegate  Selection 
Primary*  Non-Primary  Difference,  Non- 
Primary-Primary 
1960(D)  J.  Kennedy  72.0%  35.6%  -36.4% 
Johnson  5.9  46.1  +40.2 
1964(R)  Goldwater  59.2  75.3  +16.1 
Scranton  22.7  9.9  -12.8 
1968(D)  Humphrey  53.4  80.1  +26.7 
McCarthy  34.4  12.1  -22.3 
1968(R)  Nixon  42.8  59.4  +16.6 
Rockefeller  29.1  13.3  -15.8 
Total  Difference  1960  -  1968  +12.3 
1972  McGovern  64.9  41.0  -"23.9 
Jackson  11.5  30.0  +18.5 
1976(D)  Carter  75.1  72.2  -  2.9 
Udall  10.0  13.9  +  3.9 
1976(R)  Ford  55.9  44.9  -11.0 
Reagan  43.9  55.1  +11.2 
1980(D)  Carter  61.0  70.9  +  9.9 
E.  Kennedy  38.5  24.5  -14.0 
Total  Difference  1972  -  1980  -  8.3 
*  Includes  some  states  combining  delegate  selection  methods  with 
primaries  providing  a  majority  of  the  delegation. 
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Strategy  and  Power  in  the  Non-Primary  Process 
Before  reform  there  were  different  loci  of  power  in  the  two 
delegate  selection  systems  requiring  distinct  strategies  to  influence 
them.  Non-primary  selection  was  controlled  by  party  organisations. 
Accordingly  the  candidates  adapted  their  strategies  to  the  function- 
ing  of  the  organisations  they  were  seeking  to  court.  Thus  campaigns 
were  conditioned  by  demands  and  influences  integral  to  the  function- 
ing  of  the  parties  as  organisations.  These  conditions  included  - 
1.  The  distribution  of  power  within  the  parties  was  reflected  in 
the  selection  of  delegates. 
2.  Participation  in  the  selection  process  was  generally  limited  to 
party  professionals. 
3.  The  award  of  delegate  status  was  an  incentive  contributing  to 
organisation  maintenance. 
4.  As  politicians,  the  delegates'  behaviour  was  directed  towards 
maximising  their  own,  their  party's  or  their  leaders'  influence 
over  the  nomination. 
Effective  campaigns  for  non-primary  delegates  before  reform  were 
dependent  upon  an  understanding  of  the  power  relations  within  the 
party  organisations  controlling  selection.  The  extensive  travelling 
undertaken  by  prospective  candidates  and  their  aides  prior  to  the 
election  year  generated  a  body  of  intelligence  identifying  the  influ- 
entials  within  the  parties  from  which  delegates  would  be  sought.  For 
example,  from  1956  onwards  the  Kennedys  set  out'to  learn  who  the 
people  were  -  the  right  people. 
30 
Establishing  who  the  "right 
people"  were  differentiated  between  "those  who  were  party  leaders  in 
name  and  those  who  actually  spoke  for  delegates.  "31  The  objective  of 
such  pre-election  year  preparation  was  to  provide  the  answers  to  what 
Theodore  White  described  as  "the  root  question  of  American  politics 
...  who's  the  Man  to  see?  "32  Only  after  power  had  been  located  could -  273  - 
it  be  co-opted. 
Candidates  lacking  current  political  intelligence  were  disadvan- 
taged  by  their  ignorance  of  the  informal  power  structures  of  the 
organisations  they  were  striving  to  influence.  When  the  former  direc- 
tor  of  the  Draft  Goldwater  Committee  assumed  control  of  Reagan's 
campaign  in  1968  he  found  that:  "Power  structures  had  changed,  and 
in  some  cases  the  ins  of  1964  had  become  the  outs,.  "33  Similarly, 
Robert  Kennedy's  hurriedly-assembled  campaign  was  compelled  to  rely 
on  the  Kennedy  organisation  established  for  1960.  In  the  interim  the 
effectiveness  within  the  parties  of  many  of  its  members  had  declined. 
34 
The  attempts  of  the  Republican  'establishment'  to  prevent  Goldwater's 
nomination  were  afflicted  by  the  redistribution  of  power  within  the 
party  wrought  by  three  years  of  conservative  invasion.  35 
Lodge, 
returning  from  Vietnam  to  campaign  for  Scranton,  perceived  the 
party's  transformation:  "What  in  God's  name  has  happened  to  the 
Republican  Party?  I  hardly  know  any  of  these  people  1,, 
36 
Johnson's  1960  campaign  was  based  not  on  out-dated  information 
but  unsupported  assumptions  that  members  of  Congress  were  influential 
within  their  state  parties.  On  this  assumption,  the  influence  that 
Johnson  and  Rayburn,  his  campaign  manager,  exerted  in  Congress  could 
be  translated  into  convention  delegates. 
37 
But  their  assumption  was 
suspect  for  few  congressmen  possessed  sufficient  home-state  influence 
to  deliver  delegates:  "Reliance  on  the  wrong  political  figures  was 
endemic  . 
38 
When  reform  facilitated  increased  voter  participation  in  caucuses 
the  significance  of  the  internal  distribution  of  power  in  the  parties 
diminished  as  an  influence  on  non-primary  outcomes.  Few  modern  party 
organisations  were  capable  of  generating  the  numbers  necessary  to 
resist  the  post-reform  influx  of  candidate  supporters  in  caucuses. -  274  - 
In  consequence,  identifying  and  courting  party  notables  depreciated 
in  value  as  an  investment  of  campaign  effort. 
Candidate  organising  in  caucus  states  could  by-pass  the  party 
influentials  or,  at  least,  extend  beyond  them.  Carter  rose  to  national 
prominence  in  1976  after  his  'victory'  (a  plurality  of  delegates  were 
uncommitted)  in  the  Iowa  precinct  caucuses,  a  year  after  the  state 
party  chairman  advised  the  campaign  organisation  to  avoid  the  state 
as  unfavourable  territory. 
39 
Within  the  campaign  organisation  Iowa 
was  considered  propitious  because  its  voters  seemed  potential  Carter 
supporters: 
"If  you  looked  at  the  state  -  who  the  people  are,  what 
they  do,  what  they  think  -  it's  not  a  bad  state  at  all 
for  a  candidate  like  Jimmy  Carter.  ' 
Campaigning  amongst  the  voters  the  candidate  himself  also  recognised 
the  state's  potential  for  a  Carter  victory  - 
"I  found  a  lot  of  people  who  were  interested  in  me.  And 
we  began  going  from  one  living  room  to  another,  from  one 
labor  hall  to  another,  from  one  livestock  feed  hall  to 
another.  " 
41 
Numbers  rather  than  notables  provided  power  in  post-reform  caucuses. 
As  candidate  organisations  proved  more  effective  mobilisers  of  voters 
than  party  notables  so  the  principal  question  of  non-primary  campaign- 
ing  was  less  "Who  is  the  Man  to  see?  "  than  "How  Many?  ". 
The  pre-reform  emphasis  upon  notables  derived  from  the  distribution 
of  power  within  the  party  organisations  which  controlled  the  delegate 
selection  process: 
"American  party  organisations  are  centralised  at  state  and 
local  levels.  This  means  that  such  hierarchical  controls 
as  actually  exist  on  the  state  and  local  levels  will 
assert  themselves  in  the  national  convention.  '.  '42 
Whilst  there  were  disparities  between  the  formal  and  informal  distri- 
bution  of  power,  elected  chief  executives  were  customarily  the  most 
powerful  figures  at  each  level  of  government.  Through  their  use  of -  275  - 
patronage  and  the  influence  derived  from  public  popularity  chief 
executives  were  often  also  powers  within  their  parties.  In  consequence, 
convention  delegations  were  often  dominated  by  elected  chief  executives. 
Writing  in  the  early  1960's,  Polsby  and  Wildavsky  noted: 
"Since  the  probabilities  are  fairly  good  that  both  major 
parties  at  any  given  time  will  have  succeeded  in  electing 
a  substantial  number  of  governors  and  mayors  of  important 
cities,  the  chances  are  fairly  good  that  a  substantial 
number  of  delegates  will  be  controlled  hierarchically.  "k3 
Within  the  state  party,  the  unit  represented  at  the  national  convention, 
the  governor  was  normally  the  major  influence  on  the  delegation.  He 
was  involved  in  both  deciding  the  delegation's  composition  and  its 
candidate  preference.  Given  the  prevalence  of  governors  in  state 
party  affairs  their  disposition  was  a  central  strategic  concern  of 
candidates  seeking  delegates  in  non-primary  processes.  Detailed 
campaign  planning  generally  awaited  the  outcome  of  the  mid-term 
elections  which  determined  many  of  the  probable  principals  in  the 
subsequent  nominating  contest.  A  prolonged  campaign,  such  as  John 
Kennedy's,  sought  to  influence  the  balances  of  forces  in  its  favour 
by  campaigning  for  sympathisers  amongst  the  gubernatorial  candidates 
at  mid-tem. 
44 
The  significance  of  governors  to  campaign  planning  was  acknow- 
ledged,  in  some  cases,  by  incorporating  their  number  and  disposition 
into  the  premises  on  which  candidacies  were  based.  Following  Johnson's 
withdrawal  in  1968,  Humphrey  delayed  becoming  a  candidate  until  he 
had  ascertained  the  opinions  of  "certain  key  governors  and  state 
chairmen". 
45 
Rockefeller's  decisions  not  to  seek  the  nomination  in 
both  1960  and  1968  (the  latter  later  revoked)  were  explained  by  refer- 
ence  to  his  lack  of  support  amongst  the  party  hierarchy.  In  1960 
"the  great  majority  of  those  who  control  the  Republican  convention" 
were  said  to  be  opposed  to  a  contest  for  the  nomination. 
46, 
In  1968 -  276  - 
"a  considerable  majority  of  the  party's  leaders"  were  claimed  to  be 
both  Nixon  supporters  and  opponents  of  a  divisive  contest  for  the 
nomination. 
47 
Where  a  party  held  few  state  houses  the  incidence  of  hierarchical 
control  over  delegations  diminished,  creating  opportunities  for  candi- 
dates  with  little  support  amongst  the  party  leaders.  The  paucity  of 
Republican  chief  executives  at  both  city  and  state  level  restricted 
the  number  of  hierarchically  controlled  delegations  anticipated  in 
1964.  Hence  the  prospects  of  nominating  a  conservative  candidate 
were  enhanced  by  the  narrow  base  of  the  moderates  traditionally  prom- 
inent  in  the  Republican  hierarchy.  As  the  Goldwater  strategists  per- 
ceived,  the  party  was  "ripe  for  revolt.  "  48 
In  recognition  of  the  prevalence  of  hierarchical  control  campaigns 
for  non-primary  delegates  were  leader-oriented  and  -directed.  To 
win  delegates  candidates  negotiated  with  leaders  employing  appeals, 
understandings  and  deals  to  secure  their  support. 
A  candidate's  electability  appealed  to  the  leaders  as  means  of 
enhancing  the  party's  access  to  power  both  locally  and  nationally. 
A  candidate's  party  regularity  promised  a  president  who  would  work 
with  the  leaders  and  protect  the  local  parties  from  takeover  by  the 
supporters  of  an  unacceptable  insurgent  such  as  McCarthy.  A 
candidate  who  could  effectively  unite  the  two  appeals  of  electability 
and  party  regularity  -  Nixon,  John  Kennedy  -  was  persuasive  amongst 
the  leaders. 
Deals  and  understandings  were  the  currency  used  by  candidates  to 
gain  the  support  of  particular  leaders.  They  provided  the  promise  of 
mutual  gain  to  both  leader  and  candidate:  of  material  or  purposive 
benefits  to  the  leader,  of  delegate  votes  {and  potentially  the  nomin- 
ation)  for  the  candidate.  Several  Protestant  midwestern  governors -  277  - 
were  reminded  in  1960  by  the  Kennedy  campaign  that  their  support  would 
be  remembered  by  a  candidate  cognisant  of  the  need  to  balance  a  ticket 
headed  by  an  eastern  Catholic. 
49 
Assurances  on  defence  policy  and 
the  acceptability  of  the  Vice  Presidential  nominee  to  the  South  were 
provided  by  Nixon  to  Strom  Thurmond,  the  pivot  of  his  support  in  the 
region  in  1968.50  Less  specific  prospects  of  access  provided  the 
rationale  for  one  of  Robert  Kennedy's  few  supporters  amongst  the 
Texas  notables:  "if  he's  elected,  anyone  from  Texas  will  need  a  pass 
to  get  into  Washington,  and  I'm  going  to  be  the  man  handing  out  the 
passes  ;  X51 
Where  the  support  of  party  leaders  could  be  co-opted,  campaign 
organisation  was  directed  from  the  top  downwards.  Sympathetic  leaders 
assumed  control  of  the  candidate's  interests  in  the  state  and  sought  to 
rally  their  followers  to  acgdesce  to  their  preference.  The  description 
of  the  Humphrey  campaign's  efforts  to  mobilise  support  in  1968  is  a 
descent  through  the  party  hierarchy  - 
"If  there  was  a  Democratic  governor  or  lieutenant  governor 
who  might  be  for  us,  we  started  with  him.  If  there  was  no 
one  in  the  statehouse  we  tried  the  mayors,  and  if  there 
was  no  one  in  City  Hall,  we  tried  union  halls.  "52 
The  corollary  of  the  reliance  on  leaders  was  the  relative  inattention 
devoted  to  organising  at  lower  levels  of  the  party.  John  Kennedy's 
campaign  emphases  were  "more  on  Democrats  than  on  the  general  public, 
more  on  party  leaders  than  on  party  members.  "53  Nixon's  southern 
strategy  for  the  1968  nomination  was  conducted  entirely  through 
Thurmond  and  the  state  party  chairmen. 
54 
Enhanced  voter  participation  in  the  non-primary  process  following 
reform  diminished  the  relevance  of  hierarchical  party  power  structures 
in  determining  the  composition  and  preferences  of  delegations.  As 
participation  grew,  stimulated  by  the  organising  efforts  of  candidates, 
the  control  of  the  leaders  and  their  followers  declined. -  278  - 
After  reform  campaigns  in  caucus  states  became  both  voter- 
directed  and  -oriented.  Party  leaders  were  less  effective  mobilisers 
than  citizen-based  campaign  organisations  in  producing  the  support 
in  numbers  required  to  control  caucuses.  Those  post-reform  candidates 
who  employed  the  traditional  method  of  relying  on  the  leaders  -  Muskie 
and  Humphrey  in  1972,  Ford  in  1976  -  were  unable  to  assert  the 
control  formerly  guaranteed  by  such  strategies. 
Amongst  voters  the  candidates  and  causes  of  the  election  years 
provided  a  stronger  impetus  to  participate  than  loyalty  to  the  party 
organisation.  Where  the  test  was  "numbers  who  will  come  to  a  particu- 
lar  meeting  rather  than  present  party  position  or  past  service,  the 
activist  surge  is  bound  to  carry  the  day  .,, 
55 
Formerly  the  party 
1from 
organisation's  dominance  derived  procedural  control  and  low  voter 
participation  (resulting  from  closed  processes  and  a  lack  of  organised 
encouragement).  When  reform  produced  open  publicised  caucuses  the 
parties'  advantages  diminished  exposing  their  vulnerability  in  numbers. 
Richard  Stearns,  McGovern's  caucus  state  organiser,  noted  the  weakness 
of  the  resistance  to  invasion  by  candidate  supporters  in  1972:  "we 
were  running  against  an  assumption  that  there  was  more  party  organis- 
ation  than  ever  existed.  "56 
In  1976  President  Ford  commanded  the  loyalties  of  a  Republican 
leadership  that  could  not  command  the  loyalties  of  a  majority  of  caucus 
participants. 
57 
Reagan's  non-primary  campaign,  unlike  Ford's,  derived 
its  effectiveness  from  strength  at  the  base.  In  Missouri  where  Ford 
was  supported  by  Governor  Kit  Bond,  "their  [Reagan's]  foot  soldiers 
outhustled  our  generals  ., 
58 
In  New  Mexico  both  U.  S.  senators  were 
Ford  loyalists  but,  as  the  President  later  perceived,  the  Reagan 
campaign  "built  support  from  the  bottom  up  and  just  wiped  us  out.  "59 
For  leadership  support  to  become  a  campaign  deficiency,  as  it  was -  279  - 
in  1976  for  Ford,  marks  a  transformation  of  the  source  of  power  in 
the  non-primary  process.  An  illustration  drawn  from  1968  aptly 
captures  the  magnitude  of  the  change.  Explaining  the  uncharacteristic 
defeat  of  the  Humphrey  forces  in  the  Iowa  state  convention,  Senator 
Walter  Mar-dale,  one  of  the  campaign's  national  chairmen,  attributed  the 
setback  to  the  fact  that:  "There  wasn't  a  single  person  of  any  impor- 
tance  working  for  us  . 
'60 
Campaigns  oriented  towards  party  leaders  followed  from  the  assump- 
tion  of  widespread  hierarchical  control.  A  leader's  support  translated 
into  that  of  all  or  most  of  his  delegation.  Tables  7.4  and  7.5,  using 
governors  as  equivalent  to  party  leaders,  demonstrate  that  the 
validity  of  this  assumption  diminished  after  reform..  (The  tables 
omit  the  1976  Democratic  contest  because  a  vast  majority  of  the  party's 
governors  eventually  endorsed  Carter  to  unite  the  party  prior  to  the 
convention.  )  Before  reform  a  governor's  endorsement  was  a  major 
asset  in  winning  the  support  of  his  delegation.  After  reform  its 
value  depreciated..  McGovern's  performance  in  states  where  the  leaders 
were  committed  to  other  candidates  was  only  slightly  below  his  showing 
generally.  Without  the  support  of  a  single  governor  he  won  a  plurality 
of  the  non-primary  delegates  and  a  larger  proportion  of  the  total  than 
John  Kennedy  who  received  endorsements  from  seven  governors.  In  1976 
Ford  was  marginally  assisted  by  gubernatorial  support  compared  with 
his  overall  performance  but  he  was  also  the  first  nominee  in  the  period 
since  1960  to  fail  to  win  a  majority  of  the  votes  from  states  where 
he  possessed  leadership  support.  In  retrospect  Ford  appreciated 
that  "We  had  most  of  the  generals  on  our  side.  But  Reagan  had  many 
￿61  of  the  troops. 
The  trend  towards  quadrennial  mid-term  gubernatorial  elections 
may  have  lessened  the  incentives  for  governors  to  support  popular -  280  - 
TABLE  7.4 
NON-PRIMARY  DELEGATIONS'  SUPPORT  FOR  CANDIDATES 
ENDORSED  BY  THEIR  GOVERNORS,  NATIONAL  CONVENTIONS  1960-1980 
Year  Endorsements  by  Governors  Majority  of  Delegation  Followed 
Governor's  Endorsement 
No.  No.  % 
1960(D)  13  11  84.6% 
1964(R)  7  5  71.4 
1968(D)  12  9  75.0 
1968(R)  12  10  83.3 
1972(D)  8  2  25.0 
1976(R)  7  4  57.1 
1980(D)  7  5  71.4 
TABLE  7.5 
VOTES  OF  NON-PRIMARY  DELEGATES  FOR  NOMINEES, 
NATIONAL  CONVENTIONS  1960-1980 
Year  Delegations  where  Delegations  where  All  Non-Primary 
Governors  endorsed  Governors  endorsed  Delegates 
Nominee  Other  Candidates 
1960  (D)  59.8%  3.5%  35!,,  6% 
1964  (R)  100.0  44.0  75.3 
1968(D)  93.7  41.4  80.1 
1968(R)  75.0  28.0  59.4 
1972(D)  *  32.7  41.0 
1976(R)  47.1  25.0  44+.  9 
1980(D)  78.3  50.0  70.9 
*  No  governor  of  a  non-primary  state  endorsed  McGovern. -  281  - 
candidates  to  enhance  their  own  prospects  of  re-election,  as  Polsby 
and  Wildavsky  have  argued. 
62 
However,  this  development  alone  does 
not  account  for  the  recent  decline  in  the  incidence  of  hierarchically 
controlled  delegations.  Rather,  it  is  the  reform-induced  restrictions 
on  party  organisational  control  of  delegate  selection  that  has  reduced 
the  possibilities  for  'bossed'  delegations. 
In  1976  every  Republican  governor  of  a  non-primary  state  (and 
all  but  one  from  the  primary  states)  endorsed  either  Ford  or  Reagan. 
Yet,  according  to  Polsby  and  Wildavsky,  it  is  in  the  Republican  Party 
that  changing  electoral  dates  has  most  depressed  the  incentives  for 
governors  to  make  candidate  commitments.  The  evidence  of  1976 
suggests  no  shortage  of  commitments  but  -  as  the  tables  presented 
above  exemplify  -a  greatly  reduced  ability  to  deliver  on  them. 
In  the  states  where  governors  supported  Ford,  Reagan  won  a  majority 
of  the  delegates.  Failure  to  deliver  support  created  disincentives 
for  future  governors  to  avoid  the  prospect  of  embarrassment  by  avoiding 
commitments.  Democratic  governors  in  1976  evidenced  considerable 
caution  in  making  endorsements  early  in  the  nominating  process 
following  Muskie's  defeat  four  years  before  despite  extensive  support 
amongst  party  leaders.  Where  candidate  preference  was  the  principal 
criterion  of  selection,  leaders  committed  to  candidates  lacking  the 
support  of  voters  in  caucuses  risked  the  damage  to  prestige  of  even 
being  defeated  in  their  own  attempts  to  become  convention  delegates. 
The  corollary  of  the  decline  of  leadership  influence  in  the  non- 
primary  process  was  a  switch  by  candidates  to  voter-oriented  campaigns. 
Owing  to  the  complex  and  time-consuming  nature  of  caucus  participation 
campaigns  concentrated  upon  the  most  committed  voters.  Through 
association  with  issues,  interest  groups  or  personal  contact  with 
voters  candidates  sought  to  elicit  active  support.  For  candidates -  282  - 
such  as  McGovern  and  Reagan  distinctive  issue  positions  provided 
natural  constituencies  amongst  liberal  and  conservative  activists 
respectively.  Shriver  and  Bayh  sought  to  ally  themselves  with 
demographic  or  cause  groups  -  blacks,  Catholics,  labour  unions  - 
thereby  co-opting  their  support.  Carter,  a  lesser  known  candidate, 
employing  less  emphasis  on  issues,  engaged  in  extensive  'retail' 
campaigning  creating  bonds  between  himself  and  individual  voters 
which  transcended  ideological  divisions. 
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Once  support  has  been 
established  the  campaign  task  immediately  before  the  caucuses  was 
to  activate  it  - 
"The  goal  of  organisation  in  non-primary  states  differs 
from  primary  states  in  that  the  chief  concern  is  not  to 
persuade  voters  to  accept  a  particular  candidate,  but 
to  persuade  voters  to  spend  time  and  energy  in  supporting 
a  candidate  they  probably  already  prefer.  This  means 
that  organisations  must  concentrate  on  identifying  and 
1  mobilising  supporters  rather  than  enlisting  new  ones.  " 
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Success  in  caucuses  dominated  by  voters  derived  from  the  early 
establishment  of  committed  support  and  subsequent  organisational 
proficiency  in  generating  turnout  (the  latter  assisted  by  success 
in  primaries).  These  imperatives  stand  in  contrast  to  the  pre-reform 
requirement  of  acceptability  to  party  leaders.  Motivated  by  personal 
and  party  concerns,  the  leaders  sought  an  electable  party  regular  on 
whom  they  had  claims  of  access.  Since  reform  voter  concerns  supplanted 
those  of  leaders  which,  in  consequence,  receded  as  influence3determining 
candidate  support  in  the  non-primary  process. 
Having  no  attachment  to  the  party  as  an  organisation,  voters  were 
motivated  by  issue,  group  or  personality  appeals.  They  were  less 
concerned  with  the  personal  or  organisational  interests  espoused  by 
leaders.  Electability,  party  regularity  and  promise  of  recompense  for 
support  were,  therefore,  no  longer  guarantees  of  delegates  since  reform. 
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The  significance  of  organisational  proficiency  for  success  in -  283  - 
post-reform  cuacuses  doubly  removed  their  results  from  tests  of 
electability.  Not  only  were  voters  less  motivated  to  support 
candidates  by  their  electoral  potential  than  party  professionals, 
but  variation  in  the  organisational  skills  of  the  campaign  groups 
produced  caucus  electorates  unrepresentative  of  the  preferences  of 
the  party's  identifiers.  Richard  Stearns,  McGovern's  non-primary 
state  organiser,  explained  the  contrast  between  the  candidate's 
strength  in  caucuses  and  weakness  amongst  voters  as  a  whole:  "we  won 
them  by  coup  d'etat  not  popularity.  , 
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The  disparity  between  the  tests  of  electability  and  organisational 
proficiency  was  exemplified  by  McGovern's  performance  in  the  South  in 
1972.  In  three  southern  presidential  primaries  Wallace  won  73  per  cent 
of  the  delegates  to  McGovern's  five  per  cent. 
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However,  in 
caucuses  McGovern's  superiority  in  organisation  contrasted  with  the 
Wallace  campaign's  incomprehension  of  the  prerequisites  of  non-primary 
success  after  reform. 
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In  consequence,  McGovern  won  a  plurality  of 
the  southern  caucus  delegates  to  Wallace's  15  per  cent.  Yet  in  the 
presidential  election  McGovern's  weakness  among  southern  voters  was 
demonstrated  by  his  securing  there  the  lowest  proportion  of  the  popular 
vote  of  any  Democratic  presidential  candidate  in  the  twentiety  century 
despite  the  absence  of  a  regional  third  party  candidate  in  1972.  A 
Texas  party  leader  in  noting  McGovern's  strength  at  the  state  conven- 
tion,  made  the  prescient  observation:  "He'd  run  about  as  well  down 
here  as  Mao  Tse-tung  . 
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Traditionally  the  leaders  control  over  non-primary  delegates 
ensured  the  nomination  of  a  party  regular.  Insurgents  Theodore  Roosevelt 
and  Estes  Kefauver  were  able  to  win  primary  victories  but  could  not 
insinuate  their  popularity  amongst  voters  into  the  non-primary  process. 
In  the  immediate  pre-reform  period  party  outsiders  like  Rockefeller -  284  - 
(in  1964)  and  McCarthy  were  similarly  unable  to  mount  effective 
campaigns  for  delegates  without  leadership  support. 
After  reform  the  non-primary  process  ceased  to  be  a  preserve  of 
party  regulars  inhospitable  to  insurgents.  In  open  caucuses  candidate 
organisations  capable  of  mobilising  voters  gained  access  to  delegates 
irrespective  of  their  relations  with  party  leaders.  The  dissolution 
of  the  strategic  advantages  of  party  insiders  in  the  non-primary 
process  after  reform  is  demonstrated  in  Table  7.6,  comparing  the  vote 
of  non-primary  delegates  for  the  principal  party  insider  and  outsider 
in  national  conventions  from  1964  to  1980.  Party  insiders  from  1964 
to  1972  are  defined  by  their  leadership  of  polls  of  party  chairmen 
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(In  1972  Humphrey,  the  poll  leader,  withdrew  before  the  nominating 
ballot.  As  Jackson  inherited  much  of  Humphrey's  support  and  became 
the  rallying  point  for  leaders  engaged  in  a  stop-McGovern  effort  he 
is  treated  as  the  party  insider.  )  In  1976  and  1980  the  incumbent 
presidents  are  regarded  as  the  insiders  though  party  chairmen  polls 
were  unavailable.  Party  outsiders  are  distinguished  by  low  standing 
in  party  chairmen  polls  supported  by  an  impressionistic  judgement 
of  the  candidate  as  an  insurgent  (rather  than  simply  an  insider  with 
little  first-choice  support).  The  utility  of  the  definitions  applies 
only  to  the  election  year  concerned.  Where  an  insider-outsider  dist- 
inction  did  not  persist  to  the  nominating  ballot  the  year  is  omitted 
from  the  tabulation. 
In  the  post-reform  period  the  former  pattern  of  insider-monopoly, 
outsider-exclusion  was  disrupted.  Invasion-style  strategies  previously 
adopted  by  insurgents  proved  to  be  the  most  effective  means  of  winning 
delegates  where  earlier  they  were  employed  only  as  a  last,  and  usually 
unproductive,  resort.  Party  insiders  such  as  Muskie  and  Ford  who 
persisted  in  'lining'up'  the  leaders  found  the  return  in  delegates -  285  - 
TABLE  7.6 
NON-PRIMARY  DELEGATES'  SUPPORT  FOR  CANDIDATES 
BY  THEIR  RELATIONSHIP  TO.  THE  PARTY  ORGANISATIONS, 
NATIONAL  CONVENTIONS  1964-1980 
Year 
1964  (R) 
1968  (D) 
1968  (R) 
Candidate's  Relationship  to  Party  Organisations 
Insider  Outsider 
Goldwater  75.3  Scranton  9.9 
Humphrey  80.1 
Nixon  59.4 
McCarthy  12.1 
Rockefeller  13.3 
1972  (D)  Jackson  30.0  McGovern  41.0 
1976  (R)  Ford  44.9  Reagan  55.1 
1980  (D)  Carter  70.9  E.  Kennedy  24.5 
greatly  diminished  in  comparison  with  the  period  before  reform. 
Exceptional  for  an  incumbent  president,  Ford's  nomination  in 
1976  was  dependent  upon  success  in  primaries.  This  followed  not 
only  from  the  increase  in  delegates  chosen  in  primaries  but  also 
from  Ford's  weakness  in  caucus  states.  In  1912  Taft  was  nominated 
through  the  support  of  party  leaders  immune  to  the  influence  of 
popular  opinion  expressed  in  primaries.  (As  noted  in  the  previous 
chapter,  prior  to  his  withdrawal,  Johnson's  1968  strategy  for  renomin- 
ation  excluded  primaries.  )  Had  Ford  proved  slightly  less  effective 
in  the  primaries,  the  non-primary  states  would  have  ensured  his  defeat 
whereas  they  protected  Taft  from  it.  In  1976  an  incumbent  president's 
delegate  majority  was  drawn  disproportionately  from  the  selection 
mechanism  traditionally  the  resort  of  insurgents  (see  Table  7.3,  above). 
The  diminution  of  hierarchical  control  produced  an  atomised  dis- 
tribution  of  power  in  the  non-primary  process.  Where  once  power  was -  286  - 
concentrated  in  relatively  few  state  and  local  leaders,  after  reform 
it  was  disseminated  amongst  thousands  of  voters.  Before  reform  a 
small  number  of  leaders,  effectively,  were  the  "electorate"  in  the 
non-primary  process.  Campaigns  were  compelled  to  focus  on  the 
leaders  because  delegate  support  was  mediated  through  them. 
Since  reform  few  individuals,  either  party  or  interest  group 
leaders,  were  able  to  deliver  the  voters  in  numbers  which  control 
caucuses.  In  consequence,  their  bargaining  power  diminished  compared 
with  that  of  pre-reform  party  leaders.  Furthermore,  their  support 
was  no  longer  the  prerequisite  of  winning  delegates  producing  a  shift 
in  the  content  of  non-primary  campaigns.  Candidates  worked  to  build 
a  constituency  amongst  voters.  Campaign  appeals  were  directed  towards 
the  electorate  rather  than  the  leaders.  Where  non-primary  support 
was  formerly  determined  by  candidate-leader  relations,  after  reform 
it  was  decided  by  the  candidate's  appeal  to  voters. 
Delegate  Selection  as  a  Function  of  Organisation: 
From  Party  to  Candidate 
When  the  non-primary  process  was  conducted  within  the  party 
structures  delegate  selection  was  characteristic  of  a  hierarchically 
controlled  organisation  with  its  own  maintenance  demands. 
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Selection 
was  marked  by  the  absence  of  conflict  and  the  use  of  delegate  status 
as  a  reward  for  party  service. 
The  lack  of  contests  followed  from  the  fact  of  party  organisation 
control.  Leaders  sought  to  avoid  divisions  amongst  the  party  loyalists, 
candidates  sought  to  avoid  alienating  the  leaders  by  not  intervening 
in  the  selection  process  and  participation  from  outside  the  party 
was  low. 
By  delaying  the  entrance  of  candidate  preference  into  the  selection -  287  - 
process  a  possible  source  of  conflict  within  the  party  was  eschewed. 
Refuge  was  sought  in  holding  actions  either  by  supporting  a  favourite 
son  or  in  adopting  uncommitted  status.  Delay  allowed  the  competitive 
situation  between  the  candidates  to  clarify,  increasing  the  oppor- 
tunities  for  a  timely  commitment  of  support  and  enhancing  the  prospect 
of  negotiating  a  consensus  within  the  party. 
Active  candidate  involvement  attempting  to  influence  the  preference 
of  delegates  was  largely  delayed  until  after  they  were  selected. 
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The  parties  chose  who  the  delegates  would  be.  Then  the  candidate 
organisations  sought  to  influence  how  they  would  vote. 
The  combination  of  closed  selection  systems,  little  publicity  for 
those  processes  that  were  open  and  the  candidates'  sensitivity  to  the 
leaders'  desire  for  harmony  within  the  party  discouraged  voter  parti- 
cipation  in  the  pre-reform  selection  process.  Voters  seeking  to 
promote  the  cause  of  particular  candidates  were  hindered  by  the  problems 
of  access  to  the  process  and  the  lack  of  encouragement  from  campaign 
organisations  to  breach  party  control.  In  1968  estimates  of  partici=pation 
produce  an  average  of  three  thousand  citizens  per  Republican 
non-primary  state  and  approximately  5,400  on  the  Democratic  side,  the 
latter  notable  for  unusually  high  interest  in  caucus  participation 
generated  by  the  McCarthy  campaign. 
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Where  citizen  organisations  were  formed  to  promote  a  candidate's 
interests  in  a  non-primary  state  this  did  not  necessarily  entail  parti- 
cipation  in  the  delegate  selection  process.  Kennedy  for  President 
clubs  in  1960,  for  example,  were  employed  to  promote  an  impression  of 
widespread  public  support  for  the  candidate  and  lobby  leaders  influen- 
tial  in  choosing  delegations. 
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They  were  not  designed  to  generate 
voter  turnout  in  caucuses. 
The  restraints  on  participation  -  both  procedural  and  strategic  - -  288  - 
ensured  that  the  composition  of  delegations  was  determined  within  the 
party  organisations.  The  award  of  national  convention  delegate  status 
was  thus  available  for  promoting  the  maintenance  of  the  party.  Service 
to  the  party  was  rewarded  by  selection  as  a  delegate.  The  criterion 
for  selection  therefore  was  party  service  and  not  candidate  preference. 
A  member  of  the  New  York  Democratic  state  executive  committee  which 
chose  one-third  of  the  delegation  specified  the  determinants  of  choice 
in  1968: 
"By  and  large,  the  controlling  factors  in  the  selection  of 
at  large  delegates  have  not  changed.  The  telling  factor 
is  'what  have  you  done  for  me  lately'.  " 
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In  consequence,  the  great  majority  of  convention  delegates  were  finan- 
cial  contributors  to  the  party,  party  or  public  officials. 
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Though 
these  characteristics  were  common  to.  all  delegates,  the  turnover  between 
the  conventions  was  greatest  amongst  those  selected  by  party  processes 
(where  organisation  control  was  less  susceptibl&to  insurgent  dis- 
ruption  than  primaries)  indicating  an  attempt  to  circulate  rewards  within 
the  party. 
77  (The  Democrats'  fractionising  individual  votes  between 
several  delegates  achieved  the  same  objective  of  dispersing  rewards 
widely.  ) 
Presidential  preference,  prior  to  reform,  was  neither  a  necessary 
nor  sufficient  condition  for  selection  as  a  delegate  through  party 
processes.  For  example,  in  1960  party  leaders  in  New  Mexico  selected 
a  delegation  dominated  by  Johnson  supporters  although  the  state  con- 
vention  which  approved  them  was  overwhelmingly  pro-Kennedy.. 
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Candidate-related  criteria  were  subordinated  to  standards  of  party 
service  as  the  Democratic  state  chairman  of  New  York  explained  in 
1968: 
"If  I  ignored  the  people  who  have  helped  me  with  the  organ- 
isation  work  and  appointed  strangers  just  because  they're 
for  McCarthy,  I'd  have  a  revolution  on  my  hands.  " 
79 -  289  - 
Insurgent  candidates  unlikely  to  profit  from  the  traditional  pro- 
cedures  of  delegate  allocation  sought  to  elevate  presidential 
preference  into  the  determinative  condition  of  selection.  Thus 
the  McCarthy  campaign  in  New  York  argued  for  the  distribution  of 
at-large  delegates  chosen  by  the  state  committee  to  reflect  the  results 
of  the  primary  election  of  district  delegates  where  their  supporters 
captured  half  the  seats. 
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Where  extra-party  participation  was 
possible  the  mobilisation  of  candidate  supporters  was  employed  to 
displace  the  selection  priorities  of  the  party  organisations.  In 
consequence,  the  delegates  committed  to  an  insurgent  candidate  were 
themselves  likely  to  be  insurgents.  For  example,  the  McCarthy  cam- 
paign  successfully  challenged  party  organisation  states  in  some 
thirty  towns  in  Connecticut  providing  approximately  one-third  of 
the  delegates  to  the  state  convention. 
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The  insurgents  won  nine  of 
the  forty-four  places  on  the  delegation  to  the  national  convention. 
Of  those  delegates  for  whom  relevant  information  could  be  obtained, 
three-quarters  were  public,  party  or  labour  union  officials. 
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But 
the  McCarthy  delegates  included  only  one  local  office  holder  in  a 
contingent  which  included  a  theologian,  writer  Arthur  Miller  and 
actor  Paul  Newman. 
Successful  insurgent  challenges  disrupted  the  parties'  dominance 
of  delegate  selection.  But  constricting  the  organisation's  control 
of  distributable  rewards  enhanced  the  antagonism  of  the  professionals 
towards  insurgent  candidates.  A  U.  S.  Senator  encapsulated  the  pro- 
fessionals'  opposition  to  invasion  strategies  in  his  reproach  of  the 
McCarthy  organisation  in  1968:  "They  were  squeezing  off  mayors  with 
thirty  years  of  service  ...  It's  not  right.  And  what's  more,  McCarthy 
himself  knows  it's  not  right.  " 
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Surrendering  delegate  places  to 
candidate  supporters  impeded  the  performance  of  party  maintenance -  290  - 
functions.  Resisting  the  McCarthy  campaign's  claims  for  half  the 
at-large  delegates  in  New  York,  the  state  committee's  law  chairman 
observed: 
"I've  talked  with  three  or  four  very  decent  McCarthy 
adherents.  None  of  them  have  ever  contributed  over  two 
hundred  and  fifty  dollars  to  the  party.  I  respect 
their  intelligence,  their  sincerity,  their  integrity, 
but  you  can't  run  a  campaign  on  that+".  84 
Whilst  lack  of  entree  with  the  leaders  compelled  insurgents  to 
adopt  invasion  strategies,  their  application  further  enhanced  the 
opposition  within  the  party.  Courtship  of  the  leaders  was  unavailable 
and  invasion  was  counter-productive.  Thus  the  non-primary  process 
(and  therefore  the  nomination)  was  generally  impermeable  to  insurgent 
candidates  prior  to  reform. 
After  reform  there  was  a  marked  increase  in  the  numbers  partici- 
pating  in  the  non-primary  process, 
influx  of  candidate  enthusiasts. 
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traditionally  a  connotation  of  an 
The  post-reform  increases  were 
virtually  universal  where  formerly  voter  involvement  had  been  confined 
to  the  states  most  open  procedurally  and  to  particular  years  in  which 
candidates  such  as  McCarthy  or  Eisenhower  were  able  to  mobilise 
voter  support  in  caucuses. 
The  most  pronounced  increases  in  participation  occurred  in  those 
states  where  closed  processes  previously  excluded  direct  voter  parti- 
cipation.  in  the  election  year.  It  was  in  those,  states  that  campaigns 
had  encountered  the  greatest  problems  in  injecting  candidate  preference 
into  criteria  of  selection,  and  party  maintenance  functions  were  at 
their  most  salient  in  determining  the  delegation.  In  Louisiana  in  1968, 
for  example,  the  Democratic  Governor  -  elected  in  1966  -  chose  a 
delegation  "rife  with  nepotism  and  patronage.  , 
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Where  party  or  public  officials  were  exclusively  the  participants 
in'delegate  selection  their  selection  marked  the  last  point  directly -  291  - 
accessible  to  voters,  usually  two  or  four  years  previously.  As 
presidential  campaign  planning  generally  post-dated  the  mid-term 
elections,  party  or  public  offices  decided  then  or  at  the  preceding 
general  election  were  unlikely  to  be  related  to  presidential  preference. 
Elections  for  party  offices  such  as  precinct  committeemen  were  rarely 
contested. 
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Where  contests  took  place  they  usually  involved  isolated 
individuals  rather  than  organised  groups. 
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In  those  states  where  caucuses  were  formally  open  they  were  not 
necessarily  so  in  fact. 
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The  absence  of  formal  rules  provided  con- 
siderable  latitude  for  the  party  organisations  to  conduct  the  selection 
process  as  they  chose.  According  to  the  National  Municipal  League's 
survey  of  1964  procedures,  state  conventions  consisted  of  persons 
"who  said  they  had  been  delegated  by  county  conventions,  but  the 
realities  below  the  county  chairmen  are  highly  uncertain.  "90 
Before  reform  few  candidates  risked  antagonising  the  leaders  by 
engaging  in  the  selection  process  and  those  insurgents  who  attempted 
to  do  so  usually  found  procedures,  formally  or  in  fact,  resistant  to 
their  efforts.  The  restrictions  on  outside  participation  left  the 
organisation's  selection  criteria  largely  undisputed. 
After  reform  candidate  preference  became  the  raison  d'etre  of 
participation  in  the  non-primary  process.  Responding  to  the  post- 
reform  opportunities  for  winning  delegates  in  open  caucuses  and  the 
diminished  need  for  deference  to  the  imperatives  of  party  maintenance, 
candidates  sought  to  turnout  their  own  supporters  in  numbers  necessary 
to  dominate  caucuses.  Unlike  the  pre-reform  party  organisations,  the 
post-reform  candidate  organisations  concentrated  upon  securing  the 
selection  of  committed  delegates. 
The  contrast  in  the  rates  of  participation,  candidate  commitments 
and  influence  of  party  leaders  resulting  from  reform  is  illustrated  by -  292  - 
the  Louisiana  Democrats  experience  of  delegate  selection  in  1968 
(cited  earlier)  and  1972.  In  1968  the  Governor  selected  the  entire 
delegation  in  conformity  with  his  personal  and  party  priorities. 
In  1972  an  estimated  fifteen  thousand  voters  attended  the  represen- 
tative  district  caucuses. 
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The  forces  mobilising  voters  included 
the  party  organisation  but  also  numbered  the  McGovern  and  Wallace 
campaigns,  black  and  women's  groups. 
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As  no  group  was  able  to 
dominate  the  others,  delegate  selection  was  characterised  by  bargain- 
ing  between  them.  In  these  negotiations  the  party's  representatives 
suffered  from  an  unaccustomed  disadvantage.  Unable  to  control  the 
process,  the  organisation  was  handicapped  by  a  large  number  of  pre- 
vious  commitments  for  delegate  slots  which  precluded  compromises 
with  other  groups  which  thus  conceded  delegates  to  them. 
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The 
Governor  secured  selection  as  a  delegate  but  the  remainder  of  his 
slate  for  at-large  places  -  the  national  committeemen,  the  state 
president  of  the  AFL-CIO,  the  state  party  chairman  -  were  defeated 
by  three  black  candidates  supported  by  McGovern  and  black  groups. 
94 
At  the  completion  of  the  selection  process  only  a  third  of  the  delegates 
were  uncommitted. 
The  Timing  and  Magnitude  of  Delegate  Commitments 
When  the  nominating  process  was  dominated  by  party  leaders  they, 
as  politicians,  sought  to  enhance  their  own  political  power.  By 
maximising  their  influence  over  the  nominating  decision  leaders 
maximised  their  access  to  power  in  the  future  providing  their  candi- 
date  won  the  nomination  and  election.  Thus  both  sets  of  principals 
in  the  pre-reform  nominating  process  -  the  candidates  and  party 
leaders  -  were  engaged  in  a  quest  for  political  power. -  293  - 
Strategies  for  the  nomination  were  worked  out  in  an  environment 
in  which  many  of  the  party  leaders  the  candidates  sought  to  influence 
developed  power-seeking  plans  of  their  own.  Thus  deals,  understandings 
and  the  promise  of  re-election  through  a  strong  coat-tail  effect  were 
employed  to  induce  the  leaders'  support. 
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Access  to  power  was 
promised  in  order  to  gain  power.  To  maximise  their  claims  to 
access  the  leaders  sought  to  control  the  size  and  timing  of  their 
delegations'  commitment  to  candidates,  factors  in  some  primary  states 
regulated  by  law  and  the  party's  electorate. 
The  timing  of  commitments  emerged  from  the  interplay  between  the 
objectives  of  leader  and  candidate.  Active  candidates,  needing  to 
demonstrate  increasing  support  to  sustain  an  impression  of  growing 
strength,  sought  to  counter  the  leaders'  desire  for  delay  (choosing 
early  increased  the  probability  of  choosing  wrongly).  In  consequence, 
candidates  emphasised  the  incentives  to  early  support.  Kennedy's 
1960  campaign  recalled  Jim  Farley's  criteria  for  distributing  federal 
patronage  during  the  New  Deal  dependent  upon  support  for  Roosevelt 
before,  at  or  after  the  convention. 
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Deferring  commitments,  Sorensen 
argued  on  Robert  Kennedy's  behalf  in  1968,  risked  undermining  the  value 
of  a  delegation's  support  leading  to  a  denial  of  future  access:  "Those 
states  which  try  to  be  cute  by  not  supporting  a  candidate  can  only 
come  out  as  the  tail  of  the  dog.  u97 
Late-starting  or  inactive  candidates  sought  to  reinforce  the  leaders' 
predilection  for  delayed  commitment.  By  withholding  support  the 
front-runner  could  be  stalled  and  the  leaders'  influence,  by  initiating 
a  new  bandwagon  rather  than  joining  an  existing  one,  enhanced.  The 
night  of  Johnson's  withdrawal  in  1968,  Humphrey  aides  urged  party 
leaders  to  withstand  the  Kennedy  surge:  "We  couldn't  tell  them  we; 
were  running,  but  we  were  able  to  say  'Hold  off  a  bit  longer  and  you 
won't  be  sorry'.  "98 -  294  - 
United  delegations  maximised  states'  contributions  to  a  nomin- 
ating  majority  and  therefore  enhanced  their  leaders'  access  to 
subsequent  influence.  In  consequence,  bloc  voting  was  common  either 
through  use  of  the  unit  rule  or  informal  means  of  obtaining  cohesion. 
For  candidates,  the  translation  of  majority  support  into  a  bloc  vote 
provided  an  economical  method  of  acquiring  support.  John  Kennedy's 
campaign  outside  the  primaries  gave  highest  priority  to  non-southern 
states  employing  the  unit  rule. 
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Similarly,  the  delegations  which 
provided  the  focus  of  the  Reagan  campaign's  efforts  to  erode  Nixon's 
support  were  controlled  by  the  unit  rule. 
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After  reform  the  timing  and  solidity  of  delegation  commitments 
ceased  to  be  subject  to  strategic  manipulation  by  party  leaders. 
Voter  mobilising  efforts  by  candidate  organisations  displaced  the 
leaders  from  control  and,  therefore,  the  influence  of  their  objectives 
over  delegation  behaviour.  The  bulk  of  non-primary  participants  were 
candidate  supporters.  They  were  not  necessarily  attached  to  party 
organisations  freeing  them  from  obligations  to  leaders  nor,  as  only 
occasional  activists,  were  they  engaged  in  promoting  their  own  future 
political  influence.  Furthermore,  the  (Democratic)  reforms  prohibit- 
ing  the  unit  rule  and  mandating  proportional  representation  in  dele- 
gate  selection  reduced  the  prospects  for  converting  majority  support 
into  a  united  delegation. 
Prior  to  reform  the  strategic  concerns  of  both  leaders  and  candi- 
dates  separated  the  selection  of  delegates  from  their  expression  of 
presidential  preferences.  Early  leadership  commitments  might  precede 
delegate  selection  whilst  later  commitments  could  be  antecedent  to  it. 
After  reform  the  mobilisation  of  candidate  supporters  utilising  the 
provisions  for  expressions  of  preferences  combined  selection  of  dele- 
gates  with  their  candidate  commitment.  After  reform  the  public -  295  - 
registration  of  commitments  conformed  to  the  formal  stages  of  the 
selection  process,  not  the  strategic  judgement  of  candidates  and 
leaders. 
Following  from  the  pyramidal  nature  of  the  non-primary  process 
in  which  only  participation  at  the  base  could  guarantee  representation 
at  higher  levels,  candidate  organisations  were  stimulated  to  establish 
a  presence  at  first-level  caucuses.  Candidate  commitments  were  thus 
evident  from  the  earliest  stages  of  the  selection  process  where 
formerly  they  were  rarely  apparent  until  its  completion.  In  1976 
a  majority  of  delegates  chosen  at  Democratic  first-level  caucuses 
registered  presidential  preferences.  (Table  7.7  evidences  this 
development  by  expressing  the  ratio  of  committed/uncommitted  in  each 
state  in  terms  of  the  numbers  in  each  delegation  and  totalling  the 
results).  Owing  to  the  effects  of  the  operation  of  the  provisions 
for  proportional  representation  the  figures  provided  in  Table  7.7 
understate  the  true  numbers  expressing  candidate  preferences.  To 
secure  representation  to  next-level  caucuses  candidates  had  to  exceed 
a  specified  quota  of  votes  (established  by  Democratic  rules  at  a 
maximum  of  15  per  cent  in  1976).  Following  the  initial  vote  of  the 
caucus  the  groups  failing  to  obtain  the  quota  were  permitted  to 
caucus  again  and  the  allocation  of  delegates  determined  on  the  basis 
of  the  second  vote.  In  such  circumstances  the  uncommitted  bloc  was 
swollen  by  the  accretion  of  supporters  of  candidates  failing  to  pass 
the  threshold  on  the  first  vote.  In  addition,  uncommitted  status 
could  be  adopted  by  supporters  of  unannounced  or  unpopular  candidates 
as  a  means  of  preserving  their  involvement  in  the  process  without 
publicly  declaring  it.  (Supporters  of  Hubert  Humphrey  employed 
uncommitted  status  in  1976  awaiting  a  declaration  of  candidacy. 
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Thus  uncommitted  consisted  of  three  groups  -  supporters  of  losing -  296  - 
candidates,  covert  supporters  of  other  candidates  and  undecideds  - 
of  whom  only  the  latter  are  genuinely  without  a  presidential 
preference. 
Continued  campaigning  by  the  candidate  organisations  aided  by 
the  clarification  of  the  alternatives  provided  by  the  primaries 
diminished  the  uncommitted  delegate  component  as  the  caucus  process 
continued.  When  state  and  district  conventions  completed  the  selec- 
tion  process  a  substantial  majority  of  delegates  were  already  committed 
(precise  figures  for  1976  are  provided  in  Table  7.2,  above),  where 
previously  campaign  efforts  were  only  initiated  after  the  delegations 
were  chosen.  As  the  uncommitted  delegates  switched  progressively 
to  the  active  candidates  so  the  opportunities  for  late-starting 
candidates  receded. 
In  the  immediate  pre-reform  period  several  major  candidates  - 
Stevenson,  Scranton,  Rockefeller,  Humphrey  (the  latter  two  in  1968)  - 
were  active  only  after  the  selection  process  had  been  initiated  or 
even  after  it  had  been  completed.  Despite  their  late  entry  many 
delegates  were  accessible  to  them  because  commitments  were  deferred. 
In  1968  Humphrey  withheld  his  announcement  of  candidacy  for  four 
weeks  after  Johnson  withdrew,  six  weeks  after  the  New  Hampshire  primary. 
For  a  candidate  like  Humphrey,  favoured  within  the  party  organisations, 
there  was  no  necessity  to  engage  in  the  selection  of  delegates  to 
garner  support.  In  contrast,  Brown  and  Church  declared  their  candi- 
dacies  three  weeks  after  the  New  Hampshire  primary  in  1976.  By  that 
stage  the  selection  and,  concomitantly,  the  commitment  of  delegates 
had  commenced  in  eight  caucus  states  representing  two-fifths  of  the 
total  non-primary  vote  in  the  national  convention.  Furthermore, 
operating  Brown  and  Church  campaign  organisations  necessary  for  gener- 
ating  caucus  support  were  lacking  in  most  of  the  remaining  states. -  297  - 
Humphrey  could  depend  on  the  existing  party  structures  to  deliver 
support  so  that  four  days  after  his  announcement  he  was  accredited 
with  nine  hundred  delegates,  two-thirds  of  a  nominating  majority. 
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Brown  and  Church,  on  the  other  hand,  required  voter-oriented  campaign 
organisations  to  achieve  the  control  of  caucuses  which  translated 
into  delegates  in  the  post-reform  period.  Humphrey  was  the  over- 
whelming  preference  of  non-primary  delegates  in  1968,  Brown  and 
Church  could  make  only  a  negligible  impact  in  1976. 
TABLE  7.7 
PRESIDENTIAL  PREFERENCE  OF  DELEGATES  SELECTED 
AT  DEMOCRATIC  FIRST-LEVEL  CAUCUSES,  1976 
Candidate  Preference 
Presidential  Uncommitted  Total 
Candidate 
No.  of  delegates  375  298  673* 
Percentage  delegates  55.7  44.3  100.0 
*NA=  56  delegates 
The  earliness  of  commitment  in  the  post-reform  period  was 
concomitant  with  an  increase  in  the  rigidity  of  the  pledges  that 
were  made.  Though  not  enforced  by  legal  sanctions  caucus  commitments 
were  less  susceptible  to  conversion  than  formerly.  First,  delegates 
were  candidate  supporters  participating  to  promote  a  particular  candi- 
dacy.  Their  commitments  were  likely  to  be  more  intensely  felt  than  the 
pragmatic  choices  made  by  politicians.  Secondly,  from  1976  the 
Democratic  Party  rules  provided  candidates  with  a  right  of  veto  over 
delegates  running  in  their  name.  Defectors  could  be  removed  at  the 
candidate's  request  and  replaced  by  loyal  supporters.  In  effect, -  298  - 
caucuses  produced  mandated  delegates. 
Thus  after  reform  candidates  failing  to  have  their  own  supporters 
selected  had  no  plausible  means  of  access  to  large  numbers  of  dele- 
gates  in  order  to  become  serious  contenders.  Not  only  were  a  substan- 
tial  majority  of  delegates  elected  in  primaries  but  few  of  the 
minority  who  were  not  could  be  won  without  engaging  in  their  selection. 
Threatened  by  challenges  from  major  candidates,  favourite  sons  virtually 
disappeared  as  a  means  of  deferring  commitment.  The  delegates  that 
could  be  controlled  by  party  leaders  were  fewer  than  before  reform 
precluding  them  from  delivering  substantial  support  at  a  propitious 
moment.  In  1972,  the  last  year  in  which  lleaders  made  a  major  attempt 
to  withhold  delegate  commitments,  only  a  quarter  of  non-primary  delegates 
were  uncommitted  when  selected. 
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Owing  to  the  permeation  of  the 
selection  process  by  candidate  organisations,  particularly  McGovern's, 
no  state  leader  controlled  an  entire  delegation.  In  1976  the  small 
number  of  uncommitted  delegates  were  a  pivotal  influence  on  the 
Republican  nomination.  But  no  leaders  could  deliver  their  support  in 
blocs  necessitating  campaigns  to  win  individual  commitments: 
"over  the  next  two  months  -  indeed,  up  until  the  final 
moments  of  the  national  convention  itself  -I  [Ford]  would 
have  to  hold  hands  with,  and  consider  doing  favors  for, 
every  one  of  the  delegates.  "104 
Candidates  who  delayed  their  entries  in  the  post-reform  period  had 
no  tenable  means  of  winning  large  numbers.  of  delegates.  Both  Humphrey, 
in  1976,  and  Ford  four  years  later  recognised  the  inaccessibility  of 
many  delegates  in  their  decisions  to  remain  inactive. 
5' 
Non-primary 
delegates  were  no  longer  a  potential  reservoir  of  support  for  late- 
starting  candidates.  (See  Table  7.8.  ) 
Those  candidates  competing  for  delegates  from  the  outset  of  the 
selection  process  gained  in  support  as  the  caucus  sequence  proceeded -  299  - 
provided  they  remained  active  contenders.  Campaign  efforts  continued, 
expanding  the  base  of  support  established  at  first-level  caucuses  by 
winning  new  adherents  from  the  uncommitteds  or  former  supporters  of 
candidates  eliminated  by  defeats  in  the  primaries.  Campaigns 
established  from  the  earliest  stage  were  able  to  engage  in  enduring 
lobbying  efforts  to  win  new  supporters.  In  addition,  they  attained  a 
legitimacy  through  having  competed  openly  for  delegates  from  the 
outset.  Candidates  who  eschewed  a  state's  first-level  caucuses  failed 
to  establish  a  base  of  support  or  an  organisation  which  could  attract 
additional  delegates  as  the  process  developed.  In  effect,  they  were 
excluded  from  winning  substantial  numbers  of  delegates  in  that  state. 
In  1976  the  only  states  in  which  the  late  entrants,  Brown  and  Church, 
were  able  to  make  a  significant  impact  on  delegate  selection  were 
those  in  which  first-level  caucuses  were  held  latest. 
TABLE  7.8 
NATIONAL  CONVENTION  NON-PRIMARY  STATES  DELEGATES 
UNCOMMITTED  OR  SUPPORTING  MINOR  CANDIDATES 
WHEN  SELECTED,  1960-1980 
Year  Delegates  Uncommitted  or  Supporting  Minor  Candidates 
Number  %  Non-Primary  %  Convention  Total 
Total' 
1960(D)  254  37.0  16.7 
1964(R)  219  37.8  16.7 
1968(D)  764.5  59.2  29.2 
1968(R)  276  41.2  20.7 
1960  -  1968  1513.5  46.9  22.3 
1972(D)  341.45  34.4  11.3 
1976(D)  229  32.8  7.6 
1976(R)  109  16.1  4.8 
1980(D)  100.6  11.0  3.0 
1980(R)  35  7.4  1.8 
1972  -  1980  817.05  21.6  6.0 
mýa  ia..,  {1ýhla  data -  300  - 
An  illustration  of  the  subsequent  convergence  of  support  around 
the  early,  active  competitors  in  caucus  states  is  provided  by  the 
example  of  the  Iowa  Democrats  in  1976  (see  Table  7.9).  As  the  first 
state  in  the  nation  to  hold  caucuses,  Iowa  was  the  subject  of  pro- 
longed  attention  by  candidates  and  the  media.  More  candidates 
organised  in  Iowa  than  in  any  other  caucus  state. 
At  the  precinct  level  uncommitted  delegates  constituted  a  plurality, 
Carter  (with  29.1  per  cent)  was  second  and  Bayh  (11.4  per  cent)  was 
third.  Harris,  Udall,  Shriver  and  Jackson,  in  descending  order,  won 
smaller  numbers  of  delegates  to  the  county  conventions.  Between  the 
precinct  and  county  meetings  Carter  won  the  New  Hampshire  primary  and 
Udall  ran  second  both  there  and  in  Massachusetts.  After  his  failure 
in  the  two  New  England  primaries  Bayh  withdrew,  swelling  the  Udall 
and  uncommitted  ranks  at  the  county  conventions. 
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Between  the 
county  and  district  conventions  the  primaries  narrowed  the  active  con- 
tenders  to  Carter,  Jackson  and  Udall.  Harris,  after  repeated  primary 
defeats,  withdrew.  At  the  district  meetings  the  uncommitted  bloc 
diminished  and  Udall  was  the  recipient  of  former  Harris  support. 
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Between  the  completion  of  selection  and  the  national  convention  the 
uncommitted  vote  disappeared  switching  predominantly  to  Udall  and, 
in  smaller  numbers,  to  Carter.  The  switch  to  Udall  is  probably  indi- 
cative  of  a  large  liberal,  anti-Carter,  contingent  amongst  the  uncommitted. 
Initially  undecided  between  the  liberal  alternatives,  covert  Humphrey 
supporters  or  followers  of  defunct  candidates  the  uncommitteds  switched 
to  Udall  as  the  surviving  liberal  in  the  state. 
The  process  described  above  differs  from  the  pre-reform  period 
in'the  pervasion  of  influences  derived  from  the  primaries  (discussed 
earlier),  the  evidence  of  candidate  preference  from  the  earliest 
stages  owing  to  candidate  campaigns  ,  amongst  voters  and  the  near-monopoly -  301  - 
of  support  by  candidates  who  competed  at  precinct  level.  Before 
reform  the  conclusion  of  the  selection  process,  usually  state  con- 
ventions,  marked  the  earliest  stage  at  which  commitments  were  sought. 
Moreover,  commitments  were  not  restricted  to  candidates  who  initiated 
early  campaigns.  In  1968  the  Iowa  state  convention  was  held  less 
than  four  weeks  after  Humphrey  became  an  active  candidate.  Though 
regarded  as  a  defeat  within  the  Humphrey  campaign,  the  state  provided 
the  Vice  President  with  40  per  cent  of  its  delegates. 
TABLE  7.9 
CANDIDATE  PREFERENCES  IN  IOWA  DEMOCRATIC 
CAUCUS  PROCESS  IN  1976 
Preference  Voting  Unit 
Precinct  County  Cong.  National 
District  Convention 
Carter  29.1%  34.2%  42.6%  53.2% 
Udall  5.8 
. 
12.9  25.5  42.6 
Others  21.6  11.0  4.3  4.3 
Uncommitted  38.5  40.9  27.7  0 
For  those  candidates  whose  strategies  included  the  caucuses  the 
by 
(Democratic),  requirement  of  substantial  delegate  selection 
'districts 
and  the  use  of  proportional  representation  within  them  provided 
incentives  to  compete  in  every  state.  Formerly  the  use  of  state-wide 
and  winner-take-all  systems  of  delegate  allocation  discouraged  candi- 
dates  from  seeking  support  in  states  where  failure  to  mobilise  a 
majority  excluded  them  from  acquiring  any  convention  votes.  Kennedy, 
for  example,  made  little  effort  in  the  South  in  1960  recognising  that 
Johnson's  support  and  the  use  of  the  unit  rule  eliminated  the  region -  302  - 
as  a  source  of  delegates.  The  power-maximising  strategies  of  party 
leaders  seeking  united  delegations  compelled  candidates  to  concentrate 
their  campaigns  either  where  a  delegate  majority  (which  converted  into 
the  entire  delegation  through  the  unit  rule  or  informal  means  of 
achieving  consensus)  was  a  feasible  target  or  where  divided 
delegations  were  the  norm. 
After  reform  candidates  were  able  to  win  non-primary  delegates 
without  mobilising  state-wide  majorities.  By  concentrating  on  hos- 
pitable  areas  candidates  elicited  delegate  support  where  the  state 
as  a  whole  constituted  unfavourable  territory.  Thus  the  McGovern 
campaign  divided  its  caucus  operations  into  two  degrees  of  emphasis. 
Where  potential  strength  was  greatest  a  state-wide  effort  was  mounted. 
Elsewhere,  notably  in  the  Midwest  and  South,  the  campaign  was  limited 
to  campus  communities  or  other  areas  which  had  a  history  of  support 
for  liberal  candidates. 
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Whereas  John  Kennedy  largely  'wrote  off' 
the  South  as  Johnson  territory,  McGovern  refused  to  concede  it  to 
Wallace  or  other  candidates  with  a  more  conservative  appeal  than  his 
own.  Kennedy  won  delegates  in  the  only  two  southern  states  not  voting 
as  units.  In  contrast,  McGovern  won  some  delegates  in  each  southern 
caucus  state  and  an  overall  plurality  in  the  region. 
Formerly  candidates  adopted  an  'all  or  nothing'  approach  to 
non-primary  campaigning.  States  which  offered  the  prospect  of  winning 
the  entire  delegation  were  emphasised  whilst  the  remainder  were  dis- 
regarded.  Post-reform  strategies  were  not  as  discrete  in  emphasis. 
Kennedy's  campaign  virtually  dismissed  an  entire  region  from  their 
delegate  projections.  The  McGovern  campaign,  in  contrast,  planned 
to  mount  efforts  for  delegates  in  every  caucus  state  except  Muskie's 
home  state  of  Maine  and  South  Carolina  where  no  provisions  existed  for 
expressing  candidate  preferences. 
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The  contrast  in  the  effect  of 
.. -  303  - 
the  two  strategies  is  illustrated  in  Table  7.10  showing  the  propor- 
tions  of  delegations  won  by  McGovern  in  1972  and  Kennedy  in  1960,  the 
last  contested  Democratic  nomination  which  permitted  the  unit  rule  at 
the  convention.  Though  both  candidates  won  a  similar  share  of  the  total 
non-primary  vote  (41.7  and  34.9  per  cent  respectively)  their  perform- 
ances  within  delegations  were  divergent.  Kennedy's  showing  was  polar- 
ised  between  united  delegations  supporting  him  in  some  states  and 
complete  exclusion  in  others.  McGovern,  in  contrast,  won  some  support 
in  all  but  one  state  but  only  excluded  other  candidates  in  a  similar 
number.  In  the  caucuses,  as  in  the  primaries,  reform  multiplied  the 
number  of  arenas  in  which  candidate  competed  for  delegates. 
TABLE  7.10 
PROPORTIONS  OF  NON-PRIMARY  STATE  DELEGATIONS 
WON  BY  NOMINEES  IN  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTIONS, 
1960  AND  1972 
Year  Nominee  Proportion  of  Delegations  won  by  States 
None  Minority  Majority  All  Total 
1960  J.  Kennedy  12(36.4%)  6(18.2%)  6(18.2%)  9(27.3%)  33(100.1%) 
1972  McGovern  1(  3.6)  14(50.0)  12(42.9)  1(  3.6)  28(100.1) 
Conclusion 
Before  reform  party  processes  were  the  real  'road  to  the  White 
House'  with  primaries  rarely  significant.  Subsequently  the  non- 
primary  process  diminished  in  both  its  priority  and  independence  from 
primaries  in  campaign  strategies.  Caucus  delegates  could  be  ignored 
as  mathematically  irrelevant  to  the  nomination  or,  more  commonly,  they 
were  employed  principally  to  gain  leverage  in  the  early  primaries. 
The  early  caucuses  were  but  the  first  domino  in  strategies  dominated 
7 -  304  - 
by  the  primaries.  Few  candidates  regarded  them  as  an  independently 
valuable  source  of  delegates. 
Reform  also  transformed  the  content  of  the  non-primary  process. 
Voters  determined  the  selection  of  delegates  diminishing  the  returns 
of  courting  and  deferring  to  party  leaders.  Candidates  unable  to 
mobilise  voters  in  primaries  were  unlikely  to  do  so  in  caucuses.  Thus 
a  modest  performance  by  Muskie  in  Iowa  in  1972  indicated  his  compar- 
ative  weakness  at  the  party's  base  presaging  his  showings  in  the  New 
Hampshire  and  Florida  primaries.  For  all  candidates  in  post-reform 
caucuses  safety  resided  in  numbers. 
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CHAPTER  EIGHT 
THE  CONTENT  OF  CAMPAIGNS 
This  chapter  surveys  the  impact  of  structural  reform  on  the  appeals 
employed  by  candidates  to  win  the  support  of  the  nominating  electorate. 
The  effect  of  the  switch  from  a  party-  to  a  voter-dominated  process 
is  assessed  by  a  comparison  of  the  ways  candidates  defined  themselves 
in  relation  to  their  parties,  to  issues  and  ideology,  and  their  presen- 
tations  of  their  own  personal  traits  and  characters. 
In  any  intra-party  contest  candidates  may  locate  themselves  in 
support  or  opposition  to  their  party's  leaders,  within  or  against  its 
history,  for  or  against  its  organisational  demands.  Candidates  can 
adopt  ideological  or  pragmatic  appeals.  The  former  features  clear 
stances  on  divisive  issues  which  maximise  support  in  one  segment  of 
the  electorate  and  drive  away  the  remainder.  Pragmatic  appeals  employ 
non-divisive,  non-controversial  stances.  Positions  are  adapted  to 
maximise  support  across  the  electorate.  Thus  two  pairings  are  gener- 
ated  to  define  campaigns.  Appeals  can  be  of  the  party  or  non-party 
type  (the  latter  incorporating  appeals,  that  are  a-party,  bipartisan 
or  anti-party).  Secondly,  appeals  can  be  ideological  or  pragmatic. 
These  four  campaign  emphases  can  be  inter'-mixed  to  produce  four 
possible  styles  of  campaigning:  party-pragmatic,  party-ideological, 
non-party-pragmatiel  non-party-ideological. 
1 
Before  reform  the  structure  of  the  nominating  process  encouraged 
party  and  pragmatic  emphases.  The  nominating  decision  was  controlled 
by  party  leaders.  They  were  concerned  to  sustain  organisations  which 
thrived  upon  electoral  victory  which  was  premised  upon  unifying  ideo- 
logically  diverse  parties.  General  elections  were  won  by  appealing  to 
the  'critical  mass'  of  a  non-ideological  electorate. -  313  - 
After  reform  the  structural  imperatives  to  party  and  pragmatic 
emphases  eroded.  Party  leaders  lost  control  over  the  nomination 
removing  their  organisational  priorities  -  party  maintenance,  unity 
and  victory  -'from  their  former  position  of  dominance  as  the  nomin- 
ating  electorate's  selection  criteria.  Candidates  were  no  longer 
compelled  to  demonstrate  an  ability  to  satisfy  the  leaders'  concerns 
to  be  plausible  as  nominees. 
The  widened  opportunities  for  influence  by  the  parties'  activist 
wings  facilitated  by  reform  created  incentives  for  candidates  to  espouse 
their  concerns.  Furthermore,  the  attenuation  of  organisation  control 
permitted  campaigns  which  stressed  independence  from  or  antagonism 
toward  the  party  or  a  bipartisan  appeal. 
The  post-reform  shift  in  campaign  emphases  is  evidenced  in  Fig.  8.1 
which  employs  the  four  possible  styles  developed  above  to  characterise 
campaigns  in  contested  nominations  from  1960  to  1980.  Before  reform 
party-pragmatic  was  the  dominant  style  reflecting  a  nomination  con- 
trolled  by  party  professionals  keyed  to  winning  elections.  Non-party 
and  ideological  emphases  were  rare.  Post-reform  styles  exhibit  greater 
diversity  than  their  pre-reform  counterparts  possibly  reflecting  the 
reduced  impact  of  the  participant  bias  in  the  later  period  (see  Chapter 
Four).  In  a  more  permeable  process  a  greater  diversity  of  forces  could 
be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  nomination  rendering  no  one  style  consist- 
ently  successful.  But  the  latter  period  is  marked  by  an  upsurge  in 
ideological  and  non-party  emphases  which  were  rare  in  the  pre-reform 
years. 
Pre-reform  candidates'  presentations  of  their  personal  traits 
and  characters  were  refracted  by  the  party  leaders'  organisational 
concerns.  The  criteria  of  availability  constricted  the  range  of  ascribed 
characteristics  for  an  acceptable  nominee  (Protestant,  old  stock,  non- 
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Southern,  etc.  ).  Candidates  possessing  these  necessary  character- 
istics  publicised  them  whilst  those  without  them  contested  the  legiti- 
macy  of  the  availability  criteria  or  sought  to  minimise  their  deficiencies. 
Presentations  of  "presidential  character"  were  designed  to  promise 
favourable  working  relations  with  the  leaders.  Their  concern  for  influence 
in  Washington,  the  autonomy  of  their  party  organisations  and  the 
preservation  of  their  positions  within  them  were  accommodated  by  candidate 
presentations  of  a  deferential  and  accessible  president. 
Post-reform  presentations  of  personal  traits  and  character  were 
freed  from  the  constraints  imposed  by  the  leaders'  concerns.  The 
criteria  of  availability,  in  decline  as  tests  of  electoral  calibre 
before  reform,  were  not  utilised  by  primary  and  caucus  participants. 
Similarly,  in  a  voter-dominated  process  images  of  potential  presidents 
deferential  and  receptive  to  leaders  lost  their  appeal.  Rather  candi- 
dates  could  stress  their  independence  from  or  hostility  to  the  party 
hierarchy.  In  the  post-Watergate  era  candidates  distanced  themselves' 
from  Washington  and  the  political  establishment.  Non-political  images 
were  generated. 
To  keep  this  chapter  to  a  manageable  length  in  its  analysis  of 
the  vast  quantity  of  words  and  images  campaigns  produce,  the  survey 
concentrates  on  areas  of  difference  between  the  two  periods.  This 
approach  risks  the  implication  that  change  has  been  total  when,  in 
fact,  many  continuities  are  apparent.  However,  the  intention  of  this 
approach  is  to  demonstrate  shifts  in  emphasis  noting  the  proliferation 
of  some  themes  which  had  few  earlier  counterparts  and  the  waning  of 
others  which  have  fewer  equivalents  in  the  later  period.  Figure  8.1 
represents  the  intended  balance  between  campaign  content  in  the  two 
periods.:  it  shows  that  most  post-reform  styles  had  their  earlier 
counterparts  but  that  their  relative  incidence  has  altered. -  315  - 
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Campaigns  and  the  Party 
Organisational  dominance  of  the  pre-reform  nominating  process 
required  candidates  to  establish  contacts  with  party  leaders  and  gen- 
erate  appeals  which  established  their  partisan  credentials.  Candidates 
emphasised  their  loyalty  to  the  party  record,  their  diligence  in  the 
party's  behalf,  their  ability  to  satisfy  the  demands  for  victory  and 
organisational  maintenance. 
Where  nominations  were  controlled  by  the  parties'  long-term 
servants,  attentive  to  the  need  to  retain  the  allegiance  of  inveterate 
identifiers  in  the  electorate,  the  incentives  were  compelling  for  can- 
didates  to  associate  themselves  with  the  party  tradition.  They  declared 
their  fealty  to  its  record,  identified  themselves  with  its  heroes 
(and  sought  the  support  of  those  still  alive)  and  berated  the  opposi- 
tion  party  for  its  traditional  failings. 
Humphrey,  defending  the  administration  in  1968  against  its  challen- 
gers,  aligned  himself  with  thirty  years  of  Democratic  achievement, 
"We're  not  going  to  repudiate  the  past  -  we're  going  to  build  on  it  ... 
I  don't  think  you  can  win  an  election  by  destroying  a  record,  partic- 
ularly  when  it's  a  good  record.  "2  Claiming  a  record  of  faithful  support 
for  three  Democratic  presidents  Humphrey,  by  implication,  suggested 
that  McCarthy  and  Robert  Kennedy  were  disloyal  for  challenging  Johnson. 
He  adduced  the  maxim  that  loyalty  was  "the  least  you  can  expect"  of 
a  major  party  leader. 
3 
In  1964  the  content  of  the  Republican  Party  tradition  was  a  source 
of  conflict  between  candidates  making  rival  claims  to  inherit  its 
legacy.  Scranton,  of  the  party's  moderate  wing,  argued  that  Goldwater 
was  at  variance  with  the  Republicanism  of  Lincoln,  Eisenhower  and 
Robert  Taft.  The  national  convention  would  meet,  he  argued,  to  select 
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"the  man  who  best  squares  with  the  enduring  principles  of  the  Repub- 
lican  Party"  which  excluded  Goldwater. 
4 
Claiming  to  defend  the  party's 
integrity,  he  denounced  Goldwater  as  subscribing  to  views  both  unRepublican 
and  unAmerican.  When  Eisenhower  defined  his  criteria  of  "responsible 
Republicanism"  Rockefeller  adopted  the  characterisation  and  argued 
that  Goldwater  could  not  be  encompassed  within  it. 
For  Goldwater,  the  moderates  like  Rockefeller  advocated  policies 
closer  to  the  Democratic  Party's  platforms.  Declining  to  debate  with 
Rockefeller,  Goldwater  likened  such  an  event  to  arguing  against  a 
representative  of  the  New  Frontier.  Espousing  the  need  for  elections 
to  provide  choices  rather  than  echoes,  Goldwater  equated  a  majority 
of  the  Republican  Party  with  the  cause  of  individual  liberty.  Thus 
he,  not  the  moderates,  was  the  representative  nominee. 
Candidates  who  demonstrated  independence  from  or  hostility  to  the 
party  were  charged  with  disloyalty.  Regarded  as  unfaithful  to  the 
party,  such  candidates  lacked  bargaining  power  within  it.  Pre-reform 
challenges  to  incumbent  presidents  foundered  on  the  unwillingness  of 
party  leaders  to  engage  in  revolts.  Assessing  Robert  Kennedy's  challenge 
in  1968  a  Western  party  official  observed,  "I  did  not  become  state 
party  chairman  to  strike  a  dagger  into  the  President  of  the  United 
States". 
5 
In  1967,  seeking  to  organise  a  challenge  to  Johnson,  a 
representative  of  the  Alternative  Candidate  Taskforce  (then  without 
a  candidate)  found  willingness  to  oppose  the  President  within  the  party 
as  uncommon  as  the  incidence  of  triplets, 
"I  remember  asking  one  local  official  whether  another  local 
official  would  be  a  likely  prospect  for  our  cause.  'No', 
was  the  reply.  'He's  a  Party  man'.  "6 
When  McCarthy  became  the  "alternative"  candidate  in  opposition  to 
Johnson  he  antagonised  party  loyalists  by  his  willingness  to  pursue 
an  issue  which  divided  the  party.  Further,  he  advertised  his  refusal 
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to  compromise  in  the  party's  interest.  He  declined  to  endorse  the 
ticket  unless  concessions  were  made  on  policy.  He  announced  a 
prospective  cabinet  one  third  of  which  were  Republicans  and  publicly 
gave  consideration  to  supporting  Rockefeller  if  he  were  nominated. 
For  McCarthy's  supporters  -  predominantly  outside  the  party 
organisations  -  his  refusal  to  compromise,  the  antithesis  of  the 
conventional  politician,  was  a  major  component  of  his  appeal.?  But 
for  the  leaders,  his  elevation  of  principle  over  the  party  was  instru- 
mental  in  their  rejection  of  him.  As  one  of  them  observed,  "I  could 
talk  for  two  hours  as  to  why  I  prefer  Humphrey,  but  I'll  tell  you 
something  that  is  the  deciding  factor:  McCarthy's  disloyal  because 
he  won't  support  the  ticket.  "8 
A  second  form  of  appeal  to  the  party  was  the  recollection  of 
assiduity  in  its  cause.  Travel  for  speech-making,  fund  raising  and 
election  campaigning  assisted  state  and  local  parties  thereby  creating 
obligations  amongst  their  leaders.  In  the  years  preceding  1960  John 
Kennedy's  travels  ensured  that  no  major  state  or  city  was  neglected. 
Trips  were  concentrated  in  the  West  and  Midwest  where  his  support  in 
the  1956  balloting  for  vice  presidential  nominee  had  been  weakest. 
9 
Within  states  his  speaking  engagements  were  keyed  to  the  distribution 
of  influence  over  the  delegate  selection  process.  Where  governors 
controlled  selection  their  wishes  determined  the  candidate's  engage- 
ments  within  the  state;  where  the  state  party  was  factionalised 
Kennedy  sought  association  with  the  group  likely  to  be  in  control 
in  1960.10 
In  the  convention  year  candidates  invoked  their  past  efforts  for 
the  party  to  convert  obligations  into  delegate  support.  Humphrey,  in 
1968,  reminded  Michigan  delegates  of  his  contribution  to  building  the 
party  in  the  state,  "When  you  needed  my  help  I  was  here  in  the  dark 
L -  319  - 
days,  in  the  difficult  days4"11  Endorsing  such  claims  an  Iowa  party 
official  commented  that,  "In  the  years  when  we  could  put  our  caucuses 
and  conventions  in  phone  booths,  if  we  wanted  anyone  to  come  and 
speak  it  was  always  Hubert.  '  12 
Observing  the  success  of  party  stal- 
warts  Nixon  and  Humphrey  in  1968,  James  Reston  concluded  that  the 
chicken  dinners  were  coming  home  to  roost. 
13 
Candidates  without  a  record  of  support  for  the  party's  efforts 
lacked  a  resource  which  could  be  translated  into  delegates.  The 
antipathy  to  Rockefeller  in  the  Republican  Party  derived  from  his 
aloofness  from  the  organisations'  needs  in  addition  to  his  liberalism. 
The  response  to  his  lack  of  support  for  Goldwater  substantiated  Jim 
Farley's  maxim  that  the  party  owes  nothing  to  a  man  who  does  not 
support  the  ticket.  In  1968  one  party  official  observed  "Rockefeller 
dumped  Nixon  and  me  in  1964  so  I  just  frankly  don't  see  how  any 
Republican  can  support  him.  " 
14 
Candidates  recognised  the  importance  of  party  maintenance  func- 
tions  to  the  leaders  in  their  commitments  to  strengthen  the  party  and 
to  assign  access  to  supportive  leaders.  If  elected,  candidates 
promised  to  use  the  presidency  to  vitalise  the  party.  For  example, 
Symington's  strategy  involved  broadening  his  acquaintanceships  in 
the  party  and  emphasising  his  commitment  to  its  growth. 
15 
For  the 
emerging  Republican  party  in  the  South  in  the  early  1960's,  a  Goldwater 
nomination  would  encourage  switches  away  from  the  Democrats.  Thus  his 
appeal  was  organisational  as  well  as  ideological:  he  would  stimulate 
participation  in  the  party  and  support  for  it  in  state  and  local  electlonAle 
16 
Candidates  employed  patronage  as  an  inducement  to  win  the  support 
of  particular  leaders  by  providing  them  with  career  advancement  and 
the  resources  with  which  to  maintain  their  parties.  In  1960  "both 
hints  and  frank  talk  flowed  from  the  Kennedy  camp  to  several  governors 
about  the  kind  of  running  mate  and  other  talents  neededJ17  Subsequent -  320  - 
appointees,  the  campaign  organisation  made  clear,  would  be  those  whom 
Kennedy  knew,  trusted  and  could  work  with. 
18 
Whilst  promise  of  access  provided  incentives  to  support,  threats 
of  its  denial  discouraged  withholding  commitments.  Speaking  to  small 
state  delegations  in  1960  Sorensen  reminded  his  audiences  of  Franklin 
Roosevelt's  rules  for  patronage  distribution.  Access  was  assigned, 
in  descending  order,  to  support  before,  during  and  after  the  conven- 
tion.  Influence  would  be  maximised  by  early  support,  minimised  by 
late  commitment. 
19 
The  same  argument  was  evident  in  his  speeches 
for  Robert  Kennedy  eight  years  later,  "Those  states  which  try  to  be 
cute  by  not  supporting  a  candidate  can  only  come  out  as  the  tail  of 
the  dog. 
20 
Candidates  utilised  the  endorsement  of  their  state  parties  to 
substantiate  their  appeal  to  organisation  professionals.  By  this 
means  they  verified  their  regularity.  Humphreys  1960  campaign,  for 
example,  stressed  his  contribution  to  the  development  of  the  Demo- 
cratic  Farmer  Labor  Party  in  Minnesota.  The  state  party  chairman, 
writing  to  his  counterparts  elsewhere,  noted  that  "Hubert  Humphrey 
believes  in  political  organisation  and  has  always  supported  the 
organisation.  "  21 
Deference  to  favourite  sons  advertised  respect  for  party  organ- 
isations.  Challenges  to  them  constituted  a  repudiation  of  lcoal 
leaders,  control  over  their  parties.  As  James  Rowe  counselled 
Humphrey  in  1960,  it  was  "sound  politics"  to  avoid  challenging 
favourite  sons. 
22 
In  1960  Kennedy's  challenges  were  restricted  to  states  where 
delegates  could  be  mandated  and  favourite  sons  more  sympathetic  to 
other  candidates.  The  threat  of  challenges  in  primaries  in  California 
and  Ohio  resulted  in  favourite  sons  committing  their  support  to  Kennedy. 
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Thereby  delegates  were  won,  the  appearance  of  competing  against  the 
organisation  avoided  whilst  the  favourite  sons  retained  a  semblance 
of  control  over  their  delegations  at  the  expense  of  discretion  over 
their  presidential  preferences.  In  his  one  challenge  to  a  favourite 
son  in  1968,  Robert  Kennedy  excused  his  action  by  defining  President 
Johnson  as  his  opponent,  "I  am  not  here  to  oppose  Governor  Branigan. 
He  is  in  no  way  responsible  for  the  policies  and  actions  I  challenge 
this  year.  "23 
Recognising  the  leaders'  demand  for  electoral  victory  candidates 
projected  themselves  as  effective  vote-getters.  For  popular  favourite 
candidates  electability  was  their  principal  source  of  persuasion. 
Primaries,  polls,  crowds  and  other  expressions  of  mass  support  were 
utilised  to  demonstrate  electoral  potential.  The  evidence  derived 
from  these  sources  was  then  woven  into  their  campaign  statements. 
For  example,  John  Kennedy  argued  in  1960  - 
"During  the  past  fdity  years  no  President  has  been  elected 
from  either  party  without  entering  and  winning  at  least 
one  contested  primary.  No  convention  has  ever  nominated 
a  man  who  avoided  the  primaries  and  elected  that  man 
president.  " 
24 
By  winning  contested  primaries  Kennedy  placed  himselfiin  a  line  of 
succession  to  the  White  House  established  over  half  a  century.  }bis 
principal  opponents,  by  eschewing  the  primaries,  could  not  claim  that 
legitimacy. 
Strategies  other  than  the  popular  favourite  made  electability  a 
part  of  their  appeal.  First,  non-primary  forms  of  evidence  were 
employed.  Secondly,  the  credibility  of  the  evidence  adduced  by 
popular  favourites  was  questioned.  Thirdly,  the  ability  to  unite  the 
party,  a  pre-condition  of  winning,  was  claimed. 
For  candidates  not  entering  primaries  evidence  of  electability 
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Polls  provided  Scranton  with  evidence  of  his  greater  electoral  strength 
compared  with  Goldwater  and  the  potentially  disastrous  consequences 
for  state  and  local  Republican  candidates  if  the  latter  were  the 
nominee.  He  cited  polls  evincing  his  greater  popularity  amongst  the 
party  rank-and-file,  and  the  likelihood  of  a  majority  deserting  to 
Johnson  in  a  contest  against  Goldwater.  The  long-term  devastation 
of  the  party  resulting  from  a  Goldwater  nomination,  Scranton  argued, 
would  take  it  down  "the  low  road  into  the  dusty  limbo  of  minority 
politics.  "  25 
Projected  general  election  strategies  were  employed  by  candidates 
to  demonstrate  the  relevance  of  their  popularity  to  the  objective 
of  winning  an  Electoral  College  majority.  In  1960  Johnson's  suppor- 
ters  argued  that  his  strength  in  the  Southern  and  Border  states  alone 
would  provide  close  to  a  majority  requiring  little  additional  support 
to  guarantee  victory. 
26 
In  1964  Goldwater  argued  that  no  Republican 
could  challenge  Johnson's  liberal  appeal  in  the  North  therefore  only 
an  appeal  to  the  South  offered  the  party  the  chance  of  winning. 
27 
In 
1968  Rockefeller  sought  to  repudiate  Nixon's  strength  in  national 
polls  maintaining  that  their  results  were  inappropriate  measures  of 
electoral  strength.  In  the  major  states,  Rockefeller  claimed,  he  was 
the  stronger  candidate.  To  carry  the  major  states  necessitated  winning 
the  big  cities  and  this  had  been  Nixon's  failing  in  1960, 
"If  you  take  the  record  of  what  happened  he  carried  Illinois 
until  he  got  to  Chicago.  He  carried  New  York  until  he 
got  to  New  York  City.  He  carried  Pennsylvania  until  he 
got  to  Philadelphia.  And  he  lost  all  of  those  states 
because  he  could  not  carry  the  vote  in  the  big  cities.  "28 
Evidence  of  Nixon's  southern  strength  failed  to  offset  this  deficiency, 
Rockefeller  argued,  because  Wallace  would  win  them  in  the  election. 
29 
In  response  to  the  evidence  adduced  by  popular  favourites,  candi- 
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didates  sought  to  undermine  their  validity  as  representative  tests 
of  popular  support.  Following  Kennedy's  victory  in  West  Virginia  in  1960, 
Symington  dismissed  presidential  primaries  as  divisive,  ill-suited  to 
the  systematic  discussion  of  issues  and  under  the  control  of  "random 
factions"  of  the  electorate. 
3°  The  Humphrey  organisation  in  1968 
repudiated  McCarthy's  claim  to  be  the  people's  candidate  on  the  basis  of 
his  performances  in  primaries.  In  several  states,  according  to  Humphrey's 
advertising,  McCarthy  had  been  defeated,  including  New  Hampshire  where 
he  had  been  the  only  candidate  on  the  ballot.  In  primaries  voters 
selected  from  the  available  alternatives.  In  no  primary  had  Humphrey 
been  an  active  contender  so  their  results  could  not  be  interpeted 
as  a  referendum  on  his  candidacy.  The  McCarthy  campaign's  claims  to 
be  the  people's  candidate  and  to  primary  victories  were  rejected  as 
"a  well-publicised  myth.  °"31  Had  he  been  an  announced  candidate  in 
time  to  enter  the  primaries,  Humphrey  averred,  he  would  have  won  them. 
32 
Electoral  victory  was  premised  on  a  united  party.  Candidates 
without  evidence  of  large-scale  popular  support  could  substantiate 
their  claims  to  electability  by  demonstrating  an  ability  to  unify  the 
party's  heterogeneous  elements.  Whilst  some  candidates  could  acti- 
vate  intense  but  narrow  support  others  (the  compromise  choice 
strategies)  aimed  for  a  broad  appeal.  Symington's  1960  campaign  was 
premised  on  his  ability  to  coalesce  the  Democratic  coalition  where 
all  other  contenders  would  divide  it.  Within  the  Symington  campaign  all 
other  major  contenders  were  viewed  as  unavailable  on  religious,  regional 
or  ideological  grounds,  "the  thing  to  do  was  not  make  anybody  mad... 
We  thought  everybody  could  unite  on  Symington.  "33 
When  reform  extracted  the  nominating  process  from  the  parties' 
control  candidates  were  no  longer  compelled  to  integrate  the  leaders' 
0 
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Attachment  to  the  party  and  the  ability  to  satisfy  its  maintenance 
needs  diminished  as  tests  of  the  candidates'  acceptability  to  a 
nominating  electorate  composed  of  voters. 
Several  post-reform  candidates  positioned  themselves  in  opposition 
to  their  parties.  This  enabled  them  to  tap  the  widespread  disenchant- 
ment  with  parties  evident  amongst  the  American  electorate. 
3k 
Specific 
criticisms  of  the  parties  focused  on  bossism,  the  unrepresentativeness 
of  their  leaders  and  their  unresponsiveness  to  voter  concerns. 
Carter  frequently  charged  bossism  in  1976  projecting  an  image 
of  the  candidate  of  the  people  against  the  pals.  In  New  York  he  con- 
demned  the  primary  delegate  selection  process  as  an  organised  attempt 
by  the  bosses  to  frustrate  the  voters'  will. 
35 
In  Pennsylvania  he 
described  Philadelphia  Mayor  Rizzo  as  a  "machine  politician"  and  a 
"boss".  As  a  boss,  Rizzo's  support  for  Jackson,  Carter  suggested, 
emanated  from  dishonourable  motives,  "I  can't  imagine  Rizzo  endorsing 
anyone  without  some  sort  of  trade  or  arrangement.  ,  36 
Carter's  advertising  stressed  his  dependence  upon  the  people  for  his 
success  because  he  lacked  the  assistance  of  "political  bosses,  Kingmakers 
and  Washington  insiders., 
37 
The  unresponsiveness  of  the  party  establishment  was  a  frequent 
criticism  employed  by  Wallace  in  identifying  himself  as  the  champion 
of  the  common  man.  He  charged  that  the  Democratic  Party  had  become 
estranged  from  working  people  because  it  had  been  captured  by  exotic 
and  vociferous  minorities, 
"Once  the  Democratic  party  reflected  true  expressions  of 
the  rank-and-file  citizens...  Long  ago  it  became  the 
party  of  the  so-called  intelligentsia.  Where  once  it 
was  the  party  of  the  people,  along  the  way  it  lost 
contact  with  the  working  man  and  businessman.  It 
has  been  transformed  into  a  party  controlled  by  intel- 
lectual  snobs.  " 
38 
McGovern  too  sought  to  capitalise  on  the  party's  insensitivity  to 
voters'  discontents.  Declining  to  condemn  Wallace's  supporters  as 
7 -  325  - 
racists,  he  attributed  their  dissatisfaction  to  the  party's 
preoccupation  with  devising  anodyne  election-winning  formulas. 
Wallace's  victory  in  Florida  he  attributed  to: 
"an  angry  cry  from  the  guts  of  ordinary  Americans  against 
a  system  which  doesn't  seem  to  give  a  damn  about  what's 
really  bothering  people  in  this  country  today.  It  was 
a  vote  to  stop  the  whole  damn  Democratic  party  and  make 
it  listen  to  people  for  a  change  -  instead  of  just  to 
political  strategists.  " 
39 
The  unrepresentativeness  of  the  party  leadership  has  been  a 
favourite  charge  of  Republican  conservatives.  The  party's  alleged 
domination  by  a  Northern  liberal  elite  precluded  it  from  appealing 
beyond  its  regional  and  ideological  confines.  When  the  Republican 
Party  won  the  presidency  this  representation  of  minority  interest 
extended  into  the  administration,  a  charge  utilised  by  Reagan  in  1976, 
"For  a  great  many  years  ...  the  Northeast  of  the  United 
States,  a  tiny  region,  has  dominated  the  Republican  Party 
and,  when  the  Republicans  were  in  power,  the  nation.  '40 
When  reform  projected  control  over  the  nomination  into  primaries 
and  caucuses  the  process  became  accessible  to  independents  and  cross- 
over  voters.  This  enhanced  the  incentives  for  candidates  to  avoid 
a  partisan  identification,  and  formulate  appeals  beyond  their  party's 
supporters.  This  was  accomplished  either  through  the  use  of  issues 
or  ideologies  which  appealed  to  independents  and  other  party  iden- 
tifiers  (see  next  section)  or  through  bipartisan  stances. 
The  bipartisan  strategy  was  exemplified  by  a  rejection  of  partisan 
politics  as  an  effective  means  of  tackling  national  problems.  Reagan 
in  1976  argued,  "I  think  the  problems  cross  party  lines  and  I  think 
the  people  will  cross  party  lines.  "  41 
Similarly  Robert  Dole  in  his 
announcement  of  candidacy  for  1980  stated,  "I  will  be  speaking  with 
our  friends  in  the  Democratic  party  as  well  as  Republicans  and  inde- 
pendents,  believing  that  neither  party  has  a  corner  on  wisdom.  We 
seek  not  a  Democratic  approach  or  a  Republican  approach  to  the 
nation's  nature,  but  we  seek  the  correct  approach  and  it  will  combine 
7 -  326  - 
the  best  thinking  and  the  best  efforts  of  a1Lis 
42 
A  second  variant  of  the  bipartisan  strategy  is  the  exploitation 
of  a  local  connection.  Ford  in  Michigan  recalled  the  start  of  his 
congressional  career,  "Now,  some  twenty-seven  years  later,  I  am  asking 
for  the  help  and  assistance  of  all  of  the  people  of  this  part  of 
Michigan  and  the  great  state  of  Michigan.  '.  '  43 
The  third  variant  of  bipartisan  strategy  utilised  by  incumbent 
presidents  was  to  promote  the  nomination  as  an  endorsement  of  their 
conduct  of  office.  For  1980,  Carter's  planning  required  him  to  act 
"presidential"  and  emphasised  the  experience  he  had  acquired  over 
four  years. 
44 
Ford  also  attempted  to  make  the  primaries  into  a  vote 
on  his  performance  in  office  which  would  therefore  attract  independent 
and  crossover  support,  "I  want  every  person  who  is  registered  in  this 
state  who  can  feel  confidence  in  what  we  have  done  to  vote  for  me, 
whether  they  call  themselves  Republicans,  Independents  or  Democrats.  "  45 
The  attenuation  of  organisation  control  after  reform  resulted 
in  candidates'  greater  willingness  to  challenge  favourite  sons  (whose 
/and 
enhanced  vulnerability  contributed  to  their  decline),  oppose  the 
party  organisations  and  incumbent  presidents.  In  the  post-reform  period 
charges  of  disloyalty  no  longer  generated  the  obstacles  to  winning 
delegates  erected  by  party  leaders  in  the  earlier  period. 
Electability  was  not  the  priority  for  voters  that  it  is  for  party 
leaders  so  consequently  it  occupied  a  less  prominent  role  in  many 
post-reform  campaigns.  Those  candidates  who  stressed  their  electa- 
bility  -  Muskie,  Bayh,  Ford,  Baker  -  struggled  to  convert  this 
resource  into  support  in  primaries  and  caucuses.  Other  candidates, 
whilst  not  repudiating  the  importance  of  winning  the  election,  adver- 
tised  their  purism  (thereby  appealing  to  purists  in  the  nominating 
electorate)  by  rejecting  the  compromises  and  coalition-building 
strategies  usually  associated  with  capturing  electoral  majorities. -  327  - 
Reagan  in  1976  was  dismissive  of  ticket-balancing  to  produce  united 
parties  with  broad  appeal.  "A  Vice  President",  he  argued,  'should  be 
compatible  enough  with  the  President  to  continue  his  policies  if  the 
duties  fell  to  him,  without  a  radical  change  in  course:  "46  Announcing 
his  candidacy  for  1972  McGovern  opposed  "coalitions  of  self-interest" 
and  continual  efforts  to  adjust  policies  and  beliefs  to  "every 
seeming  shift  in  public  sentiment.  ,  47 
Thus  far  the  analysis  of  campaign  content  has  been  impressionistic. 
Greater  precision  is  hindered  by  the  reliance  on  secondary  sources: 
speeches  are  rarely  reported  in  full,  coverage  is  unevenly  distributed 
between  the  candidates  and  advertising  material  is  unobtainable.  An 
attempt  to  provide  some  quantification  to  the  effects  of  reform  upon 
the  partisan  content  of  campaigns  is  made  by  an  analysis  of  announce- 
ment  speeches.  Virtually  all  candidates  make  formal  announcements 
of  candidacy  and  a  large  number  of  verbatim  statements  have  been 
obtained.  Whilst  this  is  an  inadequate  substitute  for  a  more  extensive 
survey,  announcement  statements  have  the  advantage  of  being  more 
representative  of  the  candidate  than  many  other  speeches.  They  are 
made  to  national  rather  than  special  audiences.  They  also  inaugurate 
the  campaign  so  candidates  strive  to  define  themselves  before  the 
voters  and  their  parties. 
Table  8.1  quantifies  references  to  the  party,  its  heroes  and 
its  electoral  objectives.  References  to  the  party  are  defined  as 
either  mentions  of  it  by  name  or  "my  party",  "our  party"  etc.  Party 
heroes  are  defined  as  past  or  present  leaders  such  as  Lincoln,  Eisen- 
hower  and  Franklin  Roosevelt.  All  mentions  of  the  need  for  unity 
and/or  victory  or  the  candidate's  proclaimed  ability  to  secure  these 
goals  are  counted  as  electoral  objectives. 
Whilst  the  results  for  the  pre-reform  period  are  distorted  by 
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TABLE  8.1 
PARTY-RELATED  REFERENCES  IN  ANNOUNCEMENT  STATEMENTS,  1960-1980 
Candidate  Party-related  References  Length  of 
Statement 
(in 
sentences) 
Party  name  Party  heroes  Electoral 
Objectives 
Pre-reform 
Humphrey  '60  u  2  1  52 
J.  Kennedy  3  0  2  21 
Symington  1  0  2  18 
Johnson  11  4  0  81 
Rockefeller  '64  4  0  0  16 
Goldwater  6  0  0  32 
Scranton  24  7  2  83 
Rockefeller  '68  2  0  0  13 
McCarthy  5  0  1'  25 
R.  Kennedy  6  1  1  41 
Humphrey  '68  6  6  1  101 
Sub-total  72  20  10  483 
Average  6  2  1  140 
Post-reform 
McGovern  0  0  0  77 
Carter  '76  0  0  0  177 
Church  0  0.  0  96 
Shriver  1  4  0  114 
Ford  2  0  1  16 
Brown  '80  1  0  0  28 
Baker  2  0  2  60 
Conn  ally  2  1  0  161 
Crane  0  1  0  24 
Dole  4  0  0  132 
Reagan  '80  2  0  0  167 
Sub-total  14  6  3  1055 
Average  1  1  0  96 
Pre-reform  party-related  references  :  21.1%  of  all  sentences. 
Post-reform  of  :  2.2%  it  it  It -329- 
the  heavily  party-related  statement  of  Scranton,  the  contrast  between 
the  two  periods  is  clear.  Since  reform  the  average  announcement 
statement  has  doubled  in  length  but  party  mentions  have  diminished 
from  six  to  one.  References  to  party  heroes  declined  more  modestly 
but  the  post-reform  average  is  attributable  largely  to  a  single 
candidate,  Shriver  claiming  the  Kennedy  mantle  in  1976.  References 
to  electoral  objectives  were  a  component  of  most  statements  before 
reform  but  they  were  absent  from  most  post-reform  announcements. 
Before  reform  party-related  references  appeared  in  one  sentence  in  five. 
Subsequently  they  appeared  in  less  than  one  sentence  in  forty.  Even- 
tual  nominees  McGovern  and  Carter  (in  1976)  made  no  reference  to  the 
party,  its  heroes  or  its  objectives. 
Since  reform  party-related  references  were  also  more  likely  to 
be  neutral,  critical  or  qualified  in  their  support.  In  1980,  attempt- 
ing  to  demonstrate  the  breadth  of  his  personal  experience,  Reagan 
noted  that  he  had  been  both  a  Democrat  and  a  Republican. 
8 
Dole, 
as  already  cited,  promised  to  consult  with  both  parties  believing  that 
neither  had  a  monopoly  on  wisdom.  Brown,  in  1980,  defined  his  candidacy 
49 
as  "an  insurgent  movement  within  the  Democratic  party.  "  - 
Issues  and  Ideology 
Descriptions  of  pre-reform  nominating  politics  contain  few 
references  to  the  competing  candidates'  ideologies  and  issue  positions. 
Rather,  the  emphases  are  placed  on  pragmatic  appeals  -  electability, 
deals  and  understandings  with  party  leaders.  The  scarcity  of  issue 
and  ideological  content  has  several  explanations.  The  first  follows 
from  the  nature  of  American  parties.  They  are  non-ideological,  oriented 
to  winning  office  rather  than  devising  programmes.  Thus  the  party 
leaders'  criteria  for  evaluating  potential  nominees  were  pragmatic 
rather  than  programmatic.  Divisions  within  the  state  and  local  parties -  330  - 
amongst  which  the  candidates  sought  alliances  were  more  commonly 
based  on  personal  and  territorial  rivalries  than  differences  over 
ideology  or  issues.  Non-ideological  parties  were  partnered  by  non- 
ideological  voters.  For  the  great  majority  of  the  electorate  voting 
cues  derived  from  party  loyalties  and  candidate  images. 
The  strategies  pursued  by  many  pre-reform  candidates  constrained 
the  issue  content  of  campaigns.  Either  active  campaigns  were  eschewed 
or  entry  delayed  until  late  in  the  pre-convention  period.  Such 
limitations  on  campaign  activity  restricted  the  potential  for  candi- 
dates  to  define  their  appeal  in  policy  terms  or  debate  their  positions 
with  their  opponents. 
The  settings  most  conducive  to  policy  definition  were  usually 
lacking  in  campaigns  for  the  nomination.  According  to  Benjamin  Page's 
studies  of  presidential  elections,  exposure  to  personal  questioning  or 
responses  to  requests  for  written  statements  are  more  productive  of 
policy  content  than  where  candidates  are  free  to  offer  speeches  and 
remarks. 
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Because  so  many  pre-reform  candidacies  were  undeclared 
or  involved  little  public  campaigning  the  opportunities  for  evoking  issue 
responses  were  greatly  circumscribed. 
Where  candidates  employed  issue  stances  in  the  pre-reform  period  they 
4t 
were  designed  to  appeal  to  the  electoral  critical  mass,  to  unite  the 
parties'  diverse  components  and  assuage  the  minorities  of  issue-conscious 
groups  within  them,  and  identify  themselves  with  the  party  record. 
The  first  task,  an  aspect  of  proving  electability,  was  aimed  at  demon- 
strating  a  position  on  issues  consistent  with  appealing  to  a  majority 
of  the  electorate. 
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The  second  objective  was  also  related  to  elect- 
ability,  utilising  policy  appeals  to  unite  the  party. 
52 
Seeking 
identification  with  the  party  record  was  the  policy  component  of  demon- 
strating  party  loyalty.  Candidates  attempted  to  portray  themselves 
as  representative  spokesman  for  the  party's  heritage. -  331  - 
To  appeal  to  the  critical  mass  of  the  electorate  candidates 
aligned  themselves  with  the  broad  spectrum  of  voters  accepting  the 
New  Deal  state  and  internationalism.  In  domestic  policy  candidates, 
with  different  emphases  between  the  parties,  registered  support  for  social 
security,  minimum  wage  laws,  farm  subsidies  and  civil  rights.  In 
foreign  policy  candidates  supported  negotiations  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  U.  S.  participation  in  the  U.  N.  and  N.  A.  T.  O. 
Candidates  who  breached  the  confines  of  this  critical  mass  were 
unlikely  to  be  electable.  Thus  Goldwater,  the  pre-reform  candidate 
who  most  clearly  differentiated  himself  from  the  policy  'consensus' 
was  attacked  by  Republican  moderates  for  an  extremism  that  would 
produce  electoral  disaster.  Voluntary  social  security  (as  Goldwater 
had  suggested  in  New  Hampshire)  would  bankrupt  the  system,  according 
to  Rockefeller.  For  Scranton,  Goldwater's  policies  amounted  to  "dime 
store  feudalism"  that  would  plunge  the  party  into  "the  dusty  limbo 
of  minority  politics".  In  attacking  Goldwater,  Scranton  wondered  how 
the  Republican  Party  will  make  clear  to  the  American  people  that  it 
does  not  oppose  Social  Security,  the  United  Nations,  human  rights  and 
a  sane  nuclear  policy.  "53 
Those  candidates  who  gave  issues  prominence  emphasised  their 
electoral  appeal.  Goldwater's  candidacy  was  premised  on  the  potential 
for  activating  a  conservative  majority  in  the  election.  A  "me-too" 
Republican  could  not  pre-empt  Johnson's  liberal  support.  The  more 
effective  challenge  could  be  mounted  by  a  candidate  who  differentiated 
himself  from  Johnsonian  liberalism  and  appealed  to  the  South,  Goldwater 
maintained. 
54  Both  McCarthy  and  Robert  Kennedy  provided  the  pragmatic 
justification  for  their  nomination  that  an  electoral  majority  supported 
their  calls  for  an  end  to  the  Vietnam  war.  For  example,  Kennedy 
asserted: -  332  - 
"What  these  primaries  have  indicated  and  all  party  caucuses 
have  indicated  ...  was  that  people  in  the  Democratic  Party 
and  the  people  of  the  United  States  want  a  change.  And 
that  change  can  come  about  only  if  those  who  are  delegates 
in  Chicago  recognise  the  importance  of  what  has  happened 
here  in  the  state  of  California,  what  has  happened  in  South 
Dakota,  what's  happened  in  New  Hampshire,  what  happened 
across  the  country.  The  country  wants  to  move  in  a  differ- 
ent  direction,  we  want  to  deal  with  our  problems  within  our 
country  and  we  want  peace  in  Vietnam.  " 
55 
Most  pre-reform  candidates  employed  policy  discussion  for  coali- 
tional  purposes.  Issues  were  used  to  unite  the  parties.  Unifying 
themes  were  sought  in  valence  issues  and  areas  of  intra-party  agree- 
ment.  Sensitive  issues  that  would  divide  ideologically  diverse  parties 
were  avoided  or  finessed. 
Use  of  a  valence  issue  was  evident  in  Nixon's  1968  pledge  "to  end 
the  war  and  win  the  peace",  by  means  unspecified.  John  Kennedy 
similarly  depicted  goals  to  be  attained  such  as  economic  growth  and 
rebuilding  the  stature  of  American  science  and  education  without  speci- 
fying  the  means  to  these  objectives  or  establishing  their  relationship 
to  one  another. 
Kennedy's  treatment  of  the  potentially  divisive  civil  rights  issue 
in  1960  exemplified  the  drive  to  satisfy  all  elements  of  the  party. 
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By  the  time  of  the  convention  he  was  acceptable  to  liberals,  blacks  and 
southerners.  To  the  two  former  groups  he  expressed  his  commitment 
to  civil  rights  and  cited  his  support  for  legislation  in  Congress.  In 
the  South  he  focused  on  other  issues  such  as  the  economy  and  labour 
reform  and  recalled  bright  passages  in  southern  history.  57  His  rear- 
guard  position  in  support  of  civil  rights  in  Congress  also  aided  in 
defining  him  as  a  racial  moderate.  In  1968  Nixon's  lack  of  specificity 
on  the  Vietnam  war  ensured  that  his  stance  did  not  divide  the  party  and 
alienate  support.  He  pre-empted  discussion  of  the  issue,  beyond  stating 
the  objective  of  obtaining  an  end  to  the  war,  by  a  self-imposed  moratorium 
whilst  the  possibility  of  peace  talks  existed. -  333  - 
Though  policy  was  not  the  principal  concern  of  the  leaders  there 
were  issue-conscious  elements  within  both  parties  which  candidates 
sought  to  assuage.  In  the  Democratic  Party  these  groups  were  predom- 
inantly  liberals  -  reform  Democrats  and  some  labour  leaders.  Their 
leverage  derived  from  their  influence  within  large  state  delegations 
such  as  California  and  New  York.  In  addition,  the  prestige  and  media 
access  of  liberal  commentators  such  as  Eleanor  Roosevelt  elevated  them 
into  opinion  leaders  exercising  influence  disproportionate  to  their 
numbers.  In  the  Republican  Party  issue-conscious  groups  were  mainly 
conservative  -  prominent  within  the  party  in  many  areas  and  in  auxil- 
Lary  organisations  such  as  the  Young  Republicans.  Their  influence 
was  based  on  numerical  strength  because  many  convention  delegates 
were  conservatives. 
The  influence  of  these  groups  necessitated  that  their  support  be 
enlisted  or  their  opposition  neutralised  by  prospective  nominees. 
Thus  prior  to  1960  John  Kennedy  devoted  considerable  attention  to 
wooing  the  liberals. 
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He  sought  to  assure  them  of  his  liberal  creden- 
tials  by  his  commitments  on  issues  such  as  civil  rights.  For  the 
liberal  Michigan  party  leadership  he  answered  a  forty-one  page  question- 
naire  specifying  his  views  on  current  issues. 
59 
Rockefeller,  in  both 
his  campaigns  for  the  nomination,  sought  to  nullify  conservative 
hostility  by  advertising  his  compatibility  with  them  on  some  sensitive 
issues.  Prior  to  1964,  lists  of  his  business  and  fiscal  actions  as 
Governor  were  distributed  exemplifying  his  economic  conservatism. 
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In  1968  he  proclaimed  his  commitment  to  fiscal  responsibility  and 
states'  rights. 
6t 
Symbols  were  employed  to  demonstrate  ideological  and  issue  credi- 
bility  to  the  attentive  groups.  Kennedy  recruited  the  respected  Chester 
Bowles  to  his  campaign  as  foreign  policy  adviser.  Though  little  advice 
was  ever  sought,  his  appointment  was  a  favourable  signal  of  the  direction -  334  - 
of  Kennedy's  thinking  to  liberal  Democrats. 
62 
Rockefeller,  in  1968, 
fuelled  speculation  that  Reagan,  the  conservative  hero,  would  be  his 
vice  presidential  nominee. 
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In  only  one  pre-reform  contest,  1964,  did  the  favourite  of  the  issue- 
conscious  elements  win  the  nomination.  The  salience  of  principles  and, 
to  a  lesser  degree,  issue  stances  in  Goldwater's  campaign  were  unusual 
amongst  nominees.  Furthermore,  his  estrangement  from  the  policy 
preferences  of  the  electoral  critical  mass  was  marked.  The  success 
of  his  ideological  appeal  in  1964  is  attributable  to  the  transformation 
of  the  party  worked  by  the  Draft  movement  in  the  years  preceding. 
Control  over  the  delegate  selection  process  was  wrested  from  profes- 
sionals  and  moderates  to  be  replaced  by  purists  and  conservatives.  In 
consequence,  the  moderation  enforced  by  electoral  necessity  that  normally 
characterised  Republican  conventions  was  muted  in  1964.  Following 
from  the  pre-19611  transformation  of  the  party,  a  conservative  appeal 
found  a  receptive  audience  and  won  the  nomination. 
The  defeat  of  McCarthy's  campaign  in  1968,  however,  exemplifies 
the  more  common  modest  issue  orientation  of  party  leaders.  His  issue 
appeal  could  not  of  itself  generate  the  support  within  the  party  to  win 
the  nomination.  Without  a  transformation  of  the  party  his  insurgency 
guaranteed  his  rejection. 
To  illuminate  their  loyalty  to  the  party,  candidates  located  their 
policy  positions  within  its  tradition.  Humphrey  pledged  in  1968  to 
build  on  thirty  years  of  Democratic  achievement.  Republicans  in  1964 
offered  conflicting  claims  to  the  party's  philosophical  heritage. 
Rockefeller  claimed  that  establishing  a  "sound  basis"  for  the  party 
platform  and  victory  required  "following  the  principles  and  extending 
the  policeis  of  the  1960  and  1956  platforms  and  building  upon  the 
record  of  achievement  of  the  Eisenhower  administration.  " 
64 
Scranton -  335  - 
noted  that  Goldwater  was  opposed  to  every  major  proposal  in  the 
party's  1960  platform,  suggesting  he  intended  to  create  a  new  party. 
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By  his  opposition  to  legislation  for  civil  rights  -  "the  most  important 
single  Republican  principle  since  Abraham  Lincoln"  -  Goldwater  demon- 
strated  that  "he  is  not  with  the  Republicans",  according  to  Scranton. 
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If  Goldwater's  stances  were  adopted,  Scranton  argued,  it  would  read 
Lincoln,  Dirksen  and  Eisenhower  out  of  the  Republican  Party. 
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Goldwater  argued  that  he,  not  the  moderates,  was  in  the  mainstream 
of  the  party.  Rockefeller's  issue  positions  he  regarded  as  more  suited 
to  the  Democratic  Party  platform.  For  Goldwater,  the  Eisenhower 
administration  was  not  the  fount  of  Republican  legitimacy  having 
previously  described  it  as  a  "dime  store  New  Deal". 
In  the  post-reform  period  issues  and  ideology  grew  in  prominence 
in  candidates'  campaigns.  In  part  this  may  follow  from  developments 
external  to  the  nominating  process  -  the  increased  issue  sophistication 
and  ideological  constraint  registered  amongst  the  mass  public  from  the 
later  1960'x. 
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But  developments  within  the  nominating  process  were 
also  conducive  to  issue  definition.  First,  the  'changed  American  Voter' 
gained  access  to  the  nominating  process  in  unprecedented  numbers. 
Second,  the  activists  in  both  parties,  as  previously  noted,  are  skewed 
towards  the  ideological  poles  -  conservative  Republicans,  liberal 
Democrats.  Thus  those  elements  most  likely  to  participate  in  an  open 
nominating  process  and  exert  additional  influence  through  staffing 
candidate  organisations,  making  financial  contributions  etc.  are  those 
most  likely  to  respond  to  issue  and  ideological  appeals. 
The  proliferation  of  candidates  after  reform  encouraged  the  use 
of  issues  and  ideology  to  differentiate  their  appeals  from  their  oppon- 
ents.  Amidst  heightened  competition  the  need  for  distinctiveness  was 
enhanced.  The  duration  and  public  nature  of  campaigns  also  inspired 
issue  and  ideological  definition.  Because  campaigns  were  so  much  longer -  336  - 
than  previously  the  opportunities  to  develop  recognition  in  issue- 
ideological  terms  were  far  greater.  In  the  competition  for  media 
attention  candidates  subjected  themselves  to  interviews  and  debates 
and  responded  to  requests  for  statements  of  their  positions  -  the  settings 
conducive  to  policy  enunciation. 
This  assessment  of  post-reform  campaigns  is  not  intended  to  suggest 
that  they  conform  to  the  liberal  ideal  of  policy-specific  candidates 
and  policy-conscious  voters.  Candidates  focused  on  many  matters  other 
than  policy  and  they  rarely  engaged  in  debates  over  issues  in  which 
similarities  and  differences  were  elucidated.  Voters  had  many  other 
tests  of  candidates  in  addition  to  issues,  and  their  knowledge  of  the 
candidates'  stances  was  often  sparse.  But  if  issue  voting  is  an  echo 
of  candidates'  issue  input  it  is  unlikely  that  pre-reform  party  leaders 
were  subjected  to  extent  of-policy  discussion  of,  for  example,  the 
1976  Republican  contest  which  produced  issue  voting  of  comparable 
magnitude  to  the  succeeding  general  election. 
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In  the  post-reform  period  issue  appeals  were  employed  to  mobilise 
the  participant  bias,  construct  campaign  organisations,  encourage 
independent  and  crossover  voting  and  activate  interest  group  support. 
The  shift  in  the  participant  bias  (see  Chapter  Four)  from  election- 
oriented  professionals  to  the  activist  wings  enhanced  the  incentives 
for  issue-based  appeals  to  these  groups.  Conservative  Republicans  and 
liberal  Democrats  turnout  at-higher  rates  than  the  other  ideological 
components  of  the  party.  They  also  engage  in  issue  voting  in  greater 
proportions  than  the  other  ideological  blocs  within  the  parties'  elec- 
torates. 
To  appeal  to  the  party  activists  candidates  espoused  their  issue 
preferences.  Republican  conservative  candidates  took  hawkish  stands 
on  foreign  and  defence  policy,  opposed  government  intervention  in  the -  337  - 
economy  and  business,  and  demanded  austerity  on  socio-cultural  issues. 
Liberal  Democrats  advocated  dovish  foreign  and  defence  policies, 
supported  government  intervention  in  the  economy  and  business,  and 
favoured  permissive  stances  on  socio-cultural  issues.  70 
Reagan  in  1976  opposed  detente,  the  'giveaway'  of  the  Panama 
Canal  and  black  majority  rule  in  Rhodesia.  Several  Republican  conser- 
vatives  in  1980  opposed  the  pending  SALT  treaty  and  urged  greater 
expenditure  for  defence.  In  1976  Reagan  expressed  his  "philosophical 
opposition"  to  TVA  and  he,  in  company  with  other  conservatives  in  1980, 
advocated  balancing  the  federal  budget.  In  the  latter  year  most 
conservatives  opposed  abortion,  ERA  and  gun  control. 
Liberal  Democrats'  foreign  and  defence  policy  positions  included 
McGovern's  call  for  an  immediate  end  to  the  U.  S.  bombing  in  Vietnam 
and  the  return  of  all  troops  within  ninety  days.  He  also  recommended 
reducing  the  defence  budget  by  a  third;  Udall  opposed  foreign  policy 
alliances  with  racist  and  military  regimes;  Edward  Kennedy  opposed 
draft  registration  and  criticised  the  U.  S.  's  past  record  of  assistance 
to  the  Shah  of  Iran.  In  economic  policy,  McGovern  called  for  a  guaran- 
teed  income;  Harris  advocated  increased  wealth  taxes  and  the  dissolution 
of  monopolies;  Kennedy  urged  gasoline  rationing  and  wage  and  price 
controls.  In  socio-cultural  policy,  McGovern  supported  busing  and 
reduced  penalties  for  marijuana  use;  the  liberals  in  1976  (Shriver 
excepted)  approved  legalised  abortion  and  Kennedy  in  1980  supported 
its  federal  funding. 
The  consequence  of  appeals  to  party  activists  was  to  pull  the  policy 
emphasis  in  nominating  campaigns  away  from  the  electoral  critical  mass, 
the  magnet  for  pre-reform  issue  stances.  This  centrifugal  force  also 
affected  those  candidates  for  whom  the  activists  were  not  natural 
allies.  The  activists  possessed  the  influence  in  the  post-reform -  338  - 
process  to  compel  responses  from  other  candidates  to  gain  their 
support  or  neutrality.  In  office  the  Ford  administration  was  constrained 
by  the  need  to  assuage  Reagan's  conservative  supporters. 
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Carter  in 
1976  was  urged  by  his  pollster  Patrick  Caddell  to  "give  the  appearance 
of  substance"  which,  inter  alia,  would  send  signals  to  "suspicious 
but  open  liberals.  "72  Whilst  most  of  Carter's  resultant  responses 
were  mainly  cosmetic  he  did  endorse  the  Humphrey-Hawkins  full  employ- 
ment  bill,  a  touchstone  of  liberal  orthodoxy  in  1976. 
The  mid-campaign  readjustments  in  strategy  engaged  in  by  some 
candidates  demonstrates  the  recognition  of  the  activist  wings'  influence. 
Initially  Muskie's  campaign,  projecting  him  as  a  unifier,  avoided 
issue  discussion  as  a  risk  to  his  broad  appeal. 
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Following  several 
setbacks  in  primaries  he  moved  to  espouse  liberal  issue  positions, 
his  media  adviser  noting  "We're  going  to  erase  the  yellow  stripe  in 
the  middle  of  the  road". 
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The  new  style  was  evident  in  the  promotion 
of  issues  into  the  principal  basis  of  his  appeal  exemplified  in  a: 
speech  in  Pennsylvania, 
"The  important  question  is  not  what  a  candidate  is  against 
but  what  he  is  for  -  and  how  would  his  election  as  Presi- 
dent  make  a  difference  to  you.  I  have  proposed  a  freeze 
on  food  price  increases.  No  other  candidate  has.  I  say 
freeze  food  prices  now.  You  can  say  the  same  thing  by 
voting  for  me  "".  "75 
A  similar  response  to  failure  was  evident  in  Reagan's  1980  campaign. 
Defeat  in  the  Iowa  caucuses  was  followed  by  reorganisation  of  the 
campaign  staff  including  the  dismissal  of  manager  John  Sears  who  had 
devised  the  candidate's  election-oriented  centrist  strategy.  There- 
after  a  clearer  conservative  identification  was  pursued. 
Issue  appeals  were  also  employed  to  generate  the  volunteer  activity 
necessary  to  mount  voter-oriented  campaigns.  Because  purposive  incen- 
tives  are  a  major  stimulant  to  volunteer  effort  candidates  were -  339  - 
encouraged  to  use  issue  appeals  to  recruit  an  organisation.  In 
planning  for  the  first  post-reform  nomination  McGovern's  strategists 
believed  that  in  an  open  process  the  nomination  would  be  won  by  the 
hardest  workers  "and  people  are  not  motivated  to  work  who  have  no  strong 
convictions.  "76  Pre-empting  the  Democratic  left  for  McGovern  entailed 
monopolising  the  volunteer  support  of  that  wing,  forestalling  the 
entry  of  other  liberals  by  denying  them  the  necessary  organisational 
resources. 
Beginning  in  1970,  McGovern  spoke  before  student  audiences  demand- 
ing  withdrawal  from  Vietnam,  less  severe  penalties  for  marijuana  use 
and  amnesty  for  war  resisters.  These  audiences,  wrote  one  of  his  aides, 
"would  be  the  campaign  workers  and  voters  who  would  make  a  difference.  "77 
Observing  the  organisation  at  work  in  the  Massachusetts  primary  Theodore 
White  commented,  "No  bulletin  board  in  any  college,  apparently,  carried 
any  other  notices  but  those  of  McGovern  volunteers  or  rallies.  "78 
Prior  to  1976,  several  Democratic  candidates  sought  to  imitate  McGovern 
focusing  on  recruiting  helpers  amongst  reform  Democratic  groups. 
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In 
the  years  preceding  1980,,  Connolly  and  Reagan  established  political 
action  committees  which  enabled  them  to  tour  the  country  campaigning 
for  conservative  Republicans  and  building  contacts  among  the  party 
activists. 
Appeals  to  issue  activists  were  also  employed  to  generate  the 
financial  resources  with  which  to  mount  extensive  campaigns.  Contri- 
buting  to  campaigns  is  correlated  with  other  forms  of  political  activism 
so  the  participant  bias  extends  to  fund  raising.  The  reforms  of 
campaign  finance  laws  necessitated  a  mass  base  to  pay  for  campaigns 
following  the  prohibitions  on  large  donations  (if  federal  matching 
funds  are  utilised). 
.  Policy  appeals  aided  fund  raising  efforts  by  providing  access  to -  340  - 
issue-based  constituencies.  Use  of  interest  group  membership  rolls  and 
magazine  subscriber  lists  facilitated  concentrated  solicitations  with 
a  high  rate  of  return.  For  example,  McGovern's  direct  mail  campaign 
focused  on  members  of  SANE  (National  Committee  for  a  Sane  Nuclear 
Policy),  subscribers  to  New  Republic  and  contributors  to  the  appeal  for 
funds  to  sustain  the  McGovern-Hatfield  amendment  for  ending  the  Vietnam 
war. 
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Udall's  efforts  concentrated  on  environmentalists;  Bayh,  a 
sponsor  of  ERA,  on  women's  activist  groups  and  Jackson,  a  staunch 
defender  of  Israel,  rented  mailing  lists  from  synagogues. 
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For  candidates  who  did  not  emphasise  issue  appeals  potential 
financial  constituencies  were  more  amorphous.  For  this  reason  neither 
the  Ford  nor  Carter  campaigns  in  1976  initially  engaged  in  direct  mailing 
efforts,  believing  that  they  possessed  no  constituencies  that  could  be 
tapped  economically  and  productively. 
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Such  candidates  could  compen- 
sate  for  the  smaller  number  of  donations  by  their  greater  size.  However, 
the  utility  of  larger  sums  in  post-reform  nominating  politics  was  less 
than  previously. 
The  increased  permeability  of  the  reformed  nominating  process  to 
interest  group  participation  enhanced  the  incentives  for  candidates  to 
bid  for  their  support  by  espousing  their  issues.  Group  support  provided 
cohesive  voting  blocs,  organisation  and  finance.  In  1980,  for  example, 
all  major  Republican  candidates  except  Anderson  opposed  gun  control  in 
bidding  for  the  support  of  gun  owner  groups.  In  1972  McGovern  appealed 
to  "every  faction  of  the  fragmented  American  left:  peace  groups,  women's 
liberation,  blacks,  populists,  and  gay  liberation. 
J3 
In  competing  for  group  support  candidates  differentiated  themselves 
from  their  opponents  by  their  early  commitment  to  group  causes  and  the 
outspokenness  of  their  positions.  On  Vietnam,  as  on  other  issues, 
McGovern's  campaign  proclaimed  that  he  had  been  'Right  from  the  Start'. -  341  - 
McGovern  had  been  an  early  critic  of  American  involvement  claiming 
in  his  announcement  statement  to  have  "stood  almost  alone  in  opposition 
to  the  sending  of  American  troops"  in  the  early  1960'x. 
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As  a 
sponsor  of  ERA,  Bayh  claimed  the  support  of  women's  rights  groups, 
and  Jackson  sought  the  allegiance  of  Jewish  voters  by  emphasising  his 
long-standing  support  for  Israel. 
By  outspoken  stances  candidates  sought  to  align  themselves  with 
,  as 
group  interests  so  closel  to  make  their  opponents  seem  reticent  by 
comparison.  McGovern  called  for  a  reduction  in  the  defence  budget 
of  a  third  offering  a  challenge  to  other  candidates  who  espoused  new 
domestic  priorities  without  specifying  how  increased  spending  would  be 
funded. 
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In  his  commitment  to  busing  in  1972  Lindsay  pursued  the 
black  vote  likening  the  compromise  positions  of  other  liberals  to 
Wallace  who  made  no  claim  to  black  support. 
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Incursions  by  independents  and  crossover  voting  was  stimulated  by 
issue  and  ideological  appeals.  Injecting  non-party  identifiers  into 
primaries  and  caucuses  could  skew  the  issue  and  ideological  preferences 
of  the  nominating  electorate  towards  candidates  who  were  advantaged 
compared  to  a  purely  partisan  electorate.  By  adopting  the  most  out- 
spoken  stances  on  popular  causes  in  either  party,  candidates  became 
the  instrumentality  for  issue  voters  across  the  party  divide.  Wallace's 
opposition  to  busing  in  1972  tapped  discontent  amongst  Republicans  and 
independents  in  addition  to  Democrats.  McGovern  on  the  Vietnam  war, 
like  Wallace  on  busing,  articulated  the  clearest  divergence  from  current 
policy  on  an  issue  which  aroused  widespread  discontent.  Reagan  in  1976 
espoused  a  hawkishness  on  foreign  policy  unrepresented  by  Ford  or  the 
Democratic  candidates  (after  Wallace's  demise).  Anderson  in  1980 
offered  liberal  stances  in  all  policy  areas  but  without  the  character 
defects  that  constrained  Kennedy's  support. -  342  - 
Appeals  for  the  crossover  vote  stressed  incentives  to  crossing  party 
lines.  Reagan's  advertising  in  1976  sought  to  entice  conservative 
Democrats  into  the  Republican  primaries  following  the  collapse  of 
Wallace's  candidacy.  In  Texas  Reagan  commercials  featured  a  Wallace 
supporter  addressing  himself  to  Democrats: 
"I've  always  been  a  Democrat,  all  my  life.  A  conservative 
Democrat.  As  much  as  I  hate  to  admit  it,  George  Wallace 
can't  be  nominated.  Ronald  Reagan  can.  He's  right  on 
the  issues.  So  for  the  first  time  in  my  life  I'm  gonna 
vote  for  Ronald  Reagan:  "87 
Leaflets  were  distributed  announcing,  "Democrats:  you  will  not  be 
committing  a  major  indiscretion  if  you  vote,  this  year,  in  the  Republican 
primary-168 
Personal  Traits  and  Character 
Despite  the  prominence  assigned  to  candidate  factors  in  explaining 
voting  in  presidential  elections  they  received  little  systematic  discus- 
sion  as  determinants  of  preference  in  pre-reform  national  conventions. 
Where  references  were  made  to  such  factors  they  were  stated  at  a  high 
level  of  generality,  as  in  the  candidate's  need  to  "exhibit  the  virtues 
of  statesmanship  in  terms  which  have  wide  appeal,  while  giving  the 
impression  of  individuality  as  a  person... 
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The  content  of  such  qualities, 
how  candidates  projected  them,  how  leaders  responded  or  discriminated 
between  rival  presentations  was  not  disclosed. 
However,  there  are  sufficient  fragmentary  references  to  personal 
traits  and  character  in  pre-reform  writing  to  give  some  impression  of 
their  content,  presentation  and  reception.  They  can  be  summarised  as 
follows:  candidates'  presentations  were  communicated  to  party  leaders 
directly  through  personal  interaction;  such  interactions  were  often 
private  (rendering  knowledge  of  their  content  elusive);  public  presen- -  343  - 
tations  of  ascriptive  status  concentrated  on  traits  recognised  as 
electorally  desirable  or  supposed  disqualifications  were  presented 
so  as  to  discount  them  as  handicaps;  presentations  of  potential 
presidential  character  were  keyed  to  defining  co-operative  working 
relations  with  party  leaders. 
When  the  nomination  was  controlled  by  small  numbers  of  party 
leaders  candidates  sought  to  establish  personal  contacts  with  them. 
The  years  prior  to  the  convention  were  devoted  to  building  friendly 
relations  with  the  leaders  who  would  subsequently  control  delegates. 
Where  the  requisite  intelligence  was  available  candidates  keyed  their 
presentations  to  the  idiosyncracies  of  individual  leaders.  For  example, 
John  Kennedy's  informant  on  one  Midwestern  governor  observed  that 
"any  approach  to  him  which  overlooks  this  strong  religious  drive  - 
which  is  completely  intermeshed  with  his  personal  ambition  -  will  miss 
the  mark.  "90 
The  cultivation  of  personal  relations  either  generated  support 
or  established  the  foundations  on  which  other  appeals  could  later  be 
constructed.  The  relevance  of  personal  familiarity  to  building  support 
advantaged  those  candidates  with  extensive  contacts  within  the  party 
such  as  Nixon,  Goldwater,  John  Kennedy  and  Humphrey.  In  contrast, 
candidates  lacking  a  network  of  friendships  in  the  party  hierarchy 
were  deprived  of  support  or  the  relationships  from  which  it  could 
be  generated.  A  Midwestern  Republican  state  chairman  illustrated 
Nixon's  advantage  in  1968  - 
°I  think  that  people  who've  been  in  the  political  process 
as  I  have  are  comfortable  with  Dick  Nixon.  I've  always 
trusted  him  and  felt  grateful  to  him.  I  could  feel  that 
way  about  Rockefeller  or  Reagan  if  I  knew  them  better, 
but  I  don't.  There's  the  old  saying  here  -  stay  with  a 
friend.  " 
91 
Candidates  recognised  the  leaders'  electoral  orientation  in  the -  344  - 
presentation  of  their  personal  attributes.  Characteristics  conducive 
to  election  were  emphasised.  Attributes  considered  deterimental  to 
electoral  chances  were  overlooked  or  attempts  made  to  demonstrate 
their  surmountability  as  obstacles  to  election.  For  example,  in 
1960  Symington's  appeal  was  premised  on  his  satisfaction  of  the 
criteria  of  availability.  As  a  Border  state  Protestant  from  British 
stock  with  a  moderately  liberal  record  he  would  be  acceptable  to  all 
factions,  and  electable. 
Confronted  by  apparent  religious  and  regional  barriers  to  their 
electability,  Kennedy  and  Johnson  respectively  in  1960  sought,  variously, 
to  question  the  legitimacy  of  their  disqualifications,  disprove  their 
impeditive  effects  and  distance  themselves  from  their  negative  associ- 
ations.  Kennedy  stressed  his  commitment  to  church-state  separation 
and  noted  that  there  had  been  no  religious  barriers  to  his  serving 
his  country  in  the  armed  forces  or  in  Congress.  Johnson  denounced 
extra-constitutional  qualifications  for  the  presidency  like  regional 
specifications.  To  demonstrate  that  his  religion  did  not  deter  voters 
Kennedy  entered  several  primaries  to  prove  his  electability.  Having 
shown  his  appeal  to  voters  he  gained  the  additional  leverage  with 
party  leaders  concerned  for  the  electoral  allegiance  of  Catholics 
risking  the  charge  of  anti-Catholic  prejudice  if  they  rejected  him. 
92 
To  modify  his  southern  connection  Johnson  referred  to  Texas  as  a 
Western  state.  He  campaigned  for  its  admission  to  Democratic  Confer- 
ence  of  Western  states  and  sought  delegates  in  the  region  in  an  attempt 
to  offset  his  image  as  an  exclusively  southern  candidate. 
Whilst  candidates  sought  to  demonstrate  their  possession  of  the 
requisites  of  presidential  calibre  such  as  experience  and  leadership, 
their  presentations  were  also  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  a 
nominating  electorate  of  party  leaders  whose  political  fortunes  were, -  345  - 
in  part,  dependent  upon  the  president.  This  stimulated  the  leaders' 
concern  for  the  candidates'  likely  conduct  of  presidential  office 
in  relation  to  them.  To  satisfy  these  concerns  candidates  intimated 
their  intended  methods  for  distributing  patronage  and  favours,  their 
likely  responsiveness  to  leaders'  requests  and  deference  to  their 
control  of  their  own  bailiwicks.  Such  presentations  assured  the 
leaders  of  access  at  federal  level  and  freedom  from  intervention  in 
their  own  domains.  One  of  the  attractions  of  Symington's  candidacy 
was  that  he  promised  to  be  a  boss's  president:  one  who  deferred  to 
their  local  control. 
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Robert  Kennedy's  appeal  to  party  leaders  over 
McCarthy  was  that  they  knew  from  past  experience  that  he  could  deal 
with  them. 
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After  reform  expanded  the  nominating  electorate  candidate  presen- 
tations  of  personal  traits  and  character  were  communicated  to  voters 
via  the  mass  media.  Such  interactions  were  public.  Presentations 
were  no  longer  refracted  through  leader-oriented  requirements.  Their 
definitions  of  electable  and  co-operative  presidents  ceased  to  con- 
strain  candidates  in  projecting  their  images.  Character  and  style 
were  defined  in  relation  to  voter  demands.  Further  reflecting  the 
switch  from  a  leader-  to  voter-dominated  electorate,  candidates  strove 
to  present  a  non-political  image  and  td  distance  themselves  from 
Washington  and  the  political  establishment. 
In  a  voter-dominated  process  candidate  presentations  could  no 
longer  be  achieved  through  personal  interaction.  To  present  themselves 
to  voters  candidates  were  dependent  upon  the  mass  media  either  through 
paid  advertising  or  news  coverage.  Thomas  Patterson  noted  the  changed 
means  of  presentation  - 
"Instead  of  seeking  meetings  with  the  party  leadership  the 
candidate  now  spends  his  time  going  from  one  media  market 
to  the  next,  seeking  coverage  through  local  news  organis- 
ations  and  the  national  reporters  accompanying  him  on  the 
campaign  trail.  ", 
95 -  346  - 
The  change  from  direct  to  mediated  presentations  increased  the 
public  content  of  the  campaign.  Conclaves  could  still  be  held  with 
party  leaders  and  representatives  of  interest  groups  but  such  inter- 
actions  could  not  deliver  delegates  as  earlier  candidate-leader 
meetings  could. 
After  reform  candidates'  presentations  of  their  ascriptive  status 
was  directed  at  generating  voter  support  rather  than  satisfying  the 
leaders'  tests  of  electability.  In  1976  Carter's  unorthodox  religious 
and  regional  affiliations  did  not  prevent  him  from  dominating  the 
nomination.  His  assurances  to  Jews  and  Catholics  were  aimed,  not 
at  leaders  concerned  for  his  electoral  potential,  but  to  members  of 
those  groups  voting  in  primaries.  His  statements  of  support  for 
Israel  and  Soviet  Jews,  meetings  and  publicised  endorsements  from 
Jewish  leaders  were  concentrated  in  the  period  prior  to  the  primaries 
in  California,  New  Jersey  and  Ohio  in  which  Jews  were  a  significant 
voting  bloc.  In  the  South  he  capitalised  on  his  regional  appeal.  In 
the  North  his  defeat  of  Wallace  in  the  South  verified  his  appeal  to 
blacks  and  some  liberals. 
Two  candidate  images  developed  in  the  reform  period  which  mark 
the  switch  from  a  leader-  to  a  voter-controlled  process  are  the 
non-politician  and  the  Washington  outsider.  Both  were  probably  fostered 
by  post-Watergate  disenchantment  but  they  became  plausible  presentations 
when  the  nomination  was  removed  from  practising  politicians  based  in 
or  linked  to  Washington  who,  in  reality  or  caricature,  provided  the 
stereotypes  from  which  candidates  sought  to  distinguish  themselves. 
The  image  of  a  non-politician  was  promoted  by  an  emphasis  on 
integrity  and  purism,  references  to  non-political  experience  and 
personal  unconventionality.  Declaring  his  candidacy  for  1972,  McGovern 
committed  himself  to  a  campaign  resting,  on  "candor  and  reason  ...  For -  347  - 
my  part,  I  make  one  pledge  above  all  others  -  to  seek  and  speak  the 
truth  with  all  the  resources  of  mind  and  spirit  I  command.  "  96 
Muskies  advertising  proclaimed  "Trusty  Muskie".  Carter  frequently 
promised  that  he  would  never  lie.  Udall's  advertising  featured 
testaments  to  his  moral  strength  from  Archibald  Cox,  the  dismissed 
Watergate  Special  Prosecutor. 
Purism  was  demonstrated  by  two  means.  First,  candidates 
emphasised  the  boldness  and  clarity  of  their  statements  of  policy  and 
principle.  Dismissing  easy  options  as  unrealistic,  Anderson's 
advertising  denoted  his  distinctiveness  in  presenting  the  electorate 
with  the  unpalatable  alternatives,  "Itm  asking  you  to  think  about  a 
candidate  who  dares  to  discuss  them  before  an  election.  "97  McGovern, 
employing  the  slogan  "Right  from  the  Start",  recalled  his  lonely 
opposition  to  the  involvement  of  American  troops  in  Vietnam.  Udall's 
advertising  noted  his  record  of  being  in  the  vanguard  in  Congress 
in  adopting  stances  on  controversial  issues  before  they  became  popular. 
98 
The  second  component  of  the  purist  appeal  was  a  proclaimed 
unwillingness  to  compromise  for  political  advantage.  McGovern's 
announcement  statement  expressed  opposition  to  backroom  deals, 
coalitions  of  self-interest  and  adjusting  policy  stances  to  accord 
with  public  opinion. 
99 
Reagan  repudiated  ticket-balancing  in  favour 
of  philosophical  consistency.  Udall's  opposition  to  the  "interests" 
as  a  member  and  chairman  of  the  House  Interior  Committee  was  given 
prominence  in  his  advertising. 
100 
Candidates  distanced  themselves  from  career  politician  stereo- 
types  by  publicising  their  experience  outside  politics.  Carter  fre- 
quently  invoked  his  curriculum  vitae  as  a  farmer,  engineer,  planner, 
businessman,  nuclear  physicist  and  naval  officer.  Reagan's  announce- 
bent  for  1980  referred  to  his  experience  of  America  from  several  vantage -  348  - 
points  -  as  sportscaster,  actor,  labour  union  official,  soldier  and 
public  official. 
101 
Personal  unconventionality  contributed  to  the  non-political  image 
and  differentiated  candidates  from  their  competitors.  Carter  pro- 
claimed  his  religious  commitment  and  preached  a  gospel  of  love  to 
political  audiences.  Harris  campaigned  using  borrowed  cars,  staying 
in  private  homes  and  relying  on  volunteer  campaign  staff.  Whilst 
such  frugality  was  financially  necessary  it  also  promoted  the  desired 
image  of  a  'people's  campaign'. 
102 
Brown  rejected  the  trappings  of 
gubernatorial  office  and  pursued  idiosyncratic  personal  interests. 
He  is,  Elizabeth  Drew  wrote,  "California  hip  -  and  he  knows  how  to 
use  it  to  political  effect:  health  food,  Zen,  appropriate  technology, 
quoting  E.  F.  Schumacher's  Small  Is  Beautiful.  "  103 
Some  candidates  continued  to  portray  themselves  as  politicians. 
Bayh  proclaimed  that  it  took  a  good  politician  to  be  agood  president. 
Baker  expressed  his  pride  in  being  a  politician  and  Bush  boasted  that 
he  would  be  a  president  who  would  not  have  to  be  trained  on  the  job. 
All  three  failed  to  win  the  nomination.  Bayh  and  Baker  were  elimin- 
ated  early  in  the  primary  sequence  despite  substantial  reputations 
in  Washington  and  plausible  claims  of  electability.  Their  failure 
was  indicative  of  the  unattractiveness  of  the  politician's  image  in 
a  process  dominated  by  voters  in  the  post-Watergate  era. 
Negative  treatments  of  Washington  were  prominent  in  post-reform 
candidates'  presentations.  In  an  open  process  candidates  were  able  to 
exploit  the  greater  distrust  of  political  institutions  of  the  elec- 
torate  than  is  prevalent  amongst  elites. 
104 
The  federal  government 
and  Congress  were  condemned  for  unresponsiveness,  lack  of  innovation, 
inefficiency,  profligacy  and  receptivity  to  special  interests. 
Declaring  his  candidacy  for  1972,  Lindsay  cast  himself  as  the -  349  - 
spokesman  for  "the  America  Washington  has  ignored!.  "105  McGovern 
condemned  the  "establishment  center"  which,  he  claimed,  Americans 
viewed  as  a  decaying  void  commanding  neither  confidence  nor  love. 
106 
Condemning  Congress  for  its  immobility,  Carter  attributed  its  failings 
to  its  members, 
"we  know  from  bitter  experience  we're  not  going  to  get 
the  changes  we  need  by  shifting  around  the  same  groups 
of  Washington  insiders.  They  sit  up  in  Congress  every 
year  making  the  same  political  speeches  and  the  same 
unkept  promises"  107 
Focusing  on  his  Congress-based  opponents  Carter's  advertising  in  New 
Hampshire  charged:  "The  candidates  running  for  President  are  telling 
the  people  ...  about  the  evils  of  the  Washington  bureaucracy,  when 
they  have  been  part  of  that  bureaucracy  all  along,.  "  108 
Reagan's 
announcement  for  1976  identified  a  "buddy  system"  in  Washington 
that  "functions  for  its  own  benefit  -  increasingly  insensitive  to  the 
needs  of  the  American  worker  who  supports  it  with  his  taxes.  Today 
it  is  difficult  to  find  leaders  who  are  independent  of  the  forces 
that  have  brought  us  our  problems  -  the  Congress,  the  bureaucracy, 
the  lobbyists,  big  business  and  big  labor.  "109  Wallace  railed  against 
the  arrogance,  hypocrisy  and  ineptitude  of  Washington  intellectuals 
resulting  in  schemes  of  misplaced  social  engineering  like  busing,.. 
'the  most  atrocious,  callous,  cruel,  asinine  thing  you  can  do  for 
little  children.  "  110 
Governors  and  ex-governors  pledged  to  correct  Washington's  faults 
by  injecting  the  virtues  that  characterised  their  state  administrations. 
Carter  promised  a  rationalisation  of  the  federal  bureaucracy  compar- 
able  to  that  he  promoted  in  Georgia.  Reagan  offered  a  repeat  of  the 
reorganisation  of  welfare  and  economy  in  government  effected  in 
California.  Brown  offered  the  "different  approach"  he  utilised  as 
governor  to  the  president's  tasks. -  350  - 
Conclusion 
Adapted  to  the  demands  of  party  leaders,  pre-reform  candidates 
projected  themselves  as  party  loyalists,  representatives  of  the 
electorate's  policy  consensus,  effective  (and  appreciative)  politician- 
presidents.  Party-pragmatic  was  the  modal  campaign  style. 
The  utility  of  party  and  pragmatic  emphases  weakened  after  reform. 
The  displacement  of  the  leaders  removed  their  guardianship  of  the 
party's  heritage  and  organisational  demands  from  influence  over  the 
nomination.  They  were  replaced  by  voters  less  sympathetic  to  parties 
and  politicians,  and  ideologically-attuned  activists.  In  a  partici- 
patory  process  the  party-pragmatic  style  risked  an  unintensity  inef- 
fective  in  mobilising  support.  To  activate  a  constituency  many 
candidates  relied  upon  issue  specificity,  hostility  to  or  independence 
from  the  party,  their  uncompromising  distinctiveness  as  non-politicians. 
The  shift  in  candidate  emphases  between  the  two  periods  moves 
from  elements  of  the  professional  to  elements  of  the  amateur  style. 
"' 
In  a  process  controlled  by  professionals  candidates  appealed  to  their 
organisational,  non-ideological,  personal,  material  concerns.  In  a 
participatory  process  accessible  to  amateurs  candidates  projected 
themselves  as  ideological,  uncompromising,  anti-  (professionally-led) 
parties. -  351  - 
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CHAPTER  NINE 
COMMUNICATING  THE  CAMPAIGN 
Reform  enhanced  the  public  nature  of  nomination  campaigns.  They 
came  to  be  conducted  amongst  the  mass  electorate  more  than  party 
leaders,  via  public  communications  rather  than  private  negotiations. 
After  reform  campaigns  were  mediated  through  the  means  of  mass  communi- 
cation  where  before  they  were  conducted  directly  with  the  nominating 
electorate. 
This  chapter  contrasts  the  pre-reform  personalised  campaign  with 
its  mediated  successor.  It  argues  that  in  the  pre-reform  period 
personal  relations  with  party  leaders  were  a  necessary  pre-condition 
of  winning  their  support.  The  mass  media  performed  three  functions 
in  the  candidates'  leader-oriented  campaigns.  The  prestige  press' 
influence  upon  the  party  leaders  promoted  their  writers  into  targets 
of  candidate  efforts  to  win  their  recognition  and  favourable  coverage. 
Secondly,  the  popular  media  (television,  radio,  provincial  newspapers, 
popular  magazines)  were  utilised  by  candidates  whose  strategies 
emphasised  the  mobilisation  of  voters.  Thirdly,  the  media  transmitted 
campaign  advertising  material,  again  a  strategy  used  by  the  vote- 
mobilisers,  particularly  those  entered  in  primaries. 
After  reform  the  need  to  reach  the  greatly  enlarged  nominating 
electorate  enhanced  the  candidates'  dependence  upon  mass  media.  Per- 
sonalised  campaigning  ceased  to  be  plausible  where  the  nominating 
electorate  numbered  millions.  Moreover,  shifts  occurred  in  the 
nature  and  functions  of  the  media  strategies  of  the  candidates. 
Seeking  to  reach  a  mass  audience,  the  popular  media,  particularly  tele- 
vision,  became  the  focus  of  all  candidates.  As  campaign  finance  laws 
curbed  expenditure  on  advertising  and  organisation  so  media  reportage -  358  - 
grew  in  importance  as  the  vehicle  for  reaching  the  electorate. 
The  Personalised  Campaign 
When  the  nominating  electorate  consisted  of  a  few  hundred  party 
leaders  it  was  feasible  for  candidates  to  conduct  campaigns  in  person 
with  individual  leaders.  For  the  majority  of  pre-reform  candidates 
who  eschewed  cultivation  of  the  voters,  personalised  campaigns 
amongst  party  leaders  dominated  their  strategies.  Even  popular 
favourite  candidates  auch  as  John  Kennedy  seeking  to  mobilise  voters 
also  recognised  the  need  to  communicate  with  party  leaders.  Their 
strategies  recognised  that  public  popularity  in  the  absence  of  leader- 
ship  support  or  acquiescence,  as  exemplified  by  Kefauver  in  1952, 
would  be  insufficient  to  win  the  nomination.  For  these  candidates 
the  public  and  leader  campaigns  meshed. 
Personalised  campaigns  resulted  from  a  nominating  electorate 
consisting  of  local  notables  and  the  individualised  appeals  made  to' 
them.  By  campaigning  in  person  candidates  demonstrated  their  deference 
to  the  leaders'  control  of  their  bailiwicks  and  signified  the  importance 
that  their  support  carried.  For  the  leaders  such  campaigns  generated 
localised  benefits.  They  were  seen  to  be  confidants  of  popular  national 
figures  gaining  in  prestige  from  such  associations.  Personal  campaigns 
were  also  required  to  communicate  appeals  particular  to  each  leader. 
Whilst  the  public  'face'  of  the  campaign  emphasised  generalised  appeals 
of  electability,  policy  stances  etc.,  the  personal  component  of  the 
campaign  entailed  offering  grants  of  access  to  specific  leaders  in 
exchange  for  their  support.  Establishing  the  content  of  such  exchanges 
took  place  through  bargaining  necessitating  personal  communication. 
Personal  interaction  might  alone  generate  bonds  of  friendship -  359  - 
which  could  be  translated  into  support.  As  Polsby  observed,  "A 
politician  will  naturally  favor  a  presidential  hopeful  from  his  own 
state,  or  an  aspirant  with  whom  he  has  been  on  close  personal  or 
professional  terms. 
1  Such  personal  relations  were  likely  to  provide 
fertile  grounds  on  which  access  could  be  obtained.  In  accounting 
for  Kennedy's  success  in  1960  Theodore  White  attached  weight  to  the 
number  of  local  party  people  that  the  candidate  knew. 
2 
Such  know- 
ledge  had  been  deliberately  acquired  from  1956  onwards.  Adducing 
reasons  for  Kennedy's  narrow  defeat  for  the  1956  vice  presidential 
nomination  his  1960  campaign  manager,  Robert  Kennedy,  recalled  a 
Maryland  couple, 
"They  were  entirely  friendly.  They  liked  us.  But  Kefauver 
had  visited  them  in  their  home.  He  had  sent  them  Christmas 
cards.  We  couldn't  shake  them.  Believe  me,  we've  sent 
out  lots  of  Christmas  cards  since.  "3 
The  Midwestern  Republican  state  chairman  quoted  in  the  last  chapter 
reflected  a  preference  based  on  personal  rather  than  political  grounds 
in  explaining  his  support  for  Nixon  in  1968, 
"I  think  that  people  who've  been  in  the  political  process  as 
I  have  are  comfortable  with  Dick  Nixon.  I've  always  trusted 
him  and  felt  grateful  to  him.  I  could  feel  this  way  about 
Rockefeller  or  Reagan  if  I  knew  them  better;  but  I  don't. 
There's  the  old  saying  here  -  stay  with  a  friend.  ". 
4 
Personal  contacts  were  often  established  by  candidates  in  their 
performance  of  party  maintenance  functions.  By  attending  dinners, 
raising  funds,  making  speeches  and  campaigning  for  local  candidates 
they  came  into  contact  with  local  leaders.  Concomitantly,  they  demon- 
strated  their  commitment  to  the  welfare  of  the  local  parties,  assisted 
them  in  fulfilling  their  objectives  and  so  established  an  indebtedness 
amongst  their  leaders.  Candidates  solicitous  of  the  local  parties' 
interests  in  earlier  years  thus  mounted  campaigns  on  territory  culti- 
vated  through  party  service.  In  accounting  for  Kennedy's  popularity" -  360  - 
amongst  local  party  leaders  in  1960  Sorensen  cited  his  past  efforts, 
"He  had  spoken  at  their  dinners  and  rallies,  raised  and 
given  money  for  their  campaigns,  sought  their  advice  and 
assistance,  and  maintained  a  genuine  interest  in  them  all. 
He  never  refused  a  phone  call,  ignored  a  letter  or  turned 
away  a  visitor.  "5 
An  Iowa  party  leader  in  1968  exemplified  reciprocation  for  Humphrey's 
past  efforts  by  supporting  him  for  the  nomination,  "In  the  years  when 
we  could  put  our  caucuses  and  conventions  in  phone  booths,  if  we 
wanted  anyone  to  come  and  speak  it  was  always  Hubert.,  .6 
Candidates  without  personal  connections  to  party  leaders  were 
disadvantaged  in  the  quest  for  support.  They  lacked  the  personal 
relations  which  could  provide  support  automatically  or  the  base  from 
which  it  could  be  won.  The  absence  of  personal  relations  indicated  a 
previous  record  of  unconcern  for  the  leaders  and  their  party  organis- 
ations.  The  resentment  of  Republican  professionals  towards  Rockefeller 
derived  in  part  from  the  belief  that  he  promoted  himself  rather  than 
the  party. 
7 
An  Oregon  Republican  exemplified  the  displeasure  towards 
a  candidate  with  a  national  reputation  who  had  not  engaged  in  the 
unglamorous  work  of  assisting  local  parties, 
"He's  coming  now  because  he  wants  us.  But  who  the  Hell  is 
he?  Just  a  face  on  television.  We  don't  know  him.  But 
we  do  know  Nixon  . 
'8 
The  Pre-Reform  Role  of  Media 
Some  candidates  in  the  pre-reform  period  relied  exclusively  on 
communication  within  the  party  organisations  to  win  the  nomination. 
Symington  in  the  immediate,  pre-reform  period  typifies  this  intra-party 
communication  strategy.  He  lacked  public  recognition  and  popularity 
but  made  no  attempt  to  acquire  it.  Symington's  appeal  was  his  ability 
and  his  widespread  acceptability  both  of  which  would  impress  party -  361  - 
leaders  in  private  meetings.  His  strategists  believed  that  the  nomin- 
ation  could  be  won  by  a  candidate  with  these  assets,  known  and  popular 
within  the  party  but  largely  unknown  outside.  Cultivation  of  the 
electorate  could  await  the  election  campaign  after  the  nomination 
had  been  won. 
9 
Symington's  campaign  was  exceptional  in  the  1960's  for  its 
neglect  of  strategies  aimed  at  generating  public  recognition  and  pop- 
ularity.  By  the  immediate  pre-reform  period  most  candidates  perceived 
that  winning  the  nomination  depended  upon  attaining  public  prominence 
rather  than  satisfying  the  criteria  of  availability. 
10 
Establishing  prominence  proceeded  via  the  mass  media  through  two 
avenues.  The  first  was  aimed  at  the  nominating  electorate  through 
the  quality  media  to  which  they  were  responsive.  The  second  was  aimed 
at  the  mass  public  directed  towards  generating  prominence  that  would 
provide  a  source  of  leverage  with  party  leaders. 
To  reach  the  nominating  electorate  necessitated  use  of  the  prestige 
press  such  as  the  New  York  Times  and  Time  utilised  by  political  elites. 
The  influences  of  these  publications  had  two  bases.  First,  their 
news  sources  included  political  leaders.  "These  newspapers",  accord- 
ing  to  Key,  "serve  a  special  function  in  communication  among  the 
major  political  actors  and  lesser  activists.  These  people  talk  to 
each  other  through  these  papers;  thus  they  provide,  in  a  sense,  an 
arena  for  continuing  discussion  of  politics  among  those  principally 
concerned.  ""  The  close  contacts  between  the  writers  for  these 
publications  and  party  leaders  enabled  measures  of  the  latter's  presi- 
dential  preferences  to  be  registered.  Such  reports  served  to  mitigate 
the  pervasive  uncertainty  surrounding  nominating  politics. 
12 
Gaining 
knowledge  of  the  preferences  of  other  relevant  actors  had  utility 
for  party  leaders  assisting  them  in  deciding  the  direction  and  timing -  362  - 
of  their  own  commitments  so  as  to  maximise  their  own  political 
advantage. 
Secondly,  the  major  commentators  for  these  publications  were 
political  influentials  in  their  own  right.  The  work  of  writers  such 
as  Reston,  Lawrence  and  Alsop  conditioned  the  thinking  of  political 
leaders.  Gaining  their  recognition  and  approval  provided  candidates 
with.  an  indirect  means  of  influence  within  the  nominating  electorate. 
In  a  memorandum  for  Nixon  prior  to  the  1968,  campaign  H.  R.  Haldeman 
estimated  that  one  important  favourable  Washington  column  was  worth 
more  than  two  dozen  press  releases  or  position  papers. 
13 
Candidates  keyed  their  campaigns  to  solicit  coverage  by  these 
publications  and  writers.  John  Kennedy's  campaign  concentrated  upon 
Time  because  it  was  a  national  publication  read  by  opinion  leaders. 
14 
He  and  his  staff  were  accessible  to  its  reporters  facilitating  their 
coverage  of  him.  He  also  conducted  a  propaganda  war  with  them  against 
the  magazine's  traditional  hostility  towards  liberal  Democrats  spurring 
them  to  zealously  fair  treatment. 
15  Johnson  was  similarly  receptive 
to  Time  believing  that  coverage  in  its  pages  (like  that  of  the  New  York 
Times)  was  the  route  to  establishing  a  national  reputation.  Once 
each  week  he  made  himself  available  for  interviews  with  the  magazine's 
writer  Hugh  Sidey. 
16 
Strategies  aimed  at  soliciting  the  recognition  and  approval  of 
commentators  were  keyed.  to  their  earnest  treatment  of  politics. 
Speeches  on  major  issues  were  delivered,.  and  articles  written  on 
matters  of  public  import.  Columnists  were  included  on  the  mailing 
list  of  recipients  of  John  Kennedy's  collection  of  speeches,  The 
Strategy  of  Peace,  published  in  the  Spring  of  1960.17 
The  influence  exerted  by  the  commentators  enforced  adaptations  in 
the  conduct  of  campaigns  to  attract  favourable  coverage.  During  the -  363  - 
1960  Wisconsin  primary  the  Humphrey  campaign  strengthened  its  organis- 
ational  activity  in  Marathon  County  in  anticipation  of  a  visit  there 
by  Joseph  Alsop.  On  a  previous  visit  the  Alsops  had  noted  the  paucity 
of  activity  on  Humphrey's  behalf  compared  to  that  for  Kennedy.  18 
The  second  component  of  media  strategy  was  aimed  at  the  party 
leaders  via  the  voters.  This  required  campaigns  concentrated  upon 
the  popular  media.  The  object  of  such  strategies  was  to  promote  the 
candidate's  public  recognition  and  popularity  which  would  exert 
pressure  on  the  leaders  from  below.  Seeking  an  electable  candidate 
and  the  preservation  of  their  own  positions  through  responsiveness  to 
pressure,  party  leaders  would  be  influenced  by  mass  preferences. 
The  most  sustained  cultivation  of  the  popular  media  in  the  pre- 
reform  period  was  undertaken  on  John  Kennedy's  behalf  prior  to  1960. 
Kennedy  was  projected  into  a  national  figure  largely  on  a-political 
grounds.  Rather,  his  youth  and  good  looks,  glamorous  family,  war 
record,  prize-winning  authorship  and  associations  with  the  famous 
were  utilised  to  earn  celebrity  status.  His  cultivation  of  reporters 
and  accessibility  to  them  eased  their  coverage  of  him.  His  celebrity 
status  boosted  the  sales  of  publications  in  which  he  was  featured. 
Joseph  Kennedy  perceived  the  relevance  of  his  son's  a-political 
appeal  to  the  task  of  winning  the  nomination, 
"You  advertise  the  fact  that  he  will  be  at  a  dinner  and  you 
will  break  all  records  for  attendance.  He  can  draw  more 
poeple  to  a  fund-raising  dinner  than  Cary  Grant  or  Jimmy 
Stewart.  Why  is  that?  He  has  more  universal  appeal. 
That  is  why  the  Democratic  party  is  going  to  nominate  him. 
The  party  leaders  around  the  country  realise  that  to  win 
they  have  to  nominate  him.  "19 
Kennedy's  prominence  generated  by  media  publicity  percolated  through 
to  the  party  organisations  because  local  leaders  recognised  it  amongst 
their  acquaintances. 
20 
The  evidence  of  his  prominence,  when  revealed 
in  the  media,  then  became  an  additional  lever  to  exert  against  party 364  - 
leaders  who  were  "deluged  ...  with  articles  by  and  about  Kennedy  ... 
books  by  and  about  Kennedy  and  polls  showing  Kennedy  ahead.  "21 
Kennedy's  employment  of  pollster  Lou  Harris  -  the  first  such 
engagement  in  a  campaign  for  the  nomination  -  provided  a  mechanism 
for  strengthening  his  relations  with  the  press  and  enhancing  the 
capability  for  influencing  the  content  of  their  stories  to  his  own 
advantage.  Harris  polls  conducted  in  various  states  showing  Kennedy 
ahead  were  passed  to  reporters  lacking  in  precise  measures  of  popular 
preference  below  the  national  level.  The  poll  results  were  then 
incorporated  into  stories  reporting  the  strength  of  support  for 
Kennedy.  Both  the  polls  and  articles  using  them  were  then  passed 
to  wavering  party  leaders  providing  persuasive  evidence  of  both 
Kennedy's  appeal  amongst  the  voters  and  its  recognition  by  the  press. 
Media  advertising  was  employed  principally  by  campaigns  seeking 
to  mobilise  voter  support.  Within  such  campaigns  advertising  was 
usually  concentrated  in  primary  states.  In  West  Virginia  in  1960 
print  and  broadcast  advertising  is  estimated  to  have  accounted  for 
40  per  cent  of  Kennedy's  total  expenditure  . 
22 
In  1964  more  than 
$1.5  million  was  expended  on  broadcast  advertising  in  the  nomination 
campaigns. 
23 
As  the  great  bulk  of  total  spending  was  concentrated 
in  primary  states,  California  pre-eminently,  it  can  be  assumed  that 
media  spending  was  also  concentrated  there. 
24 
Of  Robert  Kennedy's 
total  spending  in  seven  primary  states  in  1968,  approximately  two- 
fifths  of  expenditure  was  used  to  finance  media  advertising. 
25 
For  candidates  whose  strategies  were  less  dependent  upon  voter 
mobilisation  media  advertising"was  a  smaller  component  of  overall 
expenditure.  Humphrey's  newspaper  and  television  commercials  in 
1968,  for  example,  amounted  to  one-fifth  of  total  spending. 
26 
The  predominance  of  media  spending  in  primary  states  corrobor- 
ates  the  proposition  made  in  Chapter  Seven  that  efforts  to  mobilise -  365  - 
voters  into  the  pre-reform  convention-caucus  process  were  generally 
eschewed.  Public  campaigning  to  win  converts  and  generate  turnout 
were  neglected,  McCarthy  excepted,  even  by  candidates  pursuing  popular 
favourite  strategies.  In  these  states  popular  favourites,  like  other 
candidates,  sought  to  negotiate  support  through  party  leaders.  Proof 
of  their  voter  appeal  derived  from  evidence  external  to  the  delegate 
selection  process  such  as  crowds  in  the  streets  and,  in  the  form  of 
primaries  and  national  polls,  outside  the  particular  non-primary  state. 
Rockefeller's  1968  candidacy  was  the  most  intensive  media  campaign 
conducted  outside  the  primaries.  Though  utilising  a  popular  favourite 
strategy  the  campaign  was  inaugurated  after  the  filing  deadline  for 
the  primaries  had  passed.  Attempts  to  demonstrate  voter  appeal  were 
dependent  upon  the  evidence  of  the  polls.  They  also  provided  a  device 
which  could  be  used  to  question  Nixon's-vote-getting  capability  which 
appeared  to  have  been  proven  in  the  primaries.  For  the  Rockefeller 
strategists  'the  reliability  of  the  polls  as  election  indicators  was 
posed  against  the  primaries. 
Rockefeller's  claim  to  the  nomination  depended  upon  poll  evidence 
that  only  he  could  win  the  election  for  the  Republican  Party.  To 
promote  his  poll  standings  an  extensive  advertising  campaign  was 
launched  in  newspapers  and  television.  The  campaign  focused  upon 
media  markets  in  large  states  covering  half  the  country's  population 
and  where  Rockefeller's  potential  support  was  concentrated.  If  the 
candidate's  support  increased  in  these  areas  its  impact  would  register 
in  national  polls.  The  campaign's  conclusion  was  timed  to  coincide 
with  the  interviews  for  the  final  pre-convention  Gallup  poll.  In  states 
where  delegate  preferences  were  regarded  as  fluid  the  Rockefeller 
organisation  conducted  its  own  polls  to  use  in  negotiations  with 
party  leaders.  For  leaders  concerned  about  their  party's  local  elec- -  366  - 
toral  performance  the  Rockefeller  organisation  could  provide  evidence 
of  the  relative  merits  of  Nixon  and  Rockefeller  at  the  top  of  the 
ticket. 
As  modern  presidential  campaigns  came  to  rely  increasingly  upon 
mass  media  to  reach  voters  so  the  candidates'  ability  to  utilise  it 
successfully  grew  in  influence  upon  election  outcomes.  In  evaluating 
a  candidate's  electability,  competence  at  handling  the  media  became 
relevant  to  the  assessment. 
The  failure  of  Romney,  who  premised  his  appeal  to  the  Republican 
Party  on  his  electability,  to  handle  press  questioning  proved  devas- 
tating  to  his  candidacy  prior  to  1968.  His  inability  to  enunciate 
comprehensible,  cliche-free  programmes,  particularly  on  Vietnam, 
distinguishable  from  the  administration  resulted  in 
, critical  press 
reviews. 
27 
The  climax  in  media  depictions  of  the  candidate  as  a 
lightweight  occurred  when  Romney  admitted  in  a  local  Detroit  tele- 
vision  interview  that  on  his  tour  of  Vietnam  he  had  been  "brainwashed" 
by  American  military  and  diplomatic  representatives.  Time  subse- 
quently  described  the  statement  as  "so  inept  an  explanation  of  shift- 
ing  views  that  it  could  end  his  presidential  ambitions.  "28 
Nixon's  1968  strategy  incorporated  media  competence  into  the 
conception  of  electability  which  the  campaign  sought  to  project. 
This  sensitivity  to  the  candidate's  relations  with  and  coverage  by 
the  media  followed  from  the  perceived  deficiencies  in  his  1960  presi- 
dential  and  1962  gubernatorial  campaigns. 
A  two-fold  response  emerged  to  rectify  these  past  deficiencies. 
First,  Nixon  had  to  show  improved  quality  in  his  television  perform- 
ances.  His  television  adviser,  Frank  Shakespeare  (probably  the 
first  such  full-time  member,  of  a  pre-convention  campaign)  noted 
the  relevance  of  television  to  the  goal  of  proving  electability, -  367  - 
"The  Party  felt  that  Nixon  was  experienced,  he  was  able, 
but  he  wasn't  electable;  and  he  wasn't  electable  because 
he  couldn't  handle  TV.  The  country  was  moving  to  the 
right;  the  ablest  conservative  they  had  was  obviously 
Nixon,  but  Nixon  had  to  prove  he  was  electable.  He  could 
win  the  primaries  in  the  small  states  without  using  TV; 
but  then  that  wouldn't  prove  anything;  he  had  to  win 
it,  using  TV,  to  prove  to  the  Party  chiefs  that  he  could 
win  a  national  election.  "29 
Improved  television  technique  was  achieved  through  the  widespread 
use  of  commercially-produced  mini-programmes.  These  commercials  con- 
slated  of  the  candidate  answering  questions  from  panels  of  voters. 
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The  apperaance  was  that  of  an  authentic  programme  but,  in  fact,  composed 
of  edited  highlights  of  sessions  conducted  with  panel  members  selected 
by  the  producers.  In  this  controlled  environment  the  candidate 
projected  ease,  informality  and  knowledge. 
The  second  prong  of  the  strategy  was  directed  to  neutralising 
the  antagonism  of  reporters  towards  the  candidate.  In  part  this 
objective  was  secured  by  the  television  campaign  which  relied  heavily 
on  commercial  productions.  The  reliance  on  purchased  media.  circum- 
vented  the  reporters'  mediation  of  the  campaign.  Public  activities 
were  few  and  rigorously  controlled  by  the  campaign  organisation.  The 
paucity  of  such  activities  compelled  the  press  to  cover  them  but 
the  control  exerted  over  them  excluded  content  unfavourable  to  the 
candidate. 
Nixon  limited  direct  contacts  with  the  press  where  the  former 
hostility  might  re-emerge.  His  formula  for  success,  Witcover  wrote, 
consisted  of  "blood,  sweat  and  avoiding  press  conferences.  "  31 
When 
the  press  gained  access  to  the  candidate  he  reminded  them  of  his 
previous  harsh  treatment  blunting  their  scrutiny  of  him  by  provoking 
exaggerated  attempts  at  fairness. -  368  - 
The  Post-Reform  Mass  Media  Campaign 
The  expansion  of  the  nominating  electorate  after  reform  allied 
with  the  dilution  of  leader  influence  diminished  the  value  and 
plausibility  of  personalised  campaigns.  Personal  campaigning  was 
confined  to  those  pivotal  early  state  contests,  such  as  New  Hampshire 
and  Iowa,  which  received  intensive  coverage  from  the  candidates 
enabling  them  to  meet  many  voters  in  person.  (Prior  to  1980  it  was 
said  that  Bush  spent  so  much  time  in  Iowa  that  he  met  the  residence 
requirements  to  qualify  to  vote  there.  )  Personal  campaigning  in 
these  states  was  facilitated  by  the  small  electorate  of  New  Hampshire 
and  Iowa's  use  of  a  caucus  process  in  which  turnouts  are  low  compared 
to  a  primary.  In  consequence,  in  both  states  extended  campaigning 
enabled  substantial  proportions  of  the  nominating  electorate  to  be 
reached  by  personal  solicitation  by  the  candidate. 
But  these  states  were  exceptional  in  the  incidence  of  personal 
campaigning.  In  others,  candidates  were  dependent  upon  the  mass  media 
to  reach  the  enlarged  nominating  electorate.  Voters  lacked  the 
alternative  sources  of  information  about  candidates  that  were  avail- 
able  to  pre-reform  leaders  through  the  party  as  a  communications 
network  and  many  candidates  after  reform  started  their  campaigns 
with  low  public  visibility,  dependent  upon  the  media  to  generate 
their  recognition  by  voters. 
In  contrast,  most  pre-reform  candidates  either  were  established 
national  figures  or,  as  in  the  case  of  Symington,  regarded  such 
status  as  inessential  to  the  success  of  their  campaigns.  Post-reform 
nominees  McGovern  and  Carter  demonstrated  that  through  extensive 
media  coverage  candidates  could  rise  from  public  obscurity  to  wide- 
spread  voter  recognition  and  support  to  the  nomination.  In  February 
1976  only  20  per  cent  of  the  public  knew  something  about  Carter. -  369  - 
Two  months  later  the  total  had  risen  to  77  per  cent. 
32 
Whilst  candidates'  dependence  on  the  media  in  general  grew, 
news  coverage  (as  opposed  to  advertising)  gained  in  emphasis  as 
finance  law  reform  curbed  expenditures  on  media  commercials. 
The  1970'a  witnessed  a  further  shift  towards  television  as 
the  most  potent  medium  for  candidates  to  reach  the  electorate  through 
the  news.  In  that  period  television  provided  three-quarters  of  the 
population  with  most  of  their  news;  half  the  population  with  all 
of  their  news. 
33 
In  the  post-reform  period  candidates  were  thus  heavily  depen- 
dent  upon  the  quantity,  emphases  and  interpretations  of  their  candi- 
dacies  by  media,  particularly  television,  news  coverage.  Anticipating 
the  1980  contest,  John  Connally  defined  the  media's  significance, 
"On  a  scale  of  ten  the  importance  of  media  is  at  least  eight  and 
everything  else  is  two.  "34  Media  supplanted  organisation  as  the 
means  to  reach  the  electorate  when  the  proliferation  of  contests  and 
spending  curbs  diminished  the  capabilities  of  the  latter  as  a  campaign 
resource.  Carter's  1976  finance  director  recognised  the  dependence 
on  media  to  compensate  for  the  absence  of  organisation, 
"We  had  no  structure  after  Florida;  we  had  planned  only 
for  the  short  haul.  After  Florida  it  was  all  NBC,  CBS, 
and  the  New  York  Times. 
35 
The  recognition  of  media's  indispensability  produced  strategies 
by  candidate  organisations  designed  to  evoke  extensive  and  favour- 
able  coverage.  More  precisely  the  goals  of  such  strategies  were: 
to  obtain  more  coverage  than  any  opponent,  to  maximise  favourable  inter- 
pretations  of  the  candidate;  to  meet  or  exceed  media-imposed  expec- 
tations.  To  accomplish  these  objectives  campaigns  converged  on  those 
events  which  were  most  heavily  covered.  They  sought  tö  win  contests 
that  received  extensive  coverage  or  at  least  exceed  expectations. 
Events  and  incidents  were  stimulated  to  capture  media  attention. -  370  - 
The  candidate  and  his  staff  made  themselves  accessible  to  media 
personnel.  The  staff  promoted  their  interpretation  of  events 
amongst  newsmen  -  seeking  to  encourage  favourable  interpretations. 
The  candidates'  concentration  upon  the  early  contests  followed 
from  the  disproportionate  media  coverage  devoted  to  them.  Hamilton 
Jordan's  1976  Carter  strategy  observed  that, 
"The  press  shows  an  exaggerated  interest  in  the  early 
primaries  as  they  represent  the  first  confrontation 
between  candidates,  their  contrasting  strategies  and 
styles,  which  the  press  has  been  writing  and  speculating 
about  for  two  years.  " 
36 
The  media  focus  on  these  states  afforded  extensive  opportunities  for 
candidates  to  generate  recognition  and  favourable  coverage.  Thus 
they  received  disproportionately  large  allocations  of  the  candidates' 
time,  finance  and  organisation.  (See  Chapters  Six  and  Seven.  )  To 
eschew  these  contests  was  to  forgo  the  benefits  of  momentum  they 
conferred  and  bequeath  them  to  others  -  deferred  assets  which  could 
not  be  retrieved.  The  Udall  campaign's  eventual  decision  to  compete 
in  Iowa  in  1976  followed  from  a  belated  recognition  that  the  press 
would  cover  the  contest  thoroughly,  and  that  the  benefits  accruing 
to  Bayh,  their  principal  liberal  competitor,  if  he  won  were  too  great 
to  risk. 
37 
Reflecting  on  the  momentum  Carter  gathered  from  New 
Hampshire  that  year,  Jackson  retrospectively  concluded  that  staying 
out  of  the  state  conceded  benefits  which  no  other  state  could  deliver.  38 
Subsequent  studies  have  confirmed  the  preponderance  of  coverage 
devoted  to  New  Hampshire  even  within  a  general  weighting  toward  the 
early  contests. 
39  Thus  greater  opportunities  for  developing  recogni- 
tion  and  favourable  coverage  were  available  there  than  elsewhere. 
The  early  weighting  in  media  coverage  is  a  post-reform  phenomenon. 
In  both  the  pre-  and  post-reform  periods  primaries  dominated  coverage. 
For  example,  in  both  the  1964  and  1976  Republican  contests  primaries -  371  - 
accounted  for  over  80  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of  New  York  Times 
stories  devoted  to  state  delegate  selection  processes. 
40 
In  the 
pre-reform  period  it  was  the  few  contested  primaries  which  dominated 
coverage,  58  per  cent  of  the  paper's  state  coverage  in  1964.  In  the 
post-reform  period  the  cue  for  allocating  coverage  between  primaries 
shifted  from  contests  (virtually  all  post-reform  primaries  met  this 
specification)  to  chronology.  Coverage  of  the  early  primaries  out- 
weighed  that  devoted  to  states  later  in  the  sequence.  In  the  1976 
Republican  contest  the  first  ten  primaries  of  a  total  of  twenty-nine 
accounted  for  a  majority  of  New  York  Times  stories. 
In  the  pre-reform  period  the  media  concentration  on  primaries 
magnified  their  significance  in  relation  to  the  proportion  of  convention 
delegates  they  provided.  After  reform  the  preponderance  of  primary 
coverage  approximated  to  the  proportion  of  delegates  they  supplied. 
But  within  the  primary  coverage  the  early  states  received  an  over- 
representation  of  attention.  Under-representation  characterised  the 
coverage  devoted  to  states  later  in  the  sequence  which  included  those 
heavy  with  delegates  such  as  California  and  Ohio  (see  Table  9.1). 
The  media  b  post-reform  early  emphasis  encouraged  manipulation 
of  the  selection  sequence  for  candidate  advantage  and  a  concentration 
on  events  prior  to  the  beginning  of  formal  delegate  selection.  To 
exploit  the  coverage  of  the  early  phase  candidates  sought  to  inject 
the  states  in  which  their  strength  was  greatest  into  the  initial  stages 
of  the  selection  sequence.  Jordan's  definition  of  Carter's  1980 
strategy  sought  to  promote  Carter's  Southern  strongholds  into  the 
earliest  phase  for  maximum  advantage  or,  more  defensively,  to  syn- 
chronise  them  with  states  where  defeats  were  anticipated  to  offset 
them  as  obstacles  to  momentum, 
"The  easiest  way  to  establish  early  momentum  ...  is  to  win 
southern  delegates  by  encouraging  southern  states  to  hold -  372  - 
early  caucuses  and  primaries  ...  It  is  in  our  interest  to 
have  states  that  we  are  likely  to  win  scheduled  on  the 
same  day  with  states  we  might  do  poorly  in.  " 
41 
In  the  quest  to  assess  the  relative  strengths  of  the  candidates 
prior  to  delegate  selection  reporters  utilised  such  objective  indi- 
cators  as  they  could  discover.  Devices  such  as  straw  polls  at  party 
functions  and  the  returns  from  fund-raising  efforts  were  used  to 
fill  the  evidentiary  vacuum.  Candidates  sought  to  demonstrate  their 
strength  where  media  attention  was  focused  and  attract  coverage  to 
those  indicators  most  favourable-to  them. 
In  October  1979  the  Florida  "battle  of  the  buses"  consumed  a 
quarter  of  a  million  dollars  of  expenditure  by  the  Carter  campaign 
and  $175,000  spent  on  behalf  of  Edward  Kennedy  (not  then  a  declared 
candidate)  designed  to  turnout  supporters  for  caucuses  to  supply 
members  of  a  state  convention  unrelated  to  national  convention 
delegate  selection. 
42 
Carter  declared  the  caucuses  in  advance  to 
be  "significant". 
43 
After  a  press-declared  Carter  victory,  Kennedy 
responded,  seeking  to  minimise  its  impact  by  defining  the  Iowa  caucuses 
as  the  first  test  of  the  1980  campaign. 
44 
Four  years  earlier  the  Carter  campaign  organised  its  supporters 
to  attend  a  Jefferson-Jackson  dinner  in  Iowa  in  anticipation  of  it 
receiving  national  media  attention.  Supporters  were  advised  of  the 
events  potential  significance,  transport  provided  and  Carter  regalia 
distributed. 
45 
Reporters  conducted  a  presidential  preference  poll 
amongst  1094  attenders  at  the  dinner  which  produced  a  Carter  plurality. 
The  New  York  Times  article  reporting  the  event  was  headlined  "Carter 
Appears  to  Hold  Solid  Lead  as  the  Campaign's  First  Test  Approaches.  " 
46 
A  concurrent  Gallup  poll  registered  Carter's  national  support  at  4  per  cent. 
The  interaction  of  the  norms  of  media  coverage  with  the  candidates' 
quest  for  momentum  effectively  precluded  the  operation  of  the  Demo- 
crate'  timeliness  regulation.  Formal  delegate  selection  was  deferred -  373  - 
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until  the  election  year  but  the  dynamics  which  informed  it  predated 
its  opening. 
Candidates  sought  success  in  early  contests  to  generate  the  momen- 
tum  to  carry  into  later  contests.  One  component  of  momentum  is 
dominance  in  media  coverage.  It  is  devoted  disproportionately  to 
contest  winners  and  theirs  is  largely  favourable  in  content. 
47 
The 
media  benefits  of  victory  supply  a  multiplier  effect  for  subsequent 
contests.  Voter  recognition  is  enhanced  and  the  candidate  is  known 
in  positive  terms.  A  successful  candidate  attracts  volunteer  and 
financial  support.  In  subsequent  contests  the  candidate  with  momen- 
tum  has  advantages  over  his  competitors.  He  is  widely  and  favourably 
known,  appears  a  plausible  contender  for  the  nomination  and  is 
possessed  of  enhanced  organisational  resources. 
Where  voters  possessed  information  about  only  one  candidate  there 
was  a  high  probability  that  they  voted  for  him. 
48 
The  route  to  the 
commanding  position  was  by  winning  contests  which  elevated  a  previously 
obscure  candidate  above  the  competition  (Carter  in  1976)  or  reinforced 
the  advantages  of  a  candidate  who  began  with  a  national  reputation 
(Reagan  in  1980). 
Campaign  organisations  sought  media  attention  by  generating  news- 
worthy  activities.  This  was  accomplished  by  engaging  in  activities 
conforming  to  media  definitions  of  news  -  the  dramatic,  controversial, 
unusual,  visually  arresting,  matters  of  national  importance.  Lindsay 
waded  into  the  sea  to  dramatise  pollution;  Bush  went  early-morning 
jogging  showing  his  fitness  and  giving  the  issue  of  Reagan's  age  a 
pictorial  dimension;  Reagan  utilised  his  two-man  debate  with  Bush  in 
New  Hampshire  to  characterise  the  latter  as  an  opponent  of  free  speech 
for  excluding  the  other  contenders. 
Conventional  campaigning  by  the  candidate  was  designed  to  meet -  375  - 
the  media's  need  for  activities  to  report  upon  more  than  as  a  plausible 
means  for  reaching  large  numbers  of  voters  directly.  Morning 
campaign  locations  were  selected  for  their  visual  appeal  to  attract 
television  coverage  and  allow  sufficient  time  for  film  to  be  processed 
for  the  evening  news  shows. 
A  distinctive  candidate  elicited  media  attention  through  his 
conformity  with  the  news  value  of  novelty.  Distinctiveness  resided  in 
personal  characteristics,  campaign  style,  issue  positions.  Carter's 
emergence  as  a  major  candidate  in  1976  generated  interest  in  his  back- 
ground  as  a  southerner  and  born-again  Christian.  News  stories  were 
produced  covering  his  home  town,  his  business,  his  family  and  his 
religion.  Anderson's  1980  campaign  was  premised  on  demonstrating  his 
differentness  to  generate  support.  He  was  forthright.  He  was  a 
liberal  in  a  conservative  party.  On  issues  such  as  taxation,  government 
spending  and  the  Soviet  grain  embargo  his  positions  separated  him  from 
all  the  other  Republican  candidates.  In  the  opening  phase  of  the 
primaries  Anderson  was  the  subject  of  the  same  number  of  CBS  news 
stories  as  Bush  without  winning  a  primary  whilst  the  latter  won  several. 
49 
His  campaign  was  interpreted  as  a  success  and  his  personal  qualities 
were  reviewed  favourably,  the  only  candidate  of  either  party  to  receive 
this  two-fold  advantageous  coverage. 
50 
Incumbent  presidents  seeking  the  nomination  were  assured  of  exten- 
live  media  coverage.  Their  activities  were  of  national  importance,  on 
occasions  dramatic  and/or  controversial.  The  guarantee  of  coverage 
enabled  voter-oriented  campaigns  tobe  conducted  without  active  cam- 
paigning  amongst  the  public  by  the  president,  the  Rose  Garden  strategy. 
The  presidents'  domination  of  the  news  freed  them  from  the  pressure  of 
generating  it  through  campaign  activities  in  competition  with  other 
candidates.  In  the  early  months  of  1980  campaign  CBS  news  devoted  176 -  376  - 
stories  to  the  campaign  activities  of  the  various  Democratic  candidates 
whilst  the  activities  of  Carter  as  president  generated  300  stories. 
51 
The  presidents'  domination  of  the  news  conferred  both  qualitative 
and  quantitative  benefits.  Presidents  enjoyed  greater  voter  recognition 
than  other  contenders  though  against  the  nationally  prominent  Reagan 
and  Edward  Kennedy  the  advantages  were  small.  But  the  imbalance  of 
qualitative  advantages  was  more  substantial.  The  performance  of 
presidential  duties  conferred  the  prestige  of  office  on  the  performer. 
Their  performance  facilitated  demonstrations  of  competence,  problem- 
solving,  leadership,  pursuit  of  the  national  interest  and  crisis 
management  -  the  virtues  Americans  seek  in  presidents. 
52 
The  resources  of  presidential  office  were  utilised  with  attendant 
publicity  to  confer  benefits  on  pivotal  constituencies.  In  both  1976 
and  1980  announcements  of  federal  grants  were  timed  to  coincide  with 
delegate  selection  contests  in  the  states  designated  for  aid. 
Campaigns  sought  favourable  qualitative  treatment  of  their  acti- 
vities.  Strategic  responses  to  the  quality  of  coverage  entailed 
attempts  to  influence  the  standards  of  evaluation  employed  by  reporters 
and  then  efforts  to  meet  or  exceed  the  standards  after  they  had  been 
defined. 
In  evaluating  candidate  performance  reporters  had  available  some 
independent  measures  but  they  also  relied  on  indicators  emanating  from 
the  campaign  organisations.  The  independent  measures  -  polls,  invest- 
ments  of  time,  money  and  effort  -  were  open  to  interpretation  and 
differential  emphases  could  be  assigned  between  them.  Campaign 
organisations  proffered  their  own  analyses  of  these  measures  to 
reporters.  In  addition,  they  supplied  them  with  other  sources  of 
information  by  which  to  judge  performance  -  private  polls,  moods  of 
optimism  or  pessimism  amongst  the  campaign  organisations,  disclosures 
of  money  expended. -  377  - 
The  typical  campaign  organisation  overture  to  reporters  in  seeking 
to  influence  their  interpretations  was  to  understate  the  candidate's 
prospects.  By  this  method  a  subsequent  defeat  or  low  percentage  of  the 
vote  appeared  predictable,  unexceptional  and  therefore  worthy  of 
little  comment.  A  plurality  or  large  share  of  the  vote  was  unexpected 
and  therefore  newsworthy. 
Because  understatement  was  the  standard  tactic  campaigns  sought 
to  gain  credence  for  their  interpretations  by  locating  them  on  some 
objective  foundations.  In  New  Hampshire  in  1972  McGovern's  campaign 
manager  sought  to  establish  65  per  cent  as  Muskie's  target  because 
an  opinion  poll  had  registered  this  level  of  support  for  him  in  the 
state. 
53 
In  1980  the  Kennedy  organisation  offered  50  per  cent  of  the 
vote  as  a  reasonable  standard  for  Carter  in  Iowa  given  an  international 
situation  which  favoured  the  President  and  his  past  history  of  support 
in  the  state. 
54 
Discounting  Ford's  narrow  victory  in  New  Hampshire 
in  1976,  Reagan  offered  the  performances  of  McCarthy  and  McGovern  in 
the  state  in  previous  years  as  a  baseline  against  which  to  measure  his 
share  of  the  vote,  "If  those  were  victories  for  them  then  this  is  a 
victory  for  me.  "  55 
Where  information  emanating  from  a  campaign  proved  consistently 
accurate  relations  with  the  press  were  strengthened.  Accuracy  assisted 
journalists  in  their  task  and  exemplified  a  general  level  of  profi- 
ciency  within  the  campaign.  Such  co-operation  established  between 
press  and  campaign  organisation  was  also  translated  into  other  mutual 
advantages.  Journalists  gained  access  to  the  candidate  who  in  turn  gained 
in  coverage. 
The  standards  of  evaluation  set  by  the  media  were  used  to  determine 
the  quality  of  coverage  candidates  received  in  subsequent  discussions 
of  their  performance.  Candidates  falling  below  expectations  received -  378  - 
negative  treatment  whilst  those  who  exceeded  them  were  discussed  in 
positive  terms.  The  negative  interpretation  of  Muskie's  victory  in 
New  Hampshire  in  1972  provides  an  egregious  example  of  a  plurality 
victor  "losing"  the  media  interpretation.  Though  winning  by  a  clear 
margin  he  fell  below  the  media-imposed  target  of  50  per  cent. 
Measured  against  that  target  Muskie  was  deemed  to  have  failed. 
Network  television  was  "unanimous  in  proclaiming  Muskie's  48%  a  dis- 
appointing  performance" 
56 
The  Washington  Post  concluded  that  the 
failure  to  reach  the  target  deprived  Muskie  of  momentum  for  his 
nomination  drive. 
5T  (In  subsequent  years,  partially  at  least  in 
response  to  criticism  of  Muskie's  coverage,  media  interpretation 
treated  contest  winners  in  positive  terms. 
58 
Discriminating  winners  from 
losers  persisted  in  interpretations  of  candidates  below  first  place.  ) 
A  performance  below  the  media-imposed  standard  implies  a  failure 
to  attain  expected  strength.  Subsequent  coverage  sdught  to  explain 
a  failure  rather  than  a  defeat.  The  latter  could  be  attributed  to 
the  strength  of  the  opposition;  the  former,  because  it  was  measured 
against  a  standard  which  incorporated  opposition  strength,  could  not. 
Subsequent  reports  focused  on  the  deficiencies  of  the  candidate,  his 
organisation,  his  strategy  etc. 
Media  emphasis  upon  candidate  failings  are  exemplified  in  the 
New  York  Times'  coverage  of  the  1980  Iowa  caucuses. 
59 
The  contest 
produced  a  surprise  loser  (Reagan)  and  a  surprisingly  large  margin  of 
defeat  for  Kennedy,  both  regarded  as  serious  contenders.  Reagan's 
strategy  had  been  "above  the  battle".  He  devoted  sparse  attention 
to  meeting  voters.  Coverage  of  the  other  losing  Republicans  was  also 
negative.  Baker's  third  palce  was  described  as  insufficient  and 
Connally's  "a  disappointing  fourth".  Crane  was  observed  to  be  under 
pressure  from  conservatives  to  withdraw  to  release  support  to  Reagan. -  379  - 
Pressure  from  Kansas  upon  Dole  was  anticipated  urging  him  to  concen- 
trate  on  winning  re-election  to  the  Senate.  Kennedy's  performance 
was  described  as  a  setback  sufficient  to  stagger  some  supporters, 
raise  doubte::  about  his  electability  amongst  uncommitted  politicians 
and  probably  heralded  a  decline  in  contributions. 
Coverage  of  the  victors  was  couched  in  positive  terms.  Bush's 
victory  on  the  Republican  side  was  described  as  an  organisational  and 
personal  success.  His  frequent  visits  to  the  state  and  protracted 
construction  of  a  campaign  organisation  were  referred  to.  His  victory 
narrowed  the  Republican  contest  towards  a  two-man  race  and  established 
him  as  Reagan's  principal  rival.  Carter's  success  was  attributed  to 
the  international  crisis  but  also  to  a  strong  organisation  and  "sharp" 
advertising. 
Conclusion 
Pre-reform  candidates  relied  largely  on  personalised  campaigns  to 
reach  the  nominating  electorate.  The  size  of  the  electorate  facili- 
tated,  and  the  local  influence  of  its  constituents  and  the  content 
of  campaigns  demanded  that  candidates  employ  personal  contacts.  The 
influence  of  the  media  was  restricted  largely  to  a  few  prestige 
publications  and  an  elite  band  of  commentators. 
Communicating  with  the  mass  electorate  through  the  popular  media 
was  a  concern  principally  of  the  popular  favourite  candidates  for  whom 
voter  mobilisation  was  a  component  of  strategy.  In  the  absence  of 
spending  controls  these  candidates  could  utilise  extensive  media 
advertising  campaigns  providing  a  device  for  reaching  voters  indepen- 
dent  of  reporters. 
Candidates'  dependence  on  the  press  greatly  increased  after  reform. -  380  - 
The  expansion  of  the  nominating  electorate  rendered  reliance  on 
personalised  campaigning  implausible  and  limits  on  spending  foreclosed 
a  means  for  circumventing  the  mediation  of  journalists  to  reach  the 
electorate. 
Increased  dependence  upon  media  enhanced  candidates,  sensitivity 
to  the  standards  employed  by  journalists  in  reporting  the  contest. 
Prominent  features  of  candidate  behaviour  under  reform  rules  -  the 
intense  preoccupation  in  pre-election  years  with  informal  indicators 
of  support,  the  concentration  of  resources  in  early  contests,  the 
attempt  to  generate  momentum  -  follow,  at  least  in  part,  from  the 
manner  in  which  the  press  covers  the  nomination.  These  phenomena 
exemplify  ways  in  which  the  nominating  process  gained  in  susceptibility 
to  the  influence  of  actors  outside  its  formal  structure  after  reform. -  381  - 
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CHAPTER  TEN 
CONCLUSION 
Transformation  in  structure  generated  a  similar  degree  of  change 
in  strategy.  As  the  rules,  laws  and  procedures  regulating  the  contest 
altered  so  did  the  approaches  adopted  by  candidates  to  accomplish 
the  objective  of  winning  the  nomination.  A  re-statement  of  the 
principal  differences  in  campaigns  before  and  after  reform  exemplifies 
the  magnitude  of  change. 
Pre-reform  strategies  were  aimed  at  the  party  leaders.  Candidates 
sought  to  satisfy  the  leaders'  selection  criteria  of  electability, 
maintaining  the  party  organisations  and  the  leaders'  positions  within 
them.  Candidates  sought  the  support  or  acquiescence  of  the  interest 
groups  which  possessed  veto  power  over  the  nomination.  These  groups 
derived  their  influence  from  their  relation  to  the  parties  through 
organisation  overlap,  personnel  overlap,  finance  and  electoral  strength. 
Party  professionals  were  prominent  in  campaign  organisations  utilising 
their  contacts  and  familiarity  with  the  conventions  of  campaigning  on 
behalf  of  the  candidates.  Candidates  developed  personal  relations 
with  party  leaders,  integrated  them  into  their  campaign  organisations 
and  deferred  to  their  local  control.  Finance  derived  from  the  candi- 
date,  his  family  or  a  few  wealthy  backers.  For  most  campaigns  the 
linkage  between  success  in  recruiting  political,  and  financial  support 
was  weak. 
Primaries  were  employed  by  candidates  lacking  support  amongst  party 
leaders.  This  position  derived  either  from  their  possession  of  political 
handicaps  rendering  them  unavailable  or  because  they  were  insurgents. 
Primaries  were  used  to  demonstrate  electability  thereby  satisfying  a 
demand  of  the  leaders.  Defeats  in  primaries  proved  lack  of  vote-getting -  386  - 
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power  usually  dooming  efforts  to  activate  support  amongst  the  party 
organisations.  Primaries  had  little  impact  in  re-ordering  the  relative 
standing  of  candidates.  On  occasions  they  reinforced  the  position  of 
the  existing  leader  but  where  a  new  leader  emerged,  in  the  immediate 
pre-reform  period,  primaries  were  not  responsible  for  his  elevation. 
The  primaries  which  offered  the  greatest  potential  for  influencing 
the  nomination  were  those  providing  contests  between  major  candidates 
as  they  were  an  approximation  to  an  electoral  test. 
In  non-primary  states  candidates'  strategy  pivoted  on  their 
relations  with  the  party  organisations.  Candidates  with  potential 
support  amongst  the  existing  party  leadership  sought  to  activate  it 
through  strategies  of  cultivation  and  reassurance.  Candidates  lacking 
sympathisers  engaged  in  strategies  of  inducement  and  invasion.  The 
persuasive  power  of  the  primaries  upon  the  non-primary  process  depended 
upon  the  disposition  of  party  leaders.  Where  they  were  sympathetic 
or  unopposed  to  a  clear  primary  winner  and  not  united  around  a 
primary  non-contestant  their  results  could  provide  the  leverage  to  win 
the  nomination.  Delegate  status  was  awarded  on  the  basis  of  party 
service  rather  than  candidate  preference  in  the  non-primary  process. 
Commitments  to  candidates  came  after  selection  was  completed.  Commit- 
ments  were  delayed  and  delivered  in  blocs  to  maximise  the  influence  of 
the  state  party  and  its  leaders  over  the  nominating  decision. 
In  a  party-dominated  process  candidates  emphasised  loyalty  to 
the  party,  deference  to  its  leadership,  /R11ity  to  satisfy  their 
demands  for  electability  and  party  maintenance.  Issue  and  ideological 
definition  was  muted.  Where  it  was  employed  candidates.  sought  to 
locate  themselves  within  the  post-New  Deal  consensus  to  demonstrate 
their  capacity  to  appeal  to  the  electoral  'critical  mass'.  Presen-' 
tationa  of  personal  traits  and  character  were  keyed  to  evincing  the -  387  - 
candidate's  potential  for  effective  working  relations  as  president 
with  the  party  leaders. 
The  principal  means  for  communicating  the  campaign  was  personal 
contacts  with  party  leaders.  Such  methods  were  feasible  with  a  small 
nominating  electorate,  and  necessary  to  facilitate  the  bargaining  by 
which  appeals  to  individual  leaders  were  defined.  The  major  media 
influences  upon  the  leaders,  which  the  candidates  sought  to  cultivate, 
were  the  prestige  press  and  its  political  commentators.  Strategies 
aimed  at  the  popular  media  were  the  preserve  of  candidates  seeking 
to  demonstrate  their  support  amongst  the  electorate. 
Post-reform  strategies  focused  upon  securing  the  support  of 
voters.  Active,  election-style  campaigns  were  conducted  in  primaries 
and  caucuses.  Candidates  sought  either  to  mobilise  or  depress  the 
participant  bias  deriving  from  the  high  turnout  rates  of  the  party's 
activist  wings.  In  the  post-reform  context  interest  groups'  most 
valued  attributes  for  candidates  were  not  their  anchorage  in  the 
party  but  as  providers  of  votes,  organisation  and  individual  campaign 
contributions.  Campaign  organisations  were  staffed  by  political 
consultants,  candidate  aides  and  volunteers,  none  of  whom  were 
necessarily  connected  with  party  organisations.  The  state  and  local 
party  leaders  were  largely  neglected  in  the  formulation  of  strategies 
and  organisation.  Finance  derived  from  mass  solicitation  and  federal 
matching  funds.  Individual  contributions  responded  to  changes  in  the 
campaign's  political  fortunes  providing  one  component  of-momentum  for 
successful  candidates. 
Primaries  were  utilised  by  all  active  candidates  irrespective 
of  their  relations  with  party  leaders.  They  were  entered  to  win 
large  numbers  of  mandated  delegates.  They  also  produced  substantial 
reorderings  of  candidates'  relative  standings.  Victories  in  primaries 3  tSts 
enabled  a  candidate  to  move  from  obscurity  to  widespread  public 
recognition  and  win  the  nomination  deposing  front  runners  in  the 
process.  Primaries  early  in  the  selection  sequence  received  dis- 
proportionate  investments  of  campaign  resources.  These  early 
contests  offered  the  greatest  returns  on  investment  in  momentum  - 
media  coverage,  money,  volunteers.  Actual  or  media-defined  defeats 
in  these  contests  were  usually  irrevocable. 
Strategy  and  success  in  the  post-reform  non-primary  process 
ceased  to  pivot  upon  the  candidate's  relationships  with  the  party 
organisations.  Rather,  voter  mobilisation-was  the  focus  of  strategy 
and  the  route  to  success.  The  linkage  between  primary  and  non- 
primary  processes  tightened  after  reform  when  party  leaders  lost 
their  gatekeeping  role  over  the  latter,  and  both  came  to  be  dominated 
by  voters.  Early  caucus  results  generated  momentum  which  carried 
into  the  first  primaries.  The  momentum  generated  in  the  primaries, 
in  turn,  was  translated  into  the  later  caucuses  as  successful  candidates 
gained  in  resources  and  plausibility  as  the  nominee  whilst  others 
dropped  from  contention.  Candidate  commitments  were  evident  from 
the  earliest  stages  of  the  caucus  process  and  increased  at  each 
successive  stage  of  the  hierarchical  selection  sequence.  Increased 
candidate  competition  allied  with  proportional  representation  frag- 
mented  delegations  where  bloc  voting  had  formerly  been  common. 
In  a  voter-dominated  process  candidates  distanced  themselves 
from  the  parties  in  their  appeals.  Anti-party,  neutral  or  bipartisan 
stances  were  adopted.  Issue  and  ideological  definition  increased  as 
candidates  sought  to  mobilise  the  participant  bias  or  encourage  cross- 
over  voting.  The  portrayal  of  personal  traits  and  character  sought 
to  cultivate  the  image  of  a  non-politician. 
The  popular  media  became  the  principal  vehicle  for  reaching  the 
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expanded  nominating  electorate.  News  reportage  grew  in  importance 
when  spending  curbs  limited  expenditures  on  advertising  and  organ- 
isation.  To  generate  coverage  campaigns  adapted  to  the  media's 
practices  and  norms  for  allocating  coverage  in  quantity  and  favour- 
able  quality. 
The  transformation  of  structure  incurred  by  reform  was  the  most 
substantial  in  the  presidential  nominating  process  since  the  insti- 
tution  of  national  conventions  in  the  1830's.  Transformations  in 
strategy  were  similarly  the  greatest  since  the  demise  of  the  congres- 
sional  caucus.  For  the  first  time  since  that  period  party  organis- 
ations  ceased  to  provide  the  context  in  which  nominations  were  conducted 
and  party  leaders  ceased  to  exercise  control  over  it.  The  focus  of 
mobilising  efforts  shifted  outside  the  parties  displacing  their  leaders' 
selection  criteria.  The  changed  and  enlarged  nominating  electorate 
resulted  in  transfdrmations  in  candidates'  appeals,  organisation  and 
communication  mechanisms. 
The  post-1968  structural  reforms  followed  a  course  familiar  in 
the  history  of  party  reform.  The  consequences  for  strategy  also  had 
resonances  in  earlier  exercises  in  reform  of  the  nominating  process 
at  presidential  level  and  below. 
The  inception  of  presidential  primaries  had  lengthened  campaigns 
and  encouraged  a  more  open  style  of  campaigning. 
1 
A  participant  bias 
favouring  high  turnout  elements  was  recognised  by  Ostrogorski  in 
accounting  for  the  ability  of  politicians  to  control  open  caucuses, 
and  by  Kty,  revealing  the  unrepresentativeness  of  primary  electorates. 
2 
The  latter  spelled  out  the  strategic  possibilities  of  such  biases: 
"The  effective  primary  constituency  ...  may  come  to  consist 
predominantly  of  persons  chiefly  of  specified  national 
origin  or  religious  affiliation,  of  people  especially 
responsive  to  certain  styles  of  political  leadership  or 
shades  of  ideology  ...  "3 j9U 
The  primary  system  encouraged  ideological  appeals  by  changing  the 
nature  of  intra-party  competition.  Conflicts  between  ins  and  outs 
were  supplanted  by  ideological  factionalism  when  participation  widened 
to  include  voters  removing  subjects  such  as  patronage  distributions 
from  the  debate. 
Reform  also  followed  the  route  towards  a  Voter  Dominated  party 
developed  in  Chapter  Two.  Post-reform  strategies  conformed  to  those 
likely  to  follow  in  campaigns  within  such  parties.  Candidates  focused 
on  mobilising  voter  support  and  adapted  their  campaign  organisations 
to  this  task.  Appeals  were  based  upon  traits  and  character,  issues 
and  ideology,  and  anti-organisational  themes.  The  prominence  of 
issue  discussion  encouraged  nominees  to  claim  mandates  for  their 
policies.  In  addition,  voters  as  delegates  gained  access  to  the  plat- 
form-writing  process  in  national  convention  committees,  and-  on  the. 
convention  floor. 
The  structural  and  strategic  consequences  of  reform  generated  a 
growth  industry  of  criticism  from  politicians  and  the  American  poli- 
tical  science  profession. 
5 
The  parties  engaged  in  recurrent  modifi- 
cations  of  their  delegate  selection  process  and  for  1984  the  Democrats 
enacted  a  modest  revision  of  the  participatory  system  by  insulating 
a  minority  of  delegates  from  voter  mandates.  But  so  far  (September 
1983)  the  structural  revision  has  produced  little  change  in  the  manner 
in  which  candidates  mount  their  campaigns. 
Like  other  much-criticised  reforms  such  as  the  direct  primary  and 
the  non-partisan  election,  the  participatory  system  is  likely  to  endure. 
Retreats  from  open,  anti-organisational  processes  are  difficult  to 
justify  in  the  American  context.  A  movement  to  formally  voter-controlled 
nominations  through  a  national  primary  perenially  meets  resistance. 
Given  the  likely  survival  of  the  present  system  political  scientists -  391  - 
would-'do  well  to  remember  that  their  task  is  to  understand  the  world, 
not  to  change  it. 3  9Z 
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